CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

[1]th YEAR OF PUBLICATION



JANUARY 1976

SPAIN AT THE GATES OF EUROPE
Richard Comyns Carr

GUATEMALA AND BELIZE
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THE QUIET REVOLUTION: SCOTLAND AND DEVOLUTION
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THE POWERFUL, THE WEAK AND PENAL POLICY
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WHY THEATRE NEEDS ITS FRINGE
Clare Colvin

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CUK — H06418 — 197 — P 3523

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

January 1976 Vol. 228 No. 1320 Founded 1866

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P3523

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR SIR HERBERT BUTTERFIELD
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £6.48; U.S.A. and Canada $20.00. Rates for all other countries on application.

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SPAIN AT THE GATES OF EUROPE

by Richard Comyns Carr

WHEN the EEC's Foreign Ministers suspended trade negotiations with Spain in October, it was seen as part of the general European condemnation of Spain's terrorist trials; but the negotiations had in fact already reached a stalemate, after dragging on for two years with setbacks and interruptions. Spain's relations with the EEC have always been difficult. Successive Spanish governments have persisted in their approaches with great patience despite all the disappointments, but recently opinion has been divided in Madrid whether any terms that can be obtained at the moment will really be worthwhile.

Back in 1962 the Spanish government made an application for association with the Common Market, with a view to full membership later, basing its hopes on the fact that it had embarked on a policy of trade liberalisation since the stabilisation of the peseta in 1959. The application received an acknowledgement and no comment. A year later the Spaniards sent a reminder, with the same result. After a third year, in 1964, the EEC's Council of Ministers authorised the Brussels Commission to open 'exploratory' talks with Spain. It was not until 1967 that the Council finally approved a mandate for the Commission to negotiate, and then on the basis of a preferential trade agreement, ignoring the request for asssociation. The negotiations themselves took nearly three years more, the Preferential Agreement being eventually signed in June, 1970.

When Britain, Denmark and Eire joined the Common Market, Spain asked for a revision of the agreement to cover these countries and in particular to compensate for the raising of British tariffs on Spanish farm produce that would result from her membership; but it was not until the late summer of 1973 that the Brussels Commission received a mandate, and one that the Spaniards found unexpectedly harsh. Negotiations broke down in November. A year later the Commission returned with a new mandate; but on the main points it was unyielding and nothing was achieved. Eventually, in the early months of 1975, Sr. Alberto Ullastres, Spain's ambassador to the EEC, and M. de Kergolay, Assistant Director-General of the Brussels Commission, managed to work out a formula for resuming the talks. In April Sr. Ullastres revealed some of its features at a press conference in Brussels, and it was generally believed that it would be accepted; but in July the EEC committee entrusted with the question by the Ministers declared that the plan was unsatisfactory and directed that the text should be sent out to member states so that the whole question could be re-examined. This was still the state of the case when the death sentence in Spain in September led, first to the vote in the European Parliament against trade relations with Spain, then to a declaration by the Brussels Commission that the talks with Spain should be suspended, and finally to the announcement of suspension on 6th October.

The obstacles encountered by Spain in her approaches to the Community have all along been largely political, as EEC spokesmen have made clear. Madrid's original hopes of by-passing political criticism on the ground of economic development failed ignominiously. But the political objections are of two kinds and distinct. One is that the Community, by the Treaty of Rome and by its very conception, is a group of states with similar democratic systems of government formed for political as well as economic cooperation and aiming at eventual political unity and that the Spanish régime, as it had been under Franco, would not harmonise and could not be treated with confidence. This argument was set forth by the European Parliament in 1962, a few months after Spain applied for association, accompanied by the corollary that with such countries the Community could only conclude commercial treaties. It was repeated by several EEC authorities in 1972, when Spain first sought a re-negotiation of her 1970 trade agreement. It was repeated again in January 1975, when a resolution of the economic and Social Committee of the EEC declared that it was possible for Spain to attain membership if she complied with 'the conditions envisaged by the Treaty of Rome'. The other kinds of objections are intended to bring pressure on the situation in Spain, to encourage the democratic forces and to avoid doing favours to the régime as it is. The recent resolution of the European Parliament called for a freeze on trade relations 'until such time as freedom and democracy are established in Spain'. When suspending trade talks the Council of Ministers expressed the hope that 'a democratic Spain will find her place in the concert of European relations'. But on this aspect of the objections the Community's members have adopted different attitudes. The French have

in general been disposed to help Spain out. The Dutch have always been hostile, and recently they are believed to have been supported by the Danes and the Germans.

But the objections are not only of a political, but also of a commercial, nature and are not only concerned with Spain's entering the Community as a member or associate, but also with the terms of any trade treaty that may be negotiated. There are members of the Community with interests to protect, and the foremost of these is Italy. Spanish and Italian exports run largely parallel and they are inevitably competitors: in the agricultural produce so important to both — citric and other fruits, vegetables, olive oil — and also in other exports, such as shoes and leather goods generally, not to mention the tourist trade. France has her farming interests to protect against Spanish competition and so has Holland, and obstruction from these two countries and Italy is understood to have been largely responsible for the failure to renew the talks with Spain during the first six months of 1975. France, who has always made much of her diplomatic support of Spain in Community councils, takes a different line when it comes to tariff bargaining. Protectionist motives have prevailed over other considerations that make relations with Spain valuable to the Six — over the fact that all of them are heavily involved in investing in Spain as well as selling to the Spanish market (and, for example, that the French have for several years been urging the Spanish government to adopt the SECAM system of colour television in preference to the German PAL).

The terms of the 1970 Preferential Agreement as well as those offered to Spain in subsequent negotiations for its revision reflect these commercial motives more than any political reservations. The object of the preferential trade agreements that the EEC has concluded, or is negotiating, with a number of Mediterranean countries, including Israel and North African states as well as Spain, is to open their markets to the Community's industrial exports. In return the Community offers generous tariff concessions on their industrial goods, from which it does not in general expect serious competition for its own industries. Where such competition is feared, it makes exceptions. As for agricultural exports, which are the ones of vital concern to these countries, it tries to pare down its concessions to the limit to protect its own farmers. The 1970 agreement with Spain allowed tariff reductions of in most cases 60% on Spanish industrial exports, together with the removal of quantitative restrictions, in return for a reduction of Spanish tariffs on industrial goods, but it did little for Spain's agricultural exports — fruits, vegetables and fish and their preserves, almonds, olive-oil, wine. These were not exempted from quotas, levies, and other restrictions, and where tariff cuts were granted, they were lower not only than those for industrial goods, but also than those granted to agricultural produce from Greece and some of the North African countries. When the question of re-negotiating this agreement arose in 1972, the Community became even more tight-fisted. It was engaged in re-negotiating other Mediterranean trade treaties at the same time, to extend their terms similarly from the Six to the Nine. It was doing so under what it called

a 'global Mediterranean policy', and this meant that it did not want to make concessions to one country that would encourage the others.

The Brussels Commission produced a draft mandate that the Spanish delegation considered a reasonable basis for negotiation; but this was passed to the committee of permanent representatives of the EEC countries for further study and the concessions to Spain were whittled down. The resulting tariff reductions for Spanish agricultural exports were less than those proposed in the Commission's draft and subject to seasonal limits in their operation, as well as being accompanied by new reference prices and other non-tariff restrictions. But it was the industrial section of the mandate that took the Spaniards aback. True, the Community offered practically to eliminate all duties on Spanish manufacturers by 1977; but at the same time it increased the number of so-called 'sensitive' items in which Spanish goods were considered too competitive and would be limited by quota. The real bone of contention, however, was the rate at which Spain on her side was required to dismantle her high protective tariffs. The process was to be completed by 1977 except for 20% of items, on which duties had to be abolished by 1980, whereas the Commission's draft had allowed a delay until 1985 for completing the process and delays on duty reduction for 35% of items. The Spanish delegation protested that their country's industries generally could not possibly be ready to meet competition from EEC manufacturers in a matter of five years and that many would be ruined. In the autumn of 1974 the Brussels Commission, which conducts negotiations, obtained a second mandate from the Ministers, in other words, a new offer; but the positions of the two sides remained as far apart as before. The Spaniards offered a gradual dismantlement of their tariffs on manufactures ending in 1984; but they insisted that they must have adequate guarantees of access to the Common Market for their farm produce and that for this purpose there should be a 'rendez-vous', a meeting between the two parties sometime between 1977 and 1979, at which Spain would decide, in the light of the actual treatment that had been accorded to her agricultural exports, whether or not to continue reducing her tariffs on EEC manufactures according to the time-table. This demand met with an indignant refusal, as it meant that Spain could stop her tariff reductions after the EEC, in 1977 and had already abolished all duties on Spanish manufactures. Eventually, in the formula worked out by Sr. Ullastres and M. de Kergolay, Spain apparently agreed to end tariffs on manufactures by 1983, dropped her insistence on the 'rendez-vous', and demanded only that any concessions granted to other Mediterranean countries should apply to Spain and that there should be consultations on the general working of the agreement. This formula, rejected by the EEC Ministers, represented the last proposals for negotiations made by either of the two sides.

Uppermost in the mind of the Spanish government throughout these attempts to re-negotiate the 1970 agreement has been the position of Britain. The British market is of primary interest for Spain's agricultural exports. Hitherto they have benefited by our policy of cheap food and low tariffs, made possible by deficiency payments to farmers instead of arti-

ficial prices. About half of Spanish exports to Britain are agricultural. Spain is our principal supplier in this field, accounting on an average for about 16% of our imports, and Spanish produce dominates in most kinds of fruit and vegetables. If Britain were to raise import duties to the full level of the EEC's Common External Tariff, it would be a severe blow for Spanish farmers. In a number of their products, including wine, grapes, melons, cherries, cucumbers, onions, and early potatoes, Britain buys from 50 to 80% of what they sell abroad.

The British government is, of course, in no hurry to put up the duties. Apart from concern with food supplies and prices it values our growing trade with Spain and the prospects for British exports. We are not Spain's chief suppliers — both in sales and purchases we rank fourth — but it is a well-balanced trade and has shown a steady expansion. In 1974 our exports rose by 30% and our imports by 28%.

When Spain and the Six started re-negotiating the Preferential Agreement of 1970 they concluded a temporary arrangement to cover trade during the interim. An additional Protocol to the Agreement, signed in January, 1973, prolonged it for a further year as regards trade with the Six, but excluded Britain, Denmark and Eire, with whom Spain was allowed to continue trading as before. When the Protocol expired at the end of 1973 and the negotiations had still led to no result, the 1970 Agreement went on being applied between Spain and the Six and, as regards the three new members, trade was subject to what was called a 'standstill'. This in general meant that Britain and Denmark, and Eire later on, applied the Community's full 'transiting third' rates of duty, i.e. those for countries without a preferential agreement, only when they were lower than their own, and when they were higher, their own previous tariffs.

No time-limit was originally set to the 'standstill', but, when negotiations with Spain had gone on for over a year without result, the situation began to appear more and more irregular in the eyes of the Brussels authorities. Last July, after the rejection of the Ullastres-Kergolay plan, the British government introduced temporary tariff arrangements conforming more to the system operated by the Six, but anticipating what a new Spanish preferential agreement might contain and based on the last terms offered by the EEC. In general, duties on Spanish industrial goods amounted to a reduction of 40% on the British rates levied in 1972, before our accession to the Common Market. Products coming under the European Coal and Steel Community are charged at the full 'transiting third country' rates because they were excluded from the 1970 Agreement with Spain; on the other hand, a number of other manufactures, for which arrangements were considered but not worked out in the last round of negotiations, continue at the 'standstill rates'. On agricultural imports Britain has raised tariffs to the Common Market levels, but with the reductions offered by the EEC, which cover a wide range of fresh and preserved fruit and vegetables and fruit juices and vary from 20 to 80%. A number of fruit and vegetable preserves and some wines continue at the 'standstill' rates because, again, arrangements were not worked out in detail. The new measures hit Spanish

farm exports, but not badly, and the effect is about balanced by the reduction of duties on manufactures, which are of growing importance in Spain's export trade.

It is thought that the British government may ask Spain for tariff concessions on industrial exports similar to those she grants to the Six under the 1970 Agreement; but that it is unlikely to raise Britain's tariffs to the full EEC external level while there is any prospect of a new preferential trade agreement being concluded. To raise duties only to lower them again would mean confusion and administrative expense. And some sort of agreement may well be reached in the near future. The statement issued by the EEC's Council of Ministers in October merely said: 'The Council notes that negotiations between the EEC and Spain cannot be resumed at this time'. It is open to the Ministers to take up the talks again whenever they see fit. Meanwhile, for Spain's trade with the original Six, the Preferential Agreement of 1970 remains in force.

The Ministers may choose to await developments in Spain; many people think that is what they have wanted to do for the past two years and that this accounts for the slowness of the negotiations. In Madrid opinion is divided on the best course to follow. On the one hand political change may enable Spain to realise the coveted association. In any case, only with a change of attitude on the part of the EEC's members will it be possible to secure a satisfactory trade agreement. The rapid dismantling of Spanish tariffs that they now insist on would be particularly damaging at a time of international crisis, which has hit Spain late and is having a delayed effect. On the other hand there is the danger that, if no trade agreement is signed with the EEC fairly soon, Britain and the other new members may have to apply the full 'third country' duty to Spain. They have already raised their 'third country' rates to 60% of the Common External Tariff and they are due to complete the process in January 1977. Meanwhile competitors in agricultural exports are securing preferential agreements with the EEC. Israel now has one, Portugal, as a member of EFTA, has had one since 1972, others may be signed with North African states, and the Lomé convention, which admits large quantities of fruits and vegetables from ACP countries, many of them duty free, came into force in July. Political evolution in Spain is likely to be slow, and it is not yet clear, in any case, how ready the Nine are to admit new associates or members.

The EEC market is vital for Spain — OECD figures for the first quarter of 1975 show that it took nearly half of Spain's exports — and there are those who think Spain would do better to go for a temporary agreement to tide over the present period, rather than a more important and lasting one, which may not be obtainable.

GUATEMALA AND BELIZE

by Peter Calvert

EARLY in November it was announced that Britain was sending troops, with air and sea support, to Belize to reinforce its garrison against the possibility of a Guatemalan attack. Belize, formerly known as British Honduras, covers a territory of some 8,867 square miles on the shores of the Caribbean, and has a population of about 130,000. It takes its name from its former capital, Belize City, which was destroyed by a hurricane in 1961; its new capital, Belmopan, lies inland from the old, about 50 miles. Belize has a picturesque history, but though the diplomatic and administrative record is clear, unfortunately many of the early details of life there are lost as the documents to illustrate and illuminate them have been destroyed by damp or termites. But essentially it grew out of the pirate and smuggler settlements that grew up among the secluded bays of the uninhabited coast, and became a British colony when its English-speaking inhabitants sought the protection of the Crown. It has been self-governing since 1964, and under its Premier, Mr. George Price, it is now seeking its independence with the active help and encouragement of the British Government.

Unfortunately not only its independence, but even its right to exist as an autonomous unit, is being challenged by the government of Guatemala, which adjoins it on the west and south. Guatemala, an independent state since 1839, covers a territory of about 42,000 square miles, with a coastline on both the Caribbean and the Pacific, and it has a population of nearly five million. The bulk of this population lives in the temperate uplands of the south, far away from Belize, and the northern province or Department of El Petén, which does adjoin Belize, is largely unexplored and unexploited. Though it covers an area about one-third of the Republic, its exact extent is not known, and until 1963 there was no settled land title there.

Since independence, Guatemala has undergone long periods of dictatorship. After the fall of Rafael Carrera, Conservative dictator from 1839 to 1865, the Liberals came to power and organised constitutional government on a permanent basis. Their leader, Justo Rufino Barrios, held the Presidency from 1879 to 1885, and was succeeded by constitutional means until 1898 when there began the 22 year dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, whose repressive rule is described in the novels of Guatemala's most famous writer, Miguel Angel Asturias. The last of the dictators in the old style was Jorge Ubico, who ruled from 1930 to 1944, before succumbing to the first of Latin America's postwar social revolutions. After a decade of social reform, the experiment was abruptly terminated by the controversial fall of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, since when Guatemala has had a succession of more or less right wing governments of a generally right wing complexion, the only exception being the rule of the civilian Julio César Méndez Montenegro between 1966 and 1970. There is intense competition between political

parties, and the political style of Guatemalan politics has in recent years been exceedingly violent, with much guerrilla activity and a substantial number of assassinations and unexplained disappearances of prominent figures.

Though Guatemala is a Spanish-speaking country, it has a largely Indian population of several racial groups, of which the Maya predominate. Before the time of Columbus, long before, the Maya kingdoms extended over both Guatemala and Belize, and to the south into Honduras, with which, despite the similarity of name, the old colony of British Honduras had no connection whatsoever, but well before the Spaniards arrived, the Maya settlements had moved northwards into the area of modern Mexico, and those in present-day Belize were deserted, leaving ruins of considerable extent which have a tourist interest still largely undeveloped. The Spanish conquest of Guatemala, which took place with very little resistance, was carried out by an expedition from Mexico led by a companion of Cortés called Pedro de Alvarado and was completed in 1524. The Spaniards initially claimed the entire territory of the Americas other than Brazil but no Spanish settlement was established in Belize, and by the time Guatemala became independent of Spain in 1821, the British settlement there had become an accepted fact.

The origins of the Guatemalan claims to Belize do not, therefore, lie in the colonial period. Both as part of the Central American Republic (1824-39) and in its early life as an independent state, Guatemala recognised the existence of Belize as an established fact, just, indeed, as it had to recognise the independence of its Spanish-speaking neighbours, from whose company it had seceded. The boundaries between the two territories, however, were not fixed, and in 1859 Britain and Guatemala agreed to establish the present boundaries which Guatemala recognises as forming the limits of the territory under dispute. A provision of the treaty was that Britain would endeavour to build communications by land or water or both between Belize and Guatemala City. Originally it was assumed that this would take the form of a road to the edge of El Petén, and in 1863 a convention was signed providing for such a road to be built. But at that time the British Treasury was not willing to provide the money, and when the question was raised again by the government of General Jorge Ubico in 1931, the building of the railroad from Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City was argued by the British Government to have made it superfluous, However, a road has since been built anyway, and the weekend after the troops were sent to Belize, weekend shoppers were still using it to get from one country to another.

Despite this, the Guatemalan government now base their claim to Belize on the contention that because the road was not built in 1863, the treaty of 1859 was not fulfilled. They say that it was not, as the plain sense of the words of it would seem to indicate, a treaty merely fixing boundaries, but a treaty granting recognition to the existence of Belize. Consequently, they argue, if the treaty falls, recognition does also. They therefore claim the territory as rightfully theirs on the grounds that it had once been regarded

(though never occupied) as part of the Spanish Captaincy-General of Guatemala.

This claim was first formally established in 1939. Then after the Revolution of 1944 in Guatemala the Constitution of 1945 described Belize as forming part of the national territory. In pursuit of this, seats have been set out in the Guatemalan national Congress, each draped in the blue and white national colours, which are formally reserved for future Deputies from Belize. Guatemalan maps show Belize, with its present, i.e. 1859 boundaries, as part of Guatemala, as stamp collectors will know. But the active pursuit of the claim dates only from 1962, when the government of President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes was in difficulties with its political opposition and sought to reactivate the claim to rally support, and in anticipation of the possibility that a rapidly decolonising Britain might be prepared to accept it without argument.

Ydígoras was overthrown early in 1963 by his commander of the army, General Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who, however, maintained the claim and on 31 July 1963 broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, claiming that she was in illegal occupation of part of the Guatemalan national territory. The claim has been maintained by each of the right-wing governments in Guatemala since that time. What has given it a new urgency is simply the fact that in the meanwhile Belize has made good progress towards independence and, quite reasonably, does not wish to undertake it without satisfactory international guarantees of her safety.

For Guatemala, then, this is the last chance to get hold of Belize. But why should Guatemala want Belize? Her own population can in no way fill the national territory she already has, and the maintenance of Belize costs the British taxpayer a considerable sum each year, which the Guatemalans are scarcely in a position to assume. Access to the sea at Punta Gorda would give Guatemala a longer and, they hope, more productive coastline. The principal answer, however, is that it has become a matter of national pride. With a long recent history of authoritarian government; no Guatemalan has been taught not to believe that Belize is rightfully Guatemalan. So no Guatemalan government can afford to take the issue lightly. Unfortunately, recent circumstances are such that, on the contrary, they are very likely to take it very seriously. Three aspects enter into it.

The government of Guatemala depends for its principal support on the armed forces. The President, General Kjell Laugerud Garcia, is himself a serving soldier, as was his predecessor, the former Minister of Defence. He was elected by a narrow majority in 1973 in an election in which all three candidates were soldiers and there were serious accusations of intimidation and malpractice by the opposition against the governing MLN (Movement of National Liberation). But the 12,000 strong Guatemalan army, which has supplied five out of the last six Presidents, is also the principal defence of the government of the day against the guerrilla movements which have been endemic in the country since 1960. Since then they have been extensively modernised and equipped by the United States with weapons which are primarily intended for use in internal security, but which also give the

government both overwhelming superiority against its unarmed opponents at home and any indigenous force which Belize could hope to raise without outside help.

Secondly, behind the President stands the Vice-President since 1970, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, President of the MLN and, it has been reliably reported, head of an ultra-right-wing private army, MANO (Armed Movement of Nationalist Orientation), which is said to have been largely responsible for the death or disappearance of so many real or potential opponents of the regime in recent years. It was he who, in October 1975, said: 'Guatemala will not accept the independence of Belize even if it costs Guatemalan lives.' It was also he who made it clear that Guatemala's claim was to the territory of Belize and not to its citizens, who could, he said, go where they pleased if they did not want to be Guatemalans. Since he, and the forces which he represents, which are said to number some 4,000 armed men, was the decisive factor in securing the election of the President, his remarks must be taken very seriously, not least by the President, whose policy favouring agrarian cooperatives the Vice-President openly opposes.

Guatemala has not been involved in a foreign war since 1885, when its president, Justo Rufino Barrios, was killed in battle against the forces of El Salvador in a vain attempt to bring about the reunification of Central America. This contrasts sharply with the other countries of Central America, and it is unlikely, given the government's preoccupations at home, if a real possibility of war would have arisen had it not been for the third factor, the curious behaviour of the British Government. In January 1972 the Ministry of Defence held a major combined services exercise in the Caribbean. It seemed logical to them to hold it in Belize, and it was not until the exercise was under way and the Guatemalan government erupted in protest that it was brought home to the Government of Mr. Heath that the diplomatic implications of the exercise had been completely overlooked. The forces were hastily removed, but the incident has not been forgotten in Guatemala, where it has been used to support the accusation that Britain was planning to resort to force first.

Since then the policy of successive British governments has been to advance Belize towards independence while seeking through direct negotiations with Guatemala to reach an agreement which will guarantee it. The Guatemalans broke off negotiations in July after suggesting a partition of Belize, so that the action has moved to the United Nations, where Britain is one of 66 countries sponsoring a resolution in the Special Committee on Decolonisation seeking to bring such negotiations about. Britain has the support of a wide number of countries, including those of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Of the Latin American states, strikingly enough, only Cuba supported the Belize case publicly from the beginning, while several others outspokenly supported the Guatemalans. In a special position is Mexico, which once had a claim to the territory which is now Belize, but which has not revived it and is not likely to do so, unless it considers that by so doing it can checkmate the Guatemalan pretensions. The President of Mexico, Luis Echeverria Alvarez, has offered to mediate and appealed to

the Security Council to ensure that the peace of the area is maintained, and is not threatened by 'the annexationist designs of Guatemala.' The government of the United States, on the other hand, has been remaining uncharacteristically silent, which, given the universal suspicion of all its moves in Central America, is probably the wisest thing to do, and it does have the added advantage of keeping its ultimate intentions uncertain.

With the general alert in diplomatic circles, therefore, the chance of military circles in Guatemala successfully pressing for a sudden strike against Belize—if they had ever any intention of doing so—seem to have vanished. At best it would have been a risky policy, since the removal of so many troops to the frontier zone would have seriously weakened the defence of their vital urban centres against both rural and urban guerrilla attack. So the initial Guatemalan moves seem to have been largely symbolic and may indeed only have been military manoeuvres. With the news of the British reinforcements, the Guatemalan government has now proceeded to fit its fighter aircraft with bomb racks, send more troops to the border, including all ten of its M-113 armoured troop carriers, and to call up all adult males for military service. But this does not of itself increase the risk of armed conflict.

What it does do, on the other hand, is to make negotiations more difficult. What are the chances of a peaceful solution? The answer is that they are quite good, given time and good will from the international community. There are three interesting precedents.

The Guatemalan boundary with Mexico was settled in three stages. The state of Chiapas seceded from Guatemala in 1821 and adhered to Mexico; a decision ratified by plebiscite in 1824. The district of Soconusco was annexed by military force by Mexico in 1842, having been left independent for some years pending a settlement which was never carried out. Both these transfers were recognised by Guatemala in 1882, when agreement was reached on the remainder of the line being drawn on the principle of actual occupation. The Mexicans thereupon continued to extend their occupation until the line was finally determined in 1895, thus acquiring from Guatemala a large part of the present Mexican state of Tabasco.

The boundary of Guatemala and Honduras was likewise settled on the principle of actual possession, after the Hondurans had granted concessions in territory which, since colonial times, had been regarded as forming part of Guatemala, on account of their close relations of trade between the Golfo Dulce, Lake Izabal and the capital. Under the arbitration agreement in 1931, Guatemala gave up her claims to a substantial part of this area.

With both Honduras and El Salvador the situation was complicated by the fact that, whereas in the hierarchy of Spanish colonial government, Guatemala had formed part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, with its capital at Mexico, Honduras and El Salvador had formed part of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, with its capital at Antigua Guatemala (until 1773) and thereafter at Guatemala City. But the Captaincy-General corresponded to the area, not of modern Guatemala, but of Central America as a whole, and Guatemala gave up her claims to be the seat of

government of the whole of Central America when she seceded from it. The smaller area of modern Guatemala corresponded (but only roughly) to that of a smaller province of the same name. Barrios did not attempt, when he invaded El Salvador, to extend the bounds of Guatemala itself, then, but instead to reconstitute the dream of a united Central American state. After his death, his successors immediately recognised the right of Honduras and El Salvador to an independent existence.

Finally the boundary between Guatemala and El Salvador, though poorly marked and densely populated, was marked formally only in 1936, having served for years as a useful source of revenue for smugglers. No dispute arose over the de facto line of demarcation.

Which brings us, finally, back to Belize. On these precedents it is evident that the Guatemalan claim to Belize lacks either of the two principal bases her governments have previously recognised as applying—namely the right of actual possession and the wishes of the inhabitants concerned. But as I have tried to show here, its assertion has been primarily a matter not of legal history but of current politics. It is by politics that it will have to be resolved, therefore. Provided due attention is paid to their susceptibilities, the rulers of Guatemala will no doubt realise, as others have had to do, the inevitability of decolonisation in today's world. But they will have to be given time.

[Dr. P. A. R. Calvert is Reader in Politics at the University of Southampton.]

THE QUIET REVOLUTION: SCOTLAND AND DEVOLUTION

by Duncan MacLaren

THE debate on devolution has widened out in recent months to produce a welter of print and rhetoric on the subject. While many of the points raised have been talked about in Scotland for decades, it is obvious from the press and comment south of Carlisle that England has only recently awoken to the fact that the stirrings of a major constitutional revolution are in the air. It is intended here not to add to that debate, but to set up some of the most frequently asked questions and supply the answers from a Scottish viewpoint.

Question 1: Does the Scottish National Party really seek complete independence for Scotland with a Scottish defence force, border posts, etc.?
Answer: The SNP—and with it an increasing number of the people of Scotland—seeks the restoration of sovereignty over all the affairs of Scotland to the Scottish people through the establishment of a democratically elected Parliament in Edinburgh. This means independence within the Commonwealth and, if the Scottish people so wish, the EEC. This means that Scotland will have a seat at the UN and, no doubt, like Finland and Denmark, both smaller than Scotland in terms of population, will take an active part in all international affairs, especially where they are concerned with peace.

Independence means that Scotland will pursue its own course in foreign policy and will establish its own embassies and consulates in the main centres of the world. As with other small countries such as Iceland, these embassies would serve not as fading flag-wavers of the imperial glories of yesteryear but be so manned that the emphasis was directed to attracting industry to Scotland and selling Scottish goods.

A defence force will be necessary in the new Scotland, though one on a scale commensurate to Scotland's size, population and needs. The SNP is generally in favour of the principles of collective defence and advocates mutual agreements with other states to maintain peace and security.

Border posts at the Scottish-English frontier are not a logical follow-on to the founding of an independent state. The countries within the Nordic Council manage to remain aloof in sovereignty, yet the peoples of Scandinavia can move freely from state to state. A similar situation is envisaged for the countries of the Common Market. If, for reasons of security, it is deemed necessary for border posts to be built, they will not act as barriers to keep the English out or the Scots in; and to suggest such a thing is an insult to the intelligence of the Scottish people.

Question 2: Isn't England subsidising Scotland?
Answer: It is true that at the moment Scotland is partly compensated for the

ill-effects of general UK economic policies by additional spending in some areas. For every £1 per head of population of Government spending in England and Wales, Scotland receives £1.05½ (a sum which, of course, does not cover the losses involved). This is given in the form of a higher level of rate support grant, regional subsidies, etc. What Scotland has sacrificed over the years in terms of talent going south, etc., has more than amply made up for this.

Question 3: Will an independent Scotland be able to survive economically?
Answer: Even Willie Ross, the present Secretary of State, has conceded this point. Scotland is self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs and would earn enough through the export of whisky, textiles, chemicals, etc. to make it a prosperous country under an enlightened government. This modest aim paled to insignificance, however, with the discovery of oil and gas off the Scottish coast, making Scotland potentially one of the richest nations in the world. It has been estimated that the recoverable reserves of Scottish oil (including finds still to be made) amount to around 30 billion barrels. As Scotland's oil consumption is 10% of the UK total, an oil price of 11 dollars a barrel would give Scotland an oil balance of payments surplus of £3.6 billion by 1980. Even if North Sea oil prices drop to as low as 8 dollars a barrel by 1980, a Scottish government would enjoy an oil trade surplus of £2.5 billion and oil revenues of over £2 billion.

All this talk of oil barrels, billions and dollars promises a very rosy future for an independent Scotland and is it any wonder that we Scots cast an increasingly frequent, envious glance over to our oil-producing brethren in Norway, which *The Economist* predicted a few weeks ago would be the world's richest nation by 1980.

Question 4: Has Scotland any legal basis for calling the oil in the North Sea 'Scottish'?
Answer: The legal background to Scotland's rights is the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention, ratified by the UK in 1964. This establishes that coastal states have sovereign rights over mineral exploration and exploitation within the area of seabed adjacent to them and either up to a depth of 200 metres or to the limit of technical development. The Convention also lays down rules for determining demarcation lines. In Scotland's case, this has been achieved in the North Sea by a series of bilateral agreements between the UK Government, Norway, Denmark and West Germany and by the Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order 1968 which defines the boundary between Scottish and English sectors as Parallel 55 degrees, 50 minutes North. Perhaps a little unfortunately for England, it is north of this line that most of the oil thus far has been found.

Question 5: Can Shetland not break away from Scotland and claim the oil as its own?
Answer: This question has become the cliché answer for all who argue against the oil off Scotland's coast being called 'Scottish'; it is also an

argument that is usually advanced by those who have no intention of allowing autonomy to anyone north of Watford. In order for the Shetlands to lay a serious claim to the oilfields, it would have to be a signatory to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. It is highly unlikely that a mini-state of 18,000 would gain sufficient international recognition to be in a position to sign such a document. After all, Monaco, also with a population of 18,000, is within the EEC but is not represented on any EEC bodies. Even if recognition were possible, the rights of small islands in international law are so nebulous that it is likely Shetland would only be allowed at most a 30-mile sector of seabed, yet most of the oil is found well over 50 miles from the Shetland mainland.

The main fear in Shetland is that the relatively free hand the island authority has so far exercised *vis-à-vis* the oil companies will in some way be diminished by the advent of a Scottish Assembly or sovereign Parliament. This is a supposition based on false premises when one considers that the SNP at least has always advocated—even in pre-oil days—more autonomy to the island groups of Scotland than they have at present. There might also be a case for the Shetlands having a special share of the oil revenues, which combining the land area and population of Shetland to form a composite percentage of the Scottish whole, would yield 1% of the total oil revenues. This would make the Shetlands as rich as Kuwait. To be any richer would be disastrous to the islands' unique way of life.

Question 6: Is the oil not mortgaged already?
Answer: It is true to say that the UK has borrowed massively from abroad, using North Sea oil as collateral in order to stave off the worst of an economic typhoon, but it cannot be expected of the new government of a new state, within whose maritime boundaries the oil is to be found, necessarily to honour agreements settled by another government in the new state's name. The SNP has already sent out formal letters to the countries affected, warning them that any agreements made previously between the UK Government and themselves concerning North Sea oil will have to be re-negotiated on Scotland regaining its sovereignty.

Question 7: Is oil, since it will inevitably dry up one day, not a shaky basis for a claim to independence?
Answer: The answer to this question largely depends on how quickly the oil is extracted. If the SNP optimum extraction target of one million barrels per day (50 million tons per year) is adhered to, this would mean a build up of 3 years, a plateau of 75 years and a decline of 7 years, giving Scotland in toto 88 years of oil. Very early on within that period, it would be necessary for Scotland to start manufacturing rigs and other oil-based products for other parts of the world, so that the technology that is learnt during those 88 years can be put to good use to provide jobs in Scotland for the years to come. There are signs of this happening in Scotland, but the Norwegians have shown the way. One of their shipbuilders, Aker, is now the second largest rig-builder in the world with around 20% of the world's offshore orders. The skills of Clydeside can produce similar results

and, given a Scottish Government, the Norwegians may find some tough competition on their hands.

Question 8: Do you think an England which is relying on oil to save its economic soul is going to let Scotland run away with it?
Answer: This is the 64,000 dollar question, but the answer is perhaps not as black as first appears.

A newly independent Scotland would not like to see its closest neighbour bankrupt, especially as, at a guess, circa 60% of present Scottish trade is with England and the EEC. In return for favourite nation status or certain advantageous trade agreements, Scotland would be prepared to get around the negotiating table over the question of oil.

The abhorrent possibility of England sending in the troops to a democratically-elected independent Scotland would violate the UN Declaration of Human Rights, cause untold harm to future Anglo-Scottish relations and would spark off such an international furore that England would not be able to withstand the pressure for very long. The history of such tactics has proved their impotence, and surely that kind of history has been adequately learnt.

Question 9: In claiming all the oil revenues for Scotland, aren't you being selfish?
Answer: Tell that to the Arabs! The Scottish Nationalists—and, incidentally, 66% of the Scottish people irrespective of party, according to a recent poll—want control of the oil revenues, not out of an abstract desire for wealth, but out of a burning wish to see the economic and social problems that have beset Scotland's progress for generations completely eradicated.

The money from oil will be ploughed into wiping out the situation where Scots comprise 77% of the most deprived areas of the UK and 97.5% of the 1% of worst multiple deprivation; where Scots employment in low-paid jobs is 10% above the UK level; where Scots overcrowding is twice the UK average; and where Scots infant mortality is 12% higher than the UK average. The wealth that comes from oil and the compassionate knowledge that comes from an indigenous government can together combat these and other problems with long-lasting effect.

Question 10: If your aim is to break away from the UK, what is to stop Yorkshire or Essex from doing likewise?
Answer: Absolutely nothing at all, but that is for the people of Yorkshire and Essex to decide, not the Scots. It must never be forgotten in the argument over oil revenues, assemblies and taxes on whisky that the nation of Scotland is no more a region than the nation of England. Scotland is one of the oldest recognised nations in Europe with its own legal and educational system, its own banks producing Scottish notes and its own national institutions in many aspects of life. It is no freak accident that there is an international football team from Scotland, a Scottish Opera and Ballet Company and a Scottish *National* Orchestra. These form part of the 'trap-

pings' of any nation. Scottish Nationalists do not regard these organisations as inherently better than any others because they are Scottish, but they do deserve the mark of recognition that comes from mutual respect and equality. The one thing the Scottish people lack is control, through their own Parliament, over the political and economic destiny of their country.

Question 11: What is your reaction to the November White Paper on Devolution?
Answer: Any move towards self-government is welcome and obviously the first step is bound to be less than the SNP, or for that matter most people in Scotland, would hope. Having said that, the Scots could not conceal their deep disappointment that the first step was so timid, so unimaginative and so bound down in restrictions. At the time, it was described as a 'constitutional mouse' and can only be rated by the SNP as the most minimal of minimalist plans for devolution.

Question 12: What does the SNP find most objectionable about the White Paper?
Answer: In a phrase, the vast veto power of Westminster. The White Paper sums up what self-generating powers the Assembly is to have very succinctly by stating that sovereignty will lie with Westminster *in all matters, whether devolved or not.* Any decisions made by a Scottish Government where the Scottish decision conflicts in policy with the UK decision can be overridden by the UK Government. This means in effect that a Government in Edinburgh of a different political colour to the government in London which wanted to pass a Bill in its own election manifesto could be rendered powerless on the word from Westminster and forced to drop it.

Question 13: Does the SNP consider the block grant of £2,000 million to the Assembly adequate?
Answer: A block grant is hardly an adequate source of income to something that aspires to be a Parliament. Besides, *circa* half the funds made available in the block grant will go directly out again in rate support grant to local authorities. Similar priority claims will be made on behalf of the health services and certain aspects of education and social work. In many respects the Assembly will merely act as a clearing house for transfer of funds from the Treasury to other bodies. The block grant is likely to be equivalent to only some 50% of the revenues raised in Scotland (excluding oil) and may shortly be outweighed by oil revenues alone.

Question 14: What is the SNP's opinion of the role of the Secretary of State in the Assembly, as envisaged in the White Paper?
Answer: Willie Ross, the present incumbent of the post of Secretary of State for Scotland, has been variously described as 'Viceroy of Scotland', 'the new King Willie' and 'a kind of Tudor monarch' since his role was revealed in the White Paper. He will be the one to exercise the very wide veto power on Westminster's behalf and every Scot knows that all does not

augur well for possible liberalising legislation being passed in a Scots Assembly with the sword of Willie Damocles hanging over it.

The SNP, for its part, was hoping to see the role of the Secretary of State being phased out, his powers passing to the Premier or Chief Executive of the Assembly or his ministers. Instead, the Secretary of State's powers have been strengthened tenfold.

Question 15: Does the SNP consider the industrial powers offered to the Assembly adequate?
Answer: The White Paper was particularly disappointing and confusing on this point. The SNP had, however, hoped that the powers of the Scottish Development Agency (the SDA—which has many of the functions of the NEB in England) would have been answerable to the Assembly but instead it is only given the power to appoint half of the SDA Board. What chance, therefore, has the nearest thing to a Parliament the Scots have been offered for 280 years to fight Scotland's high rate of unemployment, combat the industrial diseases of Clydeside and to plan the future needs of Scottish industry in an adequately controlled and systematic manner?

Question 16: Does the Assembly's committee structure system of Government fall into line with SNP thinking on the matter?
Answer: Very much so—in fact, the idea was probably derived from an SNP research staff paper on the Swedish committee system of government which was sent to the Devolution Unit. The powers projected in the White Paper, however, fall short of those vested in the committees of the Swedish Parliament. They will not have the initiative in preparing legislation and the role envisaged for them would appear to be basically consultative. In order to have a really effective committee system something more closely approximating to the Swedish model would have been preferred. As it is, we shall have to guard against the possibility that the Assembly committees do not develop in a way which tends to put the whole devolved structure on the level of a glorified county council.

Question 17: Since the aim of the SNP is complete independence for Scotland, is there no danger of the SNP wrecking the Assembly?
Answer: The SNP has stated repeatedly that it does not regard a majority in the devolved parliament as a mandate for independence; only a majority of Scottish seats in the Westminster Parliament can give the SNP a mandate from the Scottish people to demand negotiations to begin on the establishment in Scotland of a sovereign state. The SNP will attempt to make the Assembly work, but one of its chief aims must be to extend the powers of the Assembly and it is on this crucial point that Assembly elections will be fought. Such extension of power must surely come within the remit of any document which states, as the White Paper does, that 'a healthy democracy must develop and adapt itself to changing circumstances'.

Question 18: Will the Assembly not herald the disappearance of the SNP as a political force?

Answer: All the signs point to the negative. First reactions from the Scottish people on the White Paper are that it is simply not powerful enough. Scots of all parties know that they have achieved the setting up of a Scottish Development Agency, a Scottish office of the British National Oil Corporation and the draft of an Assembly through the election of 11 SNP MPs to Westminster. It is inevitable and logical that in order to attain more autonomy, they will elect more SNP Members both to Westminster and to the Assembly to extend its powers. Even after independence, it is likely that the SNP will continue as a centre party or mould itself on the Social Democratic parties of mainland Europe.

Question 19: Would the SNP consider a referendum on the subject of independence?

Answer: It is interesting that the chief advocate in Scotland of a referendum on Scottish independence is the Labour MP for West Renfrew, Norman Buchan, who voted against such a suggestion mooted by the Liberals a few years back. This apart, in the 1950s the Scottish Covenant Association collected over 2 million signatures in Scotland for a petition demanding a Scottish Parliament. When this was presented to Westminster, the Scots were told that referenda were not British and that they would have to fight elections and win seats for their claims to be realised. Now that the SNP is successful in this, Westminster is muttering about a referendum!

If a referendum were to be held, it would have to be under international and not UK auspices and be fairly worded. 'Do you want separatism?' is unfair because the word 'separatism' has, through wily manipulation of language by Unionist politicians, received an emotionally negative charge and is as such no longer a sufficiently neutral term. 'Do you want a Scottish Parliament with full fiscal control over oil revenues and all other aspects, nationally and internationally, of Scottish life?' (even the White Paper recognises that Scottish control over oil revenues would mean a separate Scottish state), then the answer would most likely be resoundingly in the affirmative.

Question 20: Why do you find the idea of independence so necessary for Scotland?

Answer: There are as many answers to this question as there are Scotsmen. I can do no better than quote, with one emendation, the words of a free Englishman, William Pitt: 'We must recollect . . . what it is we have at stake, what it is we have to contend for. It is for our property, it is for our liberty, it is for our independence, nay, for our existence as a nation; it is for our character, it is for our very name as Scotsmen, it is for everything dear and valuable to man on this side of the grave.'

In conclusion, I would ask those who oppose the idea of Scottish independence, why do *you* find the United Kingdom so sacrosanct, the enforced stymied unity of the nations in these islands so necessary that you will defy sweet reason and electoral democracy to defend it? The United Kingdom

was not a God-given institution, never to re-form. It came about as a result of dubious political intrigue and it is a wonder that it has lasted so long, but because it has lasted so long does not justify its existence. I, and other Scots, look forward to the day when, instead of blaming a Government in distant London for the ill-effects of a given policy decision, as we have to do at present simply because the Westminster Parliament is the only one we have, we can blame our own Parliament in Edinburgh. Faults there will be when Scotland retains its sovereignty, but at least we Scots will be able to say 'they're *our* faults' and find a remedy that will suit *us*.

[Duncan MacLaren is Research Officer to the Scottish National Party Parliamentary Group.]

The February issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The Birth of Spanish Liberalism* by Lionel King, *The Fellowship of Freedom Ltd.* by Barbara Woodhouse, *J. C. Powys and T. S. Eliot* by G. Wilson Knight and *Feeding the Soviet Union* by Leslie Symons. *The Australian Government and the Aborigines* by Keith D. Suter is unavoidably held over from January to February.

THE POWERFUL, THE WEAK AND PENAL POLICY:

The 5th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1975

by Martin Wright

THE Congress started with a political row, and politics were never far from the surface. The row centred on the Palestine Liberation Organization's presence at the Congress in Toronto, where it was originally to be held. Some Canadian politicians objected; the Canadian government, surprisingly, yielded, with the result that the venue of the Congress was changed from Toronto to Geneva at five weeks' notice. During the Congress the Palestinian representative made allegations of torture against Israel, which did not send a delegation; neither did Chile, which was similarly accused by the Soviet Union and others. Other participants refrained from making counter-accusations; but the incidents served as a reminder that crime can be committed by nations (or their rulers) as much as by the so-called criminal classes, and that nations, as well as individuals, who complain of the criminality of others do not necessarily have clean hands themselves.

Crimes (and legal but economically damaging practices) by the powerful and the rich received considerable attention, particularly those committed by transnational corporations: bribery of public officials, water and air pollution, and evasion of exchange regulations. In Latin America some companies were said consistently to undervalue their exports by some 40 per cent so as to minimize taxes (when these are higher in the importing country) (*3*,§27). The list of new forms of crime is about as long as the list of new commercial and industrial practices. Self-service shops invite crime; so do credit cards (*5*,§11), and of course motor vehicles. Even criminological research attracts deviants: a scientific session was told about 'Robin Hood-ing'; the nickname is surely either ironic or double-think, for it means securing a grant for applied research of a kind attractive to philanthropic foundations, and using it for more recondite studies that confer greater academic status.

Many participants agreed with the Working Paper (*3*,§57-58) that industrialization and urbanization are related to growing crime, including violence, though the connexion may be indirect, via unemployment, overcrowding, and other features of 'developed' countries. No one was idealistic enough to suggest a retreat from modernity as part of the solution. The Soviet delegate and others, however, denied the basic premiss: it was precisely *because of* the development achieved in Socialist countries, and the absence of exploitation of man by man, that crime was being eliminated so successfully there, except for the acts of some psychopathic personalities. By the end of the Congress statements like these produced a ripple of disbelieving laughter; one or two dissident Westerners did main-

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tain, however, that individual psychology and psychopathology still count for something, heretical though this may be in the face of the fashionable sociological orthodoxy. Indeed there does seem to be a lacuna in some criminological thinking: if the criminality of the 'have-nots' is due to deprivation, a different hypothesis is surely required to account for the criminality of the 'haves'.

Certainly in Africa industrialization has been accompanied by population redistribution, the growth of shanty towns, and dissipation of traditional social control organs, with an increase in alcohol consumption and in common offences such as thefts and assaults (*BP/4*,§9). Similarly, in Ecuador the export of bananas was followed by increased imports of whisky, and hence by more crime, including traffic offences (*BP/2*,§21): one example among many which led the Latin American preparatory meeting to feel that 'criminals' (in the everyday sense) are engendered largely by a criminal society, and that rising crime trends will not be reversed until emphasis is removed from individuals to the fear and insecurity in which so many of them live: not only are they robbed at home or in the street, but they are cheated by false packaging and unwarranted price increases (*BP/2*,§16). For migrants particularly, the way toward prevention lay in developing social, educational and health services rather than stricter law enforcement (*L.3/Rev.1*,§53).

The Asian and Latin American preparatory meetings felt that the law showed bias against the more easily prosecutable, in the selection of actions defined as criminal; as the Congress was reminded by the UN Secretary General's representative, Ms Helvi Sipila, in her opening address, when people cannot or will not live by the rules, the fault sometimes lies with the rules themselves. Police enforcement policy was felt to be similarly biassed (*BP/1*,§41-42; *BP/2*,§10). Police obligation to protect property might sometimes include an obligation to protect the interests of an acquisitive group in society, sometimes with property questionably acquired (*BP/1*,§23). Suggestions for reform included the decriminalization of some of the minor offences such as vagrancy and prostitution, and *in*criminalization of others, such as unethical financial practices.

Thus through the Congress ran a current of concern for the less fortunate. As one Working Paper put it, 'The large majority of persons caught up in the (criminal justice) system are almost invariably the poor, the weak, members of minority groups, immigrants, foreigners, persons of low intelligence and others who are in some way at a social disadvantage' (*4*,§18). Moreover, since the criminal law imposes sanctions that cause suffering to offenders, it may be adding to the social injustices that already exist (*4*,§44-45). A similar relationship between strong and weak is hinted at, on the national level, in the observation that the signatories of the UNESCO Convention on preventing the illicit transfer of ownership of cultural property, 1970, are almost all developing countries suffering from illicit export of art objects forming part of their national heritage (*L.3/Rev.1*,§15).

The extreme example of the criminality of the down-trodden is terrorism:

'the root causes of *some* acts of transnational violence can be found in the misery, fear, frustration, grievance and despair of those aspiring to international recognition of their national, ethnic and social goals' (*3*,§70; emphasis added). Hence the long-range solution lies in the direction of alleviating those conditions, under the UN aegis; in the shorter term, however, it will involve international legal and technical co-operation on extradition and security measures. It was not suggested that merely increasing the penalties would have any effect.

Recognition of the deprivation suffered by many offenders did not mean that the Congress lost sight of the suffering caused to the rest of the community by crime — and in a way more by common theft, with or without violence, than by white-collar crime, since the former is more visible and generates fear for the security of person and property, among both the rich and the poor (*L.7*,§17). Policy makers should aim not only to minimize the harm done by crime but to equalize within a society the distribution of its costs (*BP/3*,§53). No one, however, had much to say about how this was to be arranged.

The picture thus drawn is very different from the common conception of an orderly society whose stability is threatened by a few low types among the 'dangerous classes', who need to be kept in strict check. Rather, it appears, anti-social behaviour is distributed throughout society; but some countries' efforts to control the criminality of the well-to-do are largely limited to civil remedies, such as payment of damages, so that a businessman-criminal can justify as 'simply minor civil wrongs' certain unethical practices which would be clearly condemned as criminal in other jurisdictions. (Some countries, of course, regard as criminal the mere amassing of wealth, which elsewhere is a civic virtue; but that is another story (*BP/1*,§9a).) Perhaps the tide is turning: in India, at least, the wrath of the citizenry has at times been turned on white-collar criminals more than on common thieves or even murderers (*3*,§29).

The emphasis in preventing business criminality was mainly on technical economic measures, though governments were called on to combat 'get-rich-quick' philosophies. Criminal liability of individuals responsible for serious economic offences should be retained, but it was considered wasteful of talented manpower to imprison them: sentences entailing services to the community were considered preferable. Even fines were regarded as unsatisfactory, because they are commonly absorbed by the business enterprise and passed on to the consumer. Another possibility was 'capital punishment' of the corporation, by revocation of its charter to do business: its activities would not necessarily cease, but could be transferred to the State or a board of trustees. There was a risk, however, that unemployment would be caused (*3*,§28).

Many people, of course, have thought for a long time that imprisonment in general, not just of important businessmen, is a waste of manpower. Prisoners are commonly either exploited or underemployed; in the latter case the slack institutional tempo incapacitates them, by the time they are released, for normal work, which the prison stigma makes still

harder to obtain. Even in prisons that do run moderately businesslike workshops, it is the exception for prisoners to be paid more than a pittance (*6*,§12); as one individual participant put it, 'the State steals from the thief'.

At a special meeting of the International Prisoners' Aid Association Gerhard Mueller, the Executive Secretary of the Congress, estimated that every day some ten million humans are in prison. This is one more blot on the record of our egregious century; so is the fact that in this statistical age we do not even know the actual number; and that developing countries are still building more prisons, aided by Western advisers.

At the same time, ironically, some people in the West are looking to those same countries, in the hope of learning from their traditional systems of community-based justice and penalties. Informal methods of social control can be very powerful (*4*,§9), but only in a community where people know, see a lot of, and care for each other (§5).

They have dangers, however, such as scapegoating and unwarranted community condemnation: procedural rules are a safeguard against bias or excessive flexibility (*BP/1*,§19). But there was a feeling that the majesty of the law was hedged with too much mystery, and Professor Nils Christie of Norway urged delegates, when they returned home, to look at their courts and procedures through the eyes of ordinary people and to ask themselves whether some demystification was not necessary. An American Judge, Sylvia Bacon, stressed that proper procedure should not be compromised in the name of crime control, and that in any case it was unrealistic to imagine that crime prevention could be achieved by tough law enforcement and harsh punishment alone. She described a blueprint for action: a civic leader can convene a committee of professionals and laymen to identify the main local crime problems and propose preventive action, such as neighbourhood patrols, volunteers in rehabilitation, provision of job opportunities and counselling.

Community-based courts are already widespread. There are customary courts in Sierra Leone and the Sudan, *islahi* committees and *jirgas*, or elders, in Pakistan, village *panchayats* in India, *barrio* councils in the Philippines (*4*,§91), village courts in Iran, comrades' courts in the USSR, and magistrates' courts in the United Kingdom. Many of them traditionally use non-custodial sanctions: the problem is to extend their use to more categories of offender in more countries. Restitution is mandatory in Argentina, Colombia, Norway and Sweden. In some Socialist countries, including the USSR, supervisory commissions composed of representatives of trade unions, youth groups and other community organizations both exercise control over collective labour establishments and supervise persons released from them. Many volunteers in Japan assist parolees and probationers. New Zealand has semi-custodial periodic detention centres, and England's system of constructive reparation through Community Service Orders has attracted much attention, though it may not always transplant well into other social conditions. Day training centres for the socially disadvantaged offender also offer good possibilities. On the other hand in

some countries even probation is almost unknown or at least underdeveloped (*BP/2*,§33; *BP/1*,§33). Many will endorse the hope that it may not be too late for developing countries to devise a system of, for example, restitution or reparation (restitution means making good the loss caused, in whole or in part; reparation means making up for it in some other way, usually by performing service) and will not insist on re-learning for themselves what an ineffective system imprisonment is (*6*,§27). The delegate from Lesotho was doubtless not alone in feeling that the practice of imprisonment was foreign to his country; and the Latin American preparatory meeting considered that in many developing countries the drift towards importing it, as if it were part of a desirable modernization, had not yet gone too far and could still be halted if they used the social sinews of their family and community resources to tackle crime with the same resilience that they showed in the face of natural disasters, such as earthquakes (*BP/2*,§29).

Meanwhile prisons still exist, and much of the Congress' humanitarian concern was devoted to removing some of the more shameful lapses from the civilized standards codified in the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The UN prepared for the Congress by conducting a survey of 135 countries. The results were not very encouraging. Only 62 countries replied, with a response rate of only 40% of countries in Latin America (including the Caribbean region) and Asia, and 20% in Africa. As the report diplomatically says, 'it might be argued that only countries with a relatively good implementation record felt inclined (to reply). Furthermore, there is the question of whether the replies reflect actual practice or perhaps the opinions and wishes of the respondents.' Even so, 'although more than 70% of the total number of replies are in the "implemented" category, some of the perhaps most important Rules are among those least effectively implemented' (*6, Annex 1*,§72, 75). Only half the countries have been able to achieve the guidelines dealing with accommodation and decent living conditions; many have difficulty in meeting those on staffing, and only about 60% claim to observe fully the guidelines on discipline, punishment and arbitrary treatment. Rules relating to medical services, work, social relations and after-care, prisoners awaiting trial, and civil prisoners, were also implemented in full by too few countries. It must be admitted that many people, not only in developing countries, would probably sympathize with the Tanzanian delegate, who said that his country gave higher priority to clean water supply and medical facilities for all citizens; the preferred solution, of course, would include decreasing the use of imprisonment in favour of less costly community methods.

Many aspects of fair treatment for prisoners were raised at the Congress. The veteran criminologist Israel Drapkin, of the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation (IPPF) spoke in stark terms of prison conditions in many parts of the world — including so-called 'developed' countries: restrictions on visits and mail; pervasive homosexuality, including assaults; deaths due to lack of medical attention; chronic depression leading to

suicidal or violent behaviour, which was then often punished instead of being recognised as a natural reaction to being caged. In some countries fetters are still used. By coincidence, the Russian dissident writer Andrei Sinyavski was speaking at a separate meeting in Geneva of his prison experiences; the criminological view was complemented by his account of the desperate acts of defiance (rather than submission) engendered by repression — as when a number of prisoners tattooed on their foreheads slogans like 'slave of the KGB': their execution was followed by another wave of tattooing.

Some countries claimed that the Standard Minimum Rules were partly outdated: Sweden, for example, said that it was no longer found necessary there for inmates to be supervised only by guards of the same sex. The USSR, the Soviet delegate said, applied the Rules exhaustively and in some ways went beyond them 'in the sense, of course, of improvement'. But since probably a majority of the countries of the world fail to implement several of the most important rules, the Congress was surely right to give priority to better observance of them, before the time-consuming effort to agree on new ones. There was a move to draft a 'commentary' which would qualify and 'interpret' some rules in the light of advanced penological practice; but this was received with scepticism by some. Eventually, though, there will have to be revisions and additions, relating in particular to an independent authority for the redress of grievances, to the right of a prisoner to be protected against other inmates, and to consideration of the offender as a person who has rights, duties and obligations, rather than as a person to be subjected to treatment on a scientific basis (*L6/Add. 1*§3; *L.9*, page 4).

But how can implementation be improved? To begin with, of course, the Rules must be known, and the UN was asked to publicise them. One firm proposal was for the establishment of a Working Group for the implementation of the rights of prisoners. The year 1980, when the next Congress will be held (in Australia), might be designated the year for the protection of the civil and human rights of prisoners and detainees. It was also pointed out that official methods of enforcement are not the only ones. Voluntary organisations, and prison welfare workers both voluntary and professional, can help to promote the fullest observance of the Rules (*L.9*, page 5). The more members of the community have first-hand dealings with people in the criminal justice system, the more they will understand it and see the need for reforming it.

Voluntary bodies can also play a part at the international level, as was shown at the Congress. Three of them joined in promoting schemes for the transfer of foreign prisoners to their home country to serve their sentences; Scandinavian countries already do this, and others could make bilateral or regional arrangements, beginning perhaps with schemes for parolees and probationers. Another organisation, Amnesty International, worked effectively at the Congress to secure a Declaration on protection from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment. This, like the Standard Minimum Rules, will pose implementation problems, but is

an important first step, since it was unanimously approved in principle by the countries represented (*L.6*§16; *L.9*§4).

A third initiative was an attempt to establish a code of police ethics; but a proposal that police should disobey when ordered to commit acts of torture proved unacceptable, and the matter was resolved by asking the UN General Assembly to set up a committee of experts to prepare a new document.

Finally, the Congress adopted a proposal by M. Paul Cornil of the IPPF that there should be a reassessment of the purposes of correctional systems, and research into the effectiveness of deprivation of liberty as a sanction, undertaken by the UN with the help of its regional institutes.

What these initiatives will add up to remains to be seen; it depends on the vigour, and of course money, that are devoted to them. They are only part of the justification for holding the massive, fortnight-long, quinquennial Congresses, which bring together a host of administrators, criminologists and others, who, despite the cumbersome procedure (which needs a rethink), can exchange ideas and at least pay lip-service to humane ideals. The preparatory meetings and working papers, together with the welter of supporting documents issued by governments and non-governmental organisations, are also a valuable by-product of the Congresses. Perhaps the next Congress could set a modest initial aim: to reduce the number of prisoners in the world, and in each country, well below one thousand per million population, and to raise both physical conditions and administrative safeguards to at least the level prescribed by the Standard Minimum Rules.

NOTE:

References are to Conference papers, all of which are preceded in the UN numbering system by *A/CONF.56/*: thus *3* should be read as *A/CONF.56/3*. Other statements are based on my notes of the proceedings, or my comments on them. This report is necessarily selective, because two or more sessions were held simultaneously.

A/CONF.56/BP/1	Report on the Asian regional preparatory meeting of experts on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders.
BP/2	Report on the Latin American regional preparatory meeting.
BP/3	Report on the European regional preparatory meeting.
BP/4	Report on the African regional preparatory meeting.
3	Changes in forms and dimensions of criminality — transnational and national: Working paper prepared by the Secretariat.
4	Criminal legislation, judicial procedures and other forms of social control in the prevention of crime: working paper.
5	The emerging roles of the police and other law enforcement agencies, with special reference to changing expectations and minimum standards of performance: working paper.
6	The treatment of offenders, in custody or in the community,

	with special reference to the implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners adopted by the United Nations: working paper.
9	Health aspects of avoidable maltreatment of prisoners and detainees. Paper prepared by the World Health Organisation.
L.3/Rev.1	Section I. Report on Agenda Item 5: Changes in forms and dimensions of criminality — transnational and national.
L.4/Rev.1	Section II. Report on Agenda Item 6: Criminal legislation, judicial procedures and other forms of social control in the prevention of crime.
L.5/Rev.1	Section III. Report on Agenda Item 7: The emerging roles of the police and other law enforcement agencies, with special reference to changing expectations and minimum standards of performance.
L.6	Section IV. Draft Report on Agenda Item 8: The treatment of offenders, in custody or in the community, with special reference to the implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners adopted by the United Nations.
L.6/Add.1	Section IV (continued). Draft Report on Agenda Item 8: The treatment of offenders, in custody or in the community, with special reference to the implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners adopted by the United Nations.
L.7	Section V. Draft Report on Agenda Item 9: Economic and social consequences of crime: new challenges for research and planning.
L.9	Summary of the discussion of Section IV on its Draft Report to the plenary meeting.
L.10	Summary of the discussion of Section V on its Draft Report to the plenary meeting.
A/10158 (note: reference *not* preceded by *A/CONF.56*)	Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment. Analytical summary by the Secretary-General.

[Martin Wright is Director of the Howard League of Penal Reform.]

OIL AND THE OCEAN

by K. P. S. Menon

THE two burning problems of the day are the shortage and dearness of oil and the recently discussed location of an Anglo-American naval base in the Indian Ocean. And there is a connection between the two.

The essence of the oil crisis is that the oil-producing countries have at long last asserted their sovereign rights over their own natural resources. For centuries these had been exploited by foreign companies, with the powerful support of foreign governments, and they had reaped profits beyond the dreams of avarice.

In this connection, I recall an incident which occurred in 1934 during my voyage from Bombay to Mombasa on a mission to investigate the conditions of Indians in East Africa. I had the honour of being seated at the Captain's table in the dining room. At that time Persia, as Iran used to be called, had appealed to the League of Nations for an increase in royalties and the decision went in its favour. When someone round the table expressed satisfaction that justice had been done to Persia, one of those present remarked that 'the next time Persia behaves like this, there will be no Persia left.' By and large that was the attitude of westerners towards Asians and Africans.

The oil-producing countries in the Middle East have at last assumed control over their principal natural resource, oil. They have reduced production and increased prices. In doing so, they are following the example of the Oil Companies which, too, used to reduce production, or refuse to increase it, in order to keep up prices.

'Oil', said Jawaharlal Nehru 'is an oily business'. Recent revelations in Washington have suggested that one Company resorted to trickery and deception in order to hoodwink the Iraq government which was anxious to increase the production of oil and earn more revenue, by drilling wells to wrong depths, plugging off existing wells and even covering up some of the wells by bull-dozers. And we in India know how Western experts, who had been engaged to explore for oil in Western India, reported that there was no oil there, and how Soviet experts, whom we approached thereafter, found oil in that very region.

This year the eleven oil-producing countries are expected to earn 100,000 million dollars, or four times as much as in 1973; and by 1980 their earnings are expected to reach the figure of 150,000 million dollars. Their objective, however, in raising prices is not so much to earn material profits as to gain political ends. As President Boumedienne said some time ago at the Islamic meeting in Lahore, 'Oil is just a card we are using and, we hope, with good results. In future, the voice of the Third World will be listened to with greater respect in the United Nations'. And in an interview with the special correspondent of *The New York Times*, the Shah of Iran said: 'Many countries are now learning to see us differently, to take us seriously. Europe has started, and the USA will soon.'

Eighty-five per cent of the world's petroleum output is consumed by 13 rich nations, including Japan. Already their attitude towards the Arabs has undergone a change. Japan, which used to toe the American line in regard to the Arab-Israeli problem, changed its policy overnight, and has extended a credit of 400 million dollars to Egypt and 500 million to Iraq. The US Government might have preferred to follow a course of joint confrontation with the Arab States, but Western Europe would not play, and the net result has been, not a confrontation between the oil-producing and the oil-consuming States, but between the USA and France, which openly demurred at the policy of the US Government. And now the Western governments are tumbling over one another in concluding bilateral arrangements with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab States, including the Sheikhdoms of the Middle East, by supplying arms and setting up industrial units, electrical networks and petro-chemical plants.

The Indian Ocean region is rich not merely in oil, but in other vital materials. It produces 40 per cent of the world's gold, 60 per cent of the uranium, 90 per cent of the tea, rubber and jute and 98 per cent of the diamonds. During what the late Dr. K. M. Panikkar called the *Vasco da Gama* era, these resources used to be merrily exploited by Western powers, and it is on this that their prosperity was built. What is likely to happen in the face of a demand to nationalise these resources or to demand a more equitable share of the profits made by the Western States? One reason for the proposed Anglo-American base in Diego Garcia was to intimidate the people in the relevant regions. What used to be called 'gunboat diplomacy' in the 19th century is now being continued in the form of 'aircraft carrier diplomacy'.

It used to be said that Diego Garcia was going to be simply ' a naval support station'. Indeed, a spokesman of the US Embassy once observed that 'Diego Garcia is not a base. A base is a place where you base things, and nothing is going to be based there. So it is not a base.'

Very different was the evidence given by responsible officers before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Committee in Washington. Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 12th of March 1974 that the intention was to accommodate B-52 strategic bombers, which are the US Air Force's principal nuclear weapon-carriers in Diego Garcia. This was exactly the opposite of what the State Department had been saying. At the next meeting Admiral Moorer said that he had misunderstood the question put to him by the Chairman and that the base would not be wide enough or strong enough for 'continuous operation of loaded B-52s'. Under questioning, however, he said he was in favour of giving a permanent B-52 capability to the base. At a later session Air Force General Loving stated that it was the intention to station F-111 bombers at Diego Garcia. These are capable of carrying atomic weapons and have a range of 3,200 kilometres. And Diego Garcia is only 2,000 kilometres from India. But that is all in the recent past.

There are some far-sighted people in the West who realise that, whatever

it might do, the days when Europe and America could freely exploit Asia and Africa are over. Allan M. Mathias, a former Editor of the *Minerals Year Book,* has observed in an article in *The New York Times* that the secret of Western prosperity used to be that they bought raw materials from Asia, Africa and Latin America at 'dirt cheap prices'. 'We bought them', he said, 'under terms similar to those under which we bought Manhattan Island from the Indians. Those days are gone', he continued, and industrialised countries have to learn to live with high petroleum prices and pay much more than previous prices for other raw materials. This means lower standards of living in those countries, but still Americans would be infinitely better off than the people of the developing countries. 'Would it be really such a terrible world', asks Mr. Mathias, 'if we were only ten times as rich as almost everyone else, instead of twenty times?'.

The excuse for the creation of an Anglo-American base in Diego Garcia was that there had been increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. The fact, however, remains that whereas Western countries have some two dozen bases in the Indian Ocean the Soviet Union has none. The stories put out on the eve of Mr. Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973 that the USSR would ask for, and India would give, a naval base have proved to be false. The number of Soviet ships which have visited the Indian Ocean during the recent years do not come to more than ten or fifteen. To quote Geoffrey Jukes in an article in *Survival* on *The Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean*:

> This limited presence forms a natural part of the process of its growth from a very strong regional continental power to global rank. It challenges the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Western lake, as did its earlier incursion into the Mediterranean and serves to persuade the countries of the area that Soviet military power is both tangible and relevant to their own circumstances, whether in comparison with the West or China.

In the above passage the reference to the Soviet Union's 'incursion into the Mediterranean' is highly relevant. For decades Egypt had been an Anglo-French protectorate. Even after it ceased to be so it was expected to remain in the Western orbit. However, Egypt had the temerity to obtain a small quantity of arms from Czechoslovakia. That was more than John Foster Dulles, the high priest of anti-Communism, could bear. He, therefore, churlishly withdrew the proffered American aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam. There followed a series of dramatic events such as the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt and the fall of the then Prime Minister, Anthony Eden. Then the Soviet Union entered the Mediterranean region once and for all as a power that counted. Thus the net result of the attempt to keep the Soviet Union out of the Mediterranean was to bring it in. That is what is likely to happen in the Indian Ocean, too.

It is strange that 'the limited Soviet presence' in the Indian Ocean should excite so much concern in the West, even in these days of Great Power detente. One can only think that the Soviet presence is being used as an excuse for dominating this region. Moreover, beneath the smooth surface of the detente, the cold war mentality seems to be still lurking. Hanson Baldwin, the chief American expert on defence matters, has

written thus:

> In the age of missiles and nuclear warheads the Indian Ocean, the third largest in the world, is a huge landing pad for missile carrying submarines. It is as close to many Russian industrial centres as the Mediterranean and perhaps even closer, and it is less protected.

The Soviet Union cannot be an idle bystander when such developments are taking place. The establishment of the proposed naval base in Diego Garcia was bound to increase international tension in this region. The presence of nuclear-powered ships and submarines, side by side, will add to the prospect of a war — and that a nuclear war — breaking out by design or accident. The naval base in Diego Garcia must, therefore, have been regarded as a threat to world peace as well as to the economic independence of the States of Asia and Africa.

The remedy lies in cultivating unity on the one hand and world opinion on the other. The recent history of the Arabs has provided full confirmation of the old saying: United we stand, divided we fall. The Arab States were divided and fell before Israel; they are now united and have stood up to Israel, despite the fact that it has the backing of the mightiest State in the world.

World opinion is important. It may often seem elusive and even delusive, and yet it does have an effect in the long run. It is a matter for satisfaction that Australia and New Zealand in the recent past have elected governments who have been going with, and not against, Asian opinion. It is also something to be thankful for that the British Government has at least offered to reconsider the whole question of an American naval base in Diego Garcia. One can only hope that enlightened public opinion in the West, and notably in the USA itself, will join the unanimous opinion in Asian and African States and compel the USA to abandon finally a project which constitutes a defiance not only of Asian and African opinion but of the United Nations, which has visualised the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

[Dr K. P. S. Menon is a career diplomat now in retirement. He has served India as her first Ambassador to China and later as her Ambassador to the USSR for nine years (1952 to 1961).]

SOME REMINISCENCES OF ARTHUR WALEY (1889-1966)

by Celia Goodman

IN March 1938 I met in Kitzbühel an Englishman who claimed to be a spy disguised as a painter, although his appearance — that of a handsome British pro-consul — belied both professions. I asked him whether, as I had heard, Arthur Waley was then in Kitzbühel. He confirmed it, and a few days later took me out to dinner to meet him and Beryl de Zoete. During the course of the evening I said that I intended shortly to move on to Davos, and Beryl exclaimed with a spontaneous warmth and kindness which made a deep impression on me, 'But Arthur is going there too, to ski! You must stay in his hotel — he'll arrange it.' This was the beginning of my friendship with Arthur and Beryl.

Among the *habitués* of the Tiefenbrunner café in Kitzbühel at that time was a poet, Charles Higgins, whom Arthur liked to refer to as 'the poet Higgins' and who became a life-long friend of his. Later Arthur bought from a dealer in the Portobello Road several of the strange poetic pictures which Charles Higgins painted under the pseudonym of Pic, and he much enjoyed the autobiography, *Sun before Seven*, which Higgins wrote and illustrated under the name Ian Dall. The painter-spy went to live in another country, but Arthur was intrigued and amused when he reappeared in London later as a convert to an esoteric African religion.

During the fortnight I spent in Davos Arthur used to go for long ski-runs every day and we dined together in the evenings. Beryl was then travelling in the East, but after they had both returned to London I continued to see them from time to time. At first Beryl lived in a flat in Russell Square, while Arthur lived in a hotel on the other side of the square, but he soon moved into Beryl's flat. However, he always went across to the hotel for a cooked breakfast, because Beryl was, and remained, oblivious to his need for a square meal. She herself ate very little and what she did eat was often somewhat unorthodox: I remember her swallowing without a qualm a raw egg mixed with sugar. She gave the impression that she considered food a rather gross and mundane commodity, but Arthur, who usually had a good appetite, did not at all share this attitude — he had simply come to terms with it. Once when I was looking for a flat in London he observed in a questioning tone that he supposed I had 'fairly high standards'. I replied 'Not particularly', but he persisted with a smile 'But you wouldn't be content to live without an oven, as Beryl did for twenty years?'. When he and Beryl lived in Gordon Square they had an electric stove which they called 'Godot': I very much doubt whether the oven was ever used.

Several of the contributors to the *Reminiscences of Arthur Waley* which Ivan Morris edited under the title *Madly Singing in the Mountains* have described Arthur's appearance, his voice and his personality better than I could ever hope to do. Their essays testify to the fact that in spite of his

kindness, courtesy and frequent flashes of humour there was almost no-one, even among his closest friends, who did not at times feel shy or constrained in his presence; and indeed many people had moments of feeling downright frightened of him. His custom of uttering some laconic comment in a neutral tone of voice sometimes had — unintentionally, I believe — a crushing effect, and equally disconcerting was his habit of absenting himself totally from the conversation and gazing into space as though in a state of suspended animation. He once told me with amusement that Peggy Cripps, whom he met while working in the Ministry of Information and whom he liked, had been heard to say 'Whenever I talk to Arthur Waley he always looks bored. But I mean to try again'. And I can believe the story that once when a young man praised his translations in effusive terms, ending with the words 'And perhaps one day we two shall meet again in the Land of the Rising Sun', Arthur's reply was a high-pitched 'No'. It was not until I had known him for many years and had come to realise how much kindness underlay his occasionally chilling manner that I ceased ever to feel intimidated by him. It has been said that shyness was the cause of his periods of silence and abstraction while he was with other people. I think this too mild a term to give any idea of his extraordinary hypersensitivity. Although he liked company and enjoyed social life he could not bear any intrusion of his privacy, and for this reason a hundred questions that one longed to ask him remained unuttered. When the conversation held nothing to interest him, or when he did not wish to contribute to it himself he simply withdrew his attention from it so completely that he was no longer aware of it. But this is far from being a full explanation of his silences, which seemed also to be partly a matter of mood, since on some days he totally ignored a conversation which he would have joined in with interest on others.

Possibly his moods also coloured his remarks when, on these silent days, he eventually emerged from his shell. There was one such occasion when I had invited him and Beryl in for a drink to see Edmund Wilson, whom they liked very much. For a long while Arthur remained mute and withdrawn, and while Edmund Wilson discoursed upon general topics and talked of mutual friends with admirable intellectual vitality he commented only in monosyllables. Meanwhile I cast around for a subject which he might like to discuss. I knew that he and Beryl had been lunching that day with Leonard Woolf, so I asked him about Virginia Woolf.

Arthur: I think she knew that I didn't care for any of her novels except *Mrs. Dalloway.*

Me: What was she like?

Arthur: (turning towards me and speaking very emphatically) She was HORRIBLE!

Beryl: Yes, *horrible*!

Me: In what way?

Arthur: She used to say the most awful things.

Me: Such as . . .?

Arthur: Well, when Sachie [Sitwell] was just married to Georgia and took

her to visit the Woolfs, Virginia asked her 'What does it feel like to be a beautiful young married woman?'

Edmund: Yes, she always wanted to know what went on in other people's minds.

Arthur: She knew less about what went on in other people's minds than anyone else: she only knew what went on in her own.

But if Arthur did not admire Virginia Woolf's novels he was an early admirer of Ivy Compton-Burnett's, which he and Beryl used to read aloud to each other, and he enjoyed going to tea with their author. And I believe that it was on his suggestion that Beryl translated *The Confessions of Zeno* and Moravia's novella *Agostino*. Towards the end of his life he lost touch with contemporary Italian writing, but he read and liked *Arthuro's Island* by Moravia's wife (at that time), Elsa Morante, a novel he considered better than much of Moravia's work. He was a reader of very catholic tastes, extremely well read in Western, as well as in Oriental, literature. Apart from the books he needed to read for his work, and leaving aside poetry, which he read constantly, I only once knew him to concentrate on reading specifically about one subject and that was in the middle of the War, when he made a study of Marxist writings. He never brought an English book with him when he came to stay with us, relying upon random reading from among ours, but he once brought a Chinese one about the Opium War and read it sitting on a small upright chair which he placed for the purpose in the middle of our rather large lawn. Among the books he read or re-read with pleasure during the last years of his life were Peter Fleming's work on *The Siege at Peking*, of which he thought very highly; Lord Hervey's *Memoirs of the Reign of George II;* a biography of Baroness Burdett-Coutts; *Great Expectations;* and Isaac Disraeli's *Curiosities of Literature*.

In 1948 Arthur and Beryl lent me for two months the flat at the top of 50 Gordon Square in which they lived from shortly before the War until Beryl's death, as they were going abroad and I, at that time, had nowhere to live. They also lent me their devoted Irish maid May, who looked after them until the end of their lives, even going up to Highgate to work for Arthur when he moved there after Beryl died. In the flat below lived a lady called Miss Gaffran and a homeopathic expert — I forget whether or not they were one and the same person. I observed to Arthur that it must be useful to live in the same house as a homeopath, as if he had a headache he could just go downstairs and get a cure. 'Yes, I could,' he said. 'but it would take six months to work.' Alison Grant Robinson (whom Arthur later married) told me that during the War she used to post her meat ration, already cooked, through the letter-box of 50 Gordon Square for him. It is pleasant to think of Miss Gaffran's surprise when she discovered a cold mutton chop on the mat.

One day during the War when I was lunching with Arthur I mentioned that a Marx Bros. film was coming on in Leicester Square. He immediately borrowed a newspaper from a man at the next table (he always courteously addressed strangers as 'Sir') so that we could look it up, but when we met the following day at the Empire Cinema we found that we had come a day

too soon. Reluctant to waste our free afternoon, we decided to go for a row on the lake in Regent's Park. It was a brilliant day in early summer and Arthur, temporarily emerged from his censor's office and released from the task of scrutinising Japanese characters, perhaps felt a heightened sense of wonder at the beauty of the scene, for as we walked towards the lake he said: 'In the same way as Dr. Johnson considered himself a very polite man I consider myself a very religious man.'

Arthur did not believe that John Ventris's decipherment of Minoan Linear B was correct: he told me several times that he felt sure it would eventually be found to be mistaken. He maintained that at conferences of linguistic scholars he had never received satisfactory replies to the key questions he had asked about it. I showed him a chapter on the subject in D. L. Page's *The Homeric Iliad* and he read it with attention, remarking as he returned it to me that he could 'quite see what fun Greek scholars must have with it'. But he remained sceptical about Ventris's work, both on linguistic and on methodological grounds.

The fact that Arthur was Jewish was of no interest to him and his attitude to it was completely neutral. On this point his views were in conflict with those of Arthur Koestler. The following extract from a letter to me from my sister Mamaine Koestler dated 16 June 1947 and describing a dinner which she and Arthur Koestler had just had with Arthur Waley and Beryl de Zoete in North Wales gives both points of view: —

> . . . at the end of the evening he (Arthur Koestler) tried to draw Arthur on the question of Jews, on the point: if you are a Jew who believes that Jews that want to be assimilated should be (as do both the Arthurs), but if you are with people who make anti-semitic remarks, do you or not feel bound to say that you are a Jew? because if you want to be assimilated, i.e. not to be singled out from other people by your Jewish descent, it is obviously going the wrong way about it to emphasise the latter; but on the other hand, one cannot help (said K) feeling that in some ways one should . . . Arthur W. simply said he didn't see the problem, as he never felt the slightest necessity to say anything on such occasions. He said people have as much right to dislike Jews as to dislike potatoes . . .

Social distinctions also meant nothing at all to Arthur Waley and it would have been impossible to imagine him taking them seriously.

Although Arthur's knowledge of the Japanese language was apparently complete — when I asked him whether there were any Japanese words he did not know he replied 'Hardly any' — I am told that he spoke it with some difficulty, especially as regards pronunciation, and that his use of archaisms occasionally left his interlocutors feeling as though they had talked to a ghost. Never having been to Japan he was not very used to hearing the language spoken; but he was of course familiar with all Japanese and Chinese proverbs. Thus when my husband told him that during his time as an interpreter in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp he had been able to save an inefficient Japanese commander from a loss of face which might have had disastrous consequences by quoting to him an appropriate proverb, which he then gave in Japanese, Arthur Waley paused only a couple of seconds before translating: 'Even a monkey can fall from a tree'.

Both Arthur and Beryl were extremely punctual by nature: however

hard one tried to reach a restaurant before they did one always found them already there. They both enjoyed going to parties, invariably arriving dead on time and usually being among the last to leave. Yet Arthur never felt any need to speak unless he had something to say. He had little small talk, and he would throw out random remarks on subjects which were of interest to him but totally unconnected with each other. It was easy when one was with him to fall into the same habit, and the conversation would then consist, as it does with small children, of a series of *non sequiturs*.

When he stayed with us in the country he often used to read aloud in the evenings, choosing one or another of his own works — either a chapter from *The Tale of Genji* or a few Nó plays, some Chinese poems or his own additional chapter for *Monkey*. His manner of reading was extremely individual. He would inflect his quiet, rather high voice so that it exactly conveyed the various shades of meaning expressed by the words. He read with obvious appreciation and enjoyment, and to listen to him was an incomparable and sometimes very moving experience. I only once heard him read any work other than his own and that was when, at the request of Alison Grant Robinson, he read *The Waste Land*, bringing out its variety and coherence in a way which could not have been bettered. He commented that Eliot had confirmed his assumption that it was autobiographical.

Although I gathered from Beryl that the early years of their relationship had not been without stormy patches, by the time I got to know them she and Arthur appeared to live in perfect harmony (except, presumably, during the time when Beryl's last illness temporarily affected her mind). They shared numerous interests and an identical sense of humour and Beryl was endlessly amused by Arthur's individual kind of wit. Their mutual devotion was very apparent, and Arthur's gentle solicitude for Beryl during her last years was most touching. Owing to her complete lack of domestic instinct it was Arthur — during those years, at any rate — who did the cooking and washing-up, and he also did the household shopping, in spite of the fact that they lived at the top of five flights of stairs and that the shops for certain essential commodities — meat, fruit and vegetables — lay in one direction and those for others — bread, groceries and newspapers — lay in the other. When Beryl developed a serious progressive illness — chorea — and eventually became totally incapacitated Arthur nursed her single-handed for six weeks (literally so, since he had put his right arm completely out of action by a fall) and he continued in addition to do the housekeeping and prepare their meals. At that time I was working as editorial assistant for an historical journal and I telephoned Arthur from my office about an essay of his which was due to appear in it. 'Beryl is ill. She's just set the flat on fire,' he announced laconically. But he would not hear of my going to help him in any way. Fortunately Beryl recovered from that stage of her illness and returned to normal mental health.

One way in which Beryl differed from Arthur was in her willingness to travel any distance at any time. When she was eighty Arthur was invited to accompany a delegation to Peking. He substituted Beryl, who greatly enjoyed the journey and returned with a blue coolie jacket which she always

wore from then on.

During her illness Arthur, knowing that the tenancies of 50 Gordon Square were due to be terminated, bought a house in Highgate Village — No. 50 Southwood Lane; but by the time the purchase was completed Beryl was too ill to be moved there. Arthur continued to look after her, but was eventually obliged to take on a nurse to help him. He felt very strongly that Beryl must remain at home until she died, and he enabled her to do so by a devotion and endurance which were truly heroic. He bore his difficulties, hardship and harrowing sorrow without a word of complaint.

Beryl died in March 1962. That summer and the next one Arthur came to stay with us alone. He had moved into a flat in Great James Street after Beryl's death, but in 1963 he moved up to Highgate, where Alison Grant Robinson was already living, and when he came to stay with us the following summer he brought her with him. He loved his house in Highgate and the outings he made from it with Alison to Kenwood and further afield. Some of the contributors to *Madly Singing in the Mountains* have maintained that he was about to embark on another large book. This may have been so, but on two occasions when I visited him in Highgate he told me that he felt no regret at all at having retired from his work and that he was enjoying his leisure.

In April 1966 I wrote inviting him and Alison to stay for Whitsun. The following day I heard from a mutual friend that he was very ill, and I went up to Highgate at once to see him. I found him in a room at the top of the house sitting by the window, from which there was a magnificent view. Although he would never have dreamed of informing his friends of his illness unless they had chanced to get in touch with him, he said wistfully 'One feels that one's friends ought to *know* one is ill.' I suggested that I might tell some of them. He particularly wanted to see Sacheverell Sitwell, for Arthur was a close friend of all the Sitwells and his devotion and loyalty to them were absolute. I was fortunately able to get hold of Sacheverell Sitwell that evening and he hurried up to Highgate.

During the first visit I made to Arthur in his illness, which was also the last while he was still well enough to talk, I reminded him of a visit which he himself had made to Oliver Strachey when the latter was old and suffering from amnesia. 'I don't know who you are', Oliver Strachey had said to him, 'but perhaps you can tell me: what is it all about?'. I asked Arthur whether he had been able to find anything to say in reply. 'Oh yes, plenty', he answered. But now, as so often in the past, he confined himself to this brief remark and did not enlarge upon it.

WHY THEATRE NEEDS ITS FRINGE

by Clare Colvin

IT took a year of desperately high inflation to unite fringe theatre companies. They are by nature against a solid front, but the threat to their very existence led to the formation this year of the Independent Theatre Council to press for large increases in their Arts Council grants.

The fringe has lived on very little money for years — one of the hazards of being out of the theatre mainstream. It has become almost impossible to start a new company. The older companies, which have existed long enough to have gained recognition for their work, are now demanding conditions and money in keeping with their talent and experience. They believe that their forced acceptance for years of a shoestring budget has led to the feeling in the Arts Council that the fringe 'always gets by.' It is no longer enough to get by. They want to develop their companies and to be able to put on less makeshift productions. As they grow older, like the rest of the theatre, they become more averse to living on sandwiches and sleeping on the floor. That may seem a frivolous point, but those in the commercial theatre who started their careers in a similar way will understand.

Against them from the start is the sort of image the word 'Fringe' evokes. It was in 1968 when the fringe movement first came into prominence that the image was fixed. It was summed up by Dan Crawford, who runs the Kings Head Theatre in Islington as the 'explosions, blood and vomit' theatre. Most of those running small theatres or fringe companies now detest the word, which came originally from the Edinburgh Festival's 'fringe' of theatre activity. One suggestion is that the fringe should call itself 'contemporary theatre'. The disadvantage here is that this title could also be applied to the work of many repertory companies.

Is the fringe — for want of a better word — worth a vastly increased subsidy, or is it a fashion in theatre, which had its uses in revitalising established theatre and throwing up new talent, but can now be left to fade gradually away? Although they are agreed that more money would encourage better work, there was a feeling among some I talked to that much talent had already been lost to more profitable sources, and that some of the subsidised fringe companies and writers lacked both inspiration and self-criticism. Thelma Holt, who runs the Open Space together with Charles Marowitz, says she has not found much work worth seeing over the past year. The excitement sparked off by the beginning of the movement, around the time the Open Space was created in 1968, seems to have burnt out. The inadequacy of their grant means that Marowitz is taking on more tours abroad, which bring in more money, with all expenses paid. At the same time, she thinks that some companies waste the small grants they are allowed and that they should be prepared to throw their books open to the Arts Council.

While agreeing that I have seen some depressingly bad work on the fringe, there has been much that proves the fringe to be still alive and to be

deserving of a larger audience. At the Open Space, Marowitz's version of *Measure for Measure*, which, by omitting certain passages and adding nothing, leaves Isobella seduced, Claudio killed and Angelo triumphant, had a stunning effect. This was probably how Shakespeare saw justice being done, rather than in the happily resolved *Measure for Measure*. This, according to Mr. Marowitz, is how justice is still being done. Then there was the Hull Truck Theatre Company's *Oh What!* ! which played for a season at the Bush Theatre, a converted room above a pub in Shepherd's Bush. The piece makes fun of the ideas and images to which people so readily succumb, and their tentative relationships with each other. *Oh What!* ! was created by the entire company during rehearsals, under the direction of Mike Bradwell. He does not like the word 'improvisation' which implies 'extempore', but his company work through improvisation during rehearsals towards a finished work. Pip Simmon's *An Die Musik* while having a subject matter distressing enough to drive some of the audience from the theatre — it was about extermination of Jews by the Nazis — nevertheless showed that this group have much talent and can put their material over brilliantly.

Judging from those I have seen this year, the most successful fringe plays are those in which a company has worked together on the material. In fact some would say that fringe theatre must involve group creativity. New plays by a single writer have been less successful, and small theatres have complained of the scarcity of worthwhile scripts. Writers who were writing for the fringe until recently — Trevor Griffiths, David Hare, Howard Barker, Howard Brenton — are now writing for the established theatre. Griffiths' *Comedians* and Hare's *Teeth 'n' Smiles* have been taken up by the West End after successful seasons at the Old Vic and the Royal Court, respectively. The writers of the Hare/Brenton generation still writing for the fringe have not developed their themes despite changes in life and politics outside the theatre. One of fringe theatre's drawbacks springs from its need to comment on today's issues. Plays which gripped people two or three years ago would seem dated now, so there is no stockpile to draw on. And if writers find it difficult to write a play about what is happening today, who can blame them? The world has become its own theatre. The issues they were writing about yesterday have exploded today.

The Soho Poly Theatre has played an important part in encouraging new writers, within the limitations imposed by their small premises and finances. They are expected, under the terms of their Arts Council grant, to produce 20 new lunchtime shows and three evening performances a year. Verity Bargate, who runs the Soho Poly, has begun a writers' workshop, where writers can go through their plays, with the help of the Soho Poly's writer in residence. Like other small theatre managements, the Soho Poly has been badly hit by inflation. Miss Bargate feels, too, that actors have subsidised lunchtime theatres for long enough. She has applied for £30,000 during 1975/6 compared with this year's £11,000. She regards their work in encouraging writers as all important. 'In the normal theatre you send a script in and hear nothing for six months. It can be very discouraging for

writers. At the Soho Poly we get in touch with each writer immediately and go over their work with them. We want to set up a centre for writers, so that they are not so isolated.' Another theatre which puts on new work which cannot find backing in the commercial theatre is the King's Head, a pub in Islington, which was started by Dan Crawford in 1971 and has put on many interesting plays. He took on Robert Patrick's *Kennedy's Children* after it had been unsuccessfully going the rounds of London theatre managements for six months. It transferred for a nine month run to the West End and then to Broadway. The rising costs in theatre are beginning to force Mr. Crawford to cut down on the number of productions.

The problems of the small theatres are less acute than those of the touring fringe companies. Here I found not just anxiety but anger at their losing fight against inflation. Mike Bradwell set up the Hull Truck Theatre Company in 1971. This year the Company received a £9,000 Arts Council grant plus a £950 guarantee against losses. They also became the first fringe company to be commissioned by the BBC to write and perform a play for television, *The Writing on the Wall*. He said, 'The fringe have been prepared to work under the odds with inadequate facilities and organisation and this often brings their standards down. It is inevitable that if you want to get started you have to put up with discomfort and travelling long distances in a van which breaks down. Because of that, people feel the fringe is about a pile of romantic people dedicated to sleeping on kitchen floors. Now we have acclaim and audiences and we feel we should be doing better than that. The committees of the Arts Council are interested in what we do, but those higher up do not take the fringe seriously enough.'

The work of the Hull Truck would not be suited to a large theatre, he feels. They would lose the intimate atmosphere their plays depend on. 'When you have to act large to get across the space to the audience, you lose the subtlety. Our plays are about relationships between people and we like the audience to be close to us.'

But there was a danger in performing in a small theatre that one was attracting only the converted. Most of the fringe companies I talked to wanted to appeal to a wider range of audience and thought that the fringe being shuffled into a 'ghetto' was self-defeating. With the national newspaper reviews that Hull Truck achieved, Bradwell found that those who had been unaware of fringe work for years were at last beginning to think of it as an important part of theatre. 'A woman from Lowndes Square came to see this play on the second night. She told me she had been to West End theatre for 20 years, and this was the best thing she had seen. Part of the ceiling fell down on two theatre critics during the performance and she sent us a cheque for a fiver to repair it.'

The work of some fringe companies would fit well into larger theatres, but they do not get the opportunity to use them. Pip Simmons is depressed and angry at the insistence in England on categorising the various forms of theatre. He is tired of spending hours on the motorway in order to perform to 60 people. During 1972 in Hamburg the Pip Simmons Group played to 3,000 people in the course of two nights. He gets more for playing one

night in France than three weeks in England, and claims that his income is less than an assistant stage manager's in a repertory company. Consequently, he spends far more time touring abroad. He will be away for the first five months of this year. In England he finds civic theatres will not risk putting his work on, and he thinks the Arts Council should be responsible for more innovation. It is prepared to subsidise a group which already has a booking, but it should go further and persuade theatres to take on a particular work. If it were not for their lucrative expenses-paid tours abroad, it is unlikely that the Group would still be operating. They broke up in 1973 mainly because they were tired of touring and playing in small theatres after having established a reputation for interesting and exciting work. Later they re-formed in Rotterdam. He does not think new groups will be forming — the ground does not exist for them.

It is inevitable that a number of already existing fringe companies will become inoperative this year. There are 52 fringe theatre companies in the Independent Theatre Council. The Arts Council subsidises 45 — not all of them members of the ITC. Michael Laye, who is the theatre director at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, and a member of the ITC steering committee, says that the fringe will need £2 million next financial year in order to develop and put on new work. During this financial year they had asked for £900,000 and had been given £400,000.

The ITC claim that the Arts Council have frozen various funds which had been promised, but were still unallocated. They calculated that £45,000 was 'frozen' out of a total budget for new drama of £90,000 and £20,000 was 'frozen' out of an initial touring budget of £53,000. They accuse the Arts Council of using the extra reserves to prevent the inflation-struck Regional and Repertory theatres being 'irrevocably destroyed.' Mr. Laye said, 'They are clawing back money already committed to our area of work, because our forms of theatre were created, and continue, through the personal sacrifices of those involved. It is assumed that our Arts Council subsidy is a "luxury" and can be withdrawn when necessary, and that we will still find some way to continue. The question is, are we prepared to make sacrifices again?'

The Independent Theatre Council and The Association of Community Theatres (known as TACT) have instructed their members to apply to the Arts Council on the basis of a wage level of £45 per week for the first half of the financial year 1976-77, and £60 per week for the second half, and that touring companies should allow £5 per company member per night spent away from home.

The Arts Council does not regard itself as unsympathetic to the fringe, but it is caught in the same spiral of inflation. Its initial allocation of £25 million for the financial year 1975/6 has proved woefully inadequate, and their request for the coming financial year is in the region of £40 million. They are unlikely to get this sum, so this year will be another struggle for survival. An officer in the Arts Council's Drama Department admitted that each year the fringe had been getting the money equivalent to that needed the year before. The chance of £2 million being given to the fringe next year

was, he thought, negligible.

'It is a drastic situation, but it always has been,' he said. 'However, as the fringe has grown older there is an awareness of how ludicrous it is to work for so little money. Obviously they cannot provide the best work if they receive wages they cannot live on. The subsidies for this financial year are spread from £1,000 to £34,000. The Drama Panel decided the only thing they could do, faced with half the money needed, was to spread it around thinly. One could subsidise fewer companies more generously, but then it becomes a question of building up an elite rather than investing in the future by helping new companies. If a company proves to be good they stay, so each year the continuing responsibility grows.'

He thought the formation of the ITC had been useful in that it gave the fringe guidelines — you did not have one company budgeting to pay its members £10 a week and another paying £60. But he denied that it was the Arts Council's responsibility, as the ITC claim, to give them enough money to run their company.

'The Arts Council is totally unable to do so. They can only contribute towards the running costs. The ITC make their demands on the basis that it is their right to work and it is the duty of the Arts Council to fund their work. We do not accept this. The Arts Council does not supply the total running costs of repertory companies. Local authorities and the box office also contribute.'

The Arts Council have, from the beginning of this year, disbanded the Fringe and Experimental and New Drama sub-committees of the Drama Panel. All drama companies will now be looked at under one heading. The Officer said, 'We believe it is harmful to these companies to have a ghetto called the fringe. As long as you classify them as fringe, people will say, '£36,000 is a lot to be giving a fringe company.' They should be accepted as theatre companies along with the reps. If a fringe company is good and a rep. company is not good, they can be compared. This is much healthier than putting the fringe in competition only with each other. All you can say at the moment is that the Belt and Braces should get more than another fringe company, which correspondingly loses out.'

What about the fringe companies' fear that this might mean more money being taken from the fringe to help the regional and repertory theatres to run their costly buildings? He did not believe this would happen. The Drama Panel would be looking at the applications for subsidies case by case. Those who had been on the fringe committee were also on the Drama Panel and knew the importance of fringe companies. But it was vital to get rid of that restricting classification.

This is something most of the fringe are in agreement about. Michael Laye said, 'The work we have been doing over the last seven or eight years should not be regarded as fringe or extraordinary now. It should be accepted as contemporary theatre.' There have been hopeful indications that the fringe is beginning to find a way to a wider audience. Hull Truck's play for BBC television, of course, would reach a wider audience than any

theatre could give them. John McGrath's 7: 84 Company has achieved wide recognition and recently played for a season at the 500-seater Shaw Theatre. An interest in the fringe movement is beginning to grow among those interested in theatre at the same time as disillusion with the West End's choice of plays increases. There is a tentative interest among West End managers, who have been searching for success with the dated formula of gathering together some star actors, an expensive set and a play by someone they have heard of. This particular formula has lost them hundreds of thousands of pounds. The Royal Court is an interesting object lesson. Most fringe companies feel that their work cannot be seen to best advantage in the traditional theatre with a proscenium arch, which distances the audience from a play. Of course, this would diminish some fringe plays, but this should not necessarily discourage them altogether. Since the Royal Court closed its Theatre Upstairs, the new management is bringing much of the former fringe talent into the main theatre. Of the three I have seen to date one, *Teeth 'n' Smiles*, was set for a West End run. I feel that the Royal Court, like the West End, is searching too hard for a success formula — star actors plus former fringe writers this time— but at least they are getting the West End contingent to sit up and ask themselves if they have been missing out on a development in the theatre.

The graduation of fringe talent to commercial theatre does not mean that the need for the fringe has gone. If we are to continue to have living theatre it is essential that young and original thought can develop in the fringe where there is freedom to experiment. British theatre has benefited immeasurably from the fringe and they should not be forced abroad in order to continue their work.

[Clare Colvin has been a journalist for ten years and worked for the *Daily Telegraph* from 1972-4. She is Theatre Critic for *The Tatler* and has written numerous feature articles for newspapers and magazines.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

The Peacock Spring. Rumer Godden. Macmillan. £3.95. *Stand Up Virgin Soldiers*. Leslie Thomas. Eyre Methuen. £2.95. *The Realms of Gold*. Margaret Drabble. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £3.50. *Distractions*. Stanley Middleton. Hutchinson. £3.75. *Vote to Kill*. Douglas Hurd. Collins. £3.50. *Montserrat at Sea*. Nicholas Montserrat. Cassell. £4.25. *Selected Stories*. Nadine Gordimer. Jonathan Cape. £3.95. *Humboldt's Gift*. Saul Bellow. The Allison Press and Secker and Warburg. £4.90.

There is a strong temptation for an author to return to the theme and setting of an earlier success. With the novel in particular, it would seem certain that the same ingredients will guarantee the mixture as before. Unfortunately, attitudes and preferences cannot be indefinitely preserved. Unavoidably, with the passage of years, both the reader and the writer have moved on.

This at any rate is the conclusion reached reluctantly after reading two major publications in the autumn lists, *Stand Up Virgin Soldiers* by Leslie Thomas and *The Peacock Spring* by Rumer Godden. Rumer Godden has over the years delighted many readers with her sensitive and perceptive studies of adolescence, often, though not always, set in India. Few writers can convey more effectively the rarefied and intangible beauty of the Indian landscape—or the anguish and tension of 'growing-up'.

In *The Peacock Spring* she focuses her attention on the fate of two young half-sisters, Una and Hal. They are snatched from a conventional English boarding school and flown out to Delhi to act as chaperone to their distinguished father, diplomat Sir Edward Gwithiam. He is set on marrying Alex Lamont, an indigenous resident of doubtful antecedents whom he has engaged as governess for the girls. Angry and frustrated at the interruption of her studies, Una soon has the lady unmasked but Hal, being more spontaneous and affectionate, lavishes upon Alex a girlish adoration. However, Una keeps up her resistance and eventually obtains from the young Indian under-gardener, Ravi, instruction in higher mathematics ; a subject well outside Alex's scholastic range. Of course, Ravi is no ordinary artisan but a poet of great sensitivity, on unofficial leave from his University. He and Una fall passionately in love, conceive a child and go through an Indian ceremony of marriage: after which they run away together, travelling across vast territories in conditions of hideous discomfort and deprivation. Sir Edward tracks down his errant daughter and compels her to part with Ravi. He urges her to undergo a *curettage* and her refusal is punished by imprisonment in her room. Open war is declared, in which everyone seems likely to get hurt when, in the nick of fictional time, Nature takes a hand, with a flow of ' . . . not heart's blood but womb blood . . . ' and there are kisses and forgiveness all round. Una is free to return to her studies at the English boarding academy, while the rest of the family disperse and gardeners prepare the grounds of the villa for new occupants . . .

And so it would seem that there is an abundance of human passion and conflict set against a backcloth of Delhi, most exquisitely and convincingly

conveyed, and yet—something is wrong with the overall reactions and implications. It is not easy to accept that a man so far-sighted and experienced as Sir Edward would choose for his third wife such an obvious fake, nor that in these enlightened days the marriage between Una and Ravi could be so arbitrarily set aside. Would a girl as passionate and mature as Una return willingly to boarding school? It seems unlikely, and the flaw in this otherwise immensely skilful and absorbing novel is that certain fundamental issues have not been squarely faced.

The same charge could not be levelled against Leslie Thomas, a writer who, though as acutely observant as Rumer Godden, draws vastly different conclusions from his chosen scene, and pretty unpleasant ones at that. *Stand Up Virgin Soldiers* is a direct continuation, via the less publicised *Onward Virgin Soldiers,* of *The Virgin Soldiers,* a story of a group of National Servicemen in a remote Malay barracks, which was published and filmed in the nineteen-fifties. Many of the same characters reappear, acting out their irresistibly comic contrivances and evasions as though there had been no interval of two decades since we first read about them. Yet somehow their antics do not seem quite so comic as before. Poverty of language structure has ceased to provoke mirth. We no longer register shock at a superabundance of expletives or other educational deficiencies, but tend to experience a measure of communal guilt for the shortcomings of the 'underprivileged'. Sadly, this altered reaction nullifies much of the impact of a vigorous example of off-beat military history.

If an author is permitted to draw upon his earlier work, the reader may be forgiven for comparing current and previous novels by the same writer. *The Realms of Gold* offers this temptation. Margaret Drabble is a successful contemporary writer who nonetheless adheres strictly to established techniques. In the present novel she frequently assumes the omnipotence of the Victorian story-teller, a device which can seem irritatingly out of place in the modern narrative. Her characters make their overall impression through a multitude of relevant detail, impeccably conveyed. The only reservation has been whether the portraits warranted the attention given them.

In *The Realms of Gold* no such doubt arises. Frances Wingate, the pivotal character, is a complex and by no means a consistently attractive personality. A frigid, domineering mother has had the effect of driving Frances to exploit her own ego through a number of emotionally exhausting activities. She marries early, and unhappily; bears four children; contrives to lecture all over the world despite domestic encumbrances, and is an authority in her own field of archaeology. Most important for the nourishment of her morale, she has a lover, Karel Schmidt, a lecturer like herself, though teaching in the unglamorous setting of a London polytechnic, beset by an overload of work and a difficult wife. In an aimless burst of self-assertion, Frances has dismissed him from her life. The scope of the action and development of *The Realms of Gold* is her attempt to recover Karel's esteem and consortium.

But to isolate the bare bones of the plot is to pay insufficient tribute to the many strands and sub-plots in which universal problems are discussed and enlarged upon in so supremely intelligent and acceptable a manner that the reader is left in no doubt that *The Realms of Gold* is Margaret Drabble's finest novel to date.

It is not easy to come to the same conclusion about Stanley Middleton's *Distractions.* Stanley Middleton was joint winner of the 1974 Booker fiction prize and, like Margaret Drabble, he is extremely accomplished at observing

and recording the individual quirks of human behaviour. His characters are usually uncomplicated people in modest circumstances. In *Distractions* he has moved them up the social scale and yet, surprisingly, the result is less colourful and engrossing. Edward Fielding, a wealthy, semi-retired businessman, has married his mistress of some years' standing, following the death by suicide of his mentally unstable wife. One would not expect the course of the new union to run smoothly. The 'mixed-up' son of the first marriage is one of the main stumbling blocks. This young man, displaying all the symptoms of insecurity, vacillates monotonously over the wisdom of marrying the girl with whom he is enjoying a form of companionate marriage. Stupendous efforts are made by the adults to solve his problems as well as their own. Skilfully drawn minor characters, such as gardeners, agents, housekeepers and, in particular, two emotionally bankrupt, aristocratic neighbours, are energetically put through their paces, yet it remains an unedifying and uniformly drab picture of contemporary provincial life, lacking sufficient bite and concentration to justify the limited terms of reference.

No such charge could be levelled at a comparatively new writer, Douglas Hurd, for with *Vote to Kill* he jumps in at the deep end with a setting of irresistible appeal—the 'goings on' in No. 10 Downing Street. Douglas Hurd, himself a Member of Parliament, has dedicated his novel to the former Conservative Prime Minister, whose Political Secretary he was in the last Tory administration.

Douglas Hurd's fictional Prime Minister certainly bears no resemblance to Ted Heath. Shoved willy-nilly into the Premiership after a lightning defeat of the Labour Government, he is totally unfitted to carry out the mammoth task which confronts the new ruling party at a date some four years hence from the present time. In his middle sixties (constantly referred to as 'old'), suffering from incipient cancer and the caprices of a young second wife, this P.M. would seem to be the last person likely to get the country back on its feet. Nor are these his only problems. His son, Anthony, by the first marriage, threatens to bring personal discredit on the occupants of No. 10, while, as if these private anxieties were not enough, a serious crisis blows up over the Ulster problem, whereupon one of the younger Conservative M.P.s mounts an assault on party discipline by organising a lethally effective campaign to discredit Government policy in Belfast. The confusing build up of ministerial advice, the conflict of priorities, and the sheer impossibility for anyone but a superman to hold all the reins and remain sane—these are so admirably presented that the reader almost shares the sense of claustrophobia and frustration common to all politicians on the lonely summit of power. All this is so absorbing and authentic that the affair between Anthony and the P.M.'s private secretary could well have been dispensed with. As it is, the love scenes and emotional recriminations strike a false note and the melodramatic and definitely incredible finale robs an exceptionally interesting 'documentary' novel of its final impact.

For readers who enjoy assessing the best of a favourite author's work, there is much to recommend the occasional published selection. All the material in *Selected Stories* by Nadine Gordimer and *Montserrat at Sea* by Nicholas Montserrat has been published elsewhere but thus assembled it takes on new power and significance. Nicholas Montserrat is a writer famous for his descriptions of the sea in all its varying moods and during World War II in particular, drawing on personal experience together with extensive scientific and technical knowledge. His style is consistently crisp and taut, entirely free of tricks or

mannerisms. Perhaps the most effective story in *Montserrat at Sea* is *The Ship that Died of Shame*—the story of a small naval vessel acquired for smuggling by two shady ex-servicemen. The power of an inanimate ship to register objection to these indignities cannot be explained in rational terms and yet, assisted by storms of unprecedented violence, the boat somehow contrives to frustrate the instigators of her ultimate degradation. And, thanks to the laconic method of address by the narrator, this seems perfectly feasible.

Nadine Gordimer also draws on a consistent background. All the stories in this collection are set in the African continent. Many are quite brief, little more than vignettes or sketches. But taken together, as in the present volume, they become part of a huge tapestry against which, under the author's microscope, men, women and children display their idiosyncrasies. Reading the stories consecutively, they have a cumulative effect and it is difficult to single out any one for particular praise. Nadine Gordimer must be one of the finest stylists in contemporary fiction ; never guilty of using stretched metaphors or gimmicks and her allusiveness is conditioned only by a heightened vision of all that is fundamental in human behaviour. With Stanley Middleton, she was joint winner of the Booker 1974 fiction prize.

And finally, a long novel from America, pulsating with the confused impressions and contradictions of life in the United States, which Saul Bellow is uniquely competent to convey. The subject matter of *Humboldt's Gift* is not easy to pin down—beyond that it concerns the soliloquising Charlie Citrine and his inheritance of money from a fellow-writer, Von Humboldt Fleischer. The unexpected affluence barely eases the many teasing problems which deprive Charlie of the necessary tranquillity to write. But as the unappetising, though strangely lovable beneficiary of the gift races and rambles through nearly five hundred closely-packed pages, the reader becomes totally involved in the vigorous, unequal American way of life which seems to have no exact counterpart in the civilised world.

Also Received

The Neti-Neti Man. Jamal. Backman and Turner. £3.75.

Although at times rather naively written and characterised, this first novel by a talented young Indian living in this country has much to recommend it. It is the story of a three-way conflict between three distinct ways of life, the English and two opposing Indian castes. The young hero, Ilango, is as much caught in the cruel cross-fire as the three attractive girls who exemplify the widely different cultures. The novel has a brief Forword by Sir Bernard Miles.

Prelude. Hilton Tims. Macdonald and Jane's. £3.25.

It was not altogether a good idea to centre this novel about Richard Wagner on a single month in the composer's chequered career. Too much is left unexplained—or has to be hastily sketched in in order to make sense—and the admission that some dates and facts have been altered does not inspire confidence. However, the reader is left eager to know the full truth and to turn back to an authoritative life—of which there are few—or better still to listen afresh to Wagner's music, which, with its force and intensity, seems remote from the character as portrayed by Hilton Tims.

The Green Isle of the Great Deep and *Morning Tide.* Neil M. Gunn. Souvenir Press. £3.00 each.

These two reissues will be particularly welcomed at a time when the future and preservation of Scotland is constantly in the news. On re-reading, the

novels have lost none of their freshness, possibly because they portray characters and events in a seemingly timeless world.

Sir Nigel. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (with an Introduction by Mary Renault). John Murray and Jonathan Cape. £3.50.

Sir Nigel provides yet another score in the mammoth task of reissuing all Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's novels with specially written Introductions to each one. How will this blend of scholarly research and cardboard chivalry strike the first-time reader? Unfavourably perhaps and yet, even against his critical judgement, he will be borne along on the irresistible tide of narrative.

SET IN THE BELFAST TRAGEDY

Harry's Game. Gerald Seymour. Collins. £3.00.

A British Cabinet Minister is assassinated on his doorstep by an IRA gunman in front of his wife and children. The scenario is no longer as improbable as it might have seemed even a few months ago. The plot is well constructed and the claustrophobic atmosphere of Belfast captured with a simplicity that is clearly authentic.

Gerald Seymour is best known as a war reporter and this venture into fiction within a real historical context has a brutal directness drawn from the realities of war. Harry's game in Belfast, as a planted agent to seek out and destroy the assassin, is like playing chess blindfold. As the wraps come off, the tactics of urban guerillas in provoking the British Army into actions which antagonise the local populace are well presented.

There is no sentimentality, but the humanity even of a professional gunman or soldier are what leads to their downfall as the finale faintly echoes the tragedy of Hamlet. Characterisation is weak but there is a compulsive quality in the strands that draw gunman and agent steadily towards each other. The last action-filled chapter knits the plot tightly together, but one feels it to be a little contrived.

One wonders whether Gerald Seymour would have been on happier ground in the Middle East or with military strategy rather than the inside job his creations are involved in. Certainly if published as a paperback, his novel would deserve a large print.

The reader will learn less of Irish history than he will of current attitudes: less of the complexity of Irish politics than he will of the drab backcloth to the thousand and more useless deaths as futile and unnecessary as these depicted in the course of Harry's game.

There is a curious detachment and objectivity so absent from such spy novels as Topaz which capitalise on brutality and the political prejudices of potential readers. It is not a novel about goodies and baddies: it is about the realities that 700 years of antagonisms have created and the professionalism of the soldier to whom political considerations are irrelevant. Seymour's slightly contemptuous treatment of the politicians is a little less than fair, but so many wars have been exacerbated or battles botched by the vanity and rivalry of soldiers and civilians that Seymour is probably drawing upon experience.

Curiously, the lack of pretension and parading of history is matched by a grasp of present reality which is likely to make this a novel more appreciated by those familiar with the Ulster scene. It enhances the plot and makes for swifter movement in the context of the detailed drabness. The impression is of a slow motion movie, running to an inevitable conclusion like an action replay.

Seymour is perceptive and entertaining, if a little artificial, and the theme is frighteningly contemporary. Indeed, one wonders after reading this book even

more than before what possible conclusion there can be to this conflict. Harry's game was unconventional. Perhaps the solution will have to be the same.

PAUL ROSE

NON-FICTION

A TRILOGY ON 19th CENTURY ART

The Pre-Raphaelite Tragedy, The Aesthetic Adventure, Victorian Olympus. William Gaunt. Jonathan Cape. £3.50 each (hardback).

Mr. Gaunt's three volumes, originally published in 1942, 1945 and 1952 respectively, have now been reprinted together in similar format. Both individually and as a sequence, they have a great deal to recommend them, and are certainly remarkably good value as source books at their price.

The Pre-Raphaelite Tragedy is probably now the most dated of the three studies since a great deal of material has been written on the history of the Brotherhood and their achievements since it originally appeared. Why were the Pre-Raphaelites a tragedy, or, rather, why does Mr. Gaunt ask us to treat them as such? Because of the personal dramas with which Dante Gabriel Rossetti was involved? Because Millais became, as he was bound to do, a successful society painter in the end? Because Hunt followed the path of personal spiritual involvement which led him to *The Scapegoat* and the banks of the Dead Sea? Mr. Gaunt never really quite explains the answer to this because he never really deals with them as fully in terms of their paintings as he does of their general background. He is excellent, however, on the general scene and provides a useful guide to such peripheral figures as Charles Augustus Howell, Vernon Lushington and Hall Caine who play so large a part in their setting. He is also particularly good on the literary allusions which play so large a part in their make-up and perhaps stopped all of them with the possible exception of Ford Madox Brown and perhaps Holman Hunt from becoming really great artists. I am afraid that even Mr. Gaunt's enthusiasm cannot persuade me from a long-standing belief that William Morris, of the second generation associates, was really the most appalling old bore and a very dubious influence on the development of English art as a whole.

The Aesthetic Adventure is spread over a far wider canvas since it covers a number of different subjects from the influence of Baudelaire and Gautier on the *L'Art pour L'Art* movement, to the Impressionists, Swinburne, Whistler, Wilde and the *Yellow Book*, down as far as Roger Fry. Although the stated period which it deals with is between 1880 and 1910, it is in fact a good deal more excursive from that, ranging from Poynter, du Maurier and Whistler as students in Paris of the 1850s to Sickert and Augustus John. It is full of some excellent vignettes and a great deal of careful knowledge of the period. The account of the *Whistler v. Ruskin* trial of 1877 is one of the best that I have read anywhere and he is extremely informative on such interesting but *maudit* characters as Simeon Solomon, Francis Thompson and James Thomson of the English decadence. The illustrations are excellent and one of the black and white reproductions points surprisingly but unmistakably to du Maurier's 'passionate Bromptonian' as the immediate ancestress of Sir Osbert Lancaster's Maudie Littlehampton. He is extremely good on Walter Pater.

Victorian Olympus is probably the most interesting of the three books because it is based on the most original selection of material. Fundamentally it is a study of the amazing career of Frederic, Lord Leighton, the most successful of all Victorian artists, although it also deals with such other atypical figures

of the period as G. F. Watts, Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema and Sir Edward Poynter. The enormous success which Watts' *Hall of Fame* pictures have recently re-achieved in a special exhibition at the National Portrait Gallery suggests that the major artists of this school may well be due for a revival of taste. (Alma-Tadema was already fetching high prices in the salerooms in 1973 before the recent art slump set in.) Certainly the leading painters of the classical and academic school which is described by Mr. Gaunt were artists of formidable skill and, often, considerable charm and taste. And how good to read, in these days of the proposed Wealth Tax, Capital Transfer Tax and Mr. Hugh Jenkins and his advisers, the account of Leighton's successes at Melbury Road. It is high time that we had a more serious look as to why this particular group of Victorian artists were in fact so highly regarded by their contemporaries, since for too long we have been inclined to overlook them and the answer that a reconsideration of their work suggests is one of increasing admiration and respect. For this purpose, no better source book could be sought than the third volume of Mr. Gaunt's trilogy.

ERNLE MONEY

WEBSTER OF THE GARDEN

The Quiet Showman: Sir David Webster and the Royal Opera House. Montague Haltrecht. Collins. £6.00.

During the Second World War the Royal Opera House was used as a dance hall, a facility much enjoyed by the troops on leave. As the war approached its end, musically interested people, headed by Leslie Boosey and Ralph Hawkes of the musical publishing firm, were anxious to regain the house as the home of opera and ballet. The Committee for Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA—the forerunner of the Arts Council) was already in existence and chaired by the eminent economist Lord Keynes. The interested parties set out to acquire Keynes as Chairman of the opera house, which they did, having decided that they wanted a permanent national home for opera, in English, and ballet, run on a seasonal, company basis, of the highest standard and state assisted. A General Administrator was obviously required and for this vital position Ralph Hawkes selected a department store manager from Liverpool who was passionate about music and had administered the Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra through its war-time concerts. His name was David Webster and for 25 years, until he retired in 1970, it is fair to say he *was* the Royal Opera House.

If the end product of the Webster regime was the first class international house that by 1970 Covent Garden had become, this status was not achieved without difficulties, vicissitudes and errors en route. From the outset there were many, headed by Sir Thomas Beecham (who was wont to dismiss Webster as 'the homosexual haberdasher') who were opposed to his appointment. The feeling prevailed that he was a provincial who lacked proper professional experience. Indeed, one has the impression that for the first five years at least, Webster, the maker of lists, was groping his way by trial and error, and did not entirely know in what direction he was heading. There was the initial decision to exclude Sadler's Wells Opera—Lilian Baylis' creation—from the project, whilst absorbing its ballet on the premise that the ballet would make money for the new company from the outset. Then there was the appointment of Karl Rankl, whom Webster had known as conductor of the Liverpool orchestra, as Musical Director. Rankl was a solid German *Kapellmeister* and trained a solid orchestra and chorus, but he lacked flair and suffered from a disastrous reluct-

ance to let in guest conductors; despite growing opposition, Rankl remained until 1951.

Then there was Webster's approach to opera itself: to be in English at all costs, even if that meant excluding distinguished singers from abroad, or even, as happened on occasions in the fifties, it led to polyglot performances. His attitude to production was modish, influenced by Shaftesbury Avenue: 'If the artists were of doubtful quality, spend your money, put the emphasis on production.' Those early years, on the operatic front at any rate, failed to produce very glowing results. There was some fine work, particularly when Erich Kleiber or Rudolph Kempe were conducting, and the ballet prospered, but fundamentally the principle of opera in English with Karl Rankl in the pit, and underrehearsed performances by overworked singers, made for a mediocrity that Webster, provided he had such favourites as Ljuba Welitsch, Peter Brook and Maria Callas available, was prepared to countenance with equanimity.

The turning point really came in 1958 when Visconti produced and designed, and Carlo Maria Giulini conducted an international cast (which included another of Webster's favourite 'discoveries', Jon Vickers) in Verdi's *Don Carlos* in Italian—a purist would have done it in French. This event began to weld the international scale house that had been sought since 1945. Two other factors thenceforth helped: first Lord Drogheda's insistence—he succeeded Lord Waverley as Chairman in 1960—in the teeth of Webster's opposition, that where possible operas be performed in their original language, and the appointment of Georg Solti as Musical Director. It tends to be forgotten today that Solti's ride both in house and press was initially a rough one, but he persevered and Covent Garden by 1970, when both Solti and Webster retired, was indeed an opera house in the international first division. The irony inherent in that achievement lay, however, in the fact that Sadler's Wells Opera—now the English National Opera—despite its rejection by Webster, had prospered and in 1968 had moved to a large house down the road from Covent Garden—The London Coliseum. There, under the aegis of Reginald Goodall, on Webster's staff but ignored by him, that project of a major company singing the largest scale works in English was realised. With Wagner's *Mastersingers* and then the *Ring Cycle*, in Andrew Porter's translation, all conducted by Goodall, Webster's dream might be said to have been realised a quarter mile from his throne.

Webster, for all his arrogance, obstinacy and occasional lapses of taste, was one of our major cultural figures, and this biography is therefore to be welcomed and should be read. It is sad to report, however, that although carefully researched, though there are lacunae about the Ballet, Goodall, Kubelik, Drogheda's influence, and Peter Hall's withdrawal as Artistic Director, the book is scarcely worthy of its subject. It abounds in small, but irritating, errors—Rodolpho and Dom Perignan, to name but two—and is written in a chatty gossip-journalism style that inevitably trivialises the subject matter. For all that Webster was a snob who loved parties, the atmosphere of cocktail party chatter that pervades this biography does little service to his very real achievements.

DAVID FINGLETON

PEACE WITH HONOUR

The Road to 1945. Paul Addison. Cape. £6.50.

How far is it true that the Churchill coalition Government 1940-45 was the greatest reforming government since the Liberal administration of 1905-13? What was the real reason for Churchill's defeat in the general election of 1945?

What caused the collapse of Conservatism? If there was a widespread surge for a genuine reconstruction during the war, what were its origins? What were the driving forces and events? Why did the Attlee government fail the 'socialists' and lead to Butskellism? These are some of the pointed-loaded questions raised by Dr. Paul Addison in this carefully researched, stylish and readable book.

It is because I knew personally almost everyone mentioned in these 278 pages and was in the House of Commons before and after the five years under examination that I marvel at the author's capacity to reconstruct (mainly from documents and cabinet, private and unpublished papers) such an accurate scenario and near-accurate pen-pictures of the dramatis personae. After all, he was born in 1943.

Let me first sketch the sweep of the book by recalling the ten chapter-headings. The Supremacy of Safety First 1922-39: Labour at the Gates 1939-40; Churchill's breakthrough 1939-40; New Deal at Dunkirk; Two Cheers for Socialism 1940-42; Blueprints from Above 1940-42; Stafford Cripps's Progress; the People's William (Beveridge); Conservatism in Eclipse 1943-45; Attlee's Consensus.

Now for the Questions. The Churchill Coalition Government was reformist in spite of Churchill, for many reasons. There was in every field a pent-up desire to improve and change our national structure, because of innumerable Reports, not only by the People's William and Keynes's Liberals but also by Conservative-dominated committees in the 'twenties and 'thirties, by the Fabians and Tory Reform Committee (Hailsham and Thorneycroft), by the Next Five Years Group with Clifford Allen and Harold Macmillan; and above all by P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning). As part-fondateur of this group, I know that our own P.E.P. Report anticipated the Beveridge Report and that our Health Report was considered a sort of bible at the Ministry of Health, not to mention other pieces of research. Again my University Colleague, M.P. Eleanor Rathbone, was more responsible than anybody for 'Children's Allowances': she wrote her classic book "The Disinherited Family" in 1924 and much later converted Beveridge, though Ernest Bevin and the Trade Union movement were always critical.

As for Education, I was Minister 1937-40 and know of the 1941 Green Book prepared by the Board of Education and circulated to all local authorities. It takes nothing away from the achievement of Mr. Butler and Chuter Ede, his Under-Secretary, to say that the Green Book of 1943 was converted into the White Paper of 1942 and the Act of 1944. Moreover, many ginger groups grew up during the war, led in some cases by Archbishop Temple himself. Quite apart from ABCA (Army Bureau of Current Affairs), Army Education was given an impetus, with Sir Philip Morris, Director of Education for Kent, put in charge. So one might continue, but this one extra point must be added. The 1944 Act cut down the number of Local Education Authorities from over 300 to 146; I doubt very much whether this step could have been if the relevant Members of Parliament had not been on active service and if there had not been a Coalition government.

I have now answered some of the questions posed by the author. His main case stands, but I would state it differently. Firstly, the Labour Party joined Churchill on their own terms; secondly, the war effort was total or if you prefer the phrase, a people's war; thirdly, as Attlee told Churchill, 'It is not that persons of particular political views are seeking to make vast changes. These changes have already taken place'. Fourthly, the Conservative leaders were

either dead or had been despatched to posts abroad; meanwhile, Churchill had surrounded himself with his own clique, some eminent like Sir John Anderson and Oliver Lyttleton, others anathema to both Conservatives and Labour such as Beaverbrook and Bracken.

It took five years in the wilderness for the Conservatives to remould their party and their policies under Mr. Butler's tutelage. Of course, after Russia was in the war on the allied side, there were efforts made by Left-wingers, Communists and some Commonwealth Independents to turn Britain into a Socialist country, but Attlee, Bevin, Morrison, Greenwood, Cripps and Dalton more nearly expressed the mood of the country and gave us what Paul Addison calls a 'consensus'. Labour had been out of office for fourteen years, the backbenchers in particular wanted a return to party politics. They got their own way for five or six years and then had to wait another fourteen years for Mr. Wilson. Meanwhile, Harold Macmillan assisted by Butler followed a middle way at home, a wind of change in the Commonwealth, a European-Atlantic policy in the West.

I commend this book because the author has assembled so much material from so many varied sources in a reasonably short study. Professor Maurice Cowling entitled his recent book 'The Impact of Hitler 1933-39'. Paul Addison reveals the impact of The Second World War on Social and Political change in Britain.

It is interesting that two historians, so different in age and outlook, overlap in many of their conclusions.

KENNETH LINDSAY

BRITAIN'S LAST NOBLE PRIME MINISTER

Lord Salisbury. Robert Taylor. Allen Lane. British Political Biography Series. £3.00 (paperback).

There has long been a need for a good biography of Britain's last noble Prime Minister, the third Marquess of Salisbury, who headed Tory administrations from 1886-1892 and from 1895-1902. The official biography, dutifully written by his daughter, Lady Gwendolen Cecil, was never finished and its four volumes end with 1892. In 1953, A. L. Kennedy published his *Salisbury*, 1830-1903: *Portrait of a Statesman*. In recent years there have appeared studies and reprints of Salisbury's numerous articles for the *Quarterly Review*, but there is no biography readily available. Mr. Taylor's study goes some of the way in remedying this need, although one regrets the excessive price demanded for such a short work (193 pages of text) in paperback.

On the whole, the book does give the reader a reasonable introduction to the political career of Lord Salisbury. Its strongest point is that it does emphasise those aspects of his career most easily overlooked. To many, Salisbury is either known for his career as Foreign Secretary or for his exposition of intellectual Toryism. Mr. Taylor rightly insists that there is much more to his career and places emphasis on Salisbury's rule as Secretary for India under Disraeli and as head of ministries which accomplished a good deal of reforming legislation.

The faults and shortcomings of the book should also be noted. After reading the book the reader does not know all that much about Salisbury as a man, nor that much about his unique family life and personality. Recent publications have brought before the reading public the highly intellectual and religious life of the third Marquess's family, but there is little of that here, beside the occasional reference to Salisbury's devotion to the Church. Indeed, one of the interesting facts about the two outstanding Victorian politicians at the end of

the century, Salisbury and Gladstone, was their known devotion to the Christian Faith and to Europe as the citadel of Christendom. Secondly, the absence of footnotes makes it difficult to sort out the sources used (which are varied and respectable). Brevity was the excuse given, but the companion volume on Gladstone, reviewed elsewhere, was a third longer, contained footnotes and cost only ten shillings more. Surely a simplified system of reference (for example, one in which a letter might stand for a source) could have been used. As it is, when one reads that Lord Salisbury 'said' something, one does not know to whom it was said or whether it was said in a confidential letter, a public speech or a published article. There are also occasional references to terms, such as the School Boards which existed between 1870 and 1903 or to the notorious Public Worship Regulation Act, passed by Disraeli's government in 1874, to placate Protestant bigotry, which might well be unknown to the lay reader. There are, finally, occasional mistakes which ought to have been spotted: Lord Lansdowne is referred to as a Liberal Unionist whilst in fact he went over to the Tory party before 1886, and Lord John Manners is referred to as 'Lord Manners' whilst as a younger son of the Duke of Rutland he held a courtesy title, not a title in his own right.

A more important fault is the somewhat hurried conclusion and the shallow treatment of the 'Irish problem'. It is extremely misleading to say, as Mr. Taylor does in the Conclusion, that 'Under the influence of Chamberlain, the Conservatives embraced protection . . . ' The party was, of course, rent by this very issue for some thirty years. The 'Irish problem' is, of course, of great importance to any understanding of Toryism in the period 1886 to 1914. It was opposition to Home Rule which gave the Tory party what was in many ways a new lease of life. Tories argued that Home Rule meant Rome Rule, that is, the ruinous oppression via democracy of the Protestant sections of Ulster by the Catholic majority in Ireland. Salisbury, not surprisingly, agreed, for like so many high Anglicans he put the Englishness of his Church before its catholicity, at least as concerns Irish Catholics. To justify this argument by citing the 'Stormont experiment', as Mr. Taylor does, is rather odd as Stormont has never controlled any area outside the six northern counties. The tyranny was not to be by Catholics but by Protestants, therefore the comparison seems decidedly illogical. The Unionist concept that one could trust Protestants to be safe with democracy whilst peasant Catholics could not be so trusted is, in the light of recent history, sheer rubbish. The Republic of Ireland, after the difficulties of the 1920s, has enjoyed peaceful and democratic rule under a system (proportional representation) arguably the most 'democratic', whilst the Scottish Protestant north stumbles from one period of 'troubles' to another, all the while propped up by Exchequer grants.

In spite of its drawbacks, the book remains a not invaluable introduction to the political life of a statesman who must in time receive proper acknowledgement both from historians and his descendants.

J. E. B. MUNSON

SHORTER REVIEWS

Obituaries from The Times 1961-1970. (Newspaper Archive Developments Ltd. £17.50.) The Times' obituaries, in the form of concise biographical records and contemporary assessments, have long been regarded as an important source of reference. Access has been one of the difficulties.

This is now being solved by the publication of selected obituaries over particular periods in volume form. The first now published and compiled by Frank C. Roberts covers the decade 1961-1970. It consists of two parts. The first contains a selection of 1,500 obituaries, reprinted in full as originally published, save for very minor corrections, immediately following the death. The anonymity of the authors has been preserved. In his Preface, William Rees-Mogg, the Editor, states that 'the selection has been made with regard to the public importance of the subject of the obituary, the intrinsic interest of what was written about him, and the need to reflect the wide range of nationalities and walks of life which *The Times* obituary columns encompass'. He points out that 'the book does contain almost all the major international figures who died in the period'. There are nearly 150 from the United States, over 60 each from France and Germany and over 30 from the Soviet Union. The obituaries come from all walks of life, including some of the most notorious. The volume has 950 large pages, each with three columns. The lengths obviously vary enormously. The longest is that of Sir Winston Churchill with 13,500 words. On the other hand, of course, a great number are quite short. The obituaries on the distinguished but less prominent are often of particular value, being the only source of information easily available, apart perhaps for the Dictionary of National Biography, when up to date. Mr. Rees-Mogg makes the point that this volume is 'both a biographical record and a record of the opinions expressed by *The Times* contemporaneously'. No tributes or appreciations from outsiders published at the time in *The Times* have been reprinted. Some might well have been published, since they throw light on some particular aspect of the deceased's life or career, which *The Times* obituary omits. They are, however, referred to in the second part, namely the Index of Obituaries and Tributes 1961-1970. The 19,000 entries provide in alphabetical order 'references to all obituaries—including the "after rules", the short death notices at the foot of the Obituary Section of the paper—and tributes, published during the period'. The volume must be widely welcomed both as a reference book and studies of contemporary history.

Portugal: The Last Empire (David and Charles. £1.98). This is a useful paperback on the background to the Portuguese revolution by Neil Bruce. He is primarily concerned with the old dictatorship, the colonial struggles and the first six months of the new era, to the autumn of 1974. Mr. Bruce has some comments on later events, but he frankly admits 'No one can look into the future'. Nonetheless, at the moment there is optimism for a moderate democratic representative system.

The Life of Dylan Thomas (Dent & Sons Ltd. £2.25). This biography by Constantine Fitzgibbon was first published in 1965. It is a sympathetic but balanced appreciation which deserves reprinting as an Aldine Paperback edition. It is unfortunate that still no source reference is given to the quotation from Rosalind Wade's *Parton Street Poets* in which she recalls Dylan Thomas in the bookshop in Red Lion Square, London. It comes from the Poetry Review in 1964.

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Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 37 Union Street, London, S.E.1. Tel 01-407 0497. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

1976

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111th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

FEBRUARY 1976

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Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £6.48; U.S.A. and Canada $20.00. Rates for all other countries on application.

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Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

February 1976 Vol. 228 No. 1321

FEEDING THE SOVIET UNION

by Leslie Symons

THE Soviet Union is by far the largest state in the world, covering about one-sixth of the earth's land surface, yet it does not seem to be able to grow enough grain to feed its population of some 250 million people—not a large number in relation to the area. Whenever the harvests are poor the Soviet government becomes a large-scale buyer on world markets, and there are threats of increases in prices for grain and fears of shortages. These failures persist in spite of the revolutionary Soviet collectivisation of agriculture carried out nearly fifty years ago, with recent heavy investment in reorganisation and modernisation of farms, and continuous exhortations from Soviet leaders to farmers to increase production. Many western critics place the whole blame for this situation on the collective system itself, a system which has given rise to nationalised land, huge farms and depersonalised labour organisation, but this, I submit, is only part of the explanation, and since only well-informed criticism is valid, the underlying difficulties which have to be overcome in the USSR should be more generally appreciated.

The obstacles to production may be grouped under three headings: environmental, historical and organisational, and no survey, however brief, can fairly neglect any one of these groups of factors. The Soviet record of failure—or of achievement, depending on one's point of view—can be assessed only after all have been considered.

When we think of the Russian physical environment, snow and frost come readily to mind, but less often appreciated are drought, wind and pests, yet these are far greater enemies of the farmer than are the famed Russian, or even Siberian, winters. This is simply because the sub-zero temperatures come mainly when there is, in any case, no plant growth. Early or late frosts are, of course, destructive, but the mid-winter freeze is feared only if there is little snow, or if unusually strong and persistent winds blow the snow cover off the fields. The snow itself is welcome, not only because it insulates the soil from frost, but also because it represents a reservoir of moisture which will melt into the land and provide soil water for spring growth. In the absence of snow, however, autumn-sown wheat will perish

and the land will have to be re-sown in spring—and spring grains never yield as highly as winter wheat.

The droughts of southern Russia, the Ukraine and the former virgin lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia are associated with anti-cyclonic conditions which build up over the great continental mass and in some years spread westward to bring warm, dry summers to the edges of the Atlantic. Hence our own fine summer this year, which brought cries of disaster from British farmers who, however, knew nothing of the degree of the scorching droughts that were occurring in the Soviet wheat lands. Low yields were reported by farmers all over Britain and the EEC, but no one accused them of inefficiency, so is it Soviet inefficiency that leads them in a drought-stricken year to seek over 10 million tons of grain from the USA?

The USA invites comparison with the USSR because it is another great continental country but dominated by private enterprise in contrast to the Soviet system. As the USA, together with Canada, provides most of the surplus wheat available for world markets it is obvious that there is a good case for believing the American private enterprise system to be superior. And, in some ways, it undoubtedly is. To put the picture straight, however, it must be remembered that the USA is almost wholly further south than the USSR. The 49th parallel, famed for providing much of the border between the USA and Canada, passes in the USSR through the middle of the Ukraine and the Kazakh steppes. These areas include the lands most favourable to agriculture in the USSR which therefore compare in latitude, and length of growing and frost-free seasons, only with the most northerly states of the USA and southern Canada. Most land further south in the USSR is so far within the continental mass as to be mainly desert, while more than half of all the southerly Soviet areas are highly mountainous. In the vast spaces of eastern Siberia and the Far East region (accounting for about half of the Soviet land mass) only relatively small basins and valleys offer cultivable land, the rest is mountainous or tundra and arctic. Only in the Caucasian valleys are there lands which can be compared with the lush lands of California, though the irrigated oases of Central Asia are highly productive. In all, only some ten per cent of the Soviet land area is fit for cultivation.

Hence, it is not surprising that Soviet grain yields per acre are generally lower than American but compare favourably with Canadian experience. By contrast, when cotton is considered, yields per acre in the oases of Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan are among the highest in the world, but unlike the Ukrainian and Kazakh wheat, the cotton does not have to survive damaging droughts without irrigation. Also cotton has traditionally been given first preference for fertiliser applications and for spraying to kill pests and diseases. In so far as fertiliser supplies have been limited and often badly distributed, and technical levels of spraying crops and of machinery available have been below the USA standards, the Soviet production and supply system has been at fault. But to get results regularly comparable with those in the USA, the Russians would have had to have far better support services than the Americans have, and would have to expect to

incur much higher costs of production.

In fact, Soviet costs are generally higher, not because of greater investment in machinery, but because of the labour involved. This is not, of course because Soviet workers are paid more than Americans, but because the use of labour is less efficient. In agriculture, this means comparative yield per man, and here the Soviet system is inefficient, because large numbers of people still live and work on the land in spite of long-continuing migration from farm to factory. It is at this point that we have to take account of the historical factor.

One hundred and ten years ago nearly one-half of the Russian population including almost all the peasants were serfs, the absolute property of their owners. Like the negro slaves of America they worked in the fields for a bare return, but unlike the American plantations the Russian estates were badly organised and ill-equipped, with many of the landlords living far from their estates and spending their incomes in St. Petersburg and Moscow. The land was cultivated on the three-field system with the strips allocated to each individual being changed annually, and long after the serfs were emancipated this primitive type of agrarian system continued. Reforms in the early part of the twentieth century made relatively little progress before the war and finally the Bolsheviks swept the whole system away. The long-suffering peasants had found little in the new Soviet system to encourage them to part with grain and other needed foodstuffs, which were worth much more to them than the depreciating currency they were offered, so compulsory deliveries were imposed. Continued resistance from the peasants led to Lenin's replacement of War Communism by the New Economic Policy, in which more encouragement was given to entrepreneurs and peasants alike to overcome temporary difficulties. Bolshevik programmes had, however, long included collectivisation of the farms and continuing difficulties with grain supply after Lenin's death led to Stalin pressing through the policy of collectivisation.

Earlier attempts to get peasants to pool their resources in collective farms had met with little response and the early state farms set up to attack the grain problem had not succeeded, but under Stalin the peasant holdings, which averaged 15 hectares in 1928, were forcibly grouped into collectives and those who resisted were heavily taxed, coerced and often arrested as enemies of the people. Great losses of livestock occurred and herds were greatly reduced by 1933 when the bulk of the 25 million farms of 1928 had been grouped into some 210,000 collectives, averaging 70 households in size.

The long slow recovery was interrupted by the Nazi invasion and occupation of the most fertile lands of the Ukraine. In 1945, agricultural production was back down to the levels of 1913 when the population had been only one-third as great. Again began the long climb back. The policy adopted was to enlarge the farms still further by amalgamating them, and to create state farms to deal with special problems, such as the settlement of the virgin lands which Khrushchev pushed ahead after 1954. But the technological level of Soviet farming remained low, transport was poorly organised and many rural areas remained grossly overpopulated, while

others, such as southern Siberia, suffered severe shortages of labour. It is obvious that with this long history of suffering, together with neglect of investment and over-population, lack of education, persistence of disease, the presence of many war-wounded men and loss of the more vigorous either to the fronts or to the cities, to mention only some of the hindrances, any parallels with the American situation are quite invalidated.

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders claim that communism has achieved tremendous advances, far greater than would have been possible under capitalism, and that their system will provide a better future for present and for unborn generations; therefore they invite constant investigation of these achievements. Despite the climate and other environmental hindrances, and the debilitating effects of historical circumstances, they claim that Soviet farming is efficient and will provide for the needs of the country and to some extent for export. The present policy is to increase investment in the farms, but also to continue to enlarge the collective farms yet further and to create yet more state farms by conversion from collectives, and so we come to consideration of the organisation as it has emerged today.

Collective farms, those in which the members hold the land in perpetuity from the state, and are paid according to the profits made by the farm, currently account for about 47 per cent of the cultivable land, and state farms, the workers of which are paid wages by the state, for almost all the rest. The collectives (*kolkhozi*) have been gradually reduced in numbers to about 31,000. One reason for the reduction in numbers has been amalgamation and the average collective now has 450 households working about 3,000 hectares of cultivable land. Livestock per farm average about 1,500 cattle, over 1,000 pigs and over 1,700 sheep. The labour force is organised by brigades, with those on some farms being almost as large as the smaller collectives of the past. It is not easy to maintain personal responsibility under these conditions and to overcome this problem there has been a rather controversial development of allocating a tract of land to the particular care of a small group of members called a link (*zveno*). This is a cause for controversy because to some it is too reminiscent of private agriculture but it does seem to get better results. In addition, the members of the collectives retain their personal plots of about one-half of a hectare on which they can grow vegetables and, if they wish, some fodder for a cow or other livestock within permitted limits. All the machinery and farm buildings are held in common, but members have the right to own hand tools as well as all forms of personal property.

The state farm (*sovkhoz*) is regarded by communists as nearer to their ideal and the role of state farms in the economy has increased very rapidly in recent years, by conversion of collectives, and by creating new state farms in pioneering regions such as the virgin lands, and in order to improve the supply of milk, meat and vegetables in the big cities. The average size of the 17,000 state farms is about twice that of the collectives, averaging 6,000 hectares of sown lands and nearly 2,000 cattle. They are rather more specialised than the collectives and their huge size is more apparent when the specialisations are considered. Thus, the average grain

sovkhoz has over 20,000 hectares of sown land and nearly 4,000 cattle, the average farm specialising in pig production has over 7,500 pigs and the average sheep *sovkhoz* has nearly 30,000 sheep.

The drive to make bigger and yet bigger units the basis of production extends beyond the limits of the individual farm to the intercollective organisations, in which several farms cooperate for certain purposes such as to develop and supply canning factories. Organisational problems abound in these enormous units but the political leadership will not be diverted from its self-imposed task, being convinced that agriculture must be 'industrialised' to get the best results.

At the other end of the scale, however, the personal plots of the members of collectives, state farm workers and other rural employees remain enormously important. They still produce over 60 per cent of all the potatoes grown, 40 per cent of the eggs and about one-third of vegetables, meat and milk, all from a mere six per cent of the cultivated land. Even these proportions are, however, small compared with early postwar years. In 1950 they produced some 70 per cent of the meat and milk and 90 per cent of the eggs. In absolute quantities there has not been much change in the yield of the personal plots but the yields from the collective and state lands have increased immensely. Thus, the proportion of the total production of the key commodities from state farms rose between 1950 and 1973 from 11 to 33 per cent in the case of meat, from 11 to 39 per cent of vegetables, from 6 to 29 per cent of milk, from 2 to 43 per cent of eggs and from 11 to 46 per cent of grain. If production for sale is considered then the proportions from the state farms are much higher because much of the produce of the personal plots is consumed by the farm household.

What of the total output? Taking five-year averages to iron out fluctuations, the total grain harvested rose from 121 million tons in 1956-60, to 130 million tons in 1961-65, and 167 million tons in 1966-70. 1973 saw a record harvest of 222 million tons (Western observers reported good weather conditions but made no comment on organisation except for waste occurring due to bad handling on farms and by transport organisations). This contrasted with the previous year's 168 million tons. This year the forecasts have gone from bad to worse and in December it appeared that only about 137 million tons would be reported as the final figure. If so, this is the lowest total since 1965 and represents a serious setback for the Soviet planners.

Grain is, of course, only part of the story. Big increases in meat, milk and vegetable production, as well as in industrial crops have been reported in recent years. In fact, part of the grain problem is related to the big increases in the number of livestock. Only exceptionally in the Soviet Union can grass be relied on to provide much of the feed, so cattle production, as well as that of pigs and poultry, is based largely on grain. With limited grainlands and undoubtedly indifferent organisation adding to the physical problems, the Soviet Union has no easy task in growing enough grain to feed the growing human and animal population. If livestock products had not been given increasing emphasis the subsistence problem would not be

serious, but the Soviet citizen has come to expect a varied diet—much less luxurious than is common in the West—but nonetheless varied and high in protein. So to accommodate this situation the Soviet government has gone shopping in years when the harvest has been low and has purchased millions of tons of grain abroad. The 1972 purchases have been labelled 'the great grain robbery' but this is really less than fair to the Soviets. American dealers, and political leaders, however, have needed some cover-up for their lack of astuteness in their handling of the sales. They have made fewer mistakes this year. President Ford imposed a ban on the sale of grain to the USSR after the first deal of 9.8 million tons, but the American farmers saw their lucrative market slipping away to others so the ban was lifted. Instead, a long-term agreement was negotiated, whereby the Soviet Union would buy between 6 and 8 million tons of grain annually during the five years from October 1, 1976, with possibly an extra 7 million tons this year. Japanese and Australian officials, concerned respectively with buying and selling, were among those who welcomed the deal as bringing some stability to world grain markets and there was no immediate rush to put up prices elsewhere. Nor was there any accusation of robbery. In fact the arrangement makes good sense. The Russians have oil to sell, as well as gold, so their purchases are well backed by resources. The Americans regularly have grain surpluses so welcome long-term markets. The effect on other grain-importing nations is not likely to be severe because without assured sales there were likely to be renewed restrictions on sowings in the USA. The problem for grain-deficient Third World countries remains that of how to finance purchases, particularly after the quadrupling of oil prices. Aid from wealthier countries, including the USSR as well as the USA, may include grain, of course, but such solutions are at best only temporary. The long-term solutions must lie in increased production in the poorer countries and the granting of better access for them to the markets of the wealthier countries—whether USSR, USA or EEC. It is not helpful, meanwhile, to blame Russian harvests for shortage of food elsewhere, or its high prices. It is only one factor; one incidentally over which *we* have no control, when there are many over which we do have, or could have some control. It is better that we in this country, in Europe, in the 'West', should give our attention to those faults that we can remedy rather than to the failings, real though they may be, of another political system's approach to the overcoming of their own problems.

However, the Soviet authorities are, as we have noted, loud in praising their own system so it is justifiable to consider the merits of this system. As far as collectivised agriculture is concerned, my own studies lead me to believe that it is not a system capable of high levels of efficiency. The scale of the enterprise is too large, the channels of command too diffuse, the level of individual responsibility too low. On the other hand, in the Soviet case, collectivisation replaced peasant farming which was grossly inefficient even in its time and it is doubtful whether if it had been allowed to continue it would have been more efficient than the present system. To give a chance of real efficiency it would have been necessary to replace the peasant holdings

by highly mechanised, carefully planned and operated, medium-size farms such are common in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, but this could not have been regarded as likely in 1917 or in 1928 when in the USSR there were still over 25 million separate peasant holdings averaging only 15 hectares.

As the poor grain harvests of 1972 and, more especially 1975, have come in years when yields have also been much below average in the more favourable western lands, but were separated by record Soviet harvests, it seems unlikely that the organisation can be blamed entirely for these lapses. Overall the record is not as bad as some claim, though obviously it could be better, and we must hope in the interests of worldwide supplies of food that the Soviet system will be improved in the future and will overcome its physical and historical handicaps to a greater extent so that its output becomes greater—but there will still be bad years as well as good years.

SOURCES

Statistics quoted are from the annual volumes, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* (The national economy of the USSR) published by the Central Statistical Office, Moscow. There are many books on Soviet agriculture, some recent ones being L. Volin, *A Century of Russian Agriculture; from Alexander II to Khrushchev,* 1971; R. C. Stuart, *The Collective Farm in Soviet Agriculture,* 1972; L. Symons, *Russian Agriculture, A Geographical Survey,* 1972.

[Dr. L. Symons is Reader in the Geography of Russia at the Centre of Russian and East European Studies and the Department of Geography, University College of Swansea.]

LARRA AND THE BIRTH OF SPANISH LIBERALISM

by Lionel King

INTEREST mounts as to the nature of the new régime in Spain now that Franco's thirty-nine year reign as her totalitarian caudillo has ended. Prospects for a constitutional monarchy, even remotely resembling the British model, are dim indeed. Few countries have enjoyed a briefer flirtation with genuine parliamentary democracy than Spain. Short-lived experiments in Liberal Government over the past 150 years have left no heritage of liberal institutions. Yet, despite the tragic background of absolutism, revolution, civil war, military dictators, six constitutions and two republics there is an unbroken liberal tradition in Spanish literature discernible throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. Arguably the founder of this tradition is Mariano José de Larra.

Larra was born in Madrid in 1809 shortly after the Napoleonic annexation. His family, sympathetic to the early ideals of the French Revolution, belonged to the intellectual minority who welcomed the invaders as liberators of the country from the effete Spanish Bourbons. When the Anglo-Spanish forces swept the French from the Iberian Peninsula, these *afrancesados*, literally the Frenchified, as they were contemptuously called, fled to France in 1814. While at school in Bordeaux, young Larra showed early signs of precocious genius. When the family returned to Madrid in 1818 following an amnesty, he re-learned his native tongue and is said to have translated *The Iliad* at twelve, later entering the University of Valladolid. Nominally a law student, Larra founded there a review, *El Duende Satírico del Día* (*The Satirical Imp of the Day*) of which he was editor and leading contributor. This ran to five issues in 1828-29 before its suppression by the censor. Later a similar publication *El Pobrecito Hablador* (*The Poor Little Prattler*) met an identical fate, though not before Larra's work had been widely read and the foundations of his reputation established.

Larra's work can be studied only against the background of the history of his times. The rigorous censorship had been re-imposed by the absolutist Fernando VII on his restoration in 1814, creating an adverse climate for literary or intellectual activity, a situation not wholly unlike that prevailing in Spain today. This period of two decades of repression and reaction effectively delayed a revival in Spanish Literature which had produced little of merit since the Siglo de Oro, the Golden Age, 150 years earlier.

In his satirical essay *Letter to Andrés* written in 1832, Larra captures, in a mood of bitter resentment, the stifling atmosphere of a country under literary censorship. The letter is purportedly written by a native of Las Batuecas, possibly the most backward and remote region of Spain at the time (Las Batuecas is a symbol for all Spain) where the inhabitants subsisted in material and cultural poverty.

> In this land no-one reads because no-one writes, and nothing is written because nothing is read.

Larra and his literary contemporaries naturally espoused the cause of

liberty and reform. He outlined his own principles in a later article, *Literature*. There should be 'liberty in literature, as in the arts, as in industry and commerce.' Literature must express truthfully people's life. It must have a social purpose and must serve the cause of human progress by the popular dissemination of truths.

For a fleeting instant it had appeared that Spain might emerge from the trauma of foreign domination and the Peninsula War with the institutions of a modern state. The Spanish Cortes, or Parliament, a dynamic body in Mediaeval Spain, but moribund for centuries, had reconvened in unoccupied Cádiz in 1812, in the absence of the King, to devise in 384 articles, the first Spanish constitution. This cautious attempt to establish the principles of popular sovereignty and place limits on royal power was wholly repudiated by the King who simply restored the feudal autocracy of pre-1808; a policy in which he was fanatically supported by the nobility, the Church and xenophobic masses.

The Independence movement throughout Spanish America, arrested by the promises of equal status with the mother country in the 1812 Constitution, now gathered momentum. In 1820 an army assembled at Cádiz for embarcation to America to suppress the rebellion, mutinied, declared against Fernando's tyranny and for the adoption of the 1812 Constitution. As nation-wide excitement grew, the King, in a panic, accepted the demand and a Liberal ministry drawn from among the Cádiz constitutionalists was formed. The 'doceañistas' (literally the men of 1812) attempted to govern Spain for the next three years, but the experiment failed dismally largely through internal dissension. As popular disillusionment mounted the Holy Alliance despatched a French Army of 100,000 troops to re-instate Fernando VII. Thousands of Liberals were now imprisoned, murdered or driven into exile. The use of the term 'Liberal' to describe an opponent of reaction is said to have originated in Spain at this time, Shortly before the King's unlamented death in 1833, the Queen Regent, Mariá Cristina, though hardly sympathetic to the principles of constitutional monarchy, found herself obliged to court the favour of the Liberals. The King's brother, Don Carlos, an uncompromising absolutist, had challenged the right of succession of her infant daughter, the future Queen Isabella II. As Liberals hastily returned from exile to flock to the banner of their unlikely new protectress, the irony of political life in Spain for the next century was born. The censorship was lifted and amid feverish literary activity many newspapers and reviews were founded.

Larra, determined upon a literary career, had been earning a living translating fashionable French plays for the Madrid stage. Now he joined *La Revista Española, The Spanish Review*, soon becoming one of Spain's highest paid journalists. It is upon his newspaper and review articles that his literary reputation is founded. Numbering some 200 or more, his *artículos* have appeared in many collections, perhaps the most complete being the 1943 Aguilar Edition of Amalgro San Martín. As no major translation into English has been undertaken to date, his work is virtually unknown in this country. The *artículos* fall into three main groups. Firstly there is literary criticism and reviews of new plays and operas. A second

group includes his purely political essays and the third, which illustrates his unique genius, consists of his *articulos de costumbres*, articles on manners, in which he observes contemporary Spanish society. Among his works outside journalism is the first Romantic novel in Spanish, *El Doncel de Don Enrique El Doliente*, written in the style of Sir Walter Scott and a verse drama, *Macías*, which was well received when played in Madrid.

On joining the Revista in 1833 he adopted the pen-name Fígaro, an acknowledgement of his esteem for the French, satirical dramatist Beaumarchais of 50 years earlier.

In *My Name and Purpose* he wrote:

> Although I'm no Sevillian or barber, I am as it were a charlatan, mischief maker and a curious one, if ever there was.

No aspect of Spanish society was to escape his mordant wit, observant eye or the whiplash of his satire. *Corridas de Toros*, (*The Bull Fight*), an early article, is probably the first in Spanish to attack the fundamental obscenity of this traditional spectacle:

> if indeed it was a proof of the valour of the Spaniard . . . now it is proof of his barbarity and ferocity.

In *El Castellano Viejo* his target is the prejudices and traditional habits of the Old Castlian who considers himself genuinely Spanish. In *Vuelva Vd. Mañana* (*Come Back Tomorrow*) he makes a biting attack on apathy and the Spanish trait of unpunctuality. In *La Fonda Nueva* (*The New Inn*) he chides his countrymen for their lack of culinary expertise and gross tastes in eating. In *Una Primera Representación*, (*A First Night*), the victims are the boorish and tasteless theatre-goers:

> Have you read that about the new play in the Review?
> What play is it?
> I don't know.
> Yes, it must be the one that fellow was writing . . .
> Ah! Yes! Then it must be good . . .
> Do many people die in it?
> Of course—they say it's good.
> Well, you know how the public are . . . but my opinion is . . .
> I wouldn't like to say . . . it'll either be a great success of a tumultuous failure.

His political articles deal with incidents in the nightmarish kaleidoscope of events in his own day. Of major importance is an extended piece, *Spanish Politics* 1830-36. Larra was an eye-witness of much of what he relates and knew personally most of the politicians of those eventful years. Seldom can history have been recorded so accurately at first hand by a more observant or objective journalist, certainly by few with a greater literary gift.

At times Larra's methods appear unfair or exaggerated, almost sardonic, too generalised, lacking the balance lent by a word of praise for the institution or idea under discussion. He had marked prejudices. He loathed particularly the lower classes of Madrid and their uncouth manners as in *Entre Qué Gente Estamos*? (*What Sort of People Are We Among*?). Many have accused him of being unpatriotic, too eager to denigrate Spain in favour of the ways and institutions of other countries. In his way, however, he was a genuine patriot, not blind to Spain's faults. In *En Este Pais* (*In This Country*), Larra protests strongly against snobbish praise of everything

foreign:

> Let's do more favour or justice to our country. Let every Spaniard do his duty like a good patriot . . .

He felt very deeply his compatriots' ignorance of Spain's heritage. This is the theme of *The Antiquities of Merida*. Only foreigners visit this ancient Roman town, never his fellow countrymen. He asks his quack guide:

> Do many foreigners come?
> Oh yes . . . English more than anyone . . . they torture us with so many questions . . . they are mad. . . . But Spaniards . . . very few . . . most of them go by without asking anything . . . they don't stay in the town . . .

Of the quality of his prose it has been said that it was scarcely surpassed in the nineteenth century. It is lucid, natural and has a distinctly modern character, yet is deeply rooted in the great tradition of Spanish prose writers such as Cervantes and Quevedo. In his later articles his prose develops a deep poetic intensity. An example is *Día de Difuntos* 1836 (All Souls Day), in which Fígaro wanders in disillusion about Madrid seeing symbols of the nation's political tragedy about him.

As Larra's reputation grew, other journals acquired his services from 1835 El Español, from 1836 El Observador and El Mundo. Influential political figures sought his support. Yet his failure to gain recognition in literary media other than periodismo began to induce in him a consuming sense of insufficiency which journalistic success could not compensate.

His early marriage in 1829 to the shallow Pepita Wettoret ended in separation in 1834. His views on marriage are found in the revealingly autobiographical *Casarse Pronto y Mal* (*Marrying Young and Badly*). In 1834-35 he developed a passionate obsession for Dolores de Armijo, who encouraged though did not return his attentions. The following year he travelled widely abroad possibly to purge the memory of La Armijo, only to find on his return that Spain was plunged in Civil War. The irreconcilable adherents of absolutism had rallied to Don Carlos who controlled the north. In the capital the supporters of the Queen Regent, the '*cristinos*', were divided into '*moderados*', conservative reformers led by Martínez de la Rosa and the '*exaltados*', radical liberals who demanded the immediate re-institution of the 1812 Constitution. The Royal Statute of 1834 had attempted an unreal compromise between absolutism and a limited parliamentary system. The crisis deepened. The war was going in favour of the Carlists. Law and order was breaking down and famine threatened the capital. After a short-lived radical government led by Mendizábal, an able Jewish banker, who fell through machinations in the Palace, new elections were arranged for the autumn. Encouraged by his friend, the playwright politician, the Duke of Rivas, Larra stood as a 'moderado' candidate in Avila, significantly the home town of La Armijo. For some time he had considered taking a more active part in politics, his dilemma over which of the warring factions to join being outlined in *Los Tres No Son Más Que Dos* (*The Three Are No More Than Two*). His decision was to cost him his friendships among the more radical faction. Larra was duly elected in a campaign characterised by bribery and corruption rife at the time. Only days later, before he could take his seat, the mutiny of sergeants of the guard at the Royal Summer residence of La Granja obliged the Queen Regent to re-proclaim the 1812

Constitution. The recent elections were annulled.

The 'moderates' fallen from grace and his erstwhile radical friends in power, Larra returned, his political aspirations in ruins, to journalism. Though his seemingly ambivalent political attitudes may have temporarily tarnished his reputation for objectivity, he found no shortage of work. His last articles reflect his disillusion and bitterness. The sparkling satire has become deep pessimism. Some observers have suggested that his depression sprang from some profound mental disorder which was aggravated by the disappointments he suffered and his sorrow over the plight of Spain.

On January 3rd 1837 his old friend, Count Campo Alenge was killed in action against the Carlists, inspiring him to pen a memorable obituary in which he attacks corrupt politicians and inept generals, adding a re-statement of his political beliefs:

> Campo-Alange believed it was his mission to defend neither the Statute of 1834 or the Constitution of 1812. Under one or the other form of Government, liberty continued to be our cause.

A month later Dolores Armijo agreed to a meeting at Larra's home, his consuming obsession being to persuade her to resume their affair. The lady was totally unmoved by Larra's pleading. As she left the house, he put a bullet through his brain.

Larra's character was long associated with the tenor of his work. Fígaro was seen as cold, rational, arrogant, bitter, ungenerous, misanthropic. His correspondence added glimpses of vanity, snobbery and egoism. Later interpretations suggest, however, a man in conflict with himself. Witty and charming in society, he unleashed at home repressed moods. Mature and reasoning with the shortcomings of others, emotional immaturity precluded him from organising his life on rational lines.

On the political stage, little happened in the years following his death that would have made Larra optimistic for Spain's future. Absolutism was dead but only a cynical charade of parliamentary democracy replaced it. Only on the literary scene would he have rejoiced. His work virtually launched the Romantic Movement in Spain. His particular contribution, the *articulo de costumbres* was developed by Alarcón, Pereda and Ibañez into the regional novel, with its strong vein of realism. Larra's exposure of the sickness of contemporary Spanish society was developed by Benito Pérez Galdos in the later part of the 19th century in a long succession of powerful novels analysing the same problems with objectivity and humanity. The analysis intensified at the turn of the century in the work of Angel Ganivet and Miguel de Unamuno. It was to become profoundly philosophic in the essays of José Ortega y Gasset, particularly in his study *Invertebrate Spain* written in the 1920s.

Larra's methods may offend his fellow countrymen, hence the disfavour that frequently has befallen his name particularly in times when Spain has withdrawn into herself. The prevailing theme of his work, a remarkable legacy indeed for a writer who died in his twenty-eighth year, is that the Spanish people should exercise a greater degree of self-criticism. This is sound advice, as it was in Larra's own day, for a nation struggling to emerge from an era of political and intellectual repression.

AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES AND THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

by Keith D. Suter

THERE are four paradoxes regarding the Australian Aborigines. First, on the one hand, the existence of Australian Aborigines is well known around the world because of, for example, their appearance on Australian postage stamps and in glossy books on Australia. While, on the other hand, few people outside Australia (and even some inside Australia) really know how Aborigines live, what language they speak and how they relate to the predominantly white Australian society. Second, Australia has one of the world's highest standards of living, rivalling that of the US and Sweden, and its wealth is more equitably distributed than in most other liberal-democratic countries. But Aborigines are the exception because they are generally far less affluent and consequently do not live so well, for instance they have one of the highest child mortality rates among liberal-democratic countries.

Third, Aborigines have never used violence against the state; they lack the political muscle of the trades unions and business companies; and they form only about one or two per cent of the Australian population. But they constitute one of the most important focal points for Australian political controversy. Finally, there is a general concern in Australia that Aborigines should be helped; a number of voluntary bodies and religious missions have pledged themselves to aid Aborigines; and Aborigines have themselves become increasingly vocal about what should be done to achieve Aboriginal advancement. But there is very little agreement on just how Aborigines should be helped.

This article will examine the efforts by recent Governments to help Aborigines and will show why the efforts have failed. In doing so, an attempt will be made to explain how the above parodoxes have come to exist and why Aboriginal affairs are moving into a new era, where Aborigines will have far more influence in deciding their own affairs. For, on the one hand, the past Governmental failures may well encourage Governments in the future to ease their own burdens by simply giving more power to Aborigines as a way of avoiding their present responsibilities for Aboriginal affairs. On the other hand, there is the increasing likelihood of Aboriginal violence and Government intervention in Aboriginal affairs will only boost the chances of such violence.

It has only been in the last eight years that the Federal Government has become so preoccupied with Aboriginal affairs. Prior to 1967, these matters were the main concern of Australia's six states, with the Federal Government only being concerned with the Aborigines in the two Territories it controlled: the Australian Capital Territory (where Canberra is situated) and the sparsely populated Northern Territory.

Australia is the second most urbanised country in the world and since

most Aborigines have always lived in rural areas, few Europeans in Australia have had any direct contact with them. The rural Europeans were largely interested in Aborigines only in so far as they could exploit the Aborigines as cheap labour. Thus, while most Europeans had some knowledge of Aboriginal affairs, this was mainly limited to the romantic notions culled from history books, rather than any direct knowledge of the squalid lives most Aborigines had in rural areas. The mass media did little to inform people of Aboriginal affairs. For example, to this day the media are always morbidly fascinated by the rape or murder of European women but when Aboriginal women are victims of such crimes they rarely rate more than a few lines.

During the 1950s and 1960s, a number of Aboriginal advancement organisations were formed by Europeans and Aborigines in all Australian states for the welfare and civil rights of Aborigines (an enterprise largely copied from the US civil rights groups working for Negro advancement) and these organizations were loosely joined together in the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement. One of the Council's main campaigns crystallised in the May 1967 Australian referendum to change inter alia two clauses in the Federal Constitution discriminating against Aborigines: section 127, which excluded full-blood Aborigines from national census counts (implying that they were somehow not full Australian citizens) and section 51 (xxvi) which prohibited the Federal Government from passing laws relating to Aborigines living outside the two Federal Government Territories.

Most Australian referenda have failed; this is therefore one of the few exceptions where Australians have responded positively (by a very large majority) to increase substantially the Federal Government's power. No doubt the main motivation was that people believed that whatever problems the Aborigines had could be better solved by giving the responsibility to the Federal Government and so ease the burden on their state Governments. However, having agreed to hold the referendum, the conservative coalition Liberal-County Party Government, led by the late Harold Holt, was at a loss as to what it should do with the extra power. Mr. Holt's two successors as Prime Minister, John Gorton and William McMahon, were equally confused.

The Federal Government had always controlled the Northern Territory and the plight of Aborigines was no better here than in the pre-1967 situation within the states. Moreover, most Aborigines live in Country Party constituencies and so the Prime Ministers had to be careful not to annoy Country Party politicians and voters, for instance, by trying to increase the wages of Aborigines working on cattle stations. Indeed, the Northern Territory Administration has been a Country Party enclave for most of its history; the Minister in charge of it has nearly always been a Country Party politician and the Administrator has usually been a retired Country Party politician.

A further reason for the lack of Government action following the 1967 referendum was the lack of agreement on just what should be done. This

remains a problem. There is no lack of suggestions but the Government has had to be careful about European opinion. Moreover, since the Aborigines are dispersed around much of Australia and live in isolated areas, there is little opportunity for them to discuss Aboriginal affairs so as to put a concerted viewpoint to the Government. Given this lack of precise Aboriginal demands, the Government followed the easier course of doing as little as possible so as to avoid annoying the Europeans and not to encourage hope among the Aborigines.

Also, since the time that Australia began as a number of colonies, Aborigines have been gradually and usually violently forced off the good agricultural land; many were killed and others managed to flee to less promising land. An increasingly important source of Australian wealth is derived from minerals and many mines, or potential mines, are located in these rural areas where Aborigines now live. Thus, the Government has had to be careful about making arrangements for Aborigines in case the Government allocated them to land which was later required for mining and they would have to be moved yet again.

Finally, while many of the faults for the present shameful situation of Aborigines may be debited against the Europeans, the Aborigines have a 'fault'. Although it is unwise to generalise about Aborigines because they are scattered over Australia and so there is little uniformity among them, it is fairly safe to assume that most of them lack one essential quality for modern European living—namely greed. Aboriginal culture has been predicated on co-operation both among individuals and between people and nature (by being mainly nomadic, they avoided destroying all the flora and fauna in any one area). Most Aborigines still lack the overriding individualistic ethic which has fostered ambition in Europeans and encouraged them to colonise much of the world and rapaciously consume the earth's non-renewable resources. It is difficult to see how, in a period of only a few years, Aborigines can be instilled with this European ethic, especially since they have been conditioned already by Europeans to regard themselves as inferior, liquor-happy, passive outcasts of the European society and suitable only for menial tasks.

Overall, then, the Liberal-Country Party Government (1949-1972) took only a few steps to foster Aboriginal advancement. For example, in the early 1950s, the National Union of Australian University Students began providing funds for Aboriginal scholarships to enable them to attend university; in 1968 the Federal Government took over this programme.

The Australian Labour Party (ALP) won the December 1972 Federal Election. The ALP victory has resulted in a number of changes both to Australian foreign policy and its domestic policy. Aboriginal affairs have been an important item of the Government's atttention. The Government created a Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), with Gordon Bryant as Minister. Mr. Bryant had played a leading role among the European activists in urging the previous Government to hold the 1967 referendum and he was widely respected for his commitment to Aboriginal advancement. But, as with some other areas of the ALP Government's work, its

record on Aboriginal matters has failed to live up to the initial hopes which the December 1972 victory created.

The two main ALP election promises had been to reconsecrate Aborigines' rights to their tribal land and a willingness to work towards an integration of the tribeless urban Aborigines into European society. Both promises, no matter how much effort the Government put into trying to achieve them, would take more time than the Aborigines and their European supporters realised in 1972. Indeed, the most important element in the Government's effort has been its failure to meet Aboriginal expectations, so that it is the resulting Aboriginal embitterness — rather than the Government's work itself — which is mainly responsible for the new activism among Aborigines.

Mr. Bryant, like all his ALP colleagues, had never served in a Federal Government before and was unused to its procedures, so that he became impatient with the established public service methods of work. He had spent a long time in Opposition preparing to take office and was worried that he would not be able to achieve all that he wanted to. The impatience was fostered by the DAA's lack of scope. Desite the 1967 referendum, the Federal Government still does not have full control over all Aborigines, especially in Queensland (Australia's 'Alabama' in many respects, including racism) where the state Government has been particularly unco-operative. Moreover, not all the Federal Government's powers over Aborigines are held by the DAA; most notably in terms of adverse publicity, the chronic ill-health of Aborigines is more a matter for the Department of Health rather than the DAA. Eventually the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, sacked Mr. Bryant. The sparking point was that Mr. Bryant had got involved in a number of public squabbles with the Queensland Government over Aborigines and these squabbles embarrassed Mr. Whitlam, who at that time was trying to improve Canberra-Queensland relations on a number of issues.

The two subsequent Ministers for Aboriginal Affairs, Senator James Cavanagh and Les Johnson, have had one quality in common: a previous lack of interest in Aboriginal affairs. But the 'low-profile' Ministers have not stopped the DAA from continuing as a politically controversial focal point that is doing no good for the Government's popularity, which is at a dangerously low level because of the present economic depression in Australia.

Aboriginal affairs have suddenly lurched from their pre-1972 situation of being virtually ignored to now being a point of extreme emotionalism so that there is (still) little reasoned debate on Aboriginal matters in politics or the mass media. The ALP Government's usual approach to solving problems is to throw money at them; Aboriginal affairs are no exception. But this flow of money (well over a $100m. each year in the DAA budget alone) has angered many Europeans who feel that Aborigines are now getting preferential treatment. Moreover, there have been stories of some allocations being misspent; these mistakes are probably no more common than in other Government expenditure areas but the mass media like to

focus on them. Meanwhile, Aboriginal activists are also dissatisfied with this money. They regard it as an easy way for European society to cleanse its conscience of past injustices. Activists are more concerned with getting their land back than with receiving pocket money. Moreover, Aborigines have not had an increased say in how the money is to be spent because the DAA remains a mainly European-dominated institution, since, although almost half the staff are Aboriginal, they are nearly all junior staff and are not involved in the policy-making. Finally, ironically, over half the DAA funds do not go to Aborigines at all but to Europeans in payment for their services or goods.

In order to achieve Aboriginal advancement, more than money is required. This entails shifting much, if not all, of the decision-making onto Aborigines. By not doing so, the Government is perpetuating the notion that Aborigines are incapable of making decisions for themselves and that Europeans know what is best for Aborigines. For Aboriginal advancement is not merely a matter of Aborigines being materially well off in a European setting but it is one of attitudes that Europeans and Aborigines currently have and which need to be revised. In order for Aborigines to play a full part in Australian life (a part yet to be defined), Europeans need to see that Aborigines are capable of making their own decisions and carrying them out. The longer that Europeans see Europeans make and implement decisions for Aborigines, the longer they will believe that Aborigines themselves are incapable of making and implementing decisions. Conversely, Aborigines have become accustomed to regarding Europeans as the decision-makers for Aboriginal affairs; in order to end this notion the burden has to be passed onto the Aborigines.

In the last few years there has been a considerable rise in Aboriginal activism. But there still remain a number of obstacles which this activism will have to overcome before large numbers of Aborigines are mobilised for political action. This article will examine three of these obstacles and then go on to look at the salient trends in the new Aboriginal activism.

One obstacle to the growth of Aboriginal activism is the way in which Aborigines are apparently worried about the implications of the activism. What Aborigines hear of the activism is often focused on the violence that has taken place. Violence is not part of the Aboriginal culture as it is in the European culture (an important factor in the early Europeans being able to acquire Aboriginal land and control Aboriginal workers on European farms, etc.). Consequently, they fear that the violence could result in Aboriginal blood being shed for little gain. A second obstacle is that Aborigines may not be entirely interested in improving their social standing and standard of living on the lines being advocated by the activists. They therefore believe that peaceful methods can eventually produce the desired results. In this respect, they are like the US Negroes in the 1950s, who believed that their main aim in life should be that of adopting European ideals and customs, for instance in getting an education which will enable them to work in a European setting, rather than expect to continue in their own lifestyle. The activists are trying to instil the belief

that, in effect, 'black is beautiful' and to erase the Aboriginal notion that they should be ashamed of being black. An important part in the European conventional wisdom about Aboriginals has been the belief that Aboriginals as such should be removed from Australia. For much of Australia's history this policy has been implemented by simply killing them and destroying the Aboriginal culture (a policy which has been entirely successful in Tasmania). In more recent decades, the policy of the Government has been that of trying to assimilate them into the European community. This policy has failed both because of the lack of Government determination to follow it up as well as opposition from some sectors (such as the agricultural interests) — for the reasons indicated above — so that few Aboriginals are fully integrated into European society, while the majority have lost much of their cultural identity and so are neither 'Europeanised' nor are proud of being black.

Finally, it is impossible for anyone to know what all Aborigines are thinking on a particular topic. Most are widely dispersed and hindered from travelling by the paternalistic station owners or reserve managers. The DAA does have elected Aboriginal advisers but some of the more radical Aborigines have refused to stand for election because they are dissatisfied with the DAA's paternalism. In short, the Aborigines lack the collective political consciousness which is necessary to achieve a mass mobilisation of them.

Despite these obstacles, there has been an increase in Aboriginal activism in the last few years and there is no sign that the momentum is slowing down — indeed it looks like becoming one of the most significant social factors in Australia for the rest of this century. The first trend in this activism is the wider international interest in 'liberation' of all kinds, such as anti-colonialism and self-determinaton for some ethnic groups, as well as women's liberation (as is to be expected, Aboriginal women generally have an even harder life than most Aboriginal men, who tend to work less than the women and who do not run the risk of sexual assault from European men that the women do). Most Aborigines are, of course, probably little directly affected by what is going on outside their immediate locale because they live in isolated rural areas and are more concerned with the daily task of remaining alive than pondering on political points. But urban Aborigines, especially the younger ones who are benefiting from the increased educational opportunities, are more informed about these developments both because they have more access to the mass media as well as seeing (if not participating in) rallies against, for instance, the Viet Nam war, apartheid in southern Africa and the Chile military junta. These Aborigines are therefore able to disseminate information among their more isolated relatives.

A second cause is the increased Aboriginal awareness that traditional Aboriginal ideas now seem ahead of their time, with such fashionable notions as shared property, the extended family (rather than the European nuclear one) and respect for the environment. These are grounds on which to build Aboriginal self-respect. The ALP Government, to its credit, has

financed programmes to revive Aboriginal customs, as well as to popularise this culture among the Europeans.

Third, there is the land rights question. This has a number of attractive features for Aboriginal activists. One is that it is a matter of great interest to nearly all Aborigines, especially those on the Government reserves who are apathetic about most other things. For not only does it contain the promise of Aborigines being able to return to some of their tribal lands but also it is a way of getting the Aborigines off the reserves. The land rights question, then, is the main rallying point of the Aboriginal activists. It also is becoming a rallying point for a number of European activist groups which are not expressly concerned about Aborigines but are concerned about Australia's environment, especially the threat posed to it by mining interests. These groups are supporting Aboriginal land claims because they believe that Aborigines will do less damage to the ecology than mining.

The final trend is the increasing Aboriginal impatience with the Government. In 1972 the Government promised too much, too quickly and raised too many hopes. Although the ALP Government has worked harder for Aboriginal advancement than any previous Government, it also promised far more. Whereas Europeans are somewhat cynical about politicians' pledges, the Aborigines were naive enough to believe them but they are now annoyed at the delay. The mass media play an important role in (not necessarily deliberately) encouraging this impatience because they give much attention to Aboriginal talk of violence. For example, Charles Perkins, the first Aborigine to graduate from a university and now the most senior Aborigine (and most controversial) in the DAA, recently warned that Aborigines might resort to violence, such as killing politicians, in order to gain international attention to the conditions in which most Aborigines have to live. Certainly, Australian Governments have been fortunate in the past that Aborigines have not attracted foreign support at the UN as a way of levering the Government into doing more to help Aborigines. This lack of UN attention may be explained by a number of reasons. Australia could claim Aboriginal affairs to be an 'internal' matter and so not within the UN's ambit. Since the UN is now involved in so many 'internal' human rights issues, this argument would not work. More importantly, Aborigines have shown little interest in communist slogans and so the east European countries are not interested in them; if they do take more interest in communism — which is inevitable, given the increasing attention to politics among Aborigines — then the east Europeans may complain about their persecution. Meanwhile, Aborigines are a minority problem for the Australian Government and nearly every third world government has also got minority problems and so is apparently reluctant to raise the issue of Aborigines in case the Australian Government also decides to raise that government's problems at the UN. But should the east Europeans begin to take an interest, the third world governments will probably join in, if only to show 'solidarity' with their black brothers and sisters. It is likely, therefore, that Aborigines will become more of an international topic in the coming years. A good way to do this, would be

for them to subscribe to some form of communist thinking and resort to violence; at this point even the Australian mass media will start taking Aboriginal problems seriously.

The main determinant of when the violence is likely to begin are the police. Each state has its own police and the training, honesty and brutality vary somewhat from state to state; only the ACT police come close to equalling the British police's high standards. The police record in the states vis-à-vis the Aborigines is generally very poor. If an Aborigine, or Aboriginal group, were to kill a politician or, an easier target, a station owner, the police could be counted on to overreact. The initial act would appal many Aborigines, but the resulting counter-violence by the police would help to recruit more members for the Aboriginal guerrilla group. With the proliferation of information on how to be a guerrilla, for instance in making bombs and living off the land, Aborigines could become efficient guerrillas. Possibly the early operations would be defeated by police informers among the Aborigines. But at least a few examples will have been set, some lessons learned and some Aboriginal martyrs created.

This violence could provide an opportunity for prompt Government action to introduce policies which, at present, would be opposed by Europeans. One policy should be the increased allocation of land to Aborigines. The ALP Government is gradually carrying out its election pledge of returning some land to Aborigines. The future violence would enable the Government to make a more drastic allocation of land on the basis that this would remove the main Aboriginal grievance and would go a long way to preventing further violence. Even if this policy annoyed the agricultural and mining interests, it might well be favourably received by many Europeans who would accept it as the price to be paid to curtail the violence and adverse international publicity. Indeed, given the low standing of the police even in the European community, the Europeans may not fully support the police counter-violence against the Aborigines, especially if they perceive that the counter-violence is not so much defeating the guerrillas as helping to recruit further members.

An alternative policy is that the new areas should be completely under Aboriginal control and that the Government funds should be spent as the local Aborigines so decided. Inevitably, there will be stories emanating from these areas that the funds are being 'misused', such as for the purchase of liquor, rather than the normal items of Government purchase, such as homes. But this is not a 'normal' situation and the previous 'normal' approaches have failed. It is likely, if the violence were bad enough, that the Europeans will accept this policy. Australia is a vast, sparsely populated land with considerable wealth. It can afford these areas for Aborigines who wish to leave the modern European community.

These proposals will not solve all the problems associated with Aboriginal affairs. Most notably, urban Aborigines who would not like to live in these areas will derive nothing from these policies. For this minority, the Government will have to continue to try to devise ways of integrating them

within the European community while not forcing them to lose their Aboriginal identity. One possibilty, which is already being examined in the Sydney suburb of Redfern (Australia's largest grouping of urban Aborigines) is to allow separate housing co-operatives to be developed within the European community so that the homes are a continuation of essentially Aboriginal cultural outlook, while the Aborigines work in European jobs. It is at this Aboriginal/European interface that the Government will have still more difficulty in handling Aboriginal affairs. Hopefully, the number of such urban Aborigines will remain for a few more years a small proportion of the total Aboriginal population, with the vast majority preferring to live in the rural Aboriginal areas, so as to allow the gradual development of Aboriginal integration into the European society which would maintain a delicate balance of Aboriginal cultural interests with the Aboriginal acceptance of some European habits. But the chances of this balance being maintained are not great because the two cultures are so irreconciliable. Moreover, while many Europeans are willing to be sympathetic to Aborigines living miles away in isolated rural areas, this sympathy will be strained by having them living in closer proximity, say at the end of the street. Thus, the Europeans are likely to be more in agreement with allowing Aborigines to run their own isolated areas rather than having them live in cities with a large degree of self-rule.

To conclude, there is no clearcut way for the Australian Government to avoid the Aborigines' increasing impatience, bitterness and possible violence. In the last eight years, the L-CP and ALP Governments have tried a variety of policies but the policies' main result has only been that of increasing Aboriginal dissatisfaction. It is time for the Government to admit both that it is not able to set the pace for Aborginal advancement and that the burden of running Aboriginal affairs must be transferred to Aborigines themselves. Unfortunately, given the current European opinion on Aboriginal affairs, it is likely that the Aborigines will first have to resort to violence in order to gain control over the decision-making.

At present, obviously, Government policy for the future remains uncertain. However, it seems unlikely that there will be much change for several months — providing that there is not an increase in the level of political violence in Australia, in which case, the Aboriginals may well follow suit and anything could happen.

[Mr. Keith D. Suter is a Commonwealth Research Fellow in the Department of Government, University of Sydney, New South Wales. He will shortly be contributing an article to the *Contemporary Review* on the political situation in Australia following the elections held on 13th December, 1975. *Editor.*]

J. C. POWYS AND T. S. ELIOT

by G. Wilson Knight

JOHN Cowper Powys's *The Complex Vision* (USA 1920, London 1974), which I reviewed in the *Contemporary Review*, October 1975, shows interesting correspondences with T. S. Eliot's *Four Quartets*. The grouping of so 'romantic' and 'personal' an apologist with so 'classic' and 'impersonal' a poet may appear strange, but Eliot's early pronouncement is easily misunderstood. In *Tradition and the Individual Talent* he wrote:

> Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. (II)

Even so, personality and emotions have their part. It is for poetry to 'digest and transmute the passions which are its material', as a 'concentration of a very great number of experiences' (II). Powys's 'apex-thought', that is, moments of supreme experience, is likewise a summation 'and *concentration*' (vii, xiv, 69, 77, 341-2) of experience, like a difficult work of art (67, 217, 341). At the apex-thought we enjoy an 'impersonal personality' (177), an insight 'at once personal and impersonal' (93). As with Eliot, there is 'escape': 'We at once escape from ourselves and realise ourselves' (59), the soul knowing, 'as in all supreme works of art' a 'realisation of itself and its liberation from itself' (135).

Powys defines art as taking us to the 'brink and margin' of the 'ultimate objective mystery' (187). This is just what *Four Quartets* does. As I think D. W. Harding first observed, the word 'eternity', central in Powys and others, is avoided, the poetry instead playing variations on time and timelessness in approach to the mystery.

Both give primary attention to the elements. Powys is always saturated in nature and the elements (88, 150-1, 203-4, 319). *Four Quartets* lists the four main elements in turn (*Little Gidding*, II). Air is apparent in the spirit-birds of *Burnt Norton;* earth is heavy in *East Coker;* water pervades *The Dry Salvages;* and fire dominates in *Little Gidding*.

Powys rejects 'God' (91-2,). Eliot, though he uses 'God' normally in *East Coker* (III), offers an expanded definition later (IV) in a mainly satiric view, recalling Powys's 'monstrous being' (281):

> The whole earth is our hospital
> Endowed by the ruined millionaire,
> Wherein, if we do well, we shall
> Die of the absolute paternal care
> That will not leave us, but prevents us everywhere.

'Absolute' and 'paternal' reminds us of Powys's animadversions against an 'Absolute God' as 'parent' (95, 136, 233, 279-81, 307). 'Prevents' cunningly balances the ancient and modern connotations.

'Love', and not expressly 'God', is said by Eliot to devise man's torment (LG, IV). The lines here on 'the intolerable shirt of flame' correspond to Powys's chapter 'Pain and Pleasure', where love and pain are intimately associated, love finding in pain 'its natural accomplice' (281; and see 285). Love and tragedy are close (98).

The creative principle is love (134). This is what the soul drives towards and what the apex-moment realises (314). It is distinguished from the sexual (33-4). In Eliot it is 'unmoving', but the 'cause and end of movement' (BN, V) and 'beyond desire' (LG, III). In *The Cocktail Party* (II) all desire is fulfilled, exactly as in Powys, 'in the delight of loving'.

Humility is said to be 'endless' in *East Coker* (II), like Powys's 'eternal vision' which 'fills us with an immense humility' (368-9). The name 'Christ' is not directly used, though implied, in *Four Quartets*. With Christ in Powys as containing all pagan duties (241) we may compare Eliot's use of Indian philosophy (DS, III).

Powys says that he 'must begin with what will turn out to be the end' (1). His philosophy will be 'at once a setting forth and a return' to reach something 'that has been with us from the beginning' (7,350). The 'advance' is a 'return' to what is already 'implicit and latent' (116, 154-5, 218, 222, 360). In seeming to move into the unknown men's souls are always 'returning' to a discovery of 'invisible' standards that have been there all along (121). 'A perpetual advance which is also a perpetual return' characterises the journeying of 'all living things' (246). The conclusion thus brings one to 'the identical point' from which he 'started' (353).

Eliot likewise emphasises this dance-like movement. In *East Coker*, we have 'In my beginning is my end' and 'Home is where one starts from' (V). The thought is amplified in *Little Gidding*:

> What we call the beginning is often the end
> And to make an end is to make a beginning.
> The end is where we start from.(V)

Again:

> And the end of all our exploring
> Will be to arrive where we started
> And know the place for the first time. (V)

Powys emphasises 'advance' as well as 'return' (154-5), and so too in Eliot's *The Dry Salvages* we are commanded to 'fare forward', for 'the way forward is the way back' (III).

The *Quartets* record moments of mystic illumination resembling Powys's 'apex-thought' (viii). In Powys this matures through a summation of attributes in 'creative totality' (54), with 'concentrated' faculties (69). It is not independent of ordinary life, but rather coordinates it and renders it harmonious. In this 'eternal Now, what *will* happen and what *has* happened are irrelevant and unimportant' (97). It not only reduces 'past and future' to 'an eternal "now",' but 'annihilates all else'; and yet both 'memory' and 'hope' are contained (314). It is the same in Eliot. 'Time past and time future' are needed to hold vision in memory (BN II), but during the vision they will seem absurd (Powys's 'unimportant'):

> Ridiculous the waste sad time
> Stretching before and after. (BN V)

Time is generally handled as we know it, but in *The Dry Salvages* Eliot envisages a new sort of time, rather like Bergson's 'duration' (DS,I,III).

As we have seen, Powys designates his eternity apprehension as an 'eternal Now'. In *Burnt Norton* we have a similar use in 'all is always now' and

'quick now, here, now, always' (BN, V). The last words are repeated in *Little Gidding* (V). In *East Coker* he relates these insights to life, looking for, not the 'isolated' intensity, but for 'a lifetime burning in every moment' (EC, V). Such would be the life of a 'saint', leading to a 'lifetime's death in love' (DS, V); love, as in Powys, being one with the vision. For Powys too such moments fertilise all life: we live by 'memory' of them and by 'hope' of their return (57, 155, 341). Without the reconciliation of such moments, action would be undisciplined, driven by dæmonic powers (DS, V); Powys too says that without a concentrated control of the various attributes contained, 'the appalling power' of each alone would be fearful (65).

This concentration of experience is said by Powys to come by the 'grace' of the gods (342). Eliot too refers to 'grace' and says the experience is one of 'concentration without elimination' (BN II); as with Powys's concentrated totality (vii, 54) and 'consummation' (134). It is for Eliot 'a new world and the old made explicit', corresponding to Powys's 'implicit' and 'latent' (116, as above). There is 'completion' and 'resolution', as in Powys's 'reconciled and fused together' (154). There is also 'a white light still and moving' (BN, II) corresponding, with a difference, to Powys's 'the moving lamp of the soul', which gives colour to 'a white screen' or 'mass of darkness' (xiii; and see below).

Both regard the vision as touching past generations. Powys says that it makes contact 'with all the dead that have ever loved and with all the unborn that will ever love' (198). In Eliot, as we grow older, the pattern of 'dead and living' becames more 'complicated', leading to thought of gravestones, 'old stones that cannot be deciphered' (EC, V; compare 'illegible stone' at LG, V). If we think out the meaning of 'the sudden illumination', it 'is not the experience of one life only but of many generations' (DS, II). History 'is a pattern of timeless moments' (LG, V).

The achievement of the vision is won with great difficulty. Powys says that what he is offering is as a 'supreme art', the 'most difficult of all arts' (67), to be reached only 'by pain and exquisite effort' (217, 341). In Eliot the needed condition is one 'costing not less than everything' (LG, V).

Powys's sense-equivalent to the apex-thought is 'fire'. We hear of 'a mass of flames', arising from the soul, which are 'fused', cleaving the darkness 'like the point of a fiery arrow'; it is like 'a moving horizontal pyramid', 'converging to a point' (15-16). Eliot's 'white light still and moving' (BN, II) may be compared. The concentrated flames illuminate the darkness 'with all the colours of life' (228, 325, 344, 358). 'Conflicting flames' have to be 'concentrated' or they would diverge and 'cancel' out (69, 65). This is Eliot's 'concentration without elimination' (BN, II).

Eliot has powerful passages on fire in the resolving poem *Little Gidding*. The dead are 'tongued with fire' (I). We are 'restored' by a 'refining fire' (II). Then:

> The dove descending breaks the air
> With flame of incandescent terror . . . (LG.IV)

One is redeemed 'from fire by fire'. 'The intolerable shirt of flame' is devised by 'Love' (IV). At the conclusion all is to be well

When the tongues of flame are in-folded
Into the crowned knot of fire
And the fire and the rose are one. (V)

These are Powys's 'tongues' of 'diversey coloured flames', which are nevertheless one in substance (53). In both Powys and Eliot they have to be fused, in-folded, concentrated.

Equally interesting is Powys's use of music. On the vision the soul rests 'even as music rests upon music' (xv). The apex-thought resolves pain and pleasure into a 'music' (46); instinct plays 'its proper rhythmic part in the musical synthesis of the complex vision' (49); only when the faculties in unison become a 'supreme music' (59) do we approach religion. Thought has to become 'rhythmical', a 'music', before it can be truth, whereas any one faculty asserting itself unduly makes for discordance (67-8). The body is an inevitable note in the soul's 'musical flight from darkness to darkness' (70). Such is the 'orchestral harmony' of the complex vision (85, 93), having a rhythm corresponding to 'the vision of the immortals' (168); it is characteristic by 'rhythmic ecstasy' and 'musical equilibrium' (311). In it the soul's 'multiform activities' achieve a 'musical consummation' (341).

Eliot's *Four Quartets* are musical in form, content and reference. Particularly revealing are their thoughts of music, stillness and silence, as in *Burnt Norton*:

Words after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern,
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness.
Not the stillness of the violin, while the note lasts,
Not that only, but the coexistence . . . (BN, V)

In *The Dry Salvages* we hear of

music heard so deeply
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music
While the music lasts. (DS, V)

As in Powys, music is to be lived. Powys too has thoughts of silence. He writes of the 'creative gesture' resolving opposites:

> It is the dramatic movement of a supreme actor at the climax of an unfathomable drama. It is music resting upon itself; music so exquisite as to seem like silence, music so passionate as to have become calm. (69)

He tells us:

> At these moments the soul's complex vision is roused to a supreme pitch of rhythmic energy. The apex-thought of its focussed attributes gathers itself together to pierce the mystery. Like a strain of indescribable music the apex-thought rests upon itself and brings each element of its being into harmony with every other.
>
> This ultimate harmony of the complex vision may be compared to a music which is so intense that it becomes silence. And in this 'silence', wherein the apex-thought becomes at once a creator and a discoverer, the pain and distress of the struggle seems suddenly to disappear and an indescribable happiness flows in upon the soul. (133)

The words music 'so intense' correspond to Eliot's 'music heard so deeply'. 'The art of life', says Powys, 'is the art of creating a rhythm, a music, a harmony, so passionate and yet so calm, that the mere fact of having once

or twice attained it is sufficient to "redeem all sorrows" ' (95). To sum up:

> From agitation to peace; from sound to silence; from creation to contemplation; from birth and death to that which is immortal; from movement to that which is at rest—such is the wayfaring of this primordial power. (189)

We may compare Eliot's 'the still point of the turning world' (BN, II).

The two works appear to report almost identical experiences. We need not regard Eliot's as a recapitulation of what he had once read and forgotten. The poetry is, anyway, authentic with the kind of authenticity that makes source-hunting inapposite. We do better to say that they spring from similar inspirations; perhaps from the same guiding spirit, or band of spirits. There is nevertheless one notable difference: on certain aspects of spirit-life Eliot is more helpful than Powys.

At she start of *Burnt Norton* we are introduced to what Powys calls throughout the 'invisible companions'. Birds are a normal poetic equivalent to spirit-life, as in Shakespeare (my *Shakespearian Tempest,* App. A); Andrew Marvell's *The Garden;* and Masefield (see my *Neglected Powers,* 289-90); indeed it is a universal association. Aristophanes' *The Birds* may be so discussed (my *Golden Labyrinth,* 16). Now, when in Eliot 'echoes inhabit the garden' (BN, 1), the use of known sensory experiences is skilfully made to report the extra-sensory nature of the entities concerned. There are birds:

> Quick, said the bird, find them, find them,
> Round the corner (BN,1)

'Round the corner', avoiding direct sight. But 'shall we follow the deception of the thrush?' 'Deception' suggests a disbelief, though the question itself hints a possible reality. The invitation is one 'into our first world', the world of childhood, when 'they' existed 'dignified' and 'invisible', moving on the ground 'without pressure'; that is, weightless. We may compare Masefield's *King Cole*:

> Once in my childhood, in my seventh year,
> I saw them come, and now they have returned,
> Those strangers, riding upon cars that burned,
> Or seemed to burn, with gold, while music thrilled . . .

To return to *Burnt Norton*:

> And the bird called, in response to
> The unheard music hidden in the shrubbery,
> And the unseen eyebeam crossed, for the roses
> Had the look of flowers that are looked at. (I)

'Unheard' and 'unseen' are for realities beyond sense-perception. The flowers are felt as being looked at, though the lookers are not seen. Eliot plays trick upon trick to realise the intangible. They, presumably the spirits, are next 'behind us', and we see their reflection in water, but a 'cloud' passes, our consciousness is blurred, and 'the pool was empty'. The bird becomes now insistent:

> Go, said the bird, for the leaves were full of children,
> Hidden, excitedly, containing laughter.
> Go, go, go said the bird: human kind
> Cannot bear very much reality. (I)

The children, being spirits, are 'hidden'. Birds and children may both hold spirit-suggestion. We hear again of the 'hidden laughter' of 'children in

the foliage', a phrase blending birds and children (BN, V); and in *East Coker* (III) of 'the laughter in the garden', both in direct association with supernal experience. *Little Gidding* (V) tells us of

> the children in the apple-tree
> Not known, because not looked for
> But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
> Between two waves of the sea.

So much for these allusive introductions to Powys's 'invisible companions'.

Where Eliot differs sharply from Powys-as-philosopher is in his powerful passages on the after-life. There are the ghostly dancers of *East Coker* (I), impressions from the past but firmly described. Death is here darkly adumbrated (III). Converse with spirits is mentioned, not unsympathetically, in *The Dry Salvages* (V). In *Little Gidding* (V):

> We are born with the dead:
> See, they return, and bring us with them.

The meaning is obscure. Death and life intermingle; people near death often sense their relatives' nearness. We have an important definition of spiritualistic truth:

> And what the dead had no speech for, when living,
> They can tell you, being dead: the communication
> Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language of the living. (LG, I)

This probably suggests an unmediated intuition or clairaudience; it would be an error to regard spirit-contact as limited to mediumistic messages.

Then there is the appearance in *Little Gidding* (II) of the spirit of 'some dead master', called 'both one and many', a 'familiar compound ghost', who appears as an etheric being to a clairvoyant, gradually making himself visible; 'and he a face still forming'. In Powys the spirits are at first vague, 'only gradually assuming coherent substance and form as the "rapport" between man and his invisible companions grows clearer and clearer' (126). The spirit's appearance is directly associated with what in Eliot corresponds to Powys's 'apex' experience, which 'makes man aware of these companions' existence' (216). The meeting occurs at what has earlier been called the 'intersection of the timeless with time' (DS, V). It happens

> In concord at this intersection time
> Of meeting nowhere, no before and after . . . (LG, II)

Eliot's intuition of the supernatural involves what is 'neither flesh nor fleshless' (BN,II), like so much of spiritualistic phenomena, or like Powys's 'attenuated essence of flesh and blood' used by the gods though 'invisible' to humanity (274); which '*is*, and also *is not*, a portion of this universe' (144; see also 70, 151, 208). So the ghost exists 'between two worlds, become much like each other'; that is, as he has grown accustomed to the new mode, he finds it less strange. Of spirit-existence, we are often told that the etheric plane is not so different from ours (see my *Jackson Knight; a Biography*, Alden Press, Oxford, 1975; 463). We next have a long speech of ghostly counsel, surveying man's troubled existence, and his one hope of restoration 'by that refining fire', wherein we 'move in measure like a dancer' (II). The spirit appears at 'this intersection time', the time of mystical insight, which

suggests that spirit-contact and mysticism need not be, as they often are, contrasted. He functions as Eliot's 'invisible companion', appearing at an 'apex-moment', and to this extent suggests that some of Powys's 'invisible companions' may be spirits of earthly beings.

NOTE

Acknowledgments are offered to Messrs. Faber and Faber for my use of quotations from *Four Quartets*. When convenient I use the abbreviations BN, EC, DS, and LG for the four poems. References to *The Complex Vision* apply to the edition published by The Village Press (London) in 1974. Acknowledgments are made to the Estate of John Cowper Powys and to The Village Press. On this work, see also Michael Greenwald's study in *Essays on John Cowper Powys*, edited by Belinda Humfrey (University of Wales Press, 1972).

[Prof. G. R. Wilson Knight, C.B.E., F.R.S.L., is best known for his work on Shakespeare, Byron and Powys. He was for some years Chancellors' Professor of English at Trinity College, University of Toronto, and later (now retired) Professor of English Literature in the University of Leeds. He is an Honorary Fellow of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford, and has Honorary Doctorates at the Universities of Sheffield and Exeter. He is a Fellow of the International Society of Arts and Letters.]

THE FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON GIFTED CHILDREN

by Pat Wood

THE first World Conference on Gifted Children was convened in London in the Autumn of 1975 by the National Association for Gifted Children to examine the many facets of giftedness. The highly intelligent can be exceptional in a variety of ways, not only academic; but as well as the achievers there are children, with the same potential, who are missing out.

Among delegates from fifty-five different countries discussion arose on how the gifted and talented could be selected, for special education or consideration, in an increasingly egalitarian society. If it is accepted that they should be encouraged to develop their potential, and may lose motivation for want of recognition, how may they be recognised early? Can any country afford to ignore its gifted youngsters who are the leaders, artists and innovators of the future? Speakers agreed on the importance of recognition and early encouragement of gifted children but strategies for organisation of their education differed.

The conference was looking at the needs of children with exceptionally high intelligence quotients — 140 plus on the Stanford-Binet test — or creativity. Lord James of Rusholme put the controversial view that highly selective schools were the answer and would best serve social mobility. He said that in Britain now there is a far more unequivocal problem than was the case a few years ago in the education of gifted children. Other countries might learn from our experience of abandoning the principle of selective education. He questioned the morals of a society which 'rejects recognition of differences in the individual, except, a glaring exception, in the field of sport'. Why should the majority encourage this kind of ability while resenting the encouragement of an intellectual elite?

'The reluctance which makes us reject the differences in children stems from humane and democratic reasons,' he said. 'These are beneficent changes, but have made things more difficult for the gifted.' The gifted child needed teachers with great knowledge of subject, and it was vital that those who have the knowledge should be deployed where they can be most profitably used. Without the stimulus of knowledgeable teaching, many who should would never get to university, and this was particularly so in the case of those who had no great stimulus at home.

Dr. Harold Lyon, Director of Education for the Gifted and Talented, U.S.A., said that the gifted had 'the potential to change the world constructively for the better if we do our job or destructively for the worse if we neglect them.' Speaking of tulip heads which were chopped off by a gardener because they bloomed early, for the sake of uniformity, he asked if this were an analogy of what happened to the gifted and talented in the classroom situation. The United States 'National Priority for the Gifted and Talented' included the academically talented of high I.Q., and those

with artistic, creative and leadership gifts. It began five years ago with a study and report which pointed out that 'we are not doing nearly what we should for pupils of high potential and that four per cent only are getting what they need.' There was insufficiency of financial resources allocated to them, and pressure of other problems distracted from their needs about which there was apathy in many areas. He hoped the present gifted and talented priority would reach the fifty state governments, eighteen of which now had a full-time person employed to look after the interests of gifted and talented pupils. He believed there were as many from poorer homes and suburbs as there were from middle-class homes if given adequate educational opportunities. Ways of identification were described, in which a high percentage of the gifted and talented were discovered among drop-outs. Considerable hostility was found to be directed towards gifted children in the classroom, particularly the creative youngsters, who survived often 'in spite of and not because of the school system.'

His new national effort was started without legislation but now had two and a half million dollars appropriated to it. Training had begun of teams of five leaders for each of the states, who had written comprehensive programmes and strategies for the gifted in the states. More funds would be allocated to help states to develop projects and train teams for associations which had influence. There was a community private sector programme to attract funds, and a community mentor programme to encourage people from the community to help children who needed accelerated work in a particular area, a scheme which begins to bridge the generation gap and costs very little money. Scholarships were available for gifted youngsters to go on world-wide expeditions with leading scientists, one-to-one relationships which had in many cases changed the lives of the youngsters.

Teachers of the gifted needed to have a natural authority rather than status authority; — empathetic understanding, confidence in their subject matter, and be caring individuals. There should be trust between student and teacher. Tough discipline was a negative trait with regard to the gifted and talented. He suggested that the N.A.G.C. organise an international committee for gifted and talented youth, 'the world's most valuable resource.'

Professor George Parkyn, who has been Director of the New Zealand Council for Educational Research and held a position with UNESCO from 1954-67 is now Professor and Head of the Department of Comparative Education at the University of London. Speaking on 'Identification and Evaluation' he said that the concept of giftedness had been enlarged. We were at a crucial time in our history because we were at the end of an era beginning with the Renaissance, continuing through the technological revolution to the building of industrial society. If we were to be able to survive in the new era we must find and nurture our gifted children in order to recognise a pattern of values which transcended the scientific humanism of the past era, with a rising concern for the quality of human life.

Emphasising the importance of work on the difference between convergent and divergent intelligence, he said different qualities of intellect were now

required including an openness to new answers. New developments could be seen as a response to revolutionary changes such as those brought about by Einstein and Rutherford. Emphasis had been on finding answers to problems which were known; now we were looking for evidences of giftedness which would give us new answers, and we must treasure other gifts than those of rational scientific thinking. The two neglected dimensions were the aesthetic and the ethical. Truth, beauty and goodness represented these three dimensions of experience, and humans differed in their perception of intellectual, aesthetic and ethical dimensions. Criteria of these values needed to be kept distinct but may be in conflict in our daily lives. Attempts had been made to hold one value paramount while stunting the others but such a course led to community disintegration and individual despair.

He noted the ability of the gifted child to progress rapidly through known and accepted stages of rational ability, ethical and aesthetic development, and the difficulty of differentiating between stages in the development in aesthetic and ethical ability. Gifted creative spirits achieved new insights and new knowledge; they expressed them in appropriate symbolic representation. We all had difficulty in recognising the products of new insights. Our ways of expression may not be fitted to express them. The creative artist might use an old system to express new insights in a way we do not understand. Hence the need for mediators for gifted children: parents or teachers who would help them to be understood. A child may be inhibited from expressing thoughts for which the symbols did not exist in his culture. Even non-verbal symbols come to have a conventional interpretation. Public priority should recognise interplay and conflict among values, not balanced mediocrity, for each individual.

Professor James J. Gallagher spoke of the design and organisation of special curricula for the gifted child. He said that egalitarianism, universal education, the decentralization of education and competition were powerful parameters which influenced the administrative package in the U.S.A. for the gifted child. The States was not against differentiated education, and society supported special programmes for the handicapped but not for the gifted. The same spirit had led to attempts to discover gifted children from culturally disadvantaged homes. It was necessary to stress cooperation as well as competition in order to achieve their national goals. The first timid legislation to present special programmes for the gifted in the States was last year, and there was a reluctance to engage in long-term planning.

There was evidence that gifted youngsters performed three to five grades above their age-range. Content of educational programmes for them was being developed in subjects such as mathematics and ethics, but specific skills of problem-solving, productive thinking and being creative had been the recent U.S. emphasis. Much work had been done on creativity; divergent thinking was not encouraged by questions with one answer but by open-ended questions. He advocated the discovery method of teaching in which materials and experience is organised in such a way that pupils come upon the principles involved.

It may be of interest to note that discovery methods have in fact been used in British schools for years, e.g. junior school projects and the Nuffield material

As Professor Gallagher pointed out; such methods created arousal and interest, and deepen the value of the insights gained; they increased the child's expectancy of solving difficult problems autonomously. The great talent necessary for gifted pupils was the recognition of problems. With regard to the learning environment, the less restrictive the better for developing creativity, but there was an ambivalence in American public schools about any special education for the gifted.

Unless special content were an integral part of any special programme other efforts would be wasted. If properly organised content were stressed the learning environment might not be so crucial. Whatever the subject being taught there should be greater stress on conceptualization. Curricula must not drown the student in interesting facts and information. Unless detail were placed in a structured pattern it was easily forgotten. Bronowski's ideas in *The Ascent of Man* were well within the grasp of the pre-adolescent gifted, as were those in Kenneth Clarke's *Civilization*.

Educators did not have enough depth of concept knowledge to create programmes by themselves; the ideas of major substance in the disciplines came from scholars, and a new partnership was needed between teachers and scholars to produce programmes for the gifted which drew on seminal ideas.

Dr. Eric Ogilvie, Director of Nene College, presented an exhibition of workshop materials from the British Schools Council project which was developed through such a working partnership.

Speaking of the problems with which the project had been dealing, he said that he believed many of the difficulties discussed at the conference with regard to education could be solved if there were a rapid and immediate advance in the pupil-teacher ratio. 'We do not individualize to any reasonable extent in our schools,' he said. Where teachers were operating with classes of 35 children there was available on average eight and a half minutes per day for each child to talk to the teacher. The team had therefore developed kinds of work activities that children could do with the minimum reference to the teacher yet under teacher guidance.

They had considered that both depth and breadth studies were important, and had compromised by providing both. After an extensive search of the literature on curricula they had opted for the fields of the environmental sciences, maths, humanities and the expressive arts, and as time and money were limited, these had been developed for 8 to 11 year-olds. The team producing the materials was a part-time team of scholars currently specialising in college, and working teachers. Their products were closely worked into school procedure, their method being to design, expose to the children, revise, and re-revise according to the effectiveness found in schools. So far two revisions had been done on prototype programmes. The Schools Council had a consultative committee system, which examined what the team did, suggested and expected them to incorporate these suggestions, but

the team nevertheless had great freedom. He asked whether the use of these materials in schools would help to find some of the talented people who would undoubtedly otherwise be missed? Would they close the gap between teachers and parents? Had the team individualised enough? Would what they had done encourage teachers to experiment for themselves? He would like to think that his team efforts could be modified for other cultures. They needed help in covering these modifications.

Professor Harry Passow stressed the need to 'discover talent when it is still potential and to provide an educational climate that would nurture and foster creativity.' The notion that we had always been taught for creativity was false. It blocked the development of programmes for developing original thinking. There were disturbing undertones to studies of creative adults, who seldom cited classroom learning as being especially influential in shaping their lives. More often they remembered a particular teacher with a classroom style or personal qualities which had provided a model for their lives.

The mind, he said, should be taught to think creatively at the same time as it is taught to think logically. Intuition had a role in learning. Parts of the creative process essential to teaching for creativity were openness to new experience under supportive teachers; ordering and differentiating (focus); disciplining of one's actions to focus and to reject distractions; plus the ability to stop the task when the creative person's personal criteria were met. These needed classroom conditions open to risk-taking; specific attention to the act of focussing rather than supplying already structured material, freedom from interruption, challenges, and a sound knowledge base.

One of the most interesting parts of the conference was that in which representatives of various countries gave ten-minute presentations on *What my Country Does for Gifted Children*. Nigeria is backing universal free primary education for all next year, there are a limited number of scholarships for the academically gifted child, but the non-academic gifted child is totally ignored. In Denmark, we were told, there is little interest in the gifted child unless he is musical, a ballet dancer or athlete, and some political parties have an official policy that 'No child may be taught anything which exceeds the capacity of any child in the class.' A large percentage of psychotic children are found to be gifted. India makes a great effort to discover the gifted child early, and has one programme 'whose purpose is to produce a company of brilliant scientists'. South Africa has special provision for identifying and promoting giftedness, but although great interest exists it is in its very early stages. *Project Talent Survey* is a long-term longitudinal study testing 70,000 white children with a follow-up of their progress until they become vocationally active. 'A full range of tests were available only for whites in 1965', said the speaker, 'but suitable tests are being developed for blacks' and would enable 'a similar study to take place among blacks.' In fostering giftedness there must be a humanitarian component.

There is an awakening of interest in the gifted child in Turkey, but 'in

a developing country the education of its normal children is also a major undertaking.' Training of the gifted and the retarded were under the same programme. Sweden, although at first glance does 'nothing in particular' for the gifted, nevertheless seemed to have a system of individualised learning which would allow talent to flourish. In Iraq, opinion was against special schools for the gifted but 6,000,000 dollars had been allocated this year towards producing centres for production of extra activities to those in schools. Israel had set up special classes for the gifted within ordinary schools.

As a result of the conference, a World Council for gifted and talented children was proposed, and a committee was formed to look into organising and funding such a council for the exchange of ideas and the dissemination of research.

The March issue of the *Contemporary Review includes John Ashley: A Forerunner of the Declaration of Independence* by Evelyn Hardy, *Seapower in History—India and China* by Anthony Harrigan, *The Channel Tunnel*: 170 *Years of Debate* by John Milsome and *Liberty, Authority and Democracy, Students and Universities* by D. J. Heasman.

BANGLADESH — THE FIRST FOUR YEARS

by John E. Owen

SELDOM has a new nation started its independent life under circumstances as inauspicious as did Bangladesh. Like the East Pakistan she had been for 24 years previously, she began her nationhood in chaos and instability. The tragic events of the nine months preceding her birth in December 1971 are well-known: the genocidal pogrom by the military forces of then West Pakistan, the fleeing of refugees into neighbouring West Bengal (India); the entry of India into the war following the Pakistani army raids on her borders, and the December war that produced an independent Bangladesh.

In retrospect, it should not be forgotten that the US role in supplying arms to West Pakistan after 1954 strengthened the West wing's political and economic dominance over East Pakistan and kept in power an alien regime that many Bengalis considered repressive and exploitative. The US 'tilt' towards Pakistan and the official silence from the Nixon White House during the nine months of terror and mass murder of Bengalis by the Pakistan army produced many expressions of moral outrage from liberal and humanitarian circles in America and other parts of the world. In a situation in which political and moral realities coincided, the outcome of events might have been very different had Washington followed a more humane policy, and the economic progress that East Pakistan had made since 1965 (partly through US aid) would not have been nullified by the West Pakistan forces (supplied with US weaponry).[1]

Paradoxically, few political leaders of a new nation have come to power with such an overwhelming popular mandate as did Sheik Mujibur Rahman on his release from gaol and the threat of a death sentence, when he made a triumphant return to his native Bengal. His tumultuous reception was only equalled in intensity by the enormity of the problems confronting him and Bangladesh. Seven and a half million refugees from India had to be resettled, together with another ten million who had been displaced by the war from their homes. The national economy was shattered, jute factories demolished, there were no reserves of capital, and the national per capita annual income was the approximate equivalent of 25 pounds, or 50p per week.

The basic minimum repair of the region's facilities after the ravages and destruction wrought by the Pakistan army was estimated at the equivalent of more than half a billion pounds sterling. About six million homes were destroyed and nearly a million and a half peasant families lost their livestock and the tools needed to farm their small-holdings.

The leading source of foreign exchange revenues had been jute. The equivalent of over eighty million pounds sterling had been earned in one year at the end of the 1960s, but the jute crop was destroyed and in any case jute could not be transported until rail transport and inland waterway communications on Bengal's river system were made available. Even as late

as June 1972, less than half the normal amount of jute was being exported from Bangladesh, and her 400 mills were functioning at only about one-third of their capacity. The area's jute exports had not been especially well-established on the international market, and new competition arose from synthetic fabrics. Three-quarters of the nation's vehicles were damaged, destroyed, or stolen by the Pakistan army. Over 300 bridges were demolished, and the rail system put out of operation. To compound the disasters of war, nature, which has always been cruel in Bengal, imposed the additional burdens of severe drought.

An early estimate of the Bangladesh Planning Commission was that about US$3 billion would be needed merely to restore the economy to 1969-70 levels. Even before the 1971 war, the province had to import about a million tons of grain every year. Annual needs have been currently estimated at between three and four million tons. The transport system was inadequate even before 1971, and to move grain (even when available) places huge strain on the rail services and waterway facilities.

The situation in the nation, four years after its painful birth, is even more depressing today. The large world powers appear to have almost written off the region as one that cannot be salvaged by massive infusions of food and aid schemes. At a Paris consortium to aid Bangladesh at the end of 1974, the nation made an appeal for an annual infusion of US$ 800 million to $1 billion. But there is the feeling among potential aid sources that Bangladesh's problems are in fact well nigh insoluble and that merely to continue to pour in more millions will not provide any lasting solution. It is in fact difficult to imagine any nation where the economic plight is more perilous or very physical survival less assured. Bangladesh suffers from not being of any strategic importance to any great power, with the exception of India. It lacks mineral resources, though it has a potential supply of natural gas. But it is not sought after as an area for building military bases.

The region has received to date the equivalent of about one billion pounds sterling in foreign aid, with America serving as the largest single source of help, about US$500 million. But the problems of rising population, lack of basic economic structure, managerial competence, and political instability have all combined to nullify the consequences of the aid given thus far. No economic recovery to pre-1971 levels is foreseen during this decade. The necessary imports (food grains, cotton, spare machinery parts, fertiliser, and fuel) require funds that the nation simply does not possess, on account of its lack of export earnings. The rice crop that provides the staple diet of Bengalis is at the mercy of climatic hazards, though the 1974 crop was unusually good. But the price of local rice has risen by 300 percent since 1971, shortages still persist, and inflation generally has been estimated as high as an annual 50 percent.

Perhaps more so than any other Asian nation, Bangladesh symbolises the population explosion that has received so much publicity in the last two decades. In 1960, East Pakistan (as it then was) had about 55 million people. By the end of 1971 and independence, the numbers had grown to 70 million. The current figure is at least 75 million. Population pressure,

with 1400 people per square mile, is one of the highest (if not *the* highest) in the world, and there is no present indication of any alleviation for the area's plight. About half the entire population is under the age of 15, and by the end of the century a population of 150 million is quite possible. It would be unrealistic to pretend that family planning schemes have made any noticeable headway. Since they began in 1960 under Pakistan government auspices with US planning and research aid, the population has gone up by almost 40 percent. But even with the record rice crop of 1974, rice output has only risen by 10 percent, and the domestic gross product is at least 10 percent lower than the 1969-70 figure.

Conditions of life for nearly all Bengalis over the last three decades, in fact, have become progressively worse, with independence from Britain in 1947, followed by almost a quarter century of colonial exploitation by West Pakistan, and finally a second 'independence' that for most Bengalis means little more than freedom to suffer malnutrition. It is the privileged Bengali who can afford more than one meal a day, and uncounted millions are going unfed. Reports from missionaries and foreign journalists visiting Dacca contain heart-rending descriptions of the widespread hunger and disease afflicting the area.

In Dacca, the 500,000 population in the 1950s with an influx of labourers from the agricultural hinterland led to a density of some 10,000 per square mile in the central city. Today the city's population is over 2 million, personal incomes are less than they were five years ago, and the overcrowded and unsanitary housing conditions are hard for Westerners to credit. Seventeen years ago the writer observed the Karachi refugee camps, which were primitive and unsanitary in the extreme and have long since been replaced with modern housing. For uncounted tens of thousands in Dacca today, housing is little better than it was for Karachi's refugees in the 1950s. One recent report claims that some hundred thousand persons (one tenth of the city's population) are not housed at all but sleep in the open. And the urban population (the other two large cities are Chittagong and Khulna) is rising by ten percent every year.[2] The land with its 54,000 square miles is not capable of maintaining the ever-rising numbers of new people to be fed. Despite agricultural aid schemes, farm methods are still quite primitive and the system of fragmented land-holdings is uneconomic.

Westerners not familiar with Asian mores and value-systems ask why family planning has not taken root in the Orient, and why the huge foreign aid funds of the past quarter-century have not been more effective. There are extraordinary problems that arise when one nation or group of nations tries to help another nation that does not share the same ideology and lacks even the rudimentary economic institutions that the West has had two centuries to establish. There was an appreciable degree of mis-appropriation of foreign aid before 1971, and the corruption that is traditional to so many undeveloped countries persisted during Mujib's short reign. No effective family planning measures could be instituted, in view of the widespread illiteracy (about 75 percent) and the long-standing attitude that children were necessary as insurance against poverty in old age. Population control,

as in India, is not politically popular and there were no practical means to enforce it. Religious taboos and the peasants' fatalistic attitudes are combined with a keen feeling for children and family.

The educational system of the country, which had been making progress in terms of enrollments and new buildings in the late 1960s, was dealt a severe blow during the 1971 war. Dacca University in particular, together with Bengali intellectual leaders and Hindus, became a target for the Pakistani army's atrocities. Even before 1971, it was only the very rare Bengali who received higher education. Today, with a shattered economy, the job prospects for those with this training are problematical. For most children, schooling is minimal, and unemployment has been variously estimated as affecting between one-third and one-half of Bengali men.

But food remains the crucial problem. Agricultural production is two million tons below even minimum needs, and foreign assistance has not been adequate to eradicate the shortages. It is a strange paradox that the land of the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta, beset by cyclones and floods, is extremely fertile and ought to be able to yield considerably more agricultural output than it has to date. A report in the spring of 1975 by two experts noted that the river Ganges and its tributaries are one of the world's great natural resources, but the water resources of this flat and fertile plain are largely untapped. Irrigation from canals and wells has been practiced for centuries, but the small ratio of water utilised for irrigation is badly managed and its productivity is low. There is also a highly seasonal quality to the flow of the river and its tributaries, with almost 85 percent of the rainfall taking place in the June through September monsoon season, and 80 percent of the annual river flow occurring in the four-month July through October period. The dry season flow of the Ganges is not sufficient for the needs of India and Bangladesh. And to appreciably increase rice output would necessitate rural credit, agricultural education specialists, fertilisers, and organised bureaucratic efficiency that is not available in Bangladesh. The same writers also recognise that 'the introduction of technological changes on the required scale might break the chains of tradition and injustice that now bind the people in misery and poverty.'[3] In retrospect, a more enlightened technical assistance programme from the UN or other overseas auspices in the early 1960s might have harnessed the Ganges waters to the end that living standards of both East and West Bengal would be significantly raised. But this would have required an ethos of far-sighted co-operation with India that was not then in evidence, combined with an effective birth control programme. By 1975 the chance for such long-term engineering has long since passed, and the immediate problems are too pressing.

Since 1971 the atmosphere of Bangladesh has been one of internal instability. Its new army, the Mukti Bahini, with less than 100,000 men, was not capable of maintaining order and the Maoist left-wing extremists were impatient with Mujib's moderate socialism. With the worsening economic situation, it was to be expected that a hungry restive population inexperienced in democratic political practices would become increasingly disenchanted with Mujib's regime. All reports indicated prevalent corrup-

tion, and it would have been unrealistic to anticipate that any one leader, no matter how widespread his original popular mandate, would be able to bring any appreciable improvement in living conditions, giving the appalling complex of hopelessness with which his new nation began. A parallel could be drawn with Ayub Khan's assuming office in 1958: by 1961 the public support for his martial law regime had lessened.

Journalists and others visiting Dacca after 1971 have reported that stories of official corruption at all levels have been legion, a continuation of an old pattern in the subcontinent. Any sense of concern for the public good and community cohesiveness, which never had time to become strongly entrenched after 1947 in view of economic hardships experienced even in those happier days, is even less evident today, with the fierce struggle to survive that most Bengalis now encounter. There have been reports of at least 5,000 political assassinations since 1971, and no accurate figures are available for the plunder that armed gangs of dacoits perpetrate. The rising but unorganised opposition to Mujib's regime, combined with the need to terminate corruption and domestic violence, led to his assuming presidential powers early in February of 1975. A majority of Parliament supported him in his move. Another factor behind his acquiring more authority may have been the fear that overseas aid might be reduced if domestic chaos was allowed to continue. Soviet Russia had an aid programme equivalent to one hundred million pounds, including a huge thermal power station, an electrical equipment factory, and a scheme to dredge Chittagong harbour. But these projects are not the type that yield immediate benefits for starving Bengali agriculturalists.

Mujib's assassination by political enemies at the end of the summer of 1975 was one more tragic link in a chain of instability that has been endemic to the region since 1947. While he lived he did symbolise Bengali nationhood, but his passing solves no problems. The subsequent power struggle and assassinations that resulted in yet another regime by early November indicate continual political instability. The long-standing economic difficulties remain and will confront the new power-holders, whoever they may prove to be in 1976. Bangladesh was born in tragedy, her future is seen as dismal by many Western observers, with the very continued existence of so many of her population defined as problematical. But it should not be forgotten that Bengalis have shouldered crushing burdens for decades and have shown an ingenious capacity to adapt and survive. Many a building in Dacca was erected by workmen on a scaffolding of local bamboo that almost seemed characteristic of the region. Westerners often commented on the apparent fragility of the scaffolding. But bamboo is a hardy plant with fibres that are surprisingly durable.

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1 For a review of the background that led to the war, see the writer's *East Pakistan, 1947-1971*, *Contemporary Review*, 221(1278): 23-28 (July, 1972).
2 *Reports and Comment, Bangladesh*, *The Atlantic*, 234 (3):6, September, 1974
3 Roger Revelle and V. Lakshminarayana, *The Ganges Water Machine*, *Science* 188(4188):611 (May 9, 1975).

ELECTORAL REFORM FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT

by Anthony Wigram

THE case for electoral reform has traditionally been argued, notably by the Liberal Party, on grounds of democratic fairness. It is true that in the October 1974 election the Liberal Party received about half as many votes as the other two parties, but won less than a twentieth of the number of seats. Equally inequitable is the fact that in the February election, Labour won more seats than Conservatives with 300,000 less votes. It is strange that we are ready to accept such illogical results.

These arguments have failed to persuade the majority of people that change is needed because we realise that perfect arithmetic accuracy is not necessary to preserve traditional democratic freedoms. The only decisive test for political institutions must be practical: whether or not they produce good government and it is this practical view, the urgent need to improve the quality of government, that leads us, as a group of Conservatives, to promote electoral reform.

There are three main reasons why we believe that alternating single party government is the most irresolute, inefficient and irresponsible type of administration that it is possible for a democracy to devise and that its use in this country since the war has been largely responsible for our appalling economic performance and our complete inability to solve the internal domestic problems and conflicts which continue to divide us as a nation.

We maintain that it is constitutionally impossible for a single party which inescapably must represent a sectional interest to devise policies which will prove to be acceptable to the nation as a whole, and yet will also win the necessary support of a majority within that party. This is so because attempts to find a compromise must be primarily seated within the party itself which, in order to be electorally successful, must stay together as a single cohesive body. This dichotomy is illustrated by the fact that although the two major parties in Britain have widely differing ideologies, both claim to be 'national parties' and to represent the whole nation. On geographical grounds alone, a glance at the political map will show how Labour held areas correlate almost completely with the urban/industrial parts of the country and the Conservatives with the suburban and rural. There are, for example, virtually no Labour members in Sussex or Surrey and very few Conservatives in the industrial and mining areas like Durham. Electoral reform which would bring with it the more effective distribution of M.P.s, would encourage parties to take more account of the interests of those groups which they now tend to see as their opponents. Labour, for example, would be made more aware of the needs of mortgage holders, small businesses and rural communities, while Conservatives would be more likely to be sensitive to the needs of industrial workers.

Two party adversary politics create a situation in which the opposition

is often obliged to pledge itself to reverse the policies being enacted by the government of the day. This means that no individual or company can forecast with any degree of certainty the measures that will be in force in five years time. These reversals of government policy are dictated by sectional party interests and not by any change in the basic facts or circumstances which led to the adoption of the original policy.

Examples of this inconsistency dictated by party dogma are apparent in every single sphere of governmental activity and include the abrogation of international treaties and even the reversal of legal judgements. In the Social Services, in Housing and Education, every change of administration has brought with it complete reversions of the proposals made by the previous government. These vertiginous antics must unquestionably undermine the morale of many serious and dedicated Civil Servants, as well as being incredibly wasteful of both manpower and resources.

In the sphere of industrial relations and business generally, the bewildering proliferation of policy reversals is equally apparent. The attempt to introduce an Industrial Relations Bill and a Prices and Incomes Policy is, of course, the most obvious example of instability and inconsistency of government; but there have also been constant changes in the type and level of taxation levied, on both companies and individuals; no coherent policy with regard to nationalisation, which has a life expectancy of more than a very few years and the whole attitude of government towards private enterprise and the concept of profitability is, in itself, a quicksand of shifting attitudes in which business conference is being slowly immersed.

Recent history has demonstrated that no single party has the power or the national support to face up to the constitutional challenge now being posed by the trade union movement. A classic power struggle is now taking place, no different from those which faced King John or Henry VIII. It is a struggle which Parliament cannot win unless the government of the day has the support of the majority of the people and genuinely represents their views, yet under our present system no government formed since the war has had the support at a general election of the votes of even half of the electorate. The government therefore lacks both moral authority and the strength which can only come from knowing that a majority of the people are prepared to suffer the inconvenience and great discomfort which would inevitably be involved if the government was to win a confrontation with any trade union group able to curtail essential services. The ability of the government to withstand pressure is a necessary foundation for a civilised and efficient system of regulating industrial relations. Constructive peace negotiations cannot take place on the basis of weakness and appeasement on the part of one side, but can only evolve out of mutual respect based on equal strength. Our present system allows union militants to outflank any government which resists them. Electoral Reform would prevent this manipulation and force the unions to face the reality that they are only one group among many and not a law unto themselves.

The case for electoral reform is based on the contention that a more representative parliament would improve the quality of government and give

stability and consistency of policy, as well as the strength and authority, the sense of direction which we have completely lacked since the war. At a time when all politicians are repeating the message that we must work together as a single nation, it is surely unacceptable that we suffer from an electoral system which encourages conflict between sectional interests in society. The present style of adversary two party politics is barbarous and inefficient and wholly inconsistent with the concept of a modern complex industrial country trying to maintain its prosperity in difficult times.

[Anthony Wigram, Director of Conservative Action for Electoral Reform, is a member of the Westminster City Council and managing director of a group of private investment companies. He has been engaged in local politics in central London since 1960 and on a national basis stood as Conservative parliamentary candidate for Pontefract in Yorkshire in 1966. The opportunity to form Conservative Action for Electoral Reform (CAER) came after the February 1974 General Election result, when Conservatives won more votes than Labour but fewer seats. The group is now actively canvassing support from Conservative Members of Parliament, constituency chairmen, councillors and all members of the Conservative Party and hopes to make electoral reform official Conservative party policy in time for the next General Election. Information about CAER may be obtained from 6 Queen Street, London, W.1.]

THE FELLOWSHIP FOR FREEDOM IN MEDICINE LTD.

by Barbara Woodhouse

THE Fellowship For Freedom in Medicine Ltd. originated in 1948—the time of inception of the National Health Service. For some years before this, discussions had been going on among groups of doctors, and also by the State, with the object of introducing a comprehensive Health Service. The majority of the Medical Profession were against a Service which would provide free and complete advice and treatment for all, irrespective of financial status, but they strongly supported an extension of the old Panel service, to include dependants of Panel Patients, and others of like income, and they also recognised the necessity to provide financial help for Hospitals which were no longer self supporting. Many felt that a comprehensive service, completely free at the time, would lose its value to the patient and be open to abuse. It would discourage the independent spirit of both doctor and patient, and would open the door to a full-time Salaried service, and a State monopoly of Medicine.

A referendum organised by the British Medical Association revealed that some two-thirds of Doctors were against joining the National Health Service as proposed by Aneurin Bevan. The Ministry of Health, led by Nye Bevan, was in favour of a complete service, covering not only Hospital and Family Doctor treatment, but also all the ancillary services—drugs, dental treatment, spectacles, X-rays, even wigs were included!—all to be free at the time to every citizen who so desired. In spite of this opposition, the decision to introduce a comprehensive service was passed by Parliament, and July 1st, 1948 was appointed as the day for its inception.

When, also, Doctors were deprived of the right to dispose of the goodwill of their practices and compensation was promised only to those who 'signed on' by the appointed day, they felt compelled to join the Service.

All these events caused considerable disquiet in the Profession, and led the late Lord Horder to write a letter to the British Medical Journal inviting those Doctors who were disturbed by recent developments, to get in touch with him. A meeting was convened in the Autumn, well attended by Doctors who opposed the Health Service, and feared State domination and loss of freedom for both doctor and patient. At this meeting the Fellowship was inaugurated, and has continued till now. Its aims were defined as follows: —

1. To insist upon the preservation of the highest standards of medical practice.
2. To protect the public and the medical profession from State monopoly in medicine.
3. To preserve the ethical and professional freedom of the individual doctor in the service of his patients and to maintain the status of the general practitioner, including his financial security.
4. To oppose all encroachments by the State on the independence of medical educational institutions and to maintain the academic freedom of all teachers of medicine.
5. To define the limits of State Medicine so as to protect the rights of the public and of the medical profession in relation to all types of independent practice.

6. To support and protect the character, status and interests of the medical profession generally.

The Fellowship never regarded itself as a body in opposition to the British Medical Association, but throughout its history it has acted rather as a 'ginger group', and has sought to stimulate support both in the central bodies of the Association, and at the periphery, for its stated aims, which would certainly be upheld by the majority of Doctors. It used its influence both in the Council of the B.M.A. and its Representative Body. In the early 1950s one of its members introduced a resolution calling for the formation of an Amending Acts Committee which was designed to study ways and means of improving the N.H.S. The resolution was carried, and valuable work was carried out by the Committee, having a member of the Fellowship as its Chairman.

In the early days of the National Health Service, General Practitioners were grossly underpaid, and all approaches to the Minister of Health on this subject bore little fruit until the time of the Danckwerts award. It is not generally known that the first suggestion of the necessity for a completely independent inquiry was made by a member of the Fellowship—an idea first greeted as impracticable, but later adopted with enthusiasm, and with due appreciation of the solid benefits which resulted from it.

In order to carry out the first two Aims of the Fellowship, the maintenance of Private Practice, as opposed to State Medicine, was obviously a necessity, and with this in view its members have always campaigned with vigour for the right of Private Patients to obtain their drugs on the same terms as National Health Patients, but to date, in spite of all efforts, this concession has never been made—nevertheless, the fight continues.

In 1951, the Fellowship decided to invite non-medicals, patients, etc., to become lay associates. The contribution such members can make, both by education of the public and by bringing influence to bear on their Members of Parliament, is of increasing importance with the present avowed intention of the Minister of Health and Social Security to drive Private Practice outside the N.H.S., and even so, to limit its sphere of activity.

Since 1948 the Fellowship has given general consideration to the major problems facing Doctors and their Patients. In particular, whenever Commissions were appointed by the State to inquire into different aspects of the Service, it has prepared evidence to submit to these bodies. Among these may be mentioned the Guillebaud Committee, the Pilkington Royal Commission, the Hinchliffe Committee and, recently, the Porritt and Merrison Committees.

In 1953 the Guillebaud Committee was appointed by the MOH 'to review the present and prospective costs of the NHS, to suggest means . . . of ensuring the most effective control and effective use of Exchequer Funds . . . to advise how . . . a rising charge upon it can be avoided . . . and to make recommendations'.

The Fellowship warmly appreciated certain advantages of the Health Service namely, extension of its benefits to all persons in lower income groups, the introduction of domiciliary visits by Consultants, and the pro-

vision of Home Helps.

One of its main criticisms was that undue emphasis had been laid on the Hospital Service, thus lowering the importance of the Family Doctor. This had led to a deterioration in the doctor-patient relationship, and an increasing demand by patients for Hospital treatment. Since the cost of attending a patient in Hospital had been shown to be much higher than that of giving him the same services in his doctor's surgery or in his own home, this was felt to be bad economics.

The Fellowship had found evidence of gross extravagance in connection with the Ophthalmic Services. Unnecessary eye tests had been carried out, and unwanted spectacles prescribed—some 15,000 pairs of glasses were never even collected from the opticians during the first five years of the service!

In the Hospital service there was discontent because of excessive administration by the State. Multiple committees had been appointed, but their authority was so limited that professional time spent attending them seemed wholly wasted.

During the first five years of the Service, the Ministry issued over 2,800 'directives' to the different Health authorities—no wonder administrative staff in Hospitals increased from 1,400 to 2,292 to deal with the resulting problems!

The Guillebaud Committee utterly rejected suggestions for economies, made by the Fellowship and other witnesses; some of these are listed below:—

1. Drastic cuts in administrative committees, and decentralisation of financial control of hospitals through a system of block grants, to cover, say, a period of five years.
2. The imposition of a board and lodging charge for patients in hospital.[1]
3. Lowering of the cost of private beds so as to attract more paying patients.

And in General Practice

4. Restoration of the doctor's right to buy and sell the goodwill of his practice.[2]
5. The introduction of the Australian method of providing 'vital' drugs free and charging for the rest.
6. The placing of some responsibility on patients by imposing a small charge, at the time services are received, on those who can afford to pay.

The Guillebaud Committee sat for more than 2½ years and produced a voluminous report on which *The Times* leading article opened with the pregnant comment 'It would be quite unfair to describe the Guillebaud report on the cost of the Health Service as a bluebook full of whitewash!' But it shied away from the two main objects of the inquiry when it virtually refused to admit the possibility of substantial economies in the Service, and rejected any modification which could place financial responsibility, however small, on the patient.

The Committee admitted its failure in its final comment which reads:—

> We have sought to ascertain where, if anywhere, there is opportunity for effecting substantial saving in expenditure, or for attracting new sources of income, within the existing structure of the Service; but we have found no opportunity for making recommendations which would either produce new sources of income or reduce in a substantial degree the annual cost of the Service.

Is it really credible that there is no way of cutting down costs, and that of all the suggestions for major economies made to the Committee by organisations in daily touch with its operations, not one was practicable?

The report leaves a strong impression that in their desire to avoid embarrassing their Ministry advisers, the Committee shrank from proposals that might appear to disparage the present system.

The Fellowship for Freedom in Medicine feels that the health of Britain's citizens is properly the concern of the whole nation, rather than that of any Political Party. While *everything for nothing* is no doubt an admirable slogan for a party out to catch votes, the F.F.M. is of the opinion that to free the N.H.S. from Party Politics should be the aim of all responsible Statesmen.

In 1957 a Royal Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Harry Pilkington, to advise on the remuneration of the Medical Profession. The primary interest of the Fellowship has never been in the *amount* of money to be paid to doctors, but rather in methods of remuneration. This subject had already been considered, and set out in a recent Fellowship booklet under the title *Towards a Reformed Health Service* and this formed a major part of the memorandum presented by the Fellowship to the Royal Commission.

This scheme, based on compulsory Insurance subsidised by the State, provided for all patients to be in private contract with their Doctors, and to recover some 80-90% of medical expenses through insurance. Special terms would be granted to the indigent.

This plan was worked out in detail, and covered such items as drugs and provision for protracted illness. Insurance premiums would, perforce rise, to cover the benefits, but taxation could be reduced, for the cost of the Service to the State would be far less, since Doctors' pay would be covered, and the vast administrative structure at present managing (or mismanaging?) the Service, would no longer be required.

The Fellowship expressed total opposition to the introduction of a whole-time salaried service both for General Practitioners and Consultants. The present method of payment by capitation fee relates to the number of patients on a Doctor's list, and so, to *quantity*, with no recognition of *quality*, there is no incentive to do more or better work for each patient.

In 1958, the Hinchliffe Committee was appointed to inquire into the cost of prescribing.

The annual cost of Pharmaceutical services in General Practice alone had been £27,700,000 in 1948-49, and was estimated to be £74,000,000 in 1958-59, and the position had now been reached when the cost of the doctor's care of his patients was *much less* than that of the drugs prescribed for them!

It is known that quantities of pills etc., are hoarded by patients, and never used, and the temptation to get 'something for nothing', no doubt encourages this tendency.

To deal with this, the Fellowship suggested dividing drugs into three categories: —

1. For serious acute or chronic illness, and for long-term disabling or incurable conditions, included in a list drawn up by an expert committee, prescriptions to be free.
2. Drugs for conditions not listed under (1) to require a prescription charge.
3. Household remedies such as aspirin, tonics, and laxatives to be paid for in full. Category (3) should provide for appreciable saving.

About the year 1961, Dr. John Seale, a member of the Fellowship, made a study of the Professional situation in the N.H.S. He found that although there had been a considerable surplus of Doctors at the inception of the Service, during the years 1950-60, the situation had changed, and there were no longer enough to meet requirements.

He made inquiry into the causes of this shortage, and found that not only had the number of students entering Medical Schools decreased considerably, but also, a larger number than ever before were emigrating annually.

Mr. Enoch Powell, then M.O.H. rejected Seale's figures, but Seale, after further research, reasserted his conclusions.

Finally, Dr. Abel Smith of the London School of Economics, was asked by the Ministry of Health to make an independent survey of medical emigration—it was expected that this would refute Seale's figures. The reverse, however, proved to be the case, and this confirmed the latter's view that the N.H.S. had proved unattractive to young British doctors.

The F.F.M. also gave evidence to the Porritt Committee which examined the structure and operation of the N.H.S. up to 1958 and reported in 1963. This committee was essentially medical, being appointed by the professional colleges and the British Medical Association. Its principal finding was that the various elements of the health services in an area should be unified under an Area Health Board and that local Hospital management committees should be abolished. In broad outline this formed the basis of the reorganisation eventually carried through by Sir Keith Joseph.

The Merrison Committee in 1973 reviewed the workings of the General Medical Council, and the F.F.M. prepared a detailed critique of some aspects of the G.M.C. functions, and made recommendations, many of which were incorporated in the Committee's report.

Certain other activities of the Fellowship may be mentioned. A Bulletin is published and circulated to members, two or three times a year, also Broadsheets are prepared from time to time, and sent to Members of Parliament. The Annual General Meeting is held each Autumn for routine business, when official reports are given, and comments and suggestions invited from members. A guest speaker is always invited for this occasion. A Dinner Meeting is also held in the Spring, when members may bring their guests. We have often had an M.P. to address us after the Dinner, and free discussion follows.

From time to time, groups of our members have been able to meet interested M.P.s either at the House, or at an informal dinner; by such means it is possible to spread information about the aims and objects of the Fellowship, and its work to forward the cause of national health both within and without the State Service.

Recently, two debates have been arranged in the London area, largely through the initiative of Lay Associate members, in which the pros and cons of retaining an element of Private Practice alongside the N.H.S. were keenly debated. On both occasions, an audience of 100 or more were strongly in favour of preserving an element of Private Practice.

Recent negotiations between the Department of Health and Social Services and the Medical Profession, and notably with the Junior Doctors, have drawn attention to the parlous state of the N.H.S. The Service is in danger of deteriorating to the point when patients not only suffer unnecessarily but even their lives are endangered. On a superficial view, the cause of all this—namely, the action of Doctors in offering restricted services—appears purely selfish and wholly unjustifiable. On deeper consideration it will be seen that present events are threatening the whole professional freedom of the younger Doctors.

It has become apparent that the proposed legislation to separate private medicine from the N.H.S. can lead to such a stranglehold on private medicine as will eventually produce a State monopoly, and complete subservience of the Medical Profession to the State.

Moreover it has been admitted that it is necessary to destroy the independence of the professions—especially Medicine and the Church—before Marxist principles can be introduced into this country with any hope of success. At the present time this appears to be no idle threat, and it behoves those who value their freedom to be prepared to face any sacrifice in its defence.

Notes

[1] On a given date (it was admitted by the Minister) there were about 4,500 patients occupying beds in hospitals in England and Wales who no longer required hospital care—Hansard, H.o.C., March 12th, 1956.

[2] This would cut Government expenditure by some £66,000,000 capital plus interest.

[Dr. Barbara Woodhouse, M.B., B.S.(Lond) worked in India for many years. She has been in General Practice both private and National Health at Stanmore, Middlesex, since 1940, and now edits the News Letter of the Fellowship for Freedom in Medicine. Particulars of the Fellowship can be obtained from 86 Harley Street, London, W.1.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

A VERY PERSONAL DIARY

The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Vol. One—Minister of Housing 1964-66. Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape. £7.95.

What, another review of Crossman? Yes, with a difference? Perhaps. At any rate I have read all the 631 pages. Moreover, I understand precisely what Dick Crossman wanted to write and to accomplish. I quote from the Introduction: 'My ambition was to write a book which fulfilled for our generation the function of Bagehot's *English Constitution* a hundred years ago by disclosing the secret operations of government, which are concealed by the thick masses of foliage which *we* call the *myth* of democracy (the latter italics are my own). I knew that no academic could write this book'. Not only did I share that desire, but in a halting and humble way I have in lectures, essays and reviews tried to express my own attitude. Students of political science sorely need the new Bagehot: we all need it. Has Dick Crossman provided us with the response to our needs? My answer must be definitely, 'not so far'. He has done lots of other admirable things, to which I will refer later; he has also communicated his enthusiasm, as an innovator and percipient observer of the political process (to use a dull phrase) and as a candid critic of all and sundry, including himself. His intellectual merit and political experience have, to a certain extent, served him well. I understand that he was a superb teacher, partly because he was so provocative, but also because he was a good scholar.

This is a day-by-day account of a Government at work, as seen by one participant. It must be remembered that Dick Crossman had been for 25 years a back-bencher but not, in my opinion, a House of Commons man; in fact he had been more a journalist than a parliamentarian, unlike either Baldwin or Churchill. I quote: 'As a back-bencher I never dreamed of attending the Queen's Speech debates, regarding them as the most boring occasions'. Otherwise it is impossible to explain his innocence or ignorance of government at the time of his first appointment, October 17th 1964, when he was pitchforked by Harold Wilson into the Cabinet as Minister of Housing and Local Government.

The diary switches from Departmental responsibilities to scores of official visits throughout the country to Cabinet procedures and divisions to the 'kitchen cabinet' (composed of 'Tony Benn, Marcia, Gerald Kaufman, Peter Shore and Tommy Balogh'), and to happy week-ends or short holidays with his wife Anne and the two children. But the magnet of attention is always Harold Wilson, a relationship not unlike that of Head Prefect and Headmaster. Now that Harold Wilson, George Brown, Marcia Williams and George Wigg have all written their autobiographies, future scholars will have plenty of material, plus gossip, to help them reconstruct the story of the Labour Government 1964-70 and before long the history of the succeeding ten years—in a word the whole post-Macmillan era. It is far too early to see the period in perspective. When it comes to be written there will be important chapters on Rhodesia, devaluation, prices and incomes, the resurgence of Labour and the Trades Unions, the reform of parliament and the questioning of the Constitution.

How much light does this first volume throw on these and other questions? Some, but not much, partly because the diary is written by an opinionated, egotistic and bullying type of man and partly because the journalist side of the

Minister is too obvious and too verbose. Nobody would pretend that Crossman was a good administrator. Most of the time he is looking over his shoulder, watching himself or others and estimating how successful or unsuccessful his colleagues are faring, especially Callaghan and George Brown, his seniors and rivals. He has a supreme contempt for half-a-dozen of them, but respects Anthony Crosland, Michael Stewart, and has quite personal affection for Barbara Castle. As Wilson admits, Dick is an innovator, possibly a think-tank, but not one to carry through a policy.

One thing I profoundly admire is his obvious enjoyment of visiting every possible Local Authority, New Town, housing experiment and Conservation area. There are two Departments of State, where this is necessary—Housing and Local Government and Education. Dick got to know not only the gravel pits and seascapes but also the Chairmen and officials of most Local Government units and their endless associations. I know from three years' experience at Education how valuable such visits can be. But even on these tours he managed to upset as well as enthuse a number of potential allies. Of course he had the disadvantage of being at loggerheads with a formidable Civil Servant and of having to learn his departmental job *ab initio*. He took the initiative of setting in motion the Royal Commission on Local Government; he did not get the Chairman he wanted and I wonder what he would think of the reforms if he was alive today. Dick is so disarming about his failures and flops as well as about his triumphs that at times one is dumbfounded. For example, 'I never asked NALGO to come near me'. NALGO is, of course, the main white-collar trade union dealing with Local Authority staff. Again 'He (Jock Campbell, later Lord Campbell of Eskan) wanted to make a speech about housing and when he asked me to help I behaved to him, in his own words, "like a headmaster caning a small boy" '. Again in July 1966: 'It is also true that in huge areas of finance, administration and planning I am still really out of my depth'. Finally, of his Department: 'In fact, when I got here I discovered there wasn't one member of the staff who had any practical knowledge of how they (the building societies) worked'. So much for his responsibility as a Departmental Minister, what about the Cabinet?

The only word I can use is—disillusionment. Here again, quotations are more eloquent than pages of description, but they can be quite contradictory. At one moment: 'there is no inner Cabinet, no coherent inner policy on home affairs and we are drifting along': or 'Throughout the whole of this, Harold was his dreary competent self, tiddling with figures. George Brown was sulking on the other side of the table. The Chancellor was talking big about getting tough with Germany. And Cabinet was a desultory affair. Nothing had been adequately prepared. Nothing had been thought out properly. We were fixing things once again, horribly inefficiently, at the last moment'.

Now let me contrast two statements. Tuesday July 1966: 'I chipped in and said to the Chancellor, "We came into office as socialists and the essence of a socialist policy is to shift from private to public expenditure. The public sector is not too big now—it's far too small" '. A month earlier, June 12, he write: 'It's coming home to me more and more that the programme we started with is really irrelevant. The Land Commission? I am trying to make it relevant so that it can do something useful for private enterprise builders during the next five years. But frankly we don't need the cumbrous machinery of a Land Commission. Nationalisation of steel? We don't need it and it won't make much difference to our position'. Can this be the same man speaking? Was he

schizophrenic? Perhaps underneath all the talk he was a conservative. Listen to this: 'What a difference it makes to be able to come back here to the sheer comfort of Prescote and its beauty and rootedness, which is more and more influencing me. Is it making me more conservative? Well, in one sense being rooted is being conservative', and again, 'Anne wants that (my retirement) with her whole heart. And I have a home to return to and enough money as well. This gives me an inner detachment, an ability to face resignation, which none of my colleagues has at all'.

As this book was published in early December I have probably read many other reviews and forgotten them, except one by Edward Heath which he wisely entitles 'One Minister's Life'. A diary is bound to be somewhat personal, but this diary is the incarnation of Dick Crossman. Only indirectly does it shed any new light on Cabinet Government.

KENNETH LINDSAY

A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE EDWARDIANS

The Edwardians. The Remaking of British Society. Paul Thompson. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £10.00. (The History of British Society series, edited by Professor E. J. Hobsbawm.)

Mr. Thompson has produced an interesting book, well worth the attention of those interested in the history of 'Edwardian England'. He has attempted to combine in one study the two disciplines of history and sociology with the argument that historians have made too little use of sociological theories. To some his book will be sociological history and to others, historical sociology. Has the author succeeded in keeping on top of two traditionally separate, and to some hostile, stools?

His method is an interesting one. Mr. Thompson has been identified for some time with the question of 'Oral History' at the University of Essex, and in preparation for this study he had interviewed some 500 men and women, all of whom were born between 1872 and 1906. Indeed, the most enjoyable portions of the book are those summations and quotations from the interviews with various individuals. But interviews and completed questionnaires, however carefully devised and conducted, must remain the flesh of history; the skeleton must be the well-founded understanding of the period under consideration. Personal reminiscences can provide the colour; they cannot provide the foundation.

This leads to the first criticism of the book, namely the writer's grasp of the period under consideration. 'Sociolegese' and interesting reminiscences ought not to be offered as a substitute for a clear understanding, and in some cases this seems to be what has happened. For example, it is quite misleading to say that Edwardian teachers resorted en masse to corporal punishment. The debate over corporal punishment in State schools had begun in the 1890s if not before and many School Boards had begun to restrict its use even if the N.U.T. protested at its complete abolition. A knowledge of the N.U.T.'s journal, *The Schoolmaster,* would have indicated this. Like other social historians, the writer, other evidence failing, turns to novels to support his generalisations, in this case, the alleged sexual immorality of aristocratic ladies, by reference to Vita Sackville-West's over-cited *The Edwardians.* More substantial evidence is needed. Again, to limit the discussion about scientific and technological education to public schools is misleading. The real problem lay in the lack of adequate secondary and technological training by the state, despite the efforts of the Technical Instruction Act 1889 and the Balfour Education Act 1902. The battle for economic survival would be won or lost not in the public schools but

in the Council, high and grammar schools.

Likewise, the fondness for similes drawn from foreign countries, especially America, so prevalent amongst modern writers, often produces ludricrous statements as when the writer refers to the 'plantation South' in the United States, a phenomenon which did not exist in 1901-1914, if ever. There was, indeed, cheap labour but it was not 'plantations'. Occasionally the author's off-hand observations have a shattering effect as when he points out that 'It must at once be emphasised that the relationship of religion with the material world was complex.' Again, when the writer refers to the 'manifest exclusiveness' of the Edwardian 'ruling political elite' he is muddling matters. Whether or not there was an 'elite', to argue that it was 'exclusive' wihout defining upon what exclusion was based, is facile. All political establishments exclude various individuals and the Edwardian establishment was, by comparison with many others, remarkably elastic and comprehensive. It could, after all, encompass in one Parliament the stone-mason, Henry Broadhurst and the Marquess' son, Lord Hugh Cecil. Much more evidence is needed than is given to assert that Liberal voters amongst the middle classes were a 'minority'. Without information as to the distribution of the franchise and as to voting patterns, such assertions will not stand. Finally, why is it that social legislation undertaken by Liberals is a radical step forward, whilst that undertaken by Tory governments is 'paternalistic'? What is 'paternalistic' legislation? In the event, since no apparent use is made of the available manuscript sources, how can the writer possibly know what the motives were?

Perhaps the most important criticism is the treatment of religion. To lump it together with drink, crime and hard work as forms of 'escape' is surely facile. Leaving aside theological questions (which sociologists are not yet competent to decide), more evidence is needed than is presented. No mention is made of the *Daily News* census which, although confined to London, nevertheless provided a good amount of evidence concerning religious 'motivation'. Religion, even if actively supported by a minority in Britain, was a motive force for those who led society (i.e. Salisbury, Gladstone, Harcourt, the Earl of Halifax, the Queen and indeed, Edward VII in a different way). If the majority of the working classes, who did not vote or read or debate, did not also attend Church, it did not really matter, at least to the historian. The sad fact for social historians is that what the unimportant people in any society do really is irrelevant, however interesting; it is what they do not do that counts.

As sociological history the book is important for it indicates the way in which, most probably, history will be written in the balance of the twentieth century. Despite its faults, the author has amassed a valuable hoard of 'case studies' which are presented in an attractive, if oft-time irritating, format.

J. E. B. MUNSON

A FRESH ASSESSMENT OF TROLLOPE

Trollope. C. P. Snow. Macmillan. £6.50.

Few major nineteenth century novelists have been less analysed and written about than Anthony Trollope. This is scarcely surprising, for there is nothing particularly exciting about his long service with the Post Office and satisfactory marriage. The only episode of romantic interest was his attachment to a young American girl, Kate Field; a relationship reminiscent of Thomas Hardy's loving involvement with Florence Henneker. Nor did the harsh treatment meted out to him in childhood serve to make him a sympathetic character in later life. Unlike Dickens, who had suffered in roughly similar circumstances, Trollope never welcomed involvement with other people outside a close circle of friends

and relatives.

Yet with a whole new generation growing up to be fully acquainted with Mrs. Proudie and the Pallisers, a fresh assessment is long overdue; if only to supplement Michael Sadleir's *Life* and Trollope's own *Autobiography*. With the assistance of a racy, almost colloquial style and what appears to be a genuine sympathy for the man and his personal problems, C. P. Snow is entirely successful in bringing Trollope to life. One has the impression of Lord Snow walking alongside his subject, noting and interpreting his virtues and shortcomings, like a trusted confidante. The domineering mother, Frances Trollope, whose vagaries have attracted greater attention than her son's solid qualities, falls into perspective; as does brother Tom, more sociable and written about during his lifetime than the illustrious Anthony.

It comes as a surprise to realise how slender was Trollope's first hand acquaintance with the interiors of ducal mansions and the chamber of the House of Commons. Clearly, from the beginning of his career, he possessed in full measure the novelists' essential gift for extracting relevant information from the minimum of opportunity.

There is always much to be learned from a study of the chronological order in which an author's novels were written and published. Thanks to concise statement and exhaustive new research there are clues here to the reasons for Trollope's early diffidence; the gradual, almost reluctant acceptance of his own powers, and anxiety over the eventually waning sales and critical esteem although, as C. P. Snow points out, these were never as serious as Trollope himself feared.

The biography is given an added value by a veritable profusion of illustrations. These companion the text on almost every page, ranging from reproductions of famous or little-known paintings to cartoons and sketches, providing a unique pictorial commentary not only on the life and work of Trollope but the entire span of the nineteenth century.

ROSALIND WADE

A MYSTERY OF ARSENIC POISONING

The Riddle of Birdhurst Rise. Richard Whittington-Egan. Harrap. £5.75.

Mr. Whittington-Egan has made a study of criminology and in his latest book he investigates the mystery of three deaths by arsenical poisoning in the highly respectable middle-class London suburb of Croydon in 1928-29. The first to die was a retired colonial civil servant, Edmund Creighton Duff who lived with his wife, Grace Duff, and their young family. He died suddenly in great pain on April 27, 1928 shortly after drinking beer. There was a post-mortem by a well-known pathologist, Dr. Robert Bronté, who deposed at the Inquest that there was no evidence from the general condition of the body of poisoning and that death was due to natural causes, namely chronic myocardis. On February 15, 1929, Mrs. Duff's sister, Vera Sidney, who lived with her mother at 29 Birdhurst Rise, died suddenly after drinking soup. Her doctor, Dr. Robert Elwell, diagnosed natural causes. Then on March 5, the widowed mother, Mrs. Violet Sydney died in great pain shortly after drinking medicine from a partly-filled bottle of a patent medicine. Her death at once raised great suspicions. Arsenic was found in the medicine bottle and also in her organs. In the result the other two bodies were exhumed and examined by Sir Bernard Spilsbury who found strong evidence of arsenic in both. There were thus three long Inquests following these disclosures and police investigation. In that of Mrs. Sydney, the jury found an open verdict with suicide a possibility ; in that of the others the verdicts were murder by a person unknown.

It is this mystery which Mr. Whittington-Egan seeks to unravel. He has done a great deal of research over many years, including close examination of the medical evidence and the background of the doctors concerned. It appears that Dr. Elwell had had some affair with Mrs. Grace Duff. He goes over with great care the police investigations; and we are given a detailed report of the Inquests consisting of 26 sittings spread over five months. This account is some what dramatic as the author has made use of the descriptive colour in contemporary press reports. Most important of all have been the interviews with survivors, including in particular Dr. John Binning who was Dr. Elwell's partner and was present at each of the deaths and Mrs. Grace Duff's brother, Thomas Sydney. Mr. Whittington-Egan and Dr. Binning did have a short meeting with Mrs. Grace Duff in June 1962. Mr. Whittington-Egan made it plain that he suspected her, and this really ended the visit. This book could not be published until after her death in June 1973.

Mr. Whittington-Egan's analysis of all the evidence now available inevitably points to Mrs. Grace Duff, although it still is not clear how she came to have the arsenic. The author invited a contribution from Mrs. Duff's daughter, Miss Grace Mary Duff, who strenuously maintains her mother's innocence. There seems little doubt that Mrs. Grace Duff was suspected.

There is no doubt, as this study shows, that mistakes were made in the early investigations. For example, at the original autopsy on Edmund Duff his organs removed for examination were mixed with those of another body nearby also being examined. On the other hand Sir Bernard Spilsbury on the exhumation had no doubt at all in finding evidence of arsenic in the body. It may also be that Dr. Elwell was biased. Furthermore, there were difficulties in knowing the proportion of arsenic in the medicine bottle. Then there was the general approach. Was poisoning likely in such a respectable neighbourhood and within an affectionate warm-hearted family? We now know, however, that Mrs. Grace Duff had suffered sexually from her husband.

This is a fascinating piece of research. As a serious study it should have had an Index.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

A REAL-LIFE JAMES BOND

Guilt-Edged. Merlin Minshall. Bachman & Turner. £4.50.

Perhaps we should commiserate with Mr. Minshall. In the 'thirties he merely wanted to be the first man to sail right across Europe to the Black Sea by inland waterways—and duly succeeded. But en route through Germany the Nazi officials would insist that he was a spy. At Nuremberg no less a person than Goering, who was there for a Rally, came aboard his sailing barge *Sperwer* and accused him outright of being one. So he decided he might as well live up to it, preferably as a real-life James Bond performing daring exploits on the unblue Danube.

Banned from using a lock, he escaped through it in the night with improvised winding gear. He pitched overboard a Gauleiter demanding to be taken into Austria to form a Hitler Youth Movement there. In Vienna he was clapped into gaol but freed with the help of an old Oxford chum, Count Hoyos. Here, too, a seductive Lisa, Professor Kaltenbrunner's daughter, wished herself on him, and in return for glad nights aboard, decamped at Budapest with his secret photos and Danube notes. Turning up again at Belgrade with implausible excuses, she put him into a Bucharest clinic for four weeks by poisoning his food at Sulina on the Black Sea. He'd been so busy spying, he'd taken three years to sail over four thousand miles from Southampton.

His most ambitious plan was to return to Bucharest in 1940, with Commander Ian Fleming's blessing, as Vice-Consul responsible for British shipping on the Lower Danube. By plotting to scuttle six vessels in the Iron Gates gorge near Turnu Severin he would close the vital German oil-supply route from Rumania. Forty pilots would get £500 each; the remaining ten, who wouldn't play, would be bumped off. Unfortunately, the plan was thwarted, when the explosive-charged vessels were under way, by a Gestapo agent's trick in luring Minshall to a fake rendezvous, holding up the leader of the enterprise.

Later he had further adventures as head of an Admiralty mission to Tito's forces in the Dalmation islands where he linked up with Sir Fitzroy Maclean's military lot, captured—armed only with a cutlass—a small German warship, held up a score of Germans with an empty pistol, plotted to kidnap a German general. The Tito venture, he admits, 'sounds pure Peter Sellers . . . Spike Milligan would have been in his element.' He had an eye for the farcical side of valour.

Much of his detail is uncheckable and must be taken on trust. But he records his exploits so vividly, with such offbeat insouciance, it would be churlish to imply that he was not only a real-life Bond but—just occasionally, maybe—a buoyant Munchhausen, too. Forty-eight photos and maps enhance this enjoyable, incredible odyssey.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES

The Return of the Gods (Cambridge University Press. £5.75). 'The Sacred Art of Susanne Wenger' is the subtitle of this appreciation of the life and work to date of the Austrian artist. In 1950 she went to Nigeria and found the traditional religion of the Yoruba in Western Nigeria the perfect inspiration for the expression and development of her art as designer and sculptor. In this book, Ulli Beier, the writer on Yoruba art and literature, discusses the traditional worship of the Yoruba *Orisha*. It is, of course, a pagan religion, with innumerable divinities and their rituals and shrines. Each person would have his own *Orisha*. Christians and Muslims have taken over in large measure the *Orisha* worship, although, as for example in Haiti, some Christians find it possible to combine in a personal way two religions, quite inconsistently. Ulli Beier writes of the basic mystical beliefs and ethical morality of the Yoruba *Orisha* religion. Susanne Wenger not only is converted to it, but lives it and spends her life in making anew the *Orisha* shrines and in particular the great Oshun shrines near Oshogbo. She accepts that she cannot work like a traditional Yorubu artist and in her sculptures endeavours to interpret the *Orishas* in a modern language of art. This volume has many photographs of her work, which nonetheless owes a great deal to native traditional art as well as her European artistic development in her earlier years. The result is a remarkable combination which has an interest far beyond Nigeria.

Autobiographical Sketches (Elek Books £4.95). Readers who have enjoyed Maxwell Fry's articles in *Contemporary Review* will welcome this book. Professor Fry overcomes the difficulty of communicating childhood

experiences with humour and detachment. Clearly, he prefers to remember himself as an inquisitive small boy, rather than as the gawky adolescent who blundered from one predicament to another. The wonder is that, despite consistent mishandling of his scholastic programme, Maxwell Fry won through to academic success. Professor Fry grew up in Liverpool and his recollections of the city are accurate and detailed. Amid the crumbling grandeur of the port and public buildings he recognised the basis of architectural elegance. Life in Liverpool in the early years of the present century provided many experiences and opportunities for the future architect. The Fry family counted for something in the provincial hierarchy and through the *Sketches* they come alive. The acount of the early adult years in Chelsea is less successful, probably because Maxwell Fry is still too closely involved to be objective. The real value of this autobiography lies in the first two-thirds of the book and the excellent drawings by the author.

The Seven Storey Mountain (Sheldon Press. £5.50). Thomas Merton's autobiography, has long been famous in the United States but has appeared only in a shortened version in this country. Now, for the first time, the book is published in the United Kingdom unabridged and Graham Greene's recommendation on the dust jacket is well justified. Born in 1915, Thomas Merton was the son of a successful artist and spent much of his early life with American grandparents and travelling in Europe. He was a variable, very human boy, manifesting all the normal frailties and inconsistencies of youth. The arrangements for his education were haphazard as was his own reaction to scholastic discipline. Something of a rebel, he toyed for a while with Communism, read voraciously and seemed generally uncertain of his objective. Thus it was all the more surprising that while still a young man he experienced conversion to the Roman Catholic faith and eventually became a Cistercian monk. The account of his own mystic explorations and initiation occupies the final pages. Interesting though this is, it lacks the conviction and vitality of the early chapters. Thomas Merton's spirited account of life with his nomadic father in Southern France can rarely have been bettered as an example of childhood autobiography.

Unpitied and Unknown (Backman and Turner. £6.50). Fortunately, for the dedicated historian there is no time limit set for the exposure of past scandals. And when the incident in question is as horrific and far-reaching as the Katyn murders, in which uncounted numbers of Polish officers were annihilated, it is right that sooner or later the full documentation should be made available. Louis FitzGibbon, author of two previous books on the subject, now presents the definitive evidence in the form of letters, memoranda and extracts from the archives of the Nuremberg trials. Supported by a hard-hitting Foreword by Lord George-Brown, **Unpitied and Unknown** is likely to be regarded as the standard work of reference for the Katyn disaster.

The Book Browser's Guide (David & Charles. £4.95). For those who are interested in old and rare books, Mr. Roy Harley Lewis has produced not only an exceedingly useful gazetteer, but also a most informative book about books and bookshops. Arranged geographically, it gives the whereabouts of secondhand and antiquarian booksellers all over Britain, together with details of their specialities. Indispensable is a word that should be used with discretion, but Mr. Lewis' bookworm's enchiridion is unquestionably an indispensable item for inclusion in every book-hunter's baggage.

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Published under the auspices of the

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
LONDON

by the Oxford University Press
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6 MAY 1976

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 37 Union Street, London, S.E.1. Tel 01-407 0497.—All business matters should be addressed to the publishers

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

111th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

MARCH 1976

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Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

March 1976 Vol. 228 No. 1322 Founded 1866

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Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

March 1976 Vol. 228 No. 1322

ANATOMY OF A BLUFF: SYRIA, THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE US

by Stephen Oren

THE PLO's presence at December and January UN Security Council meetings was more than an Israeli diplomatic defeat. Certainly nothing happened to advance Arab-Israeli accommodation. On the contrary, US relations with both Israel and Egypt, the key to Middle East peace, have suffered. Egypt, together with the US and Israel, was the principal loser in a Syrian manoeuvre, a manoeuvre arising out of inter-Arab politics. What is especially ironic about this whole affair is it was all unnecessary. For the PLO's new status is not the result of its own accomplishments. Syrian threats not to renew the United Nations Disengagement Observers Force (UNDOF) mandate on the Golan Heights in December led to the PLO's seating at the UN Security Council table. Yet these threats were almost certainly a bluff. And in turn, US inability to resist this bluff raises dangerous questions about the future US role in the Arab-Israeli dispute.



Militarily, the Syrians were in no position for war. In 1973, the Egyptians scored a very limited success, their Syrian junior partners came quite close to defeat. Israeli forces penetrated a considerable distance into Syria beyond the post-June 1967 lines. Damascus itself might well have evacuated had it not been for the aid provided by Iraqi troops. Certainly, Syria has received extensive shipments of Soviet arms since 1973. But in the judgement of most military experts, the effect, when combined with ongoing US arms supplies to Israel has merely been to restore the Syrian Army to its 1973 position of inferiority vis-a-vis the Israeli forces. Had Syria refused to allow UNDOF's mandate to be renewed and had fighting again broken out on the Golan Heights, the Syrians would have been in considerable difficulty unless they could find allies.

Yet Syria's need for political concessions from the UN arose from Syria's difficult position in the Arab world. Since Biblical times, Syria's choice of allies has been Egypt or Mesopotamia—today's Iraq. The present Syrian regime is on bad terms with both.

In the Egyptian case, the cause is quite simple. It is easier for Israel to

make concessions in Sinai to Egypt than to make concessions to Syria on the Golan. In summer 1975, the Egyptians, wishing to recover Sinai's oil, to build up the Suez Canal region as a commercial and industrial zone, and to score a success for their own internal opinion, agreed to the interim arrangement with Israel. In return for part of Sinai, Cairo foreclosed its military option for three years. The Syrians received nothing from this arrangement. While the US did commit itself to finding a Syrian-Israeli interim formula, it did so against the backdrop of Israeli statements that only 'cosmetic' changes were possible in the Syrian-Israeli lines. Egypt's actions were seen as betrayal in Damascus, the more sinister as it could portend a future Egyptian decision to concentrate on its own difficult problems of economic development and to wash its hands of the other Arab states. In that case, Egypt could make peace with Israel in return for the Sinai alone.

At present, Egypt does not want to lose its influence in the rest of the Middle East. It has written off neither Syria nor the PLO. But remembering how the 1967 War came about, Cairo has no desire to be dragged into a Syrian-initiated conflict. Today, as Egypt changes its sources of military equipment from Soviet to Western, this reluctance is especially great. Yet were Israel to initiate a war with Syria—had Israel attempted to have UNDOF swept aside—Sadat would probably have felt obligated to go to war with Israel. But no Syrian government contemplating a conflict with Israel can rationally rely on Egyptian help coming.

Since September, the Syrians, together with their new found Jordanian and PLO allies (who have the same motives for objecting to the interim Sinai settlement as the Syrians do) have been making plain their unhappiness with the settlement and with Sadat. In this they have the discreet support of the USSR which is certainly not happy with the Egyptian government's break with Moscow and its pro-Western course in both foreign and domestic policy. Crucial to the Syrian-Jordanian-PLO position is the assumption that the Egyptians sold themselves too cheaply during the summer. By obtaining concessions for the PLO, which the Egyptians were unable to do, the Syrians have lent a certain plausibility to this argument.

The most obvious result is to lessen President Sadat's ability to make concessions to achieve future Egyptian-Israeli settlements. Within a week after the Security Council voted, on Syrian demand, to invite the PLO to its January meeting, the Egyptians were successfully insisting that the PLO be allowed to address a Security Council meeting discussing an Israeli raid on Lebanon, although Egypt had hitherto ignored the question of the PLO at the UN—the more especially as Sadat is on bad terms with PLO chief Yassir Arafat.

Egypt has assumed that there is no point in alliance with the USSR not only for Egyptian domestic reasons but because the only effect of Soviet-Arab ties (as in the 1967-73 period) is to encourage US support of Israel. Hence the only road open to the Arabs is that of friendship with the US and that, if Arab states are willing to drop their most extreme demands, the US will pressure Israel toward concessions. Egypt has attempted to get

Syria and the PLO to support this position. US talks with the Syrians in 1974 and Kissinger's refusal to rule out US contacts with the PLO should it be willing to recognise Israel's existence are designed to the same end. But why should Syria or the PLO accept the internal strains that come with efforts to moderate their stands on Israel if diplomatic concessions can be obtained without changing those stands?

Nor is Egypt the only Arab state over which the Syrians could claim a triumph. The very vote in the UN Security Council on extending UNDOF's mandate (13 in favour of the resolution, none opposed, China and Iraq abstaining) shows Syria's other foreign problem. The Syrian line may be too hard for Cairo but it is too soft for Baghdad. The Iraqis do not share a border with Israel and they have no territory under Israeli occupation. Iraq continues to insist that the complete elimination of the 'Zionist entity' (Iraqi publications will not even use the term 'Israel') is the only way in which peace can be restored in the Middle East. Since Iraq became a Security Council member in 1974, it has refused to vote for any of the resolutions providing for UNDOF since Iraq insists that the battle must be resumed. Iraq has bitterly attacked the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements but they have accused the Syrians of wishing for similar partial solutions.

Verbal militancy at the UN and elsewhere was the Syrian response to this Iraqi pressure. By obtaining concessions for the PLO at the UN, Syria could show its militancy. Besides, exalting the PLO, which is aligned with Syria, is a way of slighting the Palestinian 'Rejection Front' which looks to Iraq and Libya. The attempt to expel Israel from the UN General Assembly, a Syrian idea that was transmuted into the General Assembly's verbal condemnation of Zionism, was part of this same Syrian strategy.

But while Syro-Egyptian relations do to a certain extent revolve around policy toward Israel, those between Syria and Iraq do not. Baghdad and Damascus are controlled by rival factions of the Ba'th (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party). While their rivalry has far more to do with personality disputes between military cliques than with ideology, both sides find it convenient to cast doubt upon the other's Arab revolutionary virtue. Over the past year, moreover, there have been bitter disputes concerning allocation of the water of the Euphrates River (which the two countries share with Turkey), alleged Syrian help to rebellious Kurds in Iraq (which does not prevent Syria from repressing its own Kurds), and an Iraqi decision to bypass Syria by building an oil pipeline from northern Iraqi oilfields through Turkey to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Iskanderoun, which the Syrians claim. The Syrian and Iraqi governments have several times charged each other with using diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic personnel to overthrow the other's government. In May, the Syrians surprised many by agreeing to UNDOF's extension for six months while the Egyptians were refusing to renew for more than 2 or 3 months. But at that time, the Syrian Army was not facing the Israelis, it was on the Iraqi border.

No doubt the Syrian-Iraqi feud has simmered down since October. Under heavy pressure from Saudi Arabia (whose subsidies are very import-

ant to Damascus) the Syrians agreed to allow more Euphrates water to flow downstream to Iraq. Some 40,000 Syrian troops were moved from the Iraqi to the Israeli border. And if polemics between the two states have not ceased, they have at least calmed down considerably. Yet the Syrians have only stated (much to Baghdad's indignation) that they cannot be sure of Iraqi backing should they enter a conflict with Israel. To be more exact, Iraq would probably be willing enough to send troops into Syria, but what would their real mission be? As long as Syria controls the Tabaqa Dam on the Euphrates, the closing of which can doom (as it did this year) the crops of 3.5 million Iraqi peasants, Iraq would be tempted to use its forces to take over Syria or at least to ensure a friendly government in Damascus.

And Syria, for all its tough talk to UN Secretary-General Waldheim and to the Security Council in November, is aware of its weakness. Syria does not want a conflict with Israel now because Syria could not win it while defeat would bring down the Damascus regime. If proof were needed, Syrian actions during the fighting in Lebanon would provide it. Historically, Syria has looked upon Lebanon (as upon Israel and Jordan) as *Syria irredentia* and has been the main patron of discontented Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians. Over the last nine months, however, the Syrians, including 'hard-line' Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam have played a moderating role. Syria did unleash its tame Palestinians, the as-Saiqa, when it appeared that Maronite Christian forces would take Beirut, for Syria's rulers cannot accept a Maronite victory in the civil strife. But in general the Syrians and their PLO allies tried to stay out of the the fighting, to support the efforts of Prime Minister Karami to bring the struggle to an end with only limited concessions made to the Muslims, and to arrange various cease-fires—even when the Lebanese Muslims and their Palestinian allies were winning. Israeli leaders, such as Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Allon had plainly stated that they could not accept either a Syrian-dominated Lebanon or one controlled by a leftist Palestinian-Lebanese Muslim coalition because of the danger such a Lebanon would pose to northern Israel. Thus, Syrian attempts to limit the Lebanese fighting, even at the risk of being denounced by leftist leaders such as Kemal Jumblatt, showed the Syrian desire to avoid war with Israel.

And Lebanon was also a warning to Syria's rulers. Religious passion has also burst into riot in Syria. After all, Syria's rulers for all their effort to conciliate the 65% Arab Sunni Muslim majority in Syria, originate in the Alawi sect upon which more orthodox Muslims look with suspicion and to which only 10% of Syria's population belongs. Such a government must be under constant pressure to score diplomatic triumphs in lieu of the military ones for which it dares not assume the risks.

Indeed, Syrian governmental weakness is an asset in dealing with the Great Powers. The USSR has no taste for confrontation in the Middle East because of its own economic troubles, especially on the agricultural front. But diplomatic support in the Security Council is cheap enough. Besides, while the interim Sinai agreement established the US as sole guarantor, the Security Council debates on the Middle East put these negotiations back

into a forum in which the USSR has equal status with the US. This is a useful substitute for the Soviet desire to reconvene the moribund Geneva Conference, a principal object of Soviet Middle East diplomacy for the past year.

The US has no corresponding interest in the continuance of the all-Assad regime in Damascus. A successor is unlikely, at least in practice, to be any more hawkish. But as election year approaches, Washington becomes increasingly apprehensive about the possibility of Middle East conflict, especially as the Middle East is now so identified as the area of Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic triumphs. The temptation to avoid the start of conflict by giving in to Arab demands and putting pressure on Israel (which continues to be completely dependent on the US) is great indeed. When Syria in November for the first time permitted its territory to be used as a base for Palestinian raids on Israeli-held territory, at least some US pressure was involved in the Israeli decision to retaliate not by attacking Syria but by striking Palestinian camps-bases in Lebanon, a far safer target. Ironically enough, it was that strike which provided the pretext for the first PLO participation in UN Security Council meetings and for US insistence that future Israeli retaliatory raids be cleared with Washington.

Indeed, US-Israeli ties were severely strained by the success of the Syrian-Palestinian bluff. The Sinai interim settlement included a US pledge that Washington would not deal with, and would not force Israel to negotiate with, the PLO. This would continue at least until the PLO abandoned its commitment to terrorism as a means and abolishing the Jewish state by violence as an end. Even before December, Israeli leaders, including Rabin, were apprehensive about a possible softening of this US stand. Recent statements by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders as to the need to take account of Palestinian needs in any final Arab-Israeli agreement could be so interpreted.

To be sure, the US did resist efforts to have the PLO invited in the actual resolution renewing UNDOF's mandate. And the US delegate was careful to disassociate the US from the pro-PLO statement of the Security Council majority. Still, this US declaration was made after agreement with that majority. And a week later the US declined to attempt to veto the invitation to the PLO alleging that this was a procedural resolution (to which the veto does not apply). Yet the invitation to the PLO came under none of the Security Council's rules. And the decision as to whether something is procedural is itself not procedural. Against this background, even the US decision to veto the December effort to condemn the Israeli raid into Lebanon failed to reassure Jerusalem.

In Israel, as in Egypt, the effect of the US stand is to make Arab-Israeli accommodation more difficult. Israel is being asked to surrender territory for US pledges. If in the Security Council the US retreated in the face of Syrian and Soviet pressure, pressure which would have evaporated had the US stood firm, what assurance can Israel have of the value of other pledges? Ammunition has thus been given to the Likud and those elements within Mafdal which distrust US promises, especially when made by Dr. Kissinger,

and call for retaining all the territory taken in 1967. The Rabin government's decision to authorise the building of new Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights and to allow unauthorised settlers from the religious Gush Emunim movement to remain in Samaria was taken under the impact of the Syrian raid on Ramat Magshimim and the actions of the Security Council. Ironically, since the new settlements will make future Israeli concessions on the Golan and West Bank more difficult, the Syrians and PLC are also losers.

Everyone in the Middle East knows how to threaten and be unreasonable. And if such tactics are productive they will be used. Such agreements as have taken place in the Middle East since 1973 are a product of US demonstrations that it is prepared to resist bluffs and threats, be these of war or of oil boycott. This is what US policy failed to maintain in the UN Security Council debates in November and December. The strains on US-Israeli relations, the encouragement given the Syrians and the PLO not to moderate their positions or to break with the USSR, the boost given to their status as against that of the Egyptians, and the transference of Middle East negotiations, for the moment, to a less American-influenced setting, a setting in which progress is far less likely, are the costs of this US failure.

The April issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Will the USA Quit the ILO?* by James Avery Joyce, *The Secular Church* by June Wedgwood Benn, *The New Zealand General Election of* 1975 by Juliet Lodge and *Thomas Hardy: A Strange Opportunity* by Desmond Hawkins.

INSIDE RED CHINA

by Benjamin Cavanero

IN the city and throughout the mainland, more than 800 million Chinese began a period of mourning for the late Premier Chou En-lai, who died of cancer on January 8th at the age of 78. Messages of tribute poured into Peking praising the statesmanship of Chou. Scores of world leaders offered to go to the city to pay personal respects to him; however, Chinese authorities expressed their 'deep gratitude' for these offers but turned them down.

'In accordance with China's customs and protocol reform, it has been decided that no foreign government, fraternal party, or friendly personage will be invited to send delegations to China to take part in the mourning activities', announced the funeral committee.

In the past, China's Communist leaders have held subdued services for their dead comrades. The Chinese made it clear that they were not going to turn Chou's funeral into a big affair similar to other countries'.

The country Chou En-lai left behind him is very different from most other states, whether communist or capitalist. In one area in Chiangsi province, there were thousands of men, women and children labouring like a procession of ants in road-building, using only their hands and primitive tools. Compulsory retirement is at sixty years for men and fifty years for women.

Militarisation is inculcated among all the Chinese people and particularly among the youths. Young children are not taught legends, either fairy tales or fables. They are trained for the hard realities of life and the importance of military preparedness. The victories of the revolution of the masses against landlords and imperialism are mainly emphasised. Robberies are very few because when one commits a theft, he is banished either from the factory or from the commune to another district. Places of banishment are usually along the borders of China and Siberia, Mongolia and Tibet.

The way to the Children's Palace was revealing in itself. It was a miniature remake of an ordinary combat obstacle course and training ground complete with barbed wires, tunnels, single wooden planks, etc. Here, the children are taught how to make their own toy guns, toy land and sea mines, and how to use them 'to defeat the enemy'. Imperialists are often typified by foreign soldiers, tanks and plane toys which the children use for target purposes.

Tienanmen Square is located at Peking, the Forbidden City. Here a million Chinese gather yearly on October 1st to celebrate the 'Day of Liberation'. The city, occupying all of 724,000 square metres, is ringed by a 10 metre high wall, encompassing at least 9,000 rooms as preserved at present. Among the most impressive was the Hall of Supreme Harmony, the site of imperial celebrations where the emperors presided from intricately carved and gilded thrones elevated on a dais 200 metres from the people's

section. Places of worship, either Christian, Buddhist, Moslem or any religion, have been converted into factories.

People of Red China consider religion as a mere superstition. No one professes belief in a supernatural God. However, they do not think of Chairman Mao as their God. According to them, their chairman is a living father, teacher and leader who leads them by his great deeds and words of wisdom. All their religious needs are made up for in their consuming devotion to Mao Tse Tung. In their life and relationships, they have fulfilled unknowingly the supreme commandment of laying down their life for another. Their actions indicate that they have almost obliterated 'self', and always think in terms of the 'other'. For them, the 'other' is the State which is ultimately themselves, i.e. their country and themselves.

The Yi Ming food factory, which dates back to pre-revolutionary days, was a former firm of an American capitalist surnamed Harrison. From a work force of 36, the workers now number 3,000, operating on three eight-hour shifts. All the workers are divided into groups: namely, ordinary labourers, technicians and cadres (the latter drawn from experienced and dedicated revolutionary hands). Each department is headed by a revolutionary committee entrusted with three main responsibilities: production, supply and political propaganda. The latter sees to the general welfare of the workers, with stress laid on recreation and sports, especially political education based on Mao Tse Tung thoughts.

In the outskirts of Shanghai, workers residing in the Pang Pu workers' settlement have one hundred and thirty-eight buildings to provide tenement houses for some 3,700 families—a total population of 17,000. This is one of thousands of settlement projects built by the state all over China to house workers' families. There are sixteen stores, two primary schools and one high school, which the Chinese call middle school and a medical clinic.

An ordinary family in the settlement project earns from 150 to 200 yuans a month and spends from 20 to 25 yuans a week on food and clothing. The prices of commodities not essential to the ordinary existence of a Chinese family are tagged well beyond the reach of an ordinary worker in order to discourage him from buying. Bicycles, transistorised radios and sewing machines are the symbols of prosperity.

Women do practically the same type of work as the men. Pulling a big cement mixer in a national road was a task performed by a group of women. Their clothes were tattered and patched up and they wore the same hats, bulky trousers and loose shirts as men. These workers are paid in cash and in kind according to a work point system decided by the labourers themselves, and also based on the amount of work done. Since they are paid at the end of the year, peasants in need may borrow money in the interim without any interest charge.

According to Hsia Ling, an English-speaking Chinese woman, she and her husband earn approximately sixty yuans or thirty dollars a month each, which allows them to live quite comfortably. They pay a monthly rental of five yuans for a two-bedroom flat, water and electricity included; twenty yuans for food eaten in the house, and a nominal amount for lunches and

dinners taken in the office canteen (partly subsidised by the state). With clothing materials rationed, they purchase only what they need.

Her budget does not include expenditure on cosmetics. When asked if she ever felt the feminine urge for self-beautification, she shook her head. According to her, these things are not important and would not help her work in the service of the people. Even courtship and marriage are influenced by party ideology, while almost everything else, from family conflicts to ideological revisionism, seems to be settled by 'persuasion'.

In the Peking No. 3 State Cotton Mill, 70 per cent of the workers and staff members are women; many of them are mothers. Hence, when they go to work most of them take their children to the factory's nursery and kindergarten school. Children from 56 days to three and a half years are accepted in the nursery and those up to six and a half years in the kindergarten. Expenses of management, including nurses', cooks' and teachers' salaries, are paid from the factory welfare fund, the workers contributing only a minimum, mainly for the children's food.

The commune is the most autonomous form of local government in China. The community also maintains its own small factories for the repair of agricultural machinery and equipment. For the families without houses, the state has built thousands of one-room condominium-type houses which are rented out to needy families for approximately one yuan a month plus 70 per cent a month for electricity. There are no toilets in the condominium-type houses; these are built for communal use only since human waste is used to fertilise vegetables.

In the factories and the communes, one cannot distinguish between the official and the ordinary worker because of their similar style of dress. However, factory workers earn more than commune workers. In one of the houses in the commune, a family was earning one hundred and twenty-five yuans a month. Fifty yuans by the husband, forty yuans by the wife and thirty-five yuans by the mother of the husband. Work performance in the commune is determined by the group. Performance is rated by ability, production techniques, health condition, initiative and in the teachings of Mao Tse Tung.

A worker upon retirement receives a monthly pension equivalent to seventy per cent of his or her salary. If he dies, the state pays for his funeral service. Chinese workers do not pay for hospitalisation and medicine. The state (in this case, the factory where they work) pays all the hospital bills. Nobody is allowed to own land in this region. A man may put up his own house or till a piece of soil and benefit from the produce, but the land is owned by the state. The house, though, is owned by the family who built it and can even be passed on to the heirs of the family.

Marketing operations are managed by the state, which purchases all the produce, paying the production teams 'each according to his ability'. The products are then sent to central purchasing stations whence they are distributed to retail outlets. From the initial land reform stage (where feudal estates were fragmented and distributed free to the tillers), the system evolved into cooperatives of the 'labour-exchange team type' to the present

commune ownership system controlled by the state. Thus all seeds, fertilisers, farm equipment, etc., are provided by the commune. However, ten per cent of the accumulated funds are reserved for further improvement. Commune members are allowed seven per cent of the total land area for private use.

Education is generally free and compulsory at the primary (grade) school level, which lasts for six years, and middle (high) school, which is four years. Instruction is based on Chairman Mao Tse Tung's three principles, namely: Political Ideology or the Marxist-Leninist-Mao Thoughts; Productive Labour and Service to the People. These doctrines are easily discerned starting at the nursery level where three-year-old children are introduced through their songs, dances and play activities to Chairman Mao's greatness.

Students coming from China cannot be accredited in schools outside the mainland because their system of education is very different from traditional academies. Most of the students come from the peasant and the workers' class from various far-flung provinces, all with high political consciousness. From high school, a child goes to the university, depending on his intellectual ability and state of health. Whether he takes up engineering, medicine or teaching, the Chinese youth finishes his college university education in three years so that by the time he graduates he is about eighteen or twenty years old.

University students are taught to follow the 'mass line', which means that students and graduates should go to the 'masses' and serve the people by exchanging ideas and experiences with them by teaching, doing productive labour or undertaking scientific research. There are no law students in most regions as Chinese officials claim that China has no need for lawyers. However, there are now international law subjects in the curriculum at the universities because of China's admission to the United Nations.

The Capital Gymnasium in the western suburb of Peking is the country's first colosseum with an indoor skating rink. The floor-space of the main building totals 40,000 square metres. The arena seats 18,000 and can hold 24 ping-pong tables for simultaneous play. Beneath the mechanically removable floor of the gymnasium is a layer of terrazzo flooring, which, when flooded, becomes a skating rink after only a few hours' freezing.

The Chengtu-Chungking Area, situated in the lowest part of the famous Szechuan Basin, includes the two cities, their environs and the territory between. Like the Peking-Tientsin Area, the Pearl River Delta or the Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow Area, it is thickly populated, and serves as one of China's important industrial and agricultural bases. The fertile Cheng-tu Plain, extending about 6,000 sq. km., lies in its western part and is criss-crossed with rivers. The central part is hilly. Across its thickly-forested eastern sector run parallel mountain ranges with rivers and valleys between. The Yangtze River traverses the south, with three of its southward-flowing tributaries—the Mingkiang, Tuokiang and Chialing Rivers—converging in this area.

Chengtu, with a history of over 2,000 years, has been gradually transformed from a paradise for bureaucrats and landlords into a base of various

branches of industry such as textiles and machine building. It is also a centre of culture and a hub of overland communications for Szechuan. Tzukung, with its history of over 1,000 years of salt-extraction, is developing into an outstanding centre of the chemical industry, based on the all-round use of bittern. Neikiang, known as the 'Sweet City', is a sugar-refining centre. Silk produced in Nanchung and Loshan has a wide market throughout the country.

Chungking is now the biggest port handling river cargo and one of the most important industrial and commercial cities in south-western China. It is also a place of historical interest. During the period of the anti-Japanese war, it was the centre of the reactionary Kuomintang. Then, following the war, it was the scene of major peace efforts by the Chinese Communist Party, with Chairman Mao going there personally in August 1945 to carry out peace negotiations.

The well-known Tukiangyen water-conservancy project has irrigated a vast expanse of fertile farmland known as the 'Land of Abundance'. Since the cultural revolution, after a thorough renovation, it had an expansion of irrigated area from just over two million 'mu' to over seven million today. This area is one of the important rice and wheat belts in China. The main industrial crops are sugar-cane, cotton and rapeseed. Citrus fruits are produced and sericulture is well developed, while the beautiful Szechuan satins are sold throughout the country.

Communications in the Chengtu-Chungking Area have been rapidly improved since liberation. The Chengtu-Chungking Railway, which was constructed in 1912, did not progress much during its forty years of existence. However, following its completion, the railway was opened to traffic in 1952 and the Paochi-Chengtu, Neikiang-Yipin, Chungking-Kweiyang and other railways were also opened. Highways now extend in all directions. The Yangtze River and its main tributaries make up the backbone of a network of waterways. An aviation system has been set up with this area as its centre. Gone for ever are the days when it was 'more arduous the road to Szechuan than even the road to Heaven'.

The determination of the Chinese people to produce vast amounts of the basic necessities in life is brought about by national discipline. One tall hill, obviously infertile, was painted with a gigantic slogan, 'In Agriculture, Learn from Tachai', spread miles long. Tachai, according to the pictorial, was formerly a barren hilly area with poor soil and unruly waters, now transformed into a highly productive agricultural commune with terraced cultivated land and level plots. Tachai is proudly held up to all the Chinese people and pointed out to visiting foreigners as 'a shining example for the building of a new socialist countryside in China'. Furthermore, the country regained its prestige in the international community. This is partly due to the fact that the late Chou had not lost sight of the importance of China's relations with the non-communist world, as is confirmed by reports from Brussels that China intends to explore the possibilities of a trade agreement with the EEC.

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL: 170 YEARS OF DEBATE

by John Milsome

IN 1802 an uneasy peace treaty was signed at Amiens by the British and French. It settled nothing as Britain refused to recognise the newly organised republics and Napoleon was planning to invade the island across the Channel. He assembled an armada of troop-carrying craft to ferry his army across the straits but he also had another idea for invasion.

After the signing of the Peace of Amiens, the British statesman, Charles Fox, had gone to France to discuss the possibilities of closer links between the two countries. More trade would bring mutual benefits and one way that this could be brought about was through the creation of a Channel Tunnel. Fox and Napoleon talked of how a tunnel could be achieved and both supported the idea. Fox told the French leader, 'This is one of the great things that we could do if we would work together.'

Within a year, Albert Mathieu-Favier, a French mining engineer, was commissioned by the Emperor to prepare detailed plans for a military tunnel under the Channel. The plans were quickly produced and provided for a tunnel of two sections, meeting at an artificial island built in the middle of the Channel. Horse-drawn cars were to be pulled through the tunnel on rails. Ventilation would be provided by special chimneys which would protrude above the surface of the water. This plan was eventually rejected as unworkable in view of the certain opposition of the British Navy.

Then another Frenchman, Henri Tessier de Mottray, produced a new plan which involved the laying of large wooden tubes at the bottom of the sea. Each tube would be filled with air and joined to the next tube by iron bands filled with pitch. Critics of De Mottray's scheme pointed out that wooden air-filled pipes would be buoyant and it would be impossible to keep them in a secure position. De Mottray's plan, however, provided for anchorage of his wooden tubes by heavy iron chains and stones. When war broke out in 1804 between France and Britain, no action had been taken over the plans put forward for a Channel Tunnel and, although the project was occasionally discussed when the war was over and Napoleon was in exile, the Tunnel remained only a plan.

The post-war era was one of economic distress on both sides of the Channel and the spending of money on a tunnel would have been politically unpopular. That the idea of a Channel Tunnel was revived is due very largely to the endeavours of one man, a French engineer named Thomas de Gamond. Born in 1807 he had discovered the plans of Mathieu-Favier and De Mottray and after studying them he was inspired to go into the matter himself. From the year 1830 De Gamond began to make plans and surveys for a tunnel under the Channel. It was to be his life's work and was to last for nearly forty years.

De Gamond had served in Egypt with his friend Ferdinand de Lesseps and had been very interested in that great engineer's idea for a Suez Canal.

De Lesseps had made careful surveys and De Gamond set to work to organise systematic surveys of the bed of the Channel. From 1832 he arranged for divers to go down to the bottom of the sea to examine the geological conditions that engineers would have to face when actually digging the tunnel. He had to improvise with inadequate diving equipment and made many of the dives himself.

On a typical Channel diving expedition, De Gamond was taken out to sea in a rowing boat. He wore a belt with a rope attached to the boat. Fixed to his shoulders was a bag filled with heavy stones to make him sink and when he wanted to return to the surface he signalled by pulling on the rope. Inflated pig bladders helped him to rise from the bottom of the sea. He could stay under water for up to two minutes. Time for him to bring up specimens of the sea bed for scientific study.

In Britain, Brunel and Stephenson, with their experience of building all kinds of railway tunnels, were supporters of De Gamond's Tunnel project. In 1855 De Gamond had made three survey dives and the following year he produced his first tunnel plan. This was well timed to coincide with the state visit to France of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. The Queen took a great interest in the plan. She was known to be a bad sailor who did not enjoy crossing the Channel by boat. When the Queen heard about the Channel Tunnel scheme she commented, 'You may tell the French engineer that, if he succeeds, I will give him my blessing.' Her husband, Albert, the Prince Consort, was also a strong supporter of De Gamond's project.

Reaction in Britain was mixed. Most newspapers and magazines were in favour of a Channel Tunnel, but Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, was against the tunnel to the extent that he was not prepared to discuss the project. British military leaders were also very critical of the tunnel plan, regarding it as a threat to Britain's safety in time of war. De Gamond did not give up easily. He pointed out that his survey indicated that the chalk and limestone bed of the Channel made the boring of a tunnel a fairly straight-forward task. He planned a tunnel which involved the creation of thirteen islands built on the rock dug from the tunnel. These islands were to act as air vents providing ventilation for the steam trains that were to make the journey through the tunnel.

During the next two years political feeling between Britain and France deteriorated. Under these conditions opposition to the boring of a Channel Tunnel intensified and De Gamond could not find the financial backers he needed for his plan. Then in 1867 the Universal Exhibition was held in Paris and De Gamond had a special Channel Tunnel exhibit on view for the general public to see. De Gamond had spent all his savings on the project but found that it was very difficult to convince the British and French governments of the soundness of his scheme.

He received some encouragement when a commission was appointed by the French Ministry of Public Works. It seemed that at last a start was about to be made on the tunnel in a practical way. The French government agreed to give financial assistance. Money was also forthcoming from the French Railway Company, Rothschild and the Suez Canal Company in

which the British had a great share-interest. Everything was moving towards the actual digging of the tunnel. In 1868 the Anglo-French Tunnel Committee was formed. The members of this committee were Thomas de Gamond, William Lowe, Joseph Lock, Robert Stephenson, Isambard Brunel and, later, Sir John Hawkshaw.

In 1869 the British engineer, William Low, produced plans for two parallel tunnels through which would run railway tracks. Test borings were carried out by Harley Day, a British geologist, and the reports that he made were encouraging for the engineers. Negotiations were opened between the French and British governments and representatives of the engineers. It was hoped to get government financial aid to start experimental borings from both sides of the Channel. In 1870 the Franco-Prussian war broke out and all hope of a start on the tunnel had to be abandoned. De Gamond retired from the Tunnel Committee to live in poor circumstances until his death in 1876.

The Franco-Prussian war caused economic problems and a military note of caution to be sounded against the tunnel. For two years the project was put aside but it was not forgotten. In 1872 the French government resumed discussions with Britain on Lowe's plan for a tunnel. The British attitude was not against the tunnel in principle but emphasised that the cost of digging it would have to come from private sources. In 1872 the Channel Tunnel Company was founded with William Low as chief engineer for the project. This received a great stimulus two years later when the Earl of Derby, an enthusiast for the tunnel, was appointed British Foreign Secretary. As a result of discussions that the Earl of Derby had with the French government, a French Channel Tunnel Company was formed in 1875.

That same year an Anglo-French Convention was signed to deal with the practical engineering problems involved. The British Channel Tunnel Company was authorised to buy land at St. Margaret's Bay and to start digging under Shakespeare Cliffs near Dover. The French company received a similar authority from the French government to start digging at Sangatte on the French side of the Channel. By 1880, when digging started, the English company had failed to raise the necessary funds to finance the tunnel and as a result it had been bought up by the Submarine Continental Railway Company. The chairman of this company was Sir Edward Watkin, who had been chairman of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway and the South-Eastern Railway.

When digging began, conditions for boring were described as excellent as the Channel was bedded on non-porous chalk marl. Experts estimated that an experimental tunnel could be completed within five years, using the latest type of boring machine operated by compressed air. This machine, designed by Colonel Frederick Beaumont of the Royal Engineers, was used on both sides of the Channel. Queen Victoria came to see the entrance to the shaft, as did many prominent people of the day. They were especially impressed by the new electric lighting which had been installed to illuminate what was expected to be one of the greatest engineering feats of the century.

In Britain, however, there was still considerable opposition to the

creation of a Channel Tunnel and when the digging started the opposition intensified. *The Times* opposed the construction of a tunnel because its completion would mean that Britain was no longer an island. Lord Wolseley, the Chief of Staff, added his military prestige to the chorus of protests that began in the 1880s. Lord Wolseley's main grounds for opposition to the tunnel were all concerned with security. He suggested that enemy troops disguised as tourists might try to take over the tunnel, traitors could surrender the British end of the tunnel and a victorious enemy would be able to hold the tunnel under military guard and so keep Britain permanently defeated. Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Randolph Churchill were also against the tunnel and a petition signed by famous and influential men such as Herbert Spencer, Robert Browning and Thomas Huxley was sent to the Prime Minister, asking that the digging of the tunnel should stop. Even Queen Victoria had changed her mind and now wrote to Disraeli stating that she regarded a tunnel under the Channel as extremely objectionable.

Sir Edward tried to deal with the opposition by a propaganda campaign. To promote the tunnel he was always lobbying MPs, making public speeches, writing in the press and holding champagne luncheon parties in the shaft of the tunnel. In spite of his efforts, after an impassioned speech in the House of Lords by Lord Wolseley, in which he spoke against the building of a tunnel, the question was referred to a Parliamentary Commission. By six votes to four the commission voted that the tunnel should not be completed. The supporters of the tunnel then attempted to prove that a system of precautionary measures could be devised that would ensure that the tunnel would not be a security risk.

It was the War Office and the opinion of such men as Lord Wolseley which carried most weight, however. In July 1883, Justice Kay gave a court judgement that all digging must stop. By the following year the boring of the tunnel was abandoned on the British side of the Channel. For a time the French carried on with their end of the project but it was eventually realised that completion of the tunnel would not be possible without British co-operation and so the French too stopped work.

Sir Edward Watkin had been forced to stop work but he continued to propagate the idea of a Channel Tunnel. In 1887 his company became the Channel Tunnel Company, Ltd. and Sir Edward launched a determined campaign in the press and in Parliament. He even obtained permission from the Board of Trade to demonstrate his boring machine to a party from the War Office. That same year he had some measure of success when a Channel Tunnel Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. The bill had some support but failed to get a second reading. By 1901, when Sir Edward died, the Channel Tunnel was still being discussed as a viable project, but still no decision to resume digging was given.

As the 20th century opened, Lord Asquith showed an interest in the tunnel debate and after 1904 the Entente Cordiale, encouraged by King Edward VII, gave hope to the supporters of the tunnel plans. In 1907 Baron d'Erlanger, a French banker, became chairman of the Channel

Tunnel Company and set about the task of gaining support anew. An Anglo-French team of engineers made a special study of all the problems involved in completing a tunnel. When their study was complete they issued a report which was very much in favour of a tunnel being built. As a result a new Channel Tunnel Bill was debated in the House of Commons.

Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, the Prime Minister, spoke against the tunnel. He raised all the old issues about security risks. As in the past, the vote went against the bill. For years the debate continued outside Parliament and a deputation of MPs called on Lord Asquith, then Prime Minister, with a request that he should reconsider the whole matter. At this time the tunnel supporters were increasing in number and when a vote was taken in the House of Commons, in spite of the opposition of the British Committee of Imperial Defence, only a small minority were against the new tunnel proposals. Perhaps action would have been taken if the First World War had not broken out in 1914. Sir Francis Fox, who had been responsible for building the bridge over the Zambesi River at the Victoria Falls, had produced a new plan for a Channel Tunnel. He had worked with Albert Sartinaun of the French Channel Company. War unfortunately meant that all plans had to be shelved.

Security had always been the main military concern whenever tunnel plans were discussed. During the war the very idea of a Channel Tunnel would have been considered unpatriotic. Yet it was the war leader Marshal Foch who pointed out that if the tunnel had been in existence in 1914, the supplies of the allied armies in France could have been greatly speeded up. This he believed would have shortened the war by at least two years.

When the war finished in 1918 the Channel Tunnel Company was soon active, issuing a report of the possible cost of a tunnel which it put at £16 million. During the immediate post-war years economic resources could not be used on a tunnel scheme but in 1924 a Labour Government was elected in Britain for the first time. Although dependent on Liberal support, Labour had power to introduce new policies. Ramsay MacDonald was the Prime Minister and he decided to take a new look at the problems involved in building a tunnel. A House of Commons Channel Tunnel Committee met regularly and found that the cost of the tunnel was now estimated to be £29 million.

After MPs in the House of Commons had voted in favour of the tunnel by a majority of two to one, Ramsay MacDonald called a conference of four sometime Prime Ministers: Asquith, Bonar Law, Lloyd George and Stanley Baldwin. They deliberated for what seems the incredibly short time of forty minutes and then announced that they had rejected the proposals for a tunnel on security grounds. Winston Churchill had supported the tunnel plans and when he heard of the decision of the Prime Ministers he commented, 'There is no doubt about their promptitude. The question is: was their decision right or wrong? I do not hesitate to say that it was wrong.'

The temporary optimism of the mid 1920s caused the Channel Tunnel to remain a subject of debate. In 1929 a Parliamentary Committee reported,

'Although some interests would be adversely affected, the construction of a Channel Tunnel, by creating new traffic and thus increasing trade, would be of economic advantage to this country.' The possibilities of a bridge were also considered. The Committee studied a suggestion for a hinged bridge which would rise and fall with the tide, but this was rejected. A more ambitious scheme was for a continuous suspension bridge with four road lanes, two railway tracks and a mid-Channel railway station. This was also rejected because of the heavy building costs and the possible dangers to shipping.

The worldwide economic slump of 1929-1931 left a legacy of unemployment in Europe and America during the 1930s. Then came a period of war scares and rearmament. With the outbreak of war in 1939 the security issue meant the abandonment of the tunnel plan, largely through the German invasion of France and the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk. The British Royal Air Force made constant reconnaissance missions along the French coast in case the Germans were continuing work on the tunnel. The Allies considered building a tunnel from the British side as a way of launching a second front, but the time involved in digging the tunnel was considered to be too great.

In spite of the devastation and suspicion caused by the war, there was also a desire for a new deal. There was an understanding of the need in the post-war era for European co-operation through trade and military alliance. Inevitably the Channel Tunnel was again discussed. A British Parliamentary Channel Study Group organised by Christopher Shawcross met in 1947 and that same year Andre Basdevant, a French engineer, devised an elaborate road and rail tunnel with room for oil pipelines and electric grid cables. This brought the tunnel publicity and in 1948 Sir Herbert Walker, who had been chairman of the British Southern Railway before it was nationalised, announced that he was in favour of the tunnel. He pointed out that scientific knowledge and engineering techniques had so advanced since before the war that he believed that the actual construction of the tunnel would involve no major problems.

With the growing support and interest in the country, the Channel Tunnel Company was able to have a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament set up in 1949 to consider new proposals for two tunnels from Dover to Sangatte. These would link the London-Dover railway with the Calais-Paris railway at an estimated cost of £60 million. Governments were beset by an intensification of the cold war and economic difficulties. It was not a time for a decision on something that had been shelved for 150 years. In France, Basdevant persevered with his tunnel plan and in 1952 received the support of General Gruenther, Chief of Staff of SHAPE, who could see the economic and military advantages of the tunnel.

In 1954 questions on the tunnel were again asked in the British Parliament. When asked whether there were still objections to the building of a Channel Tunnel, the Prime Minister answered that the British Government could see no serious objection. Harold Macmillan, who was then Minister of Defence, agreed with a questioner that strategic considerations hardly

mattered at all in deciding whether a tunnel should be built or not. The main difficulty was cost.

Supporters of the tunnel scheme hoped that funds would be obtainable from private sources. It was known that the Suez Canal Company would ultimately have large funds to re-invest. In 1956 it seemed possible that Britain would enter the European Common Market with the necessity for a vast speeding up of trade across the Channel. Cyril Means of the New York Stock Exchange and Frank Davidson, an international lawyer practising in New York, realised the economic growth opportunities that would be provided by a Channel Tunnel. With the backing of French investors they formed Technical Studies Incorporated to study the engineering and financial aspects of building a tunnel in the 1950s.

After the conflict over Suez with the British and French in 1956, the Egyptian Government nationalised the Suez Canal and the Channel Tunnel Company lost a possible source of funds. Technical Studies carried on discussions with the French and British Channel Tunnel Companies. In 1957 the Suez Canal Company agreed to assist the other interested parties in carrying out an up to date survey of the Channel. The result was the formation of a new Channel Tunnel Study Group which soon set to work. By March 1960 the Group was able to issue a report which stated that it was recommended that a rail tunnel should be built rather than a road tunnel as the latter would have exceptional problems of ventilation. It was suggested that the tunnel should be in the form of an immersed tube sunk into the Channel bed. These suggestions were submitted to the British and French Governments.

Both Governments agreed that the Channel Tunnel was a sound proposition but time would be needed to examine costs under the inflationary conditions of the time. In addition it would have to be considered whether other means of crossing the Channel could be made more efficient. British and French road interests wanted a bridge instead of a tunnel and found a powerful supporter in Jules Moch, a former French Government Minister. A Channel Bridge Study Group issued plans for a bridge that would carry two railway lines, five traffic lanes and two motor-cycle tracks. It was anticipated that it would be able to take 5,000 cars an hour. The building of a bridge, however, would be far more costly than a tunnel, bad weather would be a problem and for work to start on such a bridge, permission of all maritime users of the Channel would be necessary as the bridge would be built across an international seaway.

After further study of the various proposals, the British and French Governments issued a joint statement in February 1964 which stated that as a result of studies that had been undertaken, they considered that the construction of a rail Channel Tunnel was technically possible and represented a sound investment of the two countries' resources.

There was concern among Kent residents when details of possible sites for terminals of the Tunnel were announced. It was claimed, too, that by 1980 the costs of building the Tunnel would be colossal and that Channel ferries and hovercraft would be able to provide a cheaper service. In the

autumn of 1973 it seemed likely that work on the Channel Tunnel would go ahead in spite of all the doubts.

Then came the Middle East crisis and the dramatic rise in oil prices. Britain faced inflation and desperate economic problems. Although the French had already dug a tunnel three hundred metres long and the British a tunnel more than eight hundred metres, on January 20, 1975, Anthony Crosland, the British Minister of State for the Environment, announced to Parliament that work on the Tunnel was to stop.

After more than 170 years of debate the Tunnel had again been abandoned. Yet it still seems certain that the debate will continue and if a period of economic and political stability can be achieved during the last quarter of the 20th century, the Channel Tunnel could still become a reality, particularly if the project finds favour with EEC development policies.

[John Milsome, at present Deputy Headmaster of Barantyne Middle School in Northolt, has also taught in America and Nigeria. Publications include six books specially written for use in Nigerian schools and a life of Damien.]

SEAPOWER IN HISTORY—INDIA AND CHINA

by Anthony Harrigan

IN studying the influence of seapower upon history, Westerners understandably pay maximum attention to the naval developments and oceanic conquests of their own cultural world. This kind of Eurocentrism is inadequate these days, now that Asian states are playing an increasingly active role in the world arena. Therefore, students of seapower would do well to examine the maritime histories of the two principal peoples of Asia—the Indians and the Chinese.

Contemporary India has only a small naval service, but is a land with an ancient maritime tradition. Seapower has played an important part in the history of the peoples who have occupied the Indian sub-continent. Indeed, the geographical character of India compels involvement with seapower. India juts into the great southern ocean which bears the name of the peninsular sub-continent. Not a great many Indians of today, it seems, fully appreciate the relationship of seapower to the strength and independence of the people of India. One Indian thinker who has a proper awareness of the influence of seapower is M. K. Subba Rao. Writing in 1966, he urged his countrymen to bear in mind that it is an 'historical fact that when the Indians tended to neglect their seapower, aliens with superior seapower entrenched themselves in India.'

Archaelogical excavation in India has uncovered the ancient roots of India's maritime history. Not long ago, archaeologists found an ancient naval dock at Lothal in Gujaret. It was 710 feet long by 120 feet wide. Certainly, there was oceanic trade between India and Babylon as early as 3000 B.C. Cdr. K. Sridharan, author of A Maritime History of India, reports that sea voyages in the period between 2000 B.C. and 500 B.C. followed the coasts of Persia, Arabia and the lands bordering the Red Sea. Biblical scholars say that goods from the South Indian ports reached the domains of King Solomon in the 10th century B.C.

By the time of Alexander's invasion, India was well advanced in ship construction and sailing methods. In the reign of Chandragupta Maurya, a regular admiralty organisation existed under a 'Superintendent of Ships'. In addition, there was a 'Superintendent of Ocean Mines', who supervised pearl fisheries.

From the dawn of Indian history, South India played a leading role in maritime affairs. Trade links were established between South Indian ports and Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine. Extensive trade ties also were maintained between the Dravidian civilisation of the first century B.C. and the Roman world.

Between 600 and 400 B.C., and by the second century of the Christian era, Indians had penetrated to the Malay archipelago and to Java. From that time on, this region, known as 'Farther India', was of considerable importance to Indian merchants. Hindu colonial kingdoms existed through-

out this part of the Orient, with strong ties to peninsular India. King Narasimhavarman I built a naval base 30 miles south of Madras at a place called Mamallapuram.

The Chalukyas dynasty that arose in the sixth century A.D. also had strong naval interests. Pulakesin II, the most notable of the Chalukya, created a strong navy, and the kingdom was regarded as a leading naval power. Ocean voyaging led them to colonise Java.

Mr. Rao gives this account of the Chola, Chera, and Pandya Kingdoms of peninsula India:

> The Cholas were a pre-eminent maritime power and their famous sea-port of Kaveripattanam was the hub of their oceanic activity. They maintained an armada of ships and asserted their supremacy on the high seas by the end of the ninth century A.D. In fact, Rajendra Chola attacked the Hindu empire of the Sailendras in Malaya and Indonesia with his formidable armada and defeated them in 1025 A.D. Cheras was another important maritime power. They had direct commercial relations with the peoples of the West. Even as far back as 20 B.C. a Pandyan king has entered into an alliance with Augustus Caesar. A Pandyan bride was given in marriage to a Ceylonese prince and the whole bridal party was transported in a ship carrying over 800 passengers. This gives an idea of the size of the ships during those days.

The empire of Vijayanager, which came into existence in the 14th century, was another South Indian empire that emphasised maritime enterprise. At its height, this empire controlled 300 ports. Overseas trade was basic to the empire's economy and shipbuilding was a major industry. Goa was one of the principal Vijayanagar ports. Decline of the empire was caused in large part by the Portuguese occupation of Goa in 1512 A.D.

By the end of the period of Hindu supremacy, the Arabs had gained a strong hold on overseas trade in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, M. Mujeeb has written that 'the medieval history of India begins with the arrival of the first Muslim Arabs on our Western and Southern coasts'.

Arab sailors and merchants had been coming from the Red Sea and South Arabian ports for centuries, but the trade between the Persian Gulf and South Indian ports had not been in their hands. It was this trade which the Muslim Arabs took control of, and for which they established the city of Basrah in 637 A.D.

Mr. Rao, commenting on the Moghul empire in India, asserts that the Moghuls did not clearly appreciate the importance of seapower. They placed primary reliance on large standing armies, and neglected sea power. 'This continental outlook', he says, 'was one of the causes which paved the way for the ingress of the European powers.'

It should not be imagined, however, that India failed to offer naval resistance to the Europeans. In 1501 and 1503, flotillas of the Zamoein of Calicut attacked and severely damaged Portuguese forces. They did not follow up their attacks to a successful conclusion, however. Their failure to destroy the Portuguese fleet and chase Vasco da Gama's ships nullified their victories.

Much of the Indian seaward defence was undertaken by the hereditary Muslim admirals, the Maraskkars. One of the best known of these was Kunjalo III, who fought the Portuguese in coastal waters until his death in

1595. In the next century, the Maratha empire carried out a huge ship-building programme between 1659 and 1664, with 500 vessels laid down. The Maratha admirals held off the Europeans even though the state itself was weak.

The last of the great Indian admirals was Kanjoji Angre who, between 1717 and 1724, defeated a combined British, Dutch and Portuguese naval force. Thereafter, Indian seapower steadily declined. In 1756, the Maratha naval base of Vijayadung fell to the British. The main point to be noted is that the British obtained their strength on the Indian sub-continent from their power in the Indian Ocean. Their progress in controlling India grew with the annexation of bases around India.

The Indians, of course, were not the only people of Asia to conduct extensive operations in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese, spreading out from their initial centre in North China, came to have major activities and ambitions in oceanic space far to the South. And recent Chinese Communist politico-military efforts in lands along the rim of the Indian Ocean cannot be fully understood without knowing something of the history of Chinese voyaging in southern waters.

As early as the T'ang period (618-906 A.D.), the Chinese began to comprehend that the Indian Ocean—or the Southern Ocean, as they called it—provided for them a unified system of sea communications. Their understanding had its roots in the conquest of Tongking at the end of the third century B.C. and when ships were sent to India during the reign of the Han Emperor Wu Ti (141-87 B.C.).

By the first century A.D., a Chinese ambassador had reached the Persian Gulf. This was at the time of the Han dynasty when China was welded together. The Han emperors did this so thoroughly that the Chinese since that time have called themselves the Sons of Han. Then in the 4th and 5th centuries the sea connections and commerce grew steadily. The Chinese began to think of all the seas as one—a concept that Europeans arrived at only very late in history.

As early as 400 A.D., the Chinese imperial government began to organise a tributory system, first with the ruling powers in Indonesia and later with those in the Malay peninsula. One of the aims of the imperial system in Southeast Asia was to keep open the shipping lanes between mainland China and the countries of the Southern Ocean.

Under the Mongol dynasty (1279-1367), the Chinese sent an expedition to Annam, Burma, and Japan. The invasions in the South were not particularly successful. The attempt on Java was a failure, and the armada against Japan met disaster. But the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) sent new expeditions to Java and Ceylon. Indeed in 1408, in revenge for an insult offered to a Chinese envoy, a Chinese army invaded Ceylon and carried King Vijaya Bahu IV into captivity. For a generation, Ceylon was a vassal state of Imperial China.

Thus many years before Rome fell, the Chinese were voyaging across the Indian Ocean. There is available today the account of a Chinese pilgrim to India's Buddhist shrines, Fa Hsien, who went home in 413 A.D. on 'a large

merchant vessel' that was bound for Java. This vessel, he reported in his account, carried 200 people.

The maritime links with Ceylon date back to 25 A.D. Accounts of the Three Kingdoms Period (221-265 A.D.) refer to four-masted vessels. By the latter part of the 11th century, Chinese mariners had the magnetic compass and were ready for even more extensive voyages. They could sail into the wind, and their vessels had watertight compartments. By the first part of the 12th century, Chinese ships were fully capable of sailing across any part of the Indian Ocean. But it was only in the 15th century that the Chinese admiral Cheng Ho reached the east coast of the African continent.

The Chinese sea-going junks were developed chiefly under the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), and some of these had five decks and were 600 feet long.

How far these Chinese ships penetrated is still not fully known. It is clear that Chinese goods were reaching the Roman world before the beginning of the Christian era. In return, Roman materials have been found as far distant as Korea.

The 12th century saw the Suns establish trading states in Southern India. Their principal station was at Quilon. Finally, in 1414, there is a record of the ruler of the African city of Malindi sending an envoy to the Chinese emperor.

When the Ming dynasty came to power, exploration was extended along the rim of the Indian Ocean. This means that the Chinese exploration of this oceanic world took place a generation or more before the Portuguese arrived on the scene. The most dramatic expeditions were those conducted under the direction of Cheng Ho, the chief court eunuch. We know of seven separate ventures between 1403 and 1433. The first expedition consisted of 62 ships carrying 28,000 men. The third voyage sent ships as far west as Aden. Seven Chinese reached Mecca at this time. And tribute missions came to China from Africa, Arabia and Bengal.

Cheng Ho, who was known to Chinese history as the Three-Jewel Eunuch, returned to China from India in 1407: from India, Indonesia and Siam in 1409: from Ormuz in the Persian Gulf in 1414: from Malindi (he went to present-day Kenya) in 1417-19. In 1431-33 he took an enormous fleet to Aden and East Africa. Present-day Modadisco, in Somalia, is mentioned in the account.

The Chinese knew of Africa as far back as 863, and when an account of the Horn of Africa was written, Chao Ju-Kua's Chu Fan Chi, or record of foreign peoples, describes Africa as 'this country that reaches to a great mountain', presumably Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanganyika.

The extent of the Chinese explorations is not well understood in the West. It is worthwhile to compare them with the Portuguese achievement. For example, Cape Verde was not reached until 1445, by which date the Ming rulers of China had already ceased its activity. The Chinese fleets were larger than the Portuguese, and were comparable with the Portuguese in sail and navigation ability. The Chinese fleets, however, lacked a desire to reach Europe by rounding the Cape. Nor did they establish trading

stations. The similar abilities of the Chinese and the Portuguese mariners in this period makes the contrast between European and Chinese motivation all the greater. The Chinese simply lacked the expansive impulse which the Europeans of the Renaissance had, and the European desire for contact and expansion was decisive in the East-West balance of power.

The Chinese disinterest in reaching Europe and in settling in Africa was to have fateful consequences for the history of this globe and the relations between East and West. Had the Chinese been as eager as the Europeans, they might have settled in Africa and established themselves on the rim of Europe—perhaps repeating the achievement of the Arabs in the 7th and 8th centuries. It is only logical to assume that, in time, the Chinese empire would have participated in the exploration and conquest of the new world. This would have meant the spread of Asian civilisation into the Americas. The history of the world would have taken a turn that might have meant Asian domination of the entire globe. The Europeans on the European peninsula would have been surrounded and outnumbered and all the strategic positions lost to them. Had China followed up its exploration of the Indian Ocean and East Africa, Europe perhaps would not have penetrated into Asia, and the entire modern history of Asia—in the past half of a millenium—would not have resulted in the arrested history of a global region.

Perhaps no single decision contained such a fateful meaning as the Chinese decision not to press on and settle and not to use their seapower. Here it can be said that the use of seapower—or the non-use—resulted in changing human history for all time. It may well be the most important decision ever made by one nation and affecting so many other peoples.

How is it that the Chinese empire failed, to take advantage of its seapower, which had been built up by an inventive people over hundreds of years and which represented the knowledge and bravery of Chinese over many centuries? It was, as best as we can tell, bad judgement on a colossal scale.

For a long time, China had an inland party and an ocean party. In 1450, the inland party scored a sweeping success that was to be the undoing of the Han peoples and consign them to a lesser role in the world for generations. Some observers believe that the landpower advocates were so opposed to and resentful of the seapower advocates that the records of Cheng Ho's expeditions were destroyed rather than kept available for future mariners. To understand the fateful meaning of this, one has only to think what would have been the course of the West if all knowledge of Columbus and other early explorers and Dias and Da Gama had been destroyed. It would have been a crippling blow to the Western world, and that's precisely what it was to the Chinese empire.

The Chinese voyages were an extraordinary achievement—quite as great as what Columbus or Dias achieved for Europe. Europe's rulers, however, were quick to seize on the opportunity and meaning of the voyages; and, whereas Prince Henry the Navigator and others had planned for years to break into new portions of the globe and gain power, the emperors of China

lacked the incentive, the historical imagination and the global power concept of strength through seapower that was shared by the rulers of Portugal, Spain, England and other European countries of the time.

This failure to appreciate that the oceans were a highway and a means of determining the future proved to be a disaster for China. From the day that Cheng Ho's charts and records were destroyed, China moved on a downward path. Indeed the Chinese rulers hastened the destruction of their country's greatness by the mad extravangance of their dislike of seapower.

The building of an ocean-going junk was a capital offence. By the year 1500, the shipyards were closed. And the rulers also declared, in an order dated 1525, that all mariners and those who sailed in such big ships would be subject to arrest and imprisonment. Never has a country so wrecked its technological superiority. For several hundred years the Chinese had been building vessels with several masts. Yet not until the mid 1400s did Europeans develop the ships capable of sailing around Africa and to the New World.

The Chinese had the knowledge to sail into the Red Sea, to round the Cape of Good Hope and reach the Strait of Gibraltar or the English Channel. Instead they destroyed their shipyards and their vessels and denied their mariners the right to sail to the West. The fruits of such folly came in the capture of Malacca in 1511, the first major event in the long process of deterioration that led ultimately to Western invasion of China's coastal cities and to the centuries-long arresting of China. This was the price the Chinese paid for failing to make use of their seapower in the crucial region of the Indian Ocean—the middle ocean between East and West.

All of this history is relevant and offers perspective as the Indian Ocean once again becomes a cockpit of history. Across the Indian Ocean today moves the oil essential to Europe, America and Japan. Within the space of a few years, the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf have acquired an immense strategic significance. A vast transfer of wealth is in process and Saudi Arabia and Iran have embarked on massive programmes of modernisation and industrialisation. The armed forces of these newly enriched countries are in the midst of becoming formidable fighting forces. And the Shah of Iran has made known his determination to exercise influence in the wider reaches of the Indian Ocean through the agency of Iran's growing sea power.

At the same time, the super powers display increasing military interest in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union deploys a large task force in the Indian Ocean, often numbering as many as 20 vessels, and has use of a new missile-loading facility at Berbera in Somalia, as well as docking and fueling facilities elsewhere in the Western Indian Ocean. The United States, for its part, is firmly committed to developing a naval facility on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago south of India, and serious talk is being heard in the United States of the advisability of negotiating for naval back-up facilities at the Simonstown naval base in South Africa. France also shows more interest in defence of shipping in the Indian Ocean, and dispatched an aircraft-carrier to the area in 1975. Meanwhile, South Africa

continues to strengthen its navy, most recently announcing plans for small, high-speed missile ships. Nor can Peking's interest in this oceanic area be discounted. *The New York Times* recently noted: China 'has quietly built up what is now regarded as the world's third largest navy.'

In the remaining years of this century, the industrialised countries of the free world will depend heavily on oil and strategic minerals obtained from countries bordering on the Indian Ocean. America, Europe and Japan will have a vital stake in protecting the sea lanes across the Indian Ocean and in projecting naval power in the event of any threatened or actual blockade or interruption of ocean commerce. The adversaries of the West, for their part, may be strongly tempted to interdict shipping or apply naval pressure against major resource along the rim of the ocean.

Clearly, the lesson for the West insofar as the Indian Ocean is concerned, is inescapable. Pushing forward with the strengthening of seapower is essential to security.

[Anthony Harrigan is co-author of *The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West*, published in April 1975. He is a contributor to *Nato's Fifteen Nations*, *Revue Militaire Generale* and *Wehrkunde*, etc.]

JOHN ASHLEY AND A FORERUNNER OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

by Evelyn Hardy

'A MAN of middling height and domestic habits', the family genealogy describes him. This does not sound like the dangerous rebel that contemporary English politicians would have called him had they known of his activities in 1772-3. Colonel and Judge John Ashley was of the fourth generation of English settlers in Massachusetts, born in 1709. He died at the age of 93 in the township of Sheffield, with a population of about 1,500 when he wrote his *Resolves*. He lived on the family lands of 1,000 acres at Ashley Falls, a village named in his honour. His significance in this bi-centennial year of Jefferson's *Declaration of Independence* is that he drew up and wrote what is locally called *The Sheffield Declaration of Independence*, three-and-a-half years *before* the greater, better-known document.

Colonel Ashley's father, Captain John (1669-1759), called Gentleman and Squire in legal documents of the time, was active and forward-looking like his son. He was chosen by a Chief of the Housatonic tribe of Indians with the glorious name of King Conkepot to treat with him for purchases of land, calling the Captain 'their friend'. The first of these known Ashleys had moved westward from Boston to the distant township of Springfield in 1638: others of the family to Westfield and the frontier town' of Deerfield. They distinguished themselves in various professions by their ability and dedication to their work for the communities.

Col. John's cousin, Dr. Israel Ashley the 1st, born a year before him, was made Chirurgeon-General to the (British) forces in the Expedition against that massive star-shaped fort of the French with the name that rings like a roll-call—Ticonderóga. He contracted, and died of, smallpox at the early age of 47. His son, named after him and known as 'the beloved physician', taught his wife, family records tell us, how to stitch on the fingers of careless tree-fellers while he was away in the Revolutionary War, 'so that the farmers would not be kept waiting'. His wife, daughter of Judge Hugh Gelston, did as he bid her. Dr. Israel the 2nd was in service during the Saratoga campaign, ending with the surrender of Burgoyne. The Reverend, or 'Parson' Jonathan Ashley, unlike Colonel John who was an active Whig all his life, was a confirmed Tory whose pulpit in the Deerfield church was 'spiked up against him' by the young hot-headed rebels, one of whom was his son, after the Battle of Lexington (1775). Undaunted, the Parson went out into the woodshed attached to the church, took up an axe and hewed down the pulpit door, continuing with his sermon. 'Pray for the King or we are an *undone* people', he besought his congregation—using the adjective in the same forlorn sense that John Donne did when he scratched *John Donne —Anne Donne—Undone* in his prison cell.

Having graduated from Yale College in 1730, John Ashley, who was

admitted to the Bar two years later, rose to distinction as a lawyer. He was constantly involved in religious and educational township matters in addition to his military duties, for he was often away at the French and Indian Wars. He had also to attend to his large estate like an English country gentleman, looking after his 1,000 acres of rich alluvial land or hills clothed with valuable timber. He was something of a merchant, too, with saw and grist-mills, one of which has only recently closed down. His land contained a vein of white marble, quarried later and sent down river, and he had interests in iron-ore beds in the neighbouring state of Connecticut. But he was not a 'stay-at-home man'. He married a girl of Dutch descent in New York who bore him, among other children, a son who married a descendant of Governor Winthrop, became a Major-General and died before his father. In 1761, Col. John became Judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Berkshire County, occupying his seat on the Bench for twenty years except when the court was suspended during the Revolution.

In 1773, at the age of 64, after consultation with eleven Sheffield fellow-townsmen, John Ashley drew up his 14 *Resolves* with a preamble in the panelled upstairs study of his house. When the document is examined line-by-line, we find striking similarities to concepts, phrases and words with those in Thomas Jefferson's *Declaration of Independence.* This does not prove that Jefferson ever read it but *he may have done so.* For nearly a decade before the latter's *Declaration,* the restless unhappy colonists, chafing under mismanagement, had been debating the fundamental principles of government and self-government. The *'Sheffield Declaration'* has not been examined in entirety or depth but a study of the first part reveals the strong legal emphasis combined with a general tone of moderation similar to Jefferson's. Both men were patriots, both were trained in the law and both knew the work of the philosopher Locke, son of a Somerset Attorney and Secretary to Lord Ashley, later Earl of Shaftesbury, as well as that of the firebrand Thomas Paine, and the pleasure-loving Laurence Sterne. Jefferson's famous phrase 'Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of happiness' is Locke's, paraphrased in Colonel Ashley's document. Jefferson, of course, knew that other Virginian, George Mason, whose *Declaration of Rights,* available in June, 1776, appears to have influenced him in part. Among the Ashley books are many imported from England via Boston. It was on Locke's *Treatise of Civil Government* that the pattern of the *Constitution of the United States of America* was to a large extent modelled.

Unaltered and unmarked, the *Sheffield Declaration* is now under safe lock and key. From its weird variations in spelling (*emicolable* for amicable, *graicous* for gracious, *Breton* for Britain, and many more such) we deduce that this unsigned document is the 'true copy' of the original, carried unanimously by the eleven under the leadership of the Moderator (Chairman), Col. Ashley, who drew it up. The writing appears to be that of Town Clerk Thomas Sedgwick who was directed 'to make a true and attested copy as soon as may be' to forward it to 'the great and general Court at Boston'. From there, again carried by hand on horseback, the signed original may have been sent further south to the First Continental Congress of September,

1774, in Philadelphia, where Jefferson wrote his lucid, reasoned *Declaration* in July two years later, without any books or papers by him, so he stated twice when questioned afterwards.

Col. Ashley's 'forerunner' opens with a Preamble in which the colonists stress, as Jefferson did, their loyalty to the Crown, and what Jefferson did *not*—their 'regard and attachment to our gracious Sovereign'. In neither document is there any written intention to break off relationship with the Mother Country, let alone go to wasteful war with her. Both were a recital of grievances which they hoped would be recognised and rectified. Ashley went so far as to write that 'we have with that Deferance (*sic*) and Respect due to the Country, on which we are and always hope to be dependent, entered into the following *Resolves*'.

There are extant drawings and photographs of the simple, but beautifully proportioned Ashley House, now a museum. But there is no extant portrait of Col. Ashley. The times were too dangerous and unsettled for 'sitting for one's likeness'. But there are two portraits of contemporaries—one of Dr. Israel Ashley the 2nd, 'the beloved physician', and of another physician, Dr. and Judge Matthew Thornton from New Hampshire who signed the *Declaration of Independence* — a man of long experience consulted by General Washington. He was 62 when he signed this historic document, which Alistair Cooke describes as 'guarded night and day, like Lenin's tomb'. He was suffering from a serious attack of gout when other patriots signed. When George III heard of the *Declaration* he offered to repeal the Stamp Act, lower taxes and give the colonists greater representation *in return for the lives of the signers*'.[1] This so incensed Thornton that he harnessed his horse and drove, or rode more than 400 miles south to Philadelphia, impeded by snow, wide flooded rivers, and abandoned fords held by British 'enemy' troops. He left on October 15th, 1776, but did not reach Philadelphia until November 3rd. But he was accustomed to such arduous journeys. On an earlier one to Boston he declared that he had not slept out of his clothes for ten nights. (The 56 Representatives did not all sign at the same time.)

Washington consulted him about mustering arms for the Revolutionary forces. 'Was it possible to get back those which the soldiers who had not enlisted again still held?' He later informed Thornton that thirteen regiments were to be raised (by the thirteen colonies), two of them by New Hampshire. (Rhode Island was probably too small to raise one.) Thornton agreed to wait on Washington in regard to the enlistment. When Thornton signed Jefferson's *Declaration* the population of the colonies was three million souls, a quarter of all British subjects. Britain was losing what perspicacious Walpole called 'an empire'.

The portraits speak to us more immediately and vividly than words can ever do. The artists reveal something of the intelligence, courage and breeding of the finest type of colonists, among whom the faceless 'man of middling height'—Col. and Judge John Ashley—may take his place with pride. But Jefferson must tower above him, for in his *Declaration* of only 1,500 words he 'raised the American cause above parochialism, above history, and united

it with the cause of mankind'.[2]

NOTES

[1] Official 250th Anniversary Report from Londonderry, New Hampshire.
[2] *Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation* by Merrill Peterson. New York: O.U.P., 1970.

SOURCES

Family MSS and information supplied by Gelston Hardy.

THE "SHEFFIELD DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE" or **The Unanimous Resolves of the Town of Sheffield** [Massachusetts] **Nemine Contradicente**	THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
John Ashley January 12th, 1773 Sheffield, Massachusetts.	Thomas Jefferson July 4th, 1776 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Line-by-horizontal-line Comparison of the Opening **Resolves** and some other Sections of the 'Sheffield Declaration', compared with Thomas Jefferson's.

1. RESOLVED THAT Mankind in a State of Nature are **equal,** free and independent of each other, and **have a right** to the **undisturbed Enjoyment** of their **lives,** their **Liberty** and Property.	We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created **equal,** that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable **Rights,** that among these are **Life, Liberty** and the pursuit of **Happiness.** ——
2. RESOLVED that the great end of a political Society is **to secure** in a more effectual manner **those rights** and priviledges (sic) wherewith God and Nature have made us free.	That **to secure these rights,** Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, ——
3. or 4. RESOLVED THAT IT HATH a tendency to **subvert the good end** for which Society was instituted to have in any part of the legislative body an Interest separate from and independent of **the people** in general.	That whenever any Form of Government becomes **destructive of these ends,** it is the Right of **the People** to alter or to abolish it . . .
5. RESOLVED that the peaceful Enjoyment of any preveliges (sic) to the people of this provence (sic) in a great measure (under God) depends upon the uprightness of an **Independency** of the Executive Officers in general and **of the Judges** of the Superior Court in particular.	He [the King] has made **Judges dependent on his Will alone,** for the tenure of

	their offices, and the amount and payment of their **salaries.**
6. RESOLVED THAT if **Salleries** (sic) are affixed to the office of the Judges of the Superior Court rendering them independent of the people and **dependent on the Crown for their support** (which we have too much Reson (sic) to think is the Case) it is a precedent that may . . . etc.	
9. RESOLVED . . . by mere power ravished from us and unlimited power by said . . . commissions put into the hands of **Ministeral** (sic) **hirelings** . . . etc.	He has erected a Multitude of new Offices and sent hither **Swarms of Officers** to harrass our People, —— [see 10 below]
. . . **Deprivation** of our inestimable and constitutional priviledge (sic), a **trial by Jury** . . .	For **depriving us,** in many Cases, of the Benefits of . . . **Trial by Jury:** ——
RESOLVED . . .and the insulting Diference (sic) made between British and American Subjects are matters truly greavious (sic) and clearly **evince a disposition** to Rule with the **Iron Rod of Power.**	But when a long train of abuses and usurpations . . . **evinces a design** to reduce them under **absolute Despotism,** ——
10. RESOLVED that the interduction (sic) of **civil Officers unknown** in the Charter of this Province with powers which Render Property, Domestic Security and Enjoyment of the **Inhabitance** (sic) **altogether Insecure** are a very great greavance (sic).	He has erected a Multitude of **New Offices** and sent hither **Swarms of Officers to harrass our People,** and eat out their substance.
11. RESOLVED . . . that it is the Right of every subject of Great Breton (sic) to be tried by his peers of the vicinity, when charged with any crime, that any act of the parliment (sic) of Great Breton (sic) for Destroying the priviledge (sic) and tearing away subject from there (sic) Connections, Friends, Buisness (sic) and the possibility of evincing there (sic) Innocence, and carring (sic) them on bare suspicion to the Distance of **Thousands of Miles for a trial** is an treble Grevance (sic).	For transporting us **beyond Seas to be tried** for pretended Offences: ——

[Evelyn Hardy is a direct descendant of Governor John Winthrop of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and also of Col. and Judge John Ashley, Dr. Israel Ashley and Dr. and Judge Matthew Thornton. Born and educated in America, where she took her degree, she came to England at the age of 21 to study for an M.A. at London University.]

POEMS

THE PRISONER OF BRANTWOOD

Ruskin lay in his bath,
His deep mahogany bath.
The great man prayed,
'O, good Lord God,
Spare those that do me wrong.'

Numinous grey tresses
Floated on the waters,
Energy spurted in spidery veins,
Burst like a fountain
In that austere old head.

Ruskin was in his dotage.
The prophet was full of years
But by no means sure
Of his own salvation,
Although there were those
Who confidently expected
An apotheosis.

At sunset he sat by diamond panes
Like a bird in the cage of his turret,
Absorbed in the waters
And mountains of Coniston
As if he hoped to be fused away
And miss the pain of dreaded death.

He conserved his strength;
The marvellous periods
Of Praeterita
Were forming.

Poor Baxter pushed him
Past the rhododendron banks
Up the steep wild-garden
To sit in his stone-slabbed throne
By his own cascading stream
Where the ferns were malachite green.

Back in his study, he would write
A letter of the most exquisite
Delicacy and ambivalence.
Let him not remember
That other stream at Glenfilas

Where young, prancing, perfidious
Millais had painted his portrait.
Ah, false, lying, untouched Effie . . .
The clouds swooped, black and plague-like.
'Bow-wow. Damn,' he shouted
At his erstwhile darlings
From the village school,
And they fled from him.
She had fled from him—
His precious Rosie-Posie . . .

In the boathouse
His excursion coach
Rested on its shafts,
And Jumping Jenny's
Oars were shipped.

MOLLY TIBBS

GROWTH OF UNCERTAINTY

A cat is dulcet,
stepping among the geraniums,
while an Arab
in his shabby workclothes,
leans on a plough
behind a camel's spongy tracks.
His Ugliness . . .
. . . ropey tail
and thick coiled neck
that swivels the dull-lidded eye casually . . .
. . . yet is persuaded
of some indolent dignity——
the furry-humped bag
that lasts for unhurried days?

And they build a garden,
with the red geraniums,
the marigolds,
and the bright unriped dates still orange
in their clusters among the palms.
And the harnessed beast
is convinced,
but ignorant of his use,
and the man strains
and is unsure of his labour,
but knows he is cultivating . . .
. . . cultivating.

The sea remains out there,
a platform.
The sand is white
and tractable,
where the wind would nudge
or flatten it.
The cat steps among the green bushes,
where the birds twitter,
and are bright as medallions.

The camel plods on
under his harnessed assumption
and the Arab looks tired,
then stops for water
and a cigarette.
He stares quietly at the camel
and the sand
and the garden that is flourishing,
flourishing, flourishing.

WILLIAM BONNELL

PARABLES OF THE ORIENT

1. Persia

SPRINGTIME

In youth our minds were never grieved by sad foreboding:
We saw the road climb up, but not the dreadful Pass;
We treated Autumn as an undiscovered country,
And lay contented on the sun-warmed April grass.

NIGHT JOURNEY

How sweet the water tasted from a desert well,
How swift the precious minutes hurried by
Until the moment when the Caravan moved on,
With all the bright stars setting in the sky.

THE WORLD: A MIRAGE

It seems as if a veil, opaque and yet transparent,
Is drawn across the eyes of those about to die,
Who, gazing from the shore, no longer can distinguish
Between the sun's reflected glory and the sky.

2. India

THE DRAGOMAN

If Learning is your friend he cannot fail to take you
On journeys to strange countries, walking at your side,
To which you will return on many a fair tomorrow,
Each day more anxious for his company as guide.

ILLUSION v. REALITY

This life is an illusion, for the hopes and fears
That tend to make us either smile or weep,
Belong to that strange brightly-coloured dream which fades
When, as we die, we waken from our sleep.

DAYLIGHT AND DARKNESS

Although the common daylight is enough
For us to walk by between Death and Birth,
A wise man will ensure his candle's lit
Before the hour when darkness veils the earth.

J. C. E. BOWEN

AN AUTUMNAL: TO ANSELMA

After its flake-seeds' thin sortilege
Drops down the hollyhock's gaunt drawbridge.
Though the hawthorn bears its best
Jewels on its breast,
The willow-herb close draws
Together its meagre furs.
In tattered silks the roses now subside,
Spendthrift of their threadbare pride.
Softly abrupt all
Their petals fall.
Saint John's wort dangles
Gossamers and gold-yarn tangles.

Rag-picking bees
Sift the season's
Lavish beggaries
And lank profusions.
Parsley stretches wide its half
Wan webbed luxuriance.
Fruited and spent but full-armed still with love,
I too would sink in autumn opulence.
But look! Late along the boughs there trickles
Renewed October rain of honeysuckles.

DONALD BRUCE

COLONIAL

Standing up high on the shadowed verandah,
white as a nurse in his ice-bright shirt,
sun flashing out from his midnight sunglasses
(eyes black as nothing), sun flashing out
from rings and whisky at noon, he surveys
beyond his plantations
the icecream mountains, the temperate foothills.

His mind's hooded eye calculates the landscape,
clearing and felling, sowing, planting,
hiring and firing as the market dictates.
In the bone-dry shade of a truck, black pickers
rest in the dust, a dog urinates on a wheel.
The clink of ice cubes
dulls the murmur of pickers and insects. The planter
taps ash from his mellow cheroot
into the eye of a Harrod's ashtray skull.

CAL CLOTHIER

PRAGMATIC REUNIONOLOGY

by Cay Dollerup

EVERYBODY knows that science and scholarship are rapidly advancing these days. But few are indeed the pioneers that work at the frontiers of human knowledge and slow is the process by which their results come down to the general public.

More than twenty years ago a new science, reunionology, the 'logia' of meetings, was born. Its modest beginnings were that truly revolutionary milestone of social research, Professor Ratskidivuttenvot's paper 'How to Run a Meeting' (Proceedings of the INT, 1949). Unbeknown to the general public, numerous important papers have appeared in scholarly journals—but still reunionology has not received the recognition it rightly deserves. And this is, surely, surprising, considering the importance meetings have come to have in recent years.

True enough, in the good old days, the GOM of tribe would settle matters in his own way, and if you happened to disagree in public you would end up on the dinnertable—or rock. But this seems to have lost some of its attraction, and nowadays we are faced with the problems involved in the so-called democratic meetings where everybody can have his say. This procedure involves much chatter and is often followed by convulsive jerks in the right arm.

One must admit that in today's society some people, mainly politicians, seem—as it were by instinct—to have grasped some of the fundamental rules. But even they frequently make some horrible blunders. Since reunionology is ultimately of prime importance to the preservation of the established order and our present rulers, there is little doubt that the powers that be would benefit greatly from a thorough survey of the results of recent scientific research—with a view to their practical application: pragmatic reunionology. All scholars engaged in the field know Professor von und zu Hopfenmeier's authoritative *Kurze Einführung in die Reunionologie* (Kassel, 1964, 1162 pages), but it makes for some very hard reading and has not, I am afraid, received the attention it deserves.

Before going on to the details I must stress that there are two essential rules which must never be broken, if you want to apply pragmatic reunionology in an efficient and businesslike way:

One. Never let people know everything—at least not at the same time, and never in order of priority or importance.

Two. Use the phone. Avoid documents that reveal how you decided what was going to be the result of the democratic vote.

The first thing you have got to determine is how to inform everybody about what is happening—and what is going to be on the agenda. Unfortunately, democracy requires some openness, and in order to get into power you are obliged to pay at least lip-service to it. There is no doubt that at times it makes for some very unpleasant revelations, but then on the other

hand—why not look at the bright side? In the first place, few—if any—have any foresight (especially not if you withhold some small but significant item of information) and accordingly you can always say that it is the others' fault and responsibility if things go wrong. Besides, you are usually in command of the process of passing on information, and this opens up some new possibilities.

The first one is, of course, to keep back all or at least part of the relevant information until the very meeting. There is no dearth of good pretexts (e.g. the information is strictly confidential and can only be handed over for the duration of the meeting; or because everybody at the office (in the government, etc.) is overburdened with extra work because of rationalisation it was impossible to get everything finished before; or some documents of paramount importance were not received until a few seconds before the meeting (if you blame that on computers or the lethargy of officialdom you stand to gain a lot). The list could be continued here, but I suggest that you look up von und zu Hopfenmeier's extensive list (pp. 515-617), or have a look at available minutes. And by the way: why not combine it with the first theorem of pragmatic reunionology? This is, 'The number of pages participants at a meeting must read should be inversely proportional to the number of minutes they have at their disposal' (von und zu Hopfenmeier lists the mathematical formula on page 765).

The method has, really, quite a few advantages: postage is nil, and nobody is fully aware of what they are voting about. Admittedly it sometimes happens that some nefarious persons raise a protest because, as they put it, they have not had time to study it properly. A good chairman can usually be relied upon to ignore such protests—or at least to threaten to have critics thrown out because they are obstructing procedure. On the whole it may be a better idea to give in and suggest that the decision is put off to another (please take note, *not* 'the next') meeting. After all, nobody will remember what was decided a year later.

There are, however, other methods for informing people. There is the 'policy of complete openness'. True, it involves no negligible amount of paperwork and expenditure on postage. It is directly based on the second theorem of pragmatic reunionology: 'Generally speaking, the interest in messages, letters, and documents is inversely proportional to their number' (as Professor Piff-Pouff proves in *Revue sociologique*, Strasbourg, no. 4, 1968). On your part this policy requires an alert mind and an instant appreciation of what people are interested in. Consider what happens in the course of a single day, e.g. you buy a piece of indiarubber and some paper, you receive some brochures, the sun shines, and the birds are chirping outside. There you are: now duplicate the bills for the indiarubber and paper. Take some pictures of the brochures, and describe the sunshine and the birds—at length. This material is sent to everybody in order to keep all abreast of recent developments.

No matter what the contents of letter no. 57 are, you can safely end it: 'Unless two (or even better: 50% of the) recipients of this letter protest within a week, the above suggestion has been agreed upon'.

The above procedure can profitably be combined with that of sending out all the material for the meeting long ahead—preferably a year. In so doing you exploit the third theorem of pragmatic reunionology:

> If all documents are received more than a month before the meeting, the chances that they will not be read will increase in direct proportion to the square of the distance to the meeting. (The author of this ingenious theorem is that prince of peers, the shy and reticent Spanish scholar, José Lope de Ortega (*Yo. Mi vida, mi importancia, mis ideas, mi genio* (Madrid, 1971)).

This method works incredibly well. The participants will put the papers aside for later study, and not remember them until the very day of the meeting. And since nobody wants to admit that they haven't read them, even the most controversial points are passed over smoothly—unless you yourself make the unforgivable mistake of dwelling so long on any item at the meeting itself that they succeed in browsing through it.

No matter which method you use, never put numbers, dates, or anything else by which they can be identified on the documents. They must not be glued, stapled or bound together; or if this cannot be avoided at least in a haphazard order—and so that no two copies are identical.

Now for the agenda itself. It must be as vague as possible, and should end with a demand that all relevant documents are to be brought to the meeting. If anybody should have the audacity to ask what is relevant, the correct way of answering is: 'Well, it is dreadfully hard to say, old chap, but if you bring along everything from the last 25 years, I guess you'll stand a fair chance of having half of what is needed . . . '

Last, but not least. The time allotted to each item on the agenda must be insufficient. If this cannot be done easily, you will have to add some insignificant items at the end. Whenever the debate at the meeting becomes unpleasant, you can say that the agenda is long, and all items must be given proper treatment. (At this point I feel that it would be dishonest of me to hide the fact that scholars are in disagreement. Von und zu Hopfenmeier says that insignificant items are best if placed first because they will invariably require most time. He has based his thesis—at least in part—on C. N. Parkinson's *The High Finance*. This has been hotly contested by the Australian research team Thurf, Spunner, and Rosendall in *Reunionology. A Historical Survey* (Cloncurry, 1971), and by my august self in *Den reunionologiske problematik med særligt hensyn til at fuppe folk i dagsordnen* (Copenhagen, 1970; with an English summary). The point is that in the first place von und zu Hopfenmeier has misplaced a 'y^2' for a 'q^2' on p. 245, and this changes the interpretation on p. 527 completely. But Hopfenmeier's view is positively dangerous because people do at times realise that some point or other, once broached, is insignificant—and this can end you in the pickle: just imagine you have got 10 unpleasant items—and 8 hours to go. By using my method you are safe: did you ever hear of people who returned to an earlier item on the agenda when they had finished the last one, huh? Right you are, they were just too happy the meeting was over ahead of time.

The most crucial point in your preparations for a meeting is, however,

picking your chairman. You are always in a position to do so—provided you keep in mind that at all meetings there are two types of people: those that will not chair it—and those that will. By first calling upon, say, three who just plain won't, the assembly will be only too happy to accept the first one who is willing—your real candidate.

But there are also different categories of chairmen. You can call upon an impartial outsider to chair the meeting. That is a lousy idea, to put it mildly, because among other things he will not know when to stop critics in mid-sentence. The opposition sometimes demand such a chairman; your answer is that you thought of it yourself, but that the dangers inherent in letting outsiders know of internal affairs are too great.

Better to choose an insecure and inexperienced chairman. You determine what is going to happen by inviting him for dinner a week before the meeting and telling him not to worry—you'll be there. If any problem arises at the meeting he will try to catch your eye—and then it is just a simple question about whether to use sign-language or to interfere.

In rare cases *you* can chair the meeting. This is about the best thing that can happen, because now you can make snide remarks on all critics—and those who object will automatically go down to the bottom of the list of speakers.

At the meeting itself you should have many and long-winded speeches. The sentences should be complicated and you should carefully characterise your own viewpoints and decisions as 'reasonable', 'wise', 'democratic', 'thoroughly sound', etc. Don't be unfair, but speak nicely about the opposition, e.g. 'That would have been a very good point, if matters had not been so difficult'.

It is also very important that you are in absolute command of the debate. This can be done in various ways. If you are idolised by the participants, it is all right for you to interrupt other speakers. But even if you are not, you can always say that you would like to comment on the statement made by the last speaker. What you actually do is to ignore it and introduce something else. And finally there is an absolutely brilliant method: as soon as you have finished a speech and the next speaker opens his mouth you indicate that you have more to say. There are usually a few speakers before it is your turn again and if you, unexpectedly, have nothing to add, you just say that you support their views. This will win you extra allies.

If you are in power, you are bound to be criticised. Luckily criticism can be countered in different ways. In the first place, you are never entirely at fault. So why not single out the 1% which is not your fault, and point out that you are innocent of these ridiculous charges? It is even easier to ignore criticism. The critic ends up at the bottom of the list of speakers—and the others are rarely bothered. But if you misunderstand criticism you do it at your peril; your smartness may be thwarted by naive persons who try to explain what it was all about. The best way of silencing criticism is to have one of your intimate friends tell the whole assembly what an unselfish person you are. He will not have to give any examples since everybody will be deeply touched by your self-sacrifice and disregard the silly, malicious

criticism.

At first sight the biggest problem in these democratic meetings is that the outcome of some ballots and votes may be against your wishes. If you are worried by things like that, I am afraid you are not marked for greatness.

In the first place most items should not be put to the vote at all. They must be decided by the chairman. He can declare that it has been agreed upon unanimously, without saying how; or mumbling so that nobody can hear what is being said; or simply by reading the proposal quickly and adding without any pause that this is now resolved.

And if that doesn't work there are still ways and means. Cut that particular item from the minutes. Or send out a letter that you have received additional information which invalidates the decision.

As you see, pragmatic reunionology is very simple. Once you master the fundamental rules, the world is yours: too, too many meetings at local, national, or international level are based on the assumption that true democracy works. Of course it does not—but pragmatic reunionology will enable you to make it function the way it should.

[Mr. Cay Dollerup is a senior research associate professor at the English Department at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. He has written a number of scholarly articles in both Danish and English journals and a book on the Danish background in *Hamlet*.]

LIBERTY, AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY

Students and the Universities

by D. J. Heasman

DEMOCRACY can both promote and hinder the cause of freedom. Yet arguments over the extent to which students should participate in university government are often presented or interpreted as though the issue were a simple matter of democracy versus authoritarianism. The fundamental issues have to do with the purposes of the university, the liberties that are necessary if these purposes are to be furthered, and the extent to which democracy and authority can each enhance and detract.

A university is characterised by its commitment to the advancement of learning. It is not an agency for the development and expression of personality, or a holiday camp for aged and ageing adolescents, but a place of learning and free enquiry in which each member freely assumes responsibility for himself and his work. Any distinction that attaches through the years to a particular university stems from the achievements and contributions of individual scholars. It should therefore partake of democracy in the sense that all its members should be encouraged to regard themselves as members of one republic of learning. Since students should therefore be recognised and treated as adults who are expected to have put adolescence and its antics behind them and are responsible for what they do, they should not have to tolerate the spectacle of teachers posturing before them at meetings or wherever and behaving like the type of student for whom most students have contempt. They should not have to endure as though they were 'kids' that flattery of their youth and even their 'innocence' which middle-aged pragmatists are wont to perpetrate upon them. It is particularly contemptible when those who are concerned to ingratiate themselves have had to discard their earlier authoritarian postures. Flattery corrupts both the receiver and the giver, and inasmuch as democracy encourages it, so much the worse for democracy. Students are not at university to be cultivated politically. Most of them, however, do respond when one expounds with conviction the purposes of the institution, and explains how one sees one's work, and encourages them to give of their best—when, in one's bearing, one bears witness to what it is all about. Such students are dismayed when university authorities let *them* down by weakly appeasing the noisy and the brash.

Some advocates of university democracy see students as though they were one side of industry confronting, first, their 'employers' and then 'the system'; a kind of proletariat engaging in a class struggle that will bring inequality to an end. They are not easily persuaded that the university exists that they might overcome the more obvious inequality between themselves and those who know more. On the contrary, they are inclined to be contemptuous of disinterested learning as an end in itself and of university autonomy as being necessary to this end. They see their activities as part

and parcel of a wider movement that will transform society and assimilate the university to that society. These are the people who press, by one means or another, by physical disruption if need be, as occasions arise, or as they can be created, to achieve their total (literally totalitarian) objectives. Their beliefs, like those of all totalitarians, are 'religious' inasmuch as they can only be confirmed, never refuted, by events. Whatever happens is never due to incitement but always to 'the system'; violence is never due to their provocation but always to the authorities (if such there be) that dare to resist. One is condemned as much for discriminating against extremists on the grounds of 'mere belief' as for extending to them what they themselves will dismiss as 'repressive tolerance'. It is their slogans and tactics which induce others far more numerous than themselves, together with a few louts who can now get away with murder by cloaking their behaviour in ideological terms, to demand that the universities be organised internally and aligned externally so as to become microcosms of some kind of non-liberal democracy. As was said of such people two hundred years ago, 'they have no respect for the wisdom of others: but they pay it off by a very full measure of confidence in their own'.

Not for them to heed the cumulative experience of our civilisation; the teaching, for example, of Aristotle and of Mill and of many another philosopher in between and since: that inherent in the democratic order at its best, necessary to it yet—because—autonomous, there must be institutions, not just universities, that embody interests and principles which are not themselves democratic. The necessities of a civilised state and society depend for their maintenance upon active, influential, civilised, and, if need be, dissenting minorities; for them to be influential, there must be effective communication between different spheres and levels of discourse; and this requires among other things that one's work at the university, especially in such humane studies as philosophy, history, literature, and politics, should not become so esoteric as to lose touch with the educated layman. Universities are meant to sustain diversity and resist the imposition of any orthodoxy whether of the left or the right; they are needed in any society, so to break down their autonomy is to destroy a future as well as a present good.

There ought therefore to be a measure of incongruity, of tension, between the university and its host society, but not the sort that is all too predictable these days, the sort that university people have to apologise for, the sort that leads some of them to try to disguise and even to deny their connection with the academic scene. Freedom can be destroyed as successfully by making a mockery of it as by repression. Not only is a certain coarseness 'in' at the present time; it is even regarded in some quarters as an integral part of a life style that is leading to 'a new consciousness'. Worthy people whose opinions can be dubbed reactionary have been denied free speech by democratic vote at a number of universities, freedom of speech itself being dismissed (together with freedom to listen?) as a bourgeois concept. Even more exposed to ridicule and contempt are progressives who are not progressive enough. Pressure exists everywhere for

universities to take a stand on the issues of the day—as opposed to the idea that they are institutions within which many people do take stands.

Popular participation is good in itself and is itself a form of freedom, but it can pose a threat to other goods and that other form of freedom, the freedom to be left alone. This, in the case of the scholar, is the freedom to select his criteria of what is worthy of study, knowing full well that he will be judged according to his accomplishments. He must have time (the scarcest resource of all), which means that he must establish his priorities as to what he should get involved in in university affairs: he has certain obligations, to give of himself, but beyond some line or other he has a right to say 'no', to say that his is the right not to participate. He has the right to look askance at the extra hours at meetings that have arisen as a result of increased student activity. By the same token, the student who does not participate in university government or in the crusades of the day is not necessarily apathetic: he may have better things to do. It is the individual student who matters, not students *en masse*; not everyone aspires to become a self-important *petit fonctionnaire*; it is no part of a student's obligations to testify as to the worth or otherwise of professors or lecturers or anyone else around the place and he should not be pressed to do so; he should certainly not be imposed on to submit to all the tedium of committee work which will come his way eventually, likely as not, as part of the larger tedium of later life. This is the one time in his adult life when he can read widely and think deeply and stretch himself fully, a golden opportunity to develop new interests untrammelled (at any rate for most of his time) by the preoccupations and burdens of making a living and pursuing a career. He has leisure in the Aristotelian sense of the word to contemplate; to discover that learning, like writing, though a lonely and laborious business, can be a source of profound joy.

To reaffirm that teachers and students have different parts to play in the affairs of the university is not to divide them into first and second class citizens. Citizenship is a matter of belonging to the state, and the very *raison d'être* of the state is government. Heaven forbid that what is appropriate for the state should be applied unthinkingly to bodies that have other purposes. Democracy *per se* has to do with who should rule, with who decides, more than with what is decided. Whether or not the individual should be impinged upon comes to be seen in terms of who, collectively, is doing or authorising the impinging. The tendency is for reason to be subordinated to will, or even to 'feeling'. Little wonder therefore that when a committee in one university came to interpret the results of a questionnaire in which every question had opened with the words 'do you feel', the committee was able to say that it 'feels that they reflect to a large extent the feelings of this campus'.[1] People who opt for the supposed validity of their feelings over the discomforting complexities of thought makes us all vulnerable to the calculated manipulations of the leveller.

'Demands' are put forward as 'rights', and discourse degenerates through a 'process' of 'interaction' into that 'meaningful' mouthing of slogans which now passes for 'dialogue'. The idea of instant-politics, that the present must

not be confined to any degree by the past, that we must each have a vote on everything that 'may affect our lives', suggests that the future likewise cannot be committed to any arrangements entered into in the present. Universities have thus been confronted by a developing and escalating agenda of demands and disruption stemming from causes largely external to themselves—stemming, through the politics of imitation, the politics of the fashionable, from what is going on elsewhere. Because of their very tolerance universities are highly vulnerable, fragile even, when confronted by such homogenising challenges.

This is why opposition to some of the current trends in university life need not reflect some antediluvian kind of reactionary authoritarianism, but rather the conviction that where demands, many of them 'non-negotiable', are acceded to so that important distinctions get blurred and further unwieldy structures set up, they should be resisted, as should democracy itself inasmuch as it promotes uniformity, conformity, and bureaucracy (and therefore hierarchy). To be true to itself, the university should instead be nurturing diversity, spontaneity, and individual responsibility and initiative. The good life consists of all the good things of life; a plurality of goods which should not be reduced by joining together what ought to remain asunder.

Authority in a university is not the same as authority in other places. For one thing, universities thrive on informality within an unobtrusive framework of authority which is accepted without being made unduly explicit. This, unfortunately, is one of the casualties of recent years. Most university teachers are decent, modest fellows who are acutely aware, if they are truly university people, of what they themselves do not know, and who wince, therefore, even in these new circumstances, at the idea of building any argument about authority on the fact that they do know more than their students. They realise that what they have to convey to students is not just a body of knowledge but a disciplined scepticism towards received interpretations; hence the essential relevance of their research and their writing when these imbue their teaching.

The hope, for the student as for his mentors, is that in stretching himself to grasp what is just beyond his reach he will come to realise what is in him to be realised; his mind will be freed for thought—for coming to his own informed and considered and critical judgements. This is the liberation that universities exist to foster. Happily, some students will turn out to be considerably brighter than the tutors who will have helped them along the way, but their time as students is by definition their novitiate. It is one thing to encourage students in a seminar to participate on an equal footing in order that they might one day achieve equal standing; but it would be quite another thing to bring them into the making of decisions on appointments and promotions and so forth, and thereby reduce the teacher to the kind of dependence on his students that would make his affable and egalitarian stance in the seminar look like one of political calculation rather than one of temperament or pedagogical intent. Those who question this must ask themselves whether their diffidence stems from modesty or loss of nerve.

The distinction, after all, is between informality and 'phoneyness', between regarding the student as an end in himself and using him as a means to one's own advancement or survival. When an educational relationship is reduced to a political one in an educational institution, everyone is a loser; everyone is reduced; the staff have sold out.

People who know what is involved in dissenting from what is accepted and 'established', who, perhaps, have always identified with progressive causes, and who still do, find it difficult if not unnatural to defend an institution, given, as with all institutions, that it falls somewhat short of what it was meant to be. No one likes to be charged with having changed one's tune and joined 'the establishment'. But such charges are quite out of place in this context. For one thing, establishments are usually part of the problem. If university people really believe in keeping alive a tradition of informed scepticism and dissent, they must, in their various places in the university, do what has to be done to sustain the institution which, albeit imperfectly, embodies and transmits this tradition. None of them was involved in creating the university but all are involved in its custody. Their successors will rightly hold them accountable for any *trahison des clercs* which allows the institution to become a shambles or a travesty. Even within the normal workings of liberal-democracy it is recognised that office-holders best serve the public interest, not by responding in the first instance to the various pressures that come their way, but by first working out a tenable position which fully accords with the responsibilities and opportunities that stem from their office, and then with some sense of priorities considering what departures from it can be conceded. 'Look first for the academic implications and then work out the political' would seem to be the appropriate stance for office-holders in an institution like the university that is supposed to build on fine distinctions.

The democrat is inclined to see authority as deriving from numbers; but authority, as when we say that a surgeon or a mathematician or even an economist is an authority, is the kind that arises as one submits to a discipline (the inclination these days is to call this 'repression'), and comes more and more to master the discipline and to make innovations in it, and thereby to acquire a reputation as something of an authority among one's colleagues. This is the kind of authority without which a university cannot be a university. Authority in the governmental sense must be ancillary to authority in this purposive sense; and if this is not to be stifled, the various parts of the university must enjoy some of the same autonomy from the whole as the university itself enjoys from the state and society at large. There must be room for different approaches and different arrangements and different characters. Most of us, we hope, are affable, but the type who doesn't suffer fools (and isn't one himself) will be remembered when all the emollients are forgotten.

It is all a matter of reputation; of how one has discharged one's responsibilities. When the British contrast their system of government with the American by calling it one of 'responsible government' they are not implying, unless they are trying to be funny or topical, that Americans are

irresponsible; it is a way of describing who is accountable to whom, a way that differs from the American way. Likewise, when it is argued that in terms of administering the university, teachers are responsible and students are not, it is not to be inferred that students are immature or perverse or reprehensible, or that they have no part to play, but that their involvement in the university and its system of 'sanctions' is not such as to expose their reputations and careers according as they perform well or badly. They are not in this sense 'accountable'. They have little or nothing to lose. Of course, it would be a poor and a dull institution if dons were always thinking of their reputations; the best reputations, after all, are earned by people who have achieved or are striving for something other than a good reputation. There are times, moreover, when for the sake of what they have carefully thought out to be right, people must jeopardise their careers; but these are the people who, if they turn out to have been right, will have done the most, through their own thereby enhanced reputations, to define 'good performance' for others to emulate.

This is why it is dangerous to liken teachers to the student body as though each were merely an 'interest'. Each group has interests, and each group has organisations which are concerned, along with a number of other objectives, to defend and further these interests. But teachers have responsibilities to discharge—to students, for example. They are appointed and remunerated to discharge these responsibilities, and have no right to abdicate them. A certain trust has been vested in them, by all sorts of people, not least the general public. Whether they like it or not theirs is the authority, i.e., the duty and therefore the right, to make certain kinds of decisions. This is why it is necessary to draw lines between matters that should be open to student participation and matters that should not. It does students a disservice to indulge behaviour and 'demands' that they will not get away with after they leave the university. Of course, there are always a few senior people who are disposed to see some rationality in anything that student spokesmen and activists come up with, or some impropriety in any decisions that might antagonise them. But the time has come when we can see how a number of the radicals of yesteryear, now ensconced in the jobs outside the university that they have managed to secure, are already coming to terms, alas, with things as they are. Some have been heard to marvel at the willingness of many university people to allow the character and reputation of the institution to be changed to accommodate what they themselves now look back on as a somewhat crude adolescence.

University teachers and administrators must for these reasons take some of the blame for the fact that in the public arena student contributions have so often been abysmal. Student-officials have all too often shown greater interest in confrontations and sit-ins and walk-outs on the issue of participation than in actually participating. Time after time it has been more import- and to students intent on confrontation to try to get their teachers not only to capitulate but to be seen to have capitulated. Their somewhat less extreme colleagues in office have been able to capitalise on this by posing the threat that if their demands are not conceded, more extreme demands

might be put forward by more extreme people in more extreme ways. Any who are more moderate who later come into office may dissociate themselves from all this and claim that they cannot speak for their predecessors, but this is the very discontinuity which makes student involvement in university government so problematical and precarious. Authority that is taken from the staff does not necessarily become power in the hands of students. The same applies to meetings that are opened up: power has a propensity to move to gatherings that are more closed and arbitrary than those one started out with.

Advantage should be taken of a period of relative calm to reflect on what is at issue. Crises develop quickly and unexpectedly these days. Meanwhile, let it be remembered that the years of agitation and turmoil have already taken their toll: in terms of the general waste of time and energy; in the loss of enthusiasm and concern and the deterioration in morale on the part of teachers for whom teaching was a joy; and in the departure from particular institutions or from the academic world at large of a number of top-notch people, some of whom have never been replaced, a loss which has to be borne by present and future students. It has not been easy for those who have remained, to muster the resilience to carry on with their work as their conception of the university requires of them, when distracted by the need to defend the institution, and to resist the consuming clamour of degeneracy.

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[1]We live in the age of questionnaire. There was one, in Canada, that asked: 'Do you feel that the University exists primarily for (a) services to students, (b) services to community and province, (c) advancement of professional disciplines, (d) promotion of the interests of the university as an organisation, (e) promotion of the interests of corporations and power elite.' The irreverent must have found the last alternative irresistible. But the questionnaire went on: 'Do you feel that the faculty in general feels a..... b..... c..... d..... e.....' 'Do you feel that the administration, in general, feels a..... b..... c..... d..... e.....' 'Do you feel that the students in general feel a..... b..... c..... d..... e.....' Talk about groping in the dark. It sounds like one of those vaguely erotic games one played as a child, except that they were more fun, and made more sense, and were less serious.

[Professor D. J. Heasman is Professor of Political Science at the University of Saskatchewan.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

RICHARD NIXON AND THE PRESIDENCY

Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon. Theodore H. White. Jonathan Cape. £5.50.

This cannot have been a pleasant—nor an easy—book for Theodore White to write. Since the 1960 election he has chronicled each successive *Making of the President,* and in the last of them, he recounted how Richard Nixon won in 1972 in a landslide victory greater than that of any of the preceding 36 holders of the office. In writing of 1972, Theodore White mentioned Watergate only in passing. Here he tells the other side of the story: a story not of defeats, but of disgrace. It is vividly done, rich in pen portraits, as good a summary of the tragedy as the reader can find. And yet—is it the whole truth? Is it the final verdict?

Of the scale of the tragedy there can be no doubt. The burglary at the Watergate—of which, it would seem, the President was totally unaware—brought him no information at all. Even if it had done, it could have been of tiny value, and had no effect whatever on his victory. In other words, he did not need this at all. Moreover, to try to discover what the 'enemy' were doing or planning to do is normal in any form of politics. Again, about every one of Mr. Nixon's predecessors, it would have been possible 'to dig the dirt', some of it much more disturbing. Lyndon Baines Johnson, for example, arrived in Congress in 1937 as a stone-poor Democrat for the tenth district of Texas at a salary of $10,000; he had never been paid more than $22,500 until he became Vice-President in 1961; and yet he acquired a multi-million dollar empire based on monopolistic licenses granted by the Federal Government in the television and radio business. No one investigated him. He too, of course, was prosecuted and persecuted by the media over Vietnam, and driven to decide in 1968 not to run again. The campaign is now on—arguably, belatedly—against John F. Kennedy: Camelot indeed, it now seems, for there were strange goings-on among the cavaliers—and the king—at that court, too.

Is anyone free from sin? And was Mr. Nixon much more culpable?

As Mr. White in his last pages admits, though without too much emphasis, it was America's tragedy too. For it has weakened the White House; and, as he does not say because the scale of it could not be fully seen when he was writing, the 94th Congress—and not the President—is now making the operation of any coherent American foreign policy all but impossible. Every secret operation is (and even, it is seriously argued, *has* to be) leaked to the Press by one obliging Congressman or another—as if the operation of any Government engaged in diplomacy can ever be coherently conducted by perpetual press conferences. Because of Vietnam, nothing can be done in Angola except apparently to surrender it to the Communists by default. Whereas—as Mr. White admits—on foreign policy, even as Watergate was breaking, Mr. Nixon never put a foot wrong. Breach of faith? Not with the promise to end the Vietnam War, which he had promised to do, and was driven to do by the wave of feeling in 1968. Not with the accord with Communist China. Not with détente.

The breach of faith, Mr. White argues, was with the American people, because they are a people held together by a 'myth': of the President as a man of law. By a logic that this reviewer finds it hard to follow, Mr. White contends that 'take away their myths, and Frenchmen will remain Frenchmen, English-

men Englishmen . . . but take away the myths that bind Americans together, with their differences of race, culture and tradition, and America would dissolve into a sad geographical expression where whites killed blacks, blacks killed whites, and Protestants, Catholics and Jews made of their cities a constellation of Belfasts'. Picturesque stuff, but frankly rubbish. When I was in the U.S. three months ago, no one mentioned Watergate, there was no killing of blacks by whites or vice versa in the name of any myth, and affluence was making most people do very well, thank you. Reporters are the prisoners of their own myths. 215 million people, and their ancestors before them, have of course made America great and prosperous without the merits (or disadvantages) of the 'history' that marks France or England (Britain?). But they did not go, or grow prosperous, out of any respect for 'myth'—or even much knowledge of the Presidency. And when devolution comes to Scotland, it will be interesting and worrying to see how binding a force history is for England, and for Britain.

Without condoning what President Nixon did (to cover up a political crime in order to protect his lieutenants), laying aside his considerable foreign policy achievements, and laying aside equally the heady sermons on 'morality-in-politics' preached by the editorials of today's New York and Washington press, White House politics are in a strange and worrying turmoil today. If the Presidency became Imperial with F.D.R., what happens to it when every President is seen not as Caesar but as Nero? Mr. White is right to say:

> Nixon has left behind a news system more powerful than ever—made so by its successful struggle with him. His hatred of the news system and his unrelenting effort to cripple, manipulate, deceive and coerce the leadership of that news system have provoked a counter-hatred which now has a life of its own. Will its suspicion of Richard Nixon be translated into a permanent suspicion of the Presidency itself? The pursuit of Richard Nixon has made folk heroes of investigative reporters. But how much will the folklore of their triumphs inspire a new generation of editors and reporters to consider not only the Presidency but all government as a conspiracy against the people, to be ripped apart perhaps irresponsibly, for years to come? If Nixon has bequeathed to his Presidential successors a permanently hostile news system, he has cursed them all. And he has also cursed all the men of House and Senate who might be found, by the press, of insufficient zeal in frustrating a President, any President, whether he merit it or not.

This is the most significant paragraph in Mr. White's stirring, brilliantly-written book. He might have also asked why are some Presidents treated with kid gloves (Eisenhower) and as glamour boys (JFK), and why are others (LBJ and RMN) persistently attacked? Why do the Press make heroes of some (undistinguished) men and villains of other (undistinguished) men? There is in the 4th Estate in America a massive capacity to deride. They are doing it now to Gerald Ford, surpassing themselves in the clever remarks and the snide and icy wisecracks that have been their major industry since 1965. If there is a real breach of faith with the American people it lies here, not only in the White House (if there at all) but in those who are themselves the makers of myths. Far from being the watchdogs of democracy, the men of the Press are in danger of becoming its subvertors. *Quis custodiet custodes?*

ESMOND WRIGHT

MARK SYKES AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Mark Sykes: Portrait of an Amateur. Roger Adelson. Jonathan Cape.

Sir Mark Sykes was the negotiator of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916—the basic Anglo-French division of the Middle East after World War I. He was

also one of the planners in 1917 of the Balfour Declaration on the Jewish return to Palestine.

An earlier book on Sykes was published nearly half a century ago by Sir Shane Leslie—*Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters* (London, 1929). Since then, many secret official documents of the World War I period have come into the public domain. Dr. Roger Adelson, assistant professor of history at Arizona State University, has worked on all these papers as well as on the Sykes family archives at their ancestral home in Yorkshire. Dr. Adelson was granted a research fellowship for 1972-73 at St. Antony's College, Oxford, to facilitate this study. The resultant volume is extremely interesting, particularly to someone like myself who served in Palestine in World War I and has remained in that area ever since.

During World War I, in 1915, he became a General Staff officer; in 1916, a staff member to the Committee of Imperial Defence and later, political secretary to the War Cabinet till 1919.

The book under review is sub-titled *Portrait of an Amateur*, and that is correct. Sykes was a great traveller, soldier, a politician and a Middle East expert; but he knew none of the Middle Eastern languages and never acquired a degree. Nevertheless, he was a man of perception, imagination, wit and courage. A talented writer (from the age of eleven!) and a brilliant parodist, he had a very good ear for dialect, besides being an excellent mimic. He also had a good eye, and a selection of his caricatures is reproduced in this book. He was so infuriated with British military inefficiency in South Africa, that he and a friend created a character, Major-General Georg D'Ordel (pronounced Dawdle) who wrote a parody of the War Office infantry drill book of 1896 which received widespread attention in the London press.

How did Sykes acquire these qualities? A man of restless energy, he once wrote: 'Give me a native regiment to organise, a rebellion to raise, a block-house to construct, a vilayet to govern and I will do it. Give me an independent command, anything you choose . . . ' One of the causes of this restlessness was his determination to get away from both his parents, after he had travelled constantly with them in Europe from the age of seven. His mother was a spendthrift, a woman with a Napoleonic will of her own, and a scandalous reputation. She became a Catholic when Mark was three and took him with her. His father, Sir Tatton Sykes, was thirty years older than his wife and developed into a complete hypochondriac.

Another influence on Sykes was his health. He was sometimes ill as a child, so he was frequently taken abroad by his parents for his health. It was thus that he first visited Egypt, at the age of eleven. When he was grown up, he suffered at different times from malaria, from food-poisoning and an ear infection (which left him partially deaf). Having put on a great deal of weight, he lost so much during his World War I travels that he came home a skeleton. He brushed this aside, but it made him a ready victim to pneumonia, from which he died in 1919 before reaching 40.

Sykes was precocious, opinionated and impatient. Very self-centred—an only child in a wealthy family—he showed many of the prejudices of his class, including anti-Semitism. But later, in World War I, when participating in the confidential discussions that led to the Balfour Declaration, he met several leading Jews and became warmly pro-Zionist. Incidentally, it was my father—a fellow M.P. of Sykes'—who introduced him to Dr. Moses Gaster (then Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Britain) and to Prof. Chaim Weizmann (then an

obscure research chemist at Manchester—the future President of the World Zionist Organisation and eventually the first President of the State of Israel).

The same thing happened with Sykes' attitude to the Armenians, of whom he was violently critical during his travels in the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, he became their ardent political advocate, using the slogan 'Arabia for the Arabs, Judaea for the Jews and Armenia for the Armenians'. Like most Englishmen in the Middle East, he was always an admirer of the Arabs. But he was also a strong supporter of other minorities in the Ottoman Empire—the Druze and the Kurds, for whose independence from the Turks he also worked. He was, in general, a great believer in the decentralisation of authority, whether in Constantinople or in Dublin.

His travels solely in the Ottoman Empire on his many visits exceeded 6,000 miles. In the ten years between 1896 and 1906, the total of the periods he actually lived there amounted to no less than three years. This led him to write several books, the first being *Through Five Turkish Provinces*, written in 1899 when he was still an undergraduate. In 1904, he wrote the handsomely produced *Dar-ul-Islam: A Journey through Ten of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey*. In 1906, he wrote *The Caliph's Last Heritage*; but it was not published until 1915, when World War I revived British interest in Turkey.

Mark Sykes had pro-consular ambitions and considered himself a possible successor to Cromer in Egypt or even to Curzon in India. He was not in the Winston Churchill class, but had Sykes lived, he might well have replaced Churchill on his visit to the Middle East in 1921 as Colonial Secretary to reduce British military expenditure there. As it is, the summit of his career, as Dr. Adelson points out, was the Sykes-Picot Agreement which will perpetuate his name for ever.

EDWIN SAMUEL

THE APOCRYPHAL JESUS

The Child Jesus. Adey Horton. Geoffrey Chapman. £5.50.

During the fourth century A.D. the Christian church enjoyed a period of triumph when, as the price of imperial patronage, a settled order and unified system of doctrine were looked for. Amongst the matters then decided was the precise extent of Holy Scripture, so defined as to exclude a flourishing crop of apocryphal Gospels and Acts that had been composed partly with a view to propagating heresies but principally in order to entertain and amuse. The temper of the times was as favourable to miracles as our own age is suspicious of them. One of the recognised sidelines of the profession of letters was to relate marvels in honour of a particular deity and churchmen were quite equal to the task of supplying their simpler brethren with an edifying counterpart to the racy fables of paganism. It seemed, moreover, intolerable that well-loved figures and colourful episodes should often be dismissed but curtly in the Bible record when the imagination is naturally asking 'What happened next?' Just as the Jewish Haggadah is a collection of books that give supplementary information about Moses and other great figures of the Old Testament, so, in spite of disapproval voiced by the more austere critics, an enormous literature grew up over the years to fill gaps left by the Canonical Gospels in their account of Christ and the Virgin. In default of information about Christ's early years it was this period which attracted particular attention and is the subject of Mr. Horton's study. The method chosen is to start with a variety of sources extending from the Infancy Gospel of James, originally composed towards the end of the second century, down to the unbridled imaginings of the later Middle Ages

with their mixture of extreme reverence and extreme familiarity. A narrative can thus be constructed which treats systematically of the childhood and marriage of Mary, the birth and first days of Jesus, the Three Kings of Orient, the flight from Bethlehem, life in Egypt and the return to Nazareth. A genealogical table is added along the lines laid down about 1260 by Jacobus de Voragine in his influential 'Golden Legend'.

Mr. Horton tells his stories in a jaunty, easy-running fashion and illustrates them with a splendid range of pictures which testify alike to the skill of his choice and to the rich resources of the Warburg Institute. He makes much of the so-called 'malevolent acts' whereby children who upset Jesus at his play met with sharp punishment, but there is no need here for any deep psychological enquiry. The narratives which display Jesus as conceited and even malicious stem from a Gnostic work known as the Gospel of Thomas which makes no pretence of being anything other than a fantasy in which it is sometimes amusing to adopt the heartless tone of Belloc's 'Cautionary Tales'. Cranmer was right to dismiss the New Testament apocrypha as 'uncertain stories' but they had exerted a deep influence on mediaeval artists, as Mr. Horton vigorously and ingeniously reminds us.

R. L. P. MILBURN

CLASSICAL SCHOLAR

Jackson Knight: A Biography. G. Wilson Knight. Alden Press. £5.

Of the gentle Knights who have pricked to some purpose on the cultural plains of England in our time, one was a Roman Knight, the other a Shakespearean. The present book is a fine tribute to the former by the latter, his younger brother.

'Mark what ills the scholar's life assail', wrote Dr. Johnson in the eighteenth century. Things have improved in this respect in recent years, but for most of Jackson Knight's scholarly career the material rewards were meagre indeed. In 1936, when he became Assistant Lecturer in Classics at the University College of the South West at Exeter, 'he had a pathetically low salary . . . about £250, and this at the age of 41'.

But what he lacked in financial reward, he more than made up for in the affectionate esteem he inspired in his pupils, both as a schoolmaster before 1936 and as a university lecturer and teacher from 1936 to his death in 1964. That he was a particularly lovable person all the evidence concurs; that he was an inspiring teacher can be seen, not only by the testimony of those ex-pupils who have profited by his instruction and example, but by his books and broadcasts on Virgil, Homer and other classical writers, not least by his well-known Penguin translation of the *Aeneid*.

The Knight brothers, one learns with surprise, are descended from Malcolm II, King of Scotland. When Wilson Knight plays Macbeth, therefore, or when he writes on the play, as he has done so effectively since the Twenties and Thirties, he is recreating events relating to his own distant ancestors. Appendix B here gives in detail this 'Chart of Scottish Descent', and it is not entirely irrelevant to the main theme of the book, since its connection through the centuries of the author of *The Wheel of Fire* and *The Imperial Theme* with the gracious Duncan is a parallel in our own history and literature to what the elder brother Jackson Knight spent his life in doing for Greek and Roman history and literature: proving their relevance to the modern world, bringing them closer to the modern reader, *interpreting* them, literally and symbolically, as the younger brother has so illuminatingly interpreted Shakespeare. It is not

perhaps all that astonishing that among the spirit messages received—or allegedly received—from Jackson Knight since his death is one that records how he was 'met' by Virgil 'when he went over'. Conan Doyle, at any rate, would not have been surprised, even if Sherlock Holmes were to raise a sceptical eyebrow.

R. C. CHURCHILL

EDMUND WILSON IN THE TWENTIES

The Twenties. Edmund Wilson. Macmillan. £7.50.

Edmund Wilson, who died aged 77 in 1972, has been described as the last great Renaissance man of our literature. The product of an American patrician background, he became the pre-eminent American man of letters. He was best known as a critic—admitting his indebtedness to Taine—but he was much more than that. Not only did he 'convert criticism itself into a creative act', but he was poet, playwright, novelist, essayist, travel writer, social analyst, philologist and lexicographer, as well as literary and cultural critic. He was also an accomplished linguist, familiar with Latin, Greek, French, German, Russian, Hebrew and Hungarian. His *Axel's Castle* (1931) remains the great foundation study of modern symbolism; *To the Finland Station* (1940) is a classic of political perception; his novel, *I Thought of Daisy* (1929), is a remarkable and still underrated achievement. His literary chronicles of the twenties and thirties, *The Shores of Light* (1952), and of the forties, *Classics and Commercials* (1951), are literary journalism of undeniable distinction.

During the last years of his life, Wilson began to produce a series of autobiographical volumes. The first, *A Prelude*, published in 1967, dealt with his ancestors and his life from 1895 to 1919. The second, *Upstate* (1972), covered the period from 1950 to 1970. *The Twenties* takes up the story from the point at which *A Prelude* ends. Wilson was, by his own admission, 'a man of the twenties', so that one would have expected this to be the most powerful instalment of his recollections. In fact, it is rather disappointing. Possibly because he put so much of his life into his other works of the period. What we are left with seem rather the *disjecta membra*. Even so, this series of jottings from a writer's notebooks are worth reading. They reveal a great deal about the man. Not all of it pleasing. It is difficult to equate the sage of Talcotville with the author of the journals. The sub-Rousseau confessions disconcert. Wilson is seen as a mechanical rather than a romantic lover. There is a seediness about his addictions. There are, however, redeeming glimpses of the contemporary literary landscape with figures, and a scattering of splendidly evocative samples of descriptive writing, but, taken as a whole, the book does not add to Wilson's stature. For me, sadly, it diminishes him.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

A WOMAN SECRET AGENT

Operation Double Life. Roxane Pitt. Bachman & Turner. £3.50.

Roxane Pitt the writer is as elusive and baffling as Roxane the wartime secret agent of MI5 and MI6 in France, North Africa, Italy, Sicily. Her impetuous story hops about in time and place like a berserk flea. I felt at times that I had to be a secret agent myself to keep pace with its convolutions. When I tackled her about this at a first meeting she said: 'Oh, that is the modern manner.'

What emerges is a woman of wiles, daring, resource. Born in Aden of a Scots father, French mother, she attended a French school in Cairo, graduated in Classics at Milan University, read Roman Law at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford. In Paris when the Nazis marched in, she narrowly escaped the tragic fate of her

mother and sister who were liquidated by the Gestapo for their partly Jewish ancestry. For over two years she posed as a simple Breton girl seeking work, spied on the invaders, helped to locate the secret V1 and V2 launching sites. A remarkable story is of smuggling across the demarcation line into unoccupied France, seven shot-down British airmen—concealed in the statues of saints borne in a feast day procession from convent to church under the gaze of Nazi sentries. 'It was made the subject of a French film,' she told me.

Her most daring exploits were in Italy, from early 1943, where she passed as her lost sister, wife of an Italian senior officer. She had to sketch a map of Salerno harbour, look for secret orders under a stone in the ruins of Paestum. In Sicily, on the eve of the Allied landings, she operated under heavy naval shelling and air raids in the country around Syracuse, noting enemy positions to aid the invading forces. After the Italian armistice she joined ENSA in Catania as cover; served as personal assistant to Col. White, American Provost Marshal in Rome; probed into the German-occupied north searching for a picture hoard stolen from Naples by Goering, eventually locating it in an old castle between Trento and Bolzano. Postwar, she toured desolated Germany, went out to Ethiopia as special correspondent.

Vividly as she describes these experiences, her best writing is on her world-wide travels, notably in Singapore and Malaysia. On her two frustrating marriages—one to an Italian officer—and her reactions to life and love generally she is both revealing and naïve, calling Freud a 'German philosopher'. She can be tantalisingly vague on dates, background detail, yet does communicate a lifetime of rare adventure others may enjoy and envy.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Making of a Saint, the Tragi-comedy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Hamish Hamilton. £7.95). As the title implies, this is a highly controversial study by Mr. J. H. Huizinga. It is directed to downgrading the quality of Rousseau's thought and of his literary capacity. 'How could,' he asks, 'a character so feeble, a thinker so incoherent, a *litterateur* whose prose is so patchy, have earned world-wide recognition as a figure of great historical importance?' According to the author, he was a repellent figure, a morally self-confessed weakling and intellectually indecisive. He is highly critical of the Rousseau's *Social Contract,* alleging confusion of thought and on occasion 'his own semantic gamesmanship'. As to the *Confessions,* he asks how could 'so inordinately patchy a work' have gained him 'a strategic position in the history of literature'? Referring to the many claims to his greatness, Mr. Huizinga asks: 'Could it be that all these contentions about his unrivalled influence belong properly in the realm of mythology rather than that of history. . . . And do all those statements about his having altered the climate of the world, or passing a new breath of spring into man's being, perhaps form part not so much as the discipline of history as of the bastard art of *histoire romancée*?' It is a bold and provocative study.

The Guns of Dakar (Heinemann. £4.50). In his latest book, Mr. John Williams makes a special study of the disastrous expedition to seize the Vichy French base at Dakar in Senegal in September 1940. It was basically de Gaulle's brain child. He was entirely convinced that the French in Dakar would welcome him and the Free French. Churchill was persuaded

and the neutral Americans were in favour. German control of Dakar was feared. Tragically, as the author points out, everything went wrong from the start and before. The preliminary preparations and organisation for a combined landing operation supported by 7,000 British and French troops and a strong British naval force appear to have been inadequate. Furthermore, just before the expedition left the United Kingdom, two British liaison officers reported that Dakar was strongly pro-Vichy and well armed. Nonetheless, Operation Menace set off and met with a series of misfortunes. On the 13th September, Admiral Cunningham learnt that six Vichy French warships had passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and were in the Atlantic sailing south. They arrived in Dakar on the 14th just ahead of the British warships. At this stage the War Cabinet cancelled the expedition, but relented when de Gaulle and the British commanders pressed to go on. It was met with fierce resistance outside Dakar. de Gaulle's pleas were in vain. An attempted landing was made but failed. With the experience of later combined operations techniques and preparations, this landing might well have been successful. In the final result, the expedition returned to Britain, defeated and humiliated. Mr. Williams makes the point that when the British ships withdrew, the French were on the point of surrendering, by reason of running out of ammunition. The official explanation for the operation's failure was Admiral Sir Dudley North's allowing the French ships to pass through Gibraltar. He was shortly afterwards removed from command and retired. He has always stoutly protested his innocence. Mr. Williams points out that this is now generally accepted and that the trouble lay in the confusion of orders and directives that had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic station, based on Gibraltar. The book is well researched.

The Grand Duke's Woman (Macdonald and Jane's. £5.50). This book, with the curious title, is by Pauline Gray, grand-daughter of Nathalia Cheremetevskaya, the morganatic wife of the Grand Duke Michael, the younger brother of Czar Nicholas II. She has based this account on documents which she has recently traced, including love letters, and Prince Michael's diary, as well as many photographs. Natasha, as her grandmother was called, died in Paris in penury in January 1952. The author knew her only as an elderly lady, of great dignity, modesty, perseverance and the traces of her great beauty. In her youth 'she was a termagant; arrogant, selfish, impatient, intolerant and vain'. The author's mother, Tata, was the child by her first marriage, which was very brief. She then wa attracted to a Captain in the Blue Cuirassiers, of which the Grand Duke was Commander-in-Chief. Thus they met, and this book is all about their romance, the scandal of it, and their marriage in 1912 without the knowledge of the Czar, which was celebrated in a Serbian church in Vienna. The Czar was furious, and until war broke out, they were in exile in England. There is no doubt they were both intensely happy together, even during the harsh days of the war and Russian revolution. Apparently at one stage Kerensky gave them the opportunity of going to the Crimea, which could have meant exile and freedom. But they stayed on, until parted early in 1918. Unknown to Natasha, the Prince was murdered in June 1918; she escaped via the Crimea and Constantinople to the west. It is a poignant human story, not of much historical importance, written in an easy readable style, with feeling but no emotion.

19 MAY 1976

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Published under the auspices of the

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
LONDON

by the Oxford University Press
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Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 37 Union Street, London, S.E.1. Tel 01-407 0497. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

111th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

APRIL 1976

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Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
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WILL U.S.A. QUIT I.L.O.?

by James Avery Joyce

ON 6 November 1975 the United States gave two years' notice of intention to withdraw from the International Labour Organisation. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger cited four grounds for this lamentable step: 'erosion' of tripartite representation, 'selective' concern for human rights, disregard of 'due process', and increasing 'politicisation'. He said not a word about the decision of the ILO Conference (its legislative body) last summer to give a seat to a PLO observer, without a right to vote, but whose sober and constructive speech of acceptance was nonetheless viciously caricatured in the US press. Kissinger also wrote: 'The United States does not desire to leave the ILO. The United States does not expect to do so. But we do intend to make every effort to promote the conditions which will facilitate our continued participation'. He omitted to suggest what efforts made in the US itself might facilitate that continued participation.

This self-centred display of official ambivalence could doubtless be explained in many ways. But the present writer has attempted in this article a documented explanation, both in terms of the United States ideological response to the current challenge of the UN system as a whole, and, more especially, in terms of his own personal impressions during some twenty years of intermittent residence (and taxation without representation!) in the United States and of his many working contacts with labour groups across that tantalising country. As will be apparent later in this article, none of this broader factual approach is intended to be insensitive to American opinion; but surely the time has come to reject the quaint notion that everybody is out of step but our Joe!

First, however, it should be noted that the past year has seen the ILO (founded in 1919) at the apex of over half a century of steady innovation and solid achievement in establishing and advancing the human rights and living conditions of untold millions of the world's workers. For example, during 1975, in more than a hundred developing countries around the earth thousands of workers were equipped through ILO training schemes to earn a better living than before. In nearly 50 countries labour laws and practices were systematically improved to conform to ILO's standards. Above all,

the stage has been set, with the approval of leading economic authorities, industrial organisations and business journals, as well as with almost universal trade union support, for the first concerted attempt at international employment *planning*. The World Employment Conference will meet in Geneva in June 1976, when some 120 governments and countless industrial groups and labour unions will be pulling together to cope unitedly with the world depression in terms of more jobs.

The ILO's special task within the United Nations system has been to improve working techniques and living conditions by means of expert research into social conditions and direct consultation between governments, management and workers. This is the pragmatic 'tripartite' system, which makes the ILO unique among global bodies. These three key elements in modern society form the essential basis on which common policies to improve working conditions can be secured by agreement instead of strife. Some specialists have been suggesting that certain other UN bodies—such as the 'watchdog' commission recently set up to supervise the arbitrary actions of the powerful Multinationals—might also adopt the 'tripartite' principle to protect labour interests.

Not least, the ILO drew world attention last year, in its traditional defence of freedom of association, to grave breaches of human rights connected with the world of work—e.g. in Chile and elsewhere. In spite of the prevailing mood of disenchantment arising from the economic *malaise* of 1975, the ILO Director General's current report presents a moving and encouraging document registering sane and steady progress in social policy.

Conveyed within that report, too, were two accolades from Washington which stood out in ironic contrast to the State Department's letter of ignominious retreat. Muting the harsh voice of the November letter, the voice of 'the other America' could be heard on many human issues. For instance, in October the World Lawyers' Conference on World Peace Through Law in Washington acclaimed the ILO as 'the Outstanding International Agency for service in the advancement of the cause of human rights and social justice'. The ILO was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969. The new award calls on 'members of the legal profession throughout the world to give their wholehearted support to the efforts and activities of the International Labour Organisation'. While in August, also in Washington, the World Federation of the Deaf presented the ILO with its International Solidarity Award, for its contribution to the advancement of vocational rehabilitation of the deaf.

Alas! The ILO's succour to the world's deaf had not reached across the street to the American Secretary of Labour. Yet this was hardly surprising, since John Dunlop, President Ford's Secretary of Labour for just ten months, announced in January that he was resigning because 'the Ford Administration faced another difficult year in labour relations and that the schism between the Administration and organised labour, as well as differences between industry and labour, were too serious for him to overcome'. (*Herald Tribune*, 15.1.76).

This chronic ambivalence—this dichotomy between ideals and practice—

towards the international community, has been sufficiently marked in recent years, since the United States began to lose its grip on outer world events, for a frankly critical judgment—however summary—to be attempted here by way of backdrop to the Kissinger letter. For the ILO stands by no means alone as an object of US unease and estrangement. Dr. Kissinger's warning letter must be read in context.

In a parallel UN forum last autumn the voice of Dr. Kissinger (through the unsealed lips of Daniel P. Moynihan) was telling the General Assembly —or, at least, its gallery—that its actions reminded him of 'the theatre of the absurd' and that the UN was becoming 'contemptible'. I attended that Assembly, and responsible officials, who had devoted their lives to the Charter's aim to 'harmonise the actions of nations', were appalled by this deliberate attack on the Organisation itself.

Even giving due weight to the subtle and insidious strategy of the wealthy pro-Israel lobby in Washington (which few US political leaders have the mind, courage, or financial resources to oppose), it must be obvious to any reasonable observer that the three decades of chequered but resolute expansion of the UN system as the major institution of global co-operation, reaching into every area of human activity (its agenda, budget, and personnel increasing steadily year by year), cannot be *that* puerile or wrong-headed.

But is it not equally obvious in 1976 that something has gone sadly awry with the political acumen of a country that has talked so long and loudly of its 'world leadership'—ever since, in fact, the exceptional conditions resulting from the tragedies of the Second World War put it temporarily in that enviable position? Where did the dream go wrong?

Not to go back further than the early 1970s, United States isolationism has become visibly more unproductive every day. Take a glimpse into economics. 'In the summer of 1971', wrote C. Fred Bergsten in *Foreign Affairs* (Jan. 1972), 'President Nixon and Secretary Connally revolutionised US foreign economic policy. In so doing, they promoted a protectionist trend which raises questions about the future of the US economy. He (Nixon) terminated the convertibility of the dollar, shattering the linchpin of the entire international monetary system, on whose smooth functioning the world economy depends'. OPEC could not, five years ago, be blamed for that!

Even the pro-American press and other opinion-makers favouring the traditional 'special relationship' between UK and USA, have not failed to protest the 'go-it-alone' disasters which have been the Nixon legacy, as the US Administration has tried to step further off the earth into cosmic insularity. The 'tyranny of the majority', which has so painfully confronted them at the UN, turns out to be actually an embarrassing mirror in which US policy-makers are now discovering their own lonely image.

Professor Bergsten, writing as above, went on to assert that US foreign economic policy 'appears based on some totally erroneous and exceedingly dangerous theory that the United States has played Santa Claus to the world for the last 25 years. This is wrong for the American economy, for

it risks immediate losses of jobs and investments, as well as long-term insulation . . .' Does the State Department listen to its own prophets?

The foregoing is admittedly a very partial glimpse of a complicated panorama; but it would require an unusually detached philosopher to set within long-term perspectives the slow demise of American world power ever since those halcyon days when the Marshall Plan emerged so conveniently at the War's end to enhance still further, alongside a devastated Europe and impoverished Asia, America's unique war-time prosperity, with its high profits and full employment. Putting Western Europe back on its feet was how the plan looked on the *outside*. But the American Century didn't quite last out the UN's third decade, and the US delegates found themselves in 1975 accepting reluctantly and under painful duress the basic principles of a New Economic Order, approved enthusiastically and almost unanimously at the last General Assembly. Life will never be the same again.

No doubt the four specific charges cited in the Kissinger indictment will be adequately answered on the official level when the time comes; but a *tu quoque* rebuttal comes readily to mind, though it is unlikely that an intergovernmental body could evoke such a line of defence on its own behalf: this would be 'interfering' in a State's domestic politics. International organisations are always vulnerable to attacks conducted in the half light. But how important is 'erosion of tripartite representation' to the US employers' group who walked out of the ILO in the 1960s or to those members of the Congress who voted five years ago a cut off of US contributions—which are still five-and-a-half million dollars in arrears? How can 'selective concern for human rights' weigh on the consciences of those who have consistently overlooked human rights in supporting military regimes in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Chile and elsewhere and who support 'selective aid' as a political weapon? What do they know of 'due process' in world affairs who flatly refuse to ratify the international covenants and labour conventions produced by the World Community since the War? What does 'politicisation' mean other than that the other fellow can vote you down or that you don't want to change your old policies to fit the new facts?

Even so, the strained relationship which had made it difficult for the US Government, business and trade union movement to keep up with the ILO's progressive programme requires closer scrutiny on its merits. Of the 4,000 ratifications of nearly 150 ILO Conventions to date, only *seven* have been made by the United States—the record lowest of any country, apart from some recent comers. But it has been that way from the beginning, although Samuel Gompers, President of the A.F. of L. helped to shape in 1919 the ILO Constitution; and the conspicuous service of another American, David Morse, as the longest-serving Director-General, did so much to raise the ILO's prestige and effectiveness throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

Perhaps the ILO got off on the wrong foot when its very first Conference, as laid down in Part XIII of the Peace Treaty in 1920, had to be held in Washington. Thirty-nine nations sent delegations to initiate the New

World Social Order of the League of Nations. But (an observer wrote) 'in the American capital, conditions were inauspicious and depressing'. No US delegation could be appointed, as the Treaty was not ratified—with the Senate in fierce debate and the President too ill to exercise authority. Some opponents described the impatient delegates as Bolsheviks and suggested that they should all be deported. The British Government came to the rescue, however, and cabled money for a hall and typists to be hired.

Leaving aside constitutional niceties, the United States contribution to the development of the international rule of law leaves some shameful gaps, all the way from the notorious Connally amendment to block the World's Court's jurisdiction to the non-implementation of the important Human Rights Covenants which came into legal effect this year, in spite of US refusal to ratify them. Yet, ever since Mrs. Roosevelt's devoted Chairmanship of the UN's Human Rights Commission, 'the other America' has struggled consistently to promote the rule of law in world affairs, as my own limited experience there has shown.

I recall a Seminar some years back when I was a participant alongside the distinguished historian, James T. Shotwell, the author of the two-volume classic *The Origins of the I.L.O.*, and other scholars who sought to impress upon a sophisticated New York audience the value of the ILO's activities to America. Apart from the not unnatural questionings from the floor about Soviet representation, there was absolutely no hostility, only regret that the United States was so far behind the Western World in assuming binding commitments to preserve the very freedoms enshrined in its own Constitution. It has been the same story across the country with so many active United Nations associations and other voluntary organisations who are promoting student conferences and educational journals and issuing appeals for UN popular support. It has been a frequent privilege to stay in scores of American homes when on coast-to-coast lecture trips and to observe the passionate loyalty and enthusiasm for the United Nations cause which can hardly be matched in any other nation. Why, then, should the American people now be induced to scuttle or boycott the UN because some of their leaders can no longer get their own way?

One reason, need it be said, is the lingering neurosis over Communism, which the patent blunders and illusions of US foreign policy have served only to strengthen, as in South-East Asia and now Angola. The labour movement has been bound hand and foot by these obsessions. *The Economist* (29.11.75), describing how the ILO refused to 'jump when American labour boss Mr. George Meany says "jump",' suggested that 'the American labour boss is so concerned about that old bugbear, the Soviet trade unions, that he got Mr. Henry Kissinger to threaten a pullout from the ILO because, also, 1976 is American election year'.

But the ageing Meany does not confine his *diktats* to his own servile following. He is brutally frank about it—especially when Midwest farmers insist on selling their surplus grain to Russia—US foreign policy is too important a subject to be handled anywhere outside CIO-AF of L Headquarters. If only Walter Reuther had lived, the ILO would have retained

a warm, intelligent and loyal friend at the Meany court. For many second-rank labour leaders have hearts and minds open to the wider vision of America's true purpose as a champion of the earth's poor and dispossessed.

In the 1950s I was UN Special Correspondent of *Labor's Daily* and my regular articles on current United Nations activities brought back a refreshing response from those unions that supported the paper with local funds. And when lecturing for the Labor Education Service in Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, or the West Coast, there came the same eager response from local union membership: 'Why don't we hear more about this?'

Alas! After a few years of valiant financial struggle, both *Labor's Daily* and the L.E.S.—never able to draw on central labour union funds—folded their fragile tents, Yet the ILO witness has continued loud and clear across the college campuses, and today scores of universities and advanced industrial training centres give the ILO a major spot in seminars and study courses for potential labour leaders.

There were signs at the last General Assembly (in spite of a violent 'racist' diversion that occupied so much space in the opportunist press) that United States policy was gradually coming to terms with a new global order that could no longer be controlled from the State Department. In January the International Institute of Labour Studies conducted in Geneva a mammoth seminar of several hundred well-known experts on *The Social Implications of the New Economic Order*. The American voice was conspicuous by its absence. Will the United States continue to refuse to keep pace with these immense changes in the global ethos or to take a responsible part in shaping the economy of a fast-developing world? It was President Roosevelt's belief that we have nothing to fear but fear itself. Can his successors in office believe anything less?

As the ILO launches in 1976 the biggest programme yet, how much more wisdom can be found in the lips of Mr. F. Keith Richan, Vice-President of Philips Electronics Industries, Limited, in Toronto, the Canadian employers' delegate to the ILO and also chairman of the Canadian Employers' International Labour and Social Affairs Committee, who says: *'We must accept the world as it is* and go on from there with the basic freedoms of Man, as called for in all the work of the ILO and, indeed, the United Nations family, uppermost in our endeavours'.

[Dr. Joyce was formerly on the ILO staff and two of his twenty books, *Labour Faces the New Age* and *Jobs versus People*, were published by the ILO.]

THE MISPLACED REVOLUTION

by L. F. S. Upton

ALL interpretations of the American Revolution bear a strong family resemblance to each other because all are descendants of one spiritual father, John Adams. In his retirement, the second President devoted himself to proving that his state, Massachusetts, had taken the lead in resisting Great Britain. The analysis he presented to support his argument has been refined, expanded, footnoted and scrutinised but never basically altered. All accounts of the Revolution agree that the American colonies had grown to maturity by the middle of the eighteenth century, developing a society distinct from that of Britain and moving further away from the mother country with each passing year. When crossed by misguided English politicians, that society asserted its coming of age by breaking with the parent state and establishing its independence, thus releasing vast new energies for the development of America. The explanation is gratifying because it gives a clear purpose to the Revolution, making it the culmination of the first stage of American development. Yet a look at what was actually happening within the colonial societies on this continent two hundred years ago would indicate no such clarity of vision on the part of those who engaged in revolution.

By 1760, Americans were facing a massive contradiction within their own society. They had, over the previous one hundred and fifty years, created a fairly well defined self-image of the independent man, owning the land that provided his livelihood and on which he raised his family. This man was self-sufficient and in touch with a personal God. He was as good as his neighbour because all enjoyed a middling degree of prosperity. He was proud of his ability to cope with all types of challenges, from ploughing the soil and shooting Indians to making kitchen cabinets and being the family physician. This agrarian life was both norm and ideal. Yet everything that was happening by the middle of the eighteenth century was giving the lie to the cherished notions that Americans held about themselves. The resulting tension between self-image and reality created the American Revolution.

The problem arose from the fact that America was not growing away from England but was becoming every day a bit more like England. The original scattered farm settlements were developing into a commercial society patterned on that of England, not because she was the mother country, but because she was the exemplar for all commercial states. The sheer material success of the colonies was bringing change as society became more prosperous and diversified and complicated and urbanised. Each generation found itself moving farther away from the rural self-image.

The indications of change were numerous and nowhere more so than in the towns. The business of cities is business, and, as commerce expanded, urbanisation proceeded rapidly. Towns have a set of standards that are

completely antithetical to the rural ideal of the self-sufficient man. The bulk of the urban population was dependent on overseas and coastal commerce for its employment in warehouse and counting house; it relied on insecure hourly wages for its subsistence. Americans were forsaking the farming life to join the restless town dwellers, surrendering their self-reliance for dependence on the whims of employers and the fluctuations of world trade.

Towns also questioned traditional values in more subtle ways, by encouraging specialisation and devaluing the generalist. New professions appeared to satisfy the needs of a complex society: barbers were no longer necessarily dentists and surgeons as well; lawyers no sooner established themselves than they began to divide into special areas of competence. The man who hammered the nails into the frame no longer designed the house itself, for that was the task of the architect. It was too soon for some artisans: a silversmith could make a living if he sold prints on the side, a portrait painter if he also decorated rooms. Specialised services were increasingly available to those who could afford them, and another line of division was drawn between Americans.

The increase in private wealth that accompanied commercial prosperity led to class distinctions and stratifications more complex than had ever existed before. By 1760 there was a real possibility that inherited wealth would qualify enough people in enough different colonies to create a governing oligarchy patterned on those of other commercial states. Private wealth was no abstraction: it was made visible in the elaboration of private homes and social functions, in the use of carriages imported from England with coats of arms emblazoned on the doors. This display of luxury was repeatedly held up by patriotic pamphleteers as proof of the corruption that was being introduced into an otherwise virtuous and well-ordered society.

As American trade increased with each passing year, Americans became more closely enmeshed with the European world. The international wars that had racked America for a hundred years had confirmed the original Puritan revulsion against the old world, but commerce would not permit escape. The world became ever more bewildering as trade continued to tie American economic fortunes with ever more distant markets. With the increasing complexity of trade [illegible] the proliferation of governmental agencies to regulate and protect the trade: more rules, more officials, more exercise of authority than a simple self-sufficient community ever required.

American religion was also beginning to feel the pressure of change, and on this point the colonials were hypersensitive. They watched the modest progress of the Episcopal Church with an alarm bordering on hysteria. The church had the King of England as its only supreme head on earth, and so it became involved in the rhetoric of revolution. But its connection with England had little to do with the advances it was making; rather it attracted new congregations because it was in harmony with the changes in the pattern of American society. This was a comfortable church that did not demand the faithful contemplate the wrath of God seven days a week, and it offered a liturgy that removed the burden from the individual in the

presence of the Almighty. The result was that the Church of England was most successful in the commercial centres where there was a class of people sufficiently prosperous to be unconcerned about the imminence of Divine judgment.

Many of these changes were only in the beginning stage by the time of the Revolution, and they may look small beside the innovations of our own day. But there is no absolute way of measuring change, and its importance lies in the eyes of the beholder. What was happening in the mid-eighteenth century was sufficiently striking to persuade many patriots that their American-ness was under attack. Somehow there must be an explanation and somewhere there must be a villain. The easiest course was to blame an external agent, and the choice was obvious. Since America was becoming more and more like England, since the American agrarian identity was losing ground to the English commercial one, then it must be because England willed it so. Since the state was personified in the King, there must be some malign policy by George III to destroy American identity.

By no means all Americans accepted the logic of this explanation, but many found it persuasive. Those who rejected the search for a scapegoat also opposed the Revolution; they were the Americans who had most successfully adjusted to change and found it no threat to their identity or self-esteem. The commercial towns were not noted for their revolutionary fervour. The countryside, not Boston, provided the manpower for the first resistance to England. Philadelphia, lukewarm to Congress, welcomed British forces with open arms; New York was a friendly haven throughout the war; Charleston was agreeably ready to collaborate. Left to themselves, these towns would have adapted perfectly well, for they were the agents of the very changes that threatened rural society. John Adams may have organised rebellion, but it was that unrepentant agrarian, Thomas Jefferson, who articulated what revolution was.

After the political connection with Britain was severed, the same problems remained. The Revolution had struck at the wrong target but it had at least afforded a respite from the crisis of identity. After 1776 Americans could say that they were not Englishmen in the political sense, but that did not fix their place in a changing society. Once Americans realised they could no longer shift responsibility on to Britain they began to face their problems for themselves. Certain gestures could be made that had been impossible before: George Washington elevated the desire to escape from the world into a national policy. But the question of identity was still open and the argument continued in the names of Hamiltonian commercialism and Jeffersonian agrarianism. Even more fundamental was the predicament addressed by Noah Webster: how to create an American language to express American ideas with somebody else's literature as the only guide. These were the problems that had brought on the American Revolution, and they were not to be solved by armed struggle.

America was modernising in the eighteenth century and it inevitably patterned itself on the most modern state of the day. America was growing

towards England. The political connection between the two served to force the modernisation of America ahead of other parts of the new world, but any state moving from agriculture to commerce would have followed the same course. British policy towards America was totally irrelevant, because whatever Britain might or might not have done, she could not have relieved the inner tensions preying on colonial society. And it was those tensions that produced an outburst of irrational anger against change, a nativist, agrarian backlash that channeled its frustrations on to the most familiar available and non-domestic symbol: King George III.

[A history professor at the University of British Columbia, Leslie Upton read Modern History at St. John's, Oxford, and took his doctorate at the University of Minnesota. He has been a student of the American Loyalists for twenty years.]

A STRANGE OPPORTUNITY

by Desmond Hawkins

WHEN Thomas Hardy put together the collection of poems that he issued in 1922 under the title *Late Lyrics and Earlier* he included one entitled *The Opportunity,* to which he added a personal dedication—'for H.P.' In comparison with his finest poetry the four brief verses of 'The Opportunity' have no great intrinsic value, but there are other factors which attract a particular attention to H.P. and the poem she inspired Hardy to write. In the first place dedications, or any explicitly personal identification, are very rare in Hardy's poetry in spite of the fact that he was a highly personal and autobiographical writer. Among his nearly nine hundred poems there are a bare handful which commemorate the names of village girls in his youthful days, or are inscribed with the initials of a close relative, or which—exceptionally—incorporate in the title an affectionately remembered Christian name. Of these last, *Thoughts of Phena* is a direct reference, and the only one, to his cousin Tryphena Sparks; *Concerning Agnes* recalls his friendship with Agnes, Lady Grove. In the main, though, Hardy's poems—taken by themselves—are not very communicative about their origins. There is the additional problem that he had been writing poetry for thirty years before he published his first collection; and as few of his poems are dated there is often no knowing, with any certainty, whether a particular poem was first drafted in 1910, or 1890 or even 1870.

The dedication to H.P. is therefore not merely a pleasant gesture to the owner of the initials. It is the vital clue to the poem's origin and inner meaning. At the time of its publication it was a clue that would have been understood by H.P. herself but by very few others. The opportunity that forms the subject of the poem is described in a tantalisingly mysterious way: apparently the poet and H.P. met casually long ago—'forty springs back' —and took the encounter so lightly that they 'parted with smallest regret'. The poet now reflects that if they had valued this opportunity more carefully they might have made a life together 'till our long cold claytime'. The poem dwells finally on the sad fact that, even when some fortunate chance puts an opportunity in our way, we fail to recognise it and brush it aside.

Who then was H.P., when did she and Hardy have that first encounter and what was the opportunity that he feels they squandered? Her name was Helen Paterson. She was born in 1848, the daughter of a doctor, and she met Hardy for the first and probably the only time in the spring of 1874. She was then beginning to make a reputation as an artist with a particular skill as an illustrator of books. Hardy at this time was writing *Far from the Madding Crowd* for Leslie Stephen to serialise in the *Cornhill* magazine and having some difficulty in keeping ahead of its serialisation, but by April he had delivered enough instalments to allow himself a visit to London. In May he dined with G. Murray Smith, the publisher, and there met the young woman who was illustrating his novel. This was Helen Paterson, and Hardy recorded the immediate use he made of their opportune meeting—'gave her a few points'.

He must have returned to Dorset very soon afterwards as he finished writing *Far from the Madding Crowd* in July, after a spell of intense application during which he wrote the concluding chapters 'at a gallop'. The cause of this urgency was Hardy's impending marriage, which took place in mid-September—only a few weeks after his delivery of the completed MS. Following its serialisation in the *Cornhill* the book appeared in November in two volumes, with Helen Paterson's illustrations. An inspection of the artist's signature on each illustration reveals an interesting change—'Helen Paterson' is superseded by 'Helen Allingham'. By a coincidence she too had married, less than four weeks before Hardy: her husband was the Irish poet, William Allingham.

That one meeting at the publisher's dinner table seems, then, to be the extent of their acquaintance. In the words of the poem—'we parted when died that daytime'. The only other contact between them appears to have been in the form of an enquiry made by Hardy in 1880 to know whether she would illustrate the book he was then writing. The impersonal tone of her reply makes it clear that their relationship was of the slightest and most casual sort—

> 'Dear Sir, I should have much pleasure in accepting your flattering invitation to illustrate your new story, were it not that I have entirely given up book-illustration: and my hands are so full that there is no likelihood of my being able to resume it, for the present at any rate. With many thanks. Faithfully yours, Helen Allingham.'

In the six years since her marriage Helen Allingham had already won recognition as a portrait painter of enduring quality. Her portrait of her husband, which now hangs in the National Portrait Gallery, was painted in 1876. In 1878 Carlyle said to Allingham 'Your wife is the *only* person who has made a successful portrait of me, though many have tried'. Ruskin praised her, Tennyson sat for her and she must have looked back on book illustration as little more than prentice hackwork. In the face of her refusal Hardy turned to George du Maurier who had illustrated one of his earlier novels, *The Hand of Ethelberta.* Of any further correspondence there is no trace; nor is there any reason to believe it ever existed. Although Hardy considered her the best illustrator he ever had he would hardly have approached her again after such a final rejection.

The next episode in the story came in 1906 in the form of a letter, to which Professor R. L. Purdy first drew attention, from Edmund Gosse to Hardy asking for information about the illustrator of *Far from the Madding Crowd.* To this Hardy replied that 'she began as a charming young lady, Miss Helen Patterson, and ended as a married woman—charms unknown'. After saying that he had not seen her since 1874, nor thought of her for the past twenty years, Hardy added that Gosse's reminder of her existence had caused him to 'feel "quite romantical" about her (as they say here)'. He went on to urge Gosse to 'hunt her up' in London and let him know 'what she looks like as an elderly widow woman'. Moreover if he succeeded in tracing her (which he could hardly fail to do as she had published books in 1903 and 1905 and would have been well known in the literary and artistic circles in which Gosse moved) he was to give her Hardy's kind regards but—and this is the point of the story—'but you must not add that

those two simultaneous weddings would have been one but for a stupid blunder of God Almighty'.

The rather facetious man-to-man tone of the letter does not conceal the beginning of an imaginative relationship that Hardy now wanted to explore in a 'quite romantical' way. Having summarily dismissed William Allingham and his own wife, Emma Hardy, he merged the two 1874 weddings into one and elected Helen Paterson to a place among those brides of his imagination who flit like dimly perceived ghosts through the pages of his poetry. The bittersweet thought of a lost opportunity is a recurring theme with Hardy. In *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* Angel Clare is brought by chance to a brief encounter with Tess at a village dance but fails to choose her as his partner; and when she later meets Alec d'Urberville, from whom stems her whole tragedy, Hardy comments—

> 'Had she perceived this meeting's import she might have asked why she was doomed to be seen and coveted that day by the wrong man, and not by some other man, the right and desired one in all respects—as nearly as humanity can supply the right and desired; yet to him who amongst her acquaintance might have approximated to this kind, she was but a transient impression, half forgotten . . . In the ill-judged execution of the well-judged plan of things the call seldom produces the comer, the man to love rarely coincides with the hour for loving . . . We may wonder whether at the acme and summit of the human progress these anachronisms will be corrected by a finer intuition, a closer interaction of the social machinery than that which now jolts us round and along'.

Given that finer intuition Angel Clare would have fallen in love with Tess at first sight, instead of at their second meeting when it was already too late. Hardy's earlier choice of title for the book was *Too Late Beloved*, and in writing *The Opportunity* he seems to have been subjecting himself once more to his sense of the poignancy of mismanaged chances. In fiction as in real life—and indeed in the areas of fantasy that lie between the two—Hardy was acutely conscious of 'the cruel satires that Fate loves to indulge in'. In 1906 his estrangement from Emma was profound and irreversible. He had long since realised that the marriage he had made in 1874 was, in his own words, 'a preface without any book'. And Helen Paterson's? She had borne Allingham three children and there is no reason to suggest they were anything but a united and contented family. For Hardy, however, this was irrelevant: his thoughts drifted back to the talented young woman illustrator as he remembered her at a London dinner party. To him she was significantly H.P. still, not H.A. And he speculated—

> 'Had we mused a little space
> At that critical date in the Maytime,
> One life had been ours, one place,
> Perhaps, till our long cold claytime'.

Though the poem may probably have been written in 1906 Hardy withheld it until Emma had been dead for nearly ten years. At the time of its publication Helen Allingham was 73. Whether Hardy sent her the poem, or not, or someone drew her attention to it, I do not know. She had about four and a half years in which to discover it and consider it before her 'claytime'. If she did read it I wonder what she made of it.

Helen Paterson's illustrations for *Far From the Madding Crowd* may be seen in the County Museum, Dorchester.

THE SECULAR CHURCH

by June Wedgwood Benn

MODERN Man in his search for meaning has erected strange gods through whom he intercedes, that they may lead him to Truth. Over a century ago Matthew Arnold believed that the public establishment of schools for the middle classes would lead to the 'adorning and ennobling of the spirit'[1] and looked forward to the future where he saw us in our turn with our own difficulties 'mounting some new step in the arduous ladder whereby man climbs to his perfection'. That the best that has been known and felt would then be diffused in an atmosphere of sweetness and light to the lower classes of society was Arnold's dream as it has since been the dream of many an educationist. Some would say that we are nearer to the achievement of this dream today; others look incredulously at the chaos and waste of the educational systems of the West and hide their heads. Above all perhaps, a sensitive observer has an impression of the utter *meaninglessness* of much that passes for education in the secondary schools of the realm. Why is this? It is apparent to all but the most blind that the educational emperor wears no clothes—or at least that his clothes are but rags and tatters. Even this is however excused by the apostles of the secular church as being the result of cheeseparing economies. Our emperor has no clothes because we do not know what style will suit him and the pattern books of the last twenty or thirty years lie scattered on the floor!

Any handful of cuttings from the British educational press and from the various educational supplements will show all too clearly that facts and theories abound—usually contradicting each other. There are certainly more theories than facts and it seems that an awful lot of educational scenery is being shifted. We are constantly hearing of exciting new curricula, of opportunities being opened up to all, of pastoral care and team teaching, integrated days and workshops, drama therapy and modern maths. Yet if you actually step into this brave new world you may find more often than not crowds of bored and noisy adolescents unwilling to stay in or even frequent for a whole day the sacred grove of *academe*.

When we discuss at a quite simple level—and certainly at the level of *The Times* or *Guardian* correspondence columns—the rationale of schooling in the present Western world, we must learn to distinguish between social and cognitive criteria for schools. In the words of John Davy of the *Observer*: 'Education is invariably involved in two contrasting tasks: one is the development and training of individual gifts and talents; the other is "socialisation", nurturing a wide sensitive and sympathetic awareness of the world and the people in it'. The first task entails recognition of different degrees and kinds of ability, whose development leads towards specialisation. The second starts from 'the conviction that dignity and a sense of worth are owed to all human beings irrespective of talents, social status or income and leads towards broad studies and some kind of comprehensive ideal'[2]

Selective education succeeded with the first task. The unselective system is trying to succeed with both and in the eyes of its critics is failing in both. English schools have often been stronger on the character-building side and for encouraging personal initiative towards a social ideal—indeed memories of my grammar school days are filled with long and earnest speeches from headmasters about service to the community of which I heard nothing whatever when at school in France. There is further confusion between the education of the person and the education of the mind and uncertainty about what exactly these two things mean and how far they are independent of each other or interdependent. There is also the 'gap'—understood better by practitioners in the field than by educationalists—between theory and practice. There are many practical problems in educating the children of a materialist consumer society more affluent than ever before in its history yet in a country of low economic growth suffering from having been the first country to industrialise, not to mention reeling from the shock of losing an empire in a generation. The quest for equality is abroad in the world today as never before and this superimposes difficulties upon the ones already mentioned, particularly when equality is never satisfactorily defined. Intellectuals are also aware as was in particular Lionel Trilling, for example, that although we may wish to sweep away snobbery and division these things have often been important for writers and for poets, the very people whom some of the progressive educationalists use as examples of creative imagination.

More than any other factor though, in the present writer's opinion, the fact that we have drifted away from the Protestant ethic in this country—the ethic of hard work and just reward—is more responsible for our present difficulties. This sounds glib in theory but the reader might like to imagine him or herself in charge of a bunch of adolescents who have literally never done a day's work in their lives, work of any kind. We are not clear whether our schools have initiated this drift or whether they are willy-nilly part of it. We can hardly ascribe all the ills of our society to our child-centred Primary schools, which are not everywhere the norm, and so it must be partially a case of *post hoc* not *propter hoc*.

Faced with all these and many more conflicting problems the liberal intellectual who continues to try and discover the truth about education today will probably end up like one of Malcolm Bradbury's heroes full of 'anguished independent critical doubt'[3]. He ought however to try to disentangle the conflicting aims often embodied loosely in vaguely progressive ideology. One of the main conflicts is between freedom and equality. There is a great deal of talk about 'fulfilment'—that all children should be led to reach their full potential as human beings, so that their lives thereby become richer as they achieve their personal flowering. This noble ideal provides teachers, especially teachers of English, with a rationale if not a syllabus. The maximum development of personality thesis has unfortunately an unspecified end since no-one knows what potentials are to be developed. What about the blossoming of a psychopathic potential? It leaves the door wide open to the individual teacher in a way that would not be possible

for example for teachers in France who are not encouraged to insert their own ends in the blank space of 'objective to be reached.' Must we in England admit that the freedom to flower is the freedom to grow into a weed if you are one? So much for 'equality'! The theory of equality (sometimes muffled towards equality of opportunity) is a political notion if it is anything since it is obvious that children's minds like the minds of adults are manifestly not equal. We can uphold the equality thesis only if we discount the cognitive criteria for schooling. Well and good but let us not pretend that we then know what to do in schools. The equality thesis is also in conflict with the 'blossoming' thesis and is responsible for most of the drive towards unstreaming within the neighbourhood school, mixed ability teaching and the decline of academic 'subject teaching'. At the moment an uneasy compromise is reached whereby there is a sudden rush to O Level groups at the end of the third and sometimes fourth year of common schooling when standards must suddenly be raised for the more intelligent (or gifted or motivated or whatever the current euphemism is). Egalitarianism is also responsible for a sceptical or hostile attitude towards examinations which are still needed in England since we do not yet have and are not likely to have mass higher education.

When we read that a four-year study conducted by the USA Office[4] of Education shows that 20% of Americans are 'functionally illiterate' in the society which has made more provision for education than any other in the world and that about half of the US population is 'not proficient in necessary skills and knowledge' it is ironic to see the urgent need which British socialists have to believe in the common school. How, we may wonder, does this compare with the Soviet Union where an authoritarian ideology with sanctions against laziness and anti-social behaviour operates in the school system? When we read of the possible horrific future awaiting us on the globe—(disintegrating urban life, noise, pollution, diminishing privacy, the nuclear menace, over-population, waste, mental illness, breakdown of authority, terrorism, starvation . . .) we may wonder what on earth we could do to prepare for the future, never mind make the best of the present. Many conservative educationalists would rely on the simple induction into skills which at least carry with them basic attitudes to work and survival. Concepts of freedom and equality might then be seen as luxuries marginal to the struggle for survival. This is, however, cold comfort for the present. The question at present is how to achieve even the modest aim of producing pleasant 'integrated' people, able to rub along with each other doing their modest academic best, aware of the complexities of the world able to imagine the needs of others and committed to the adventure of living—which is what I take modern school curricula to be about. These ideals seem to be achieved in our society by unique individuals who are perhaps little influenced by their schooling. (They are more likely to have been influenced by their families!) In any case I see no evidence that these admirable qualities cannot co-exist with a full commitment to the values of independent enquiry and in short to the knowledge criterion. Schools of course would be very pleased to produce this sort of person and schools are also pleased to have good exam. results since the feeling that they

should be accountable to society, i.e. the people who pay for them, is growing. On the other hand Heads without many bright children are often heard decrying 'academic' values saying we need rounded human beings not masterminds with good memories and quick mental reflexes. Of course we want the latter but the two successful outcomes are surely not mutually exclusive! The poverty of vocabulary, the mindless addiction to inferior music and mass-produced tat, stock-responses, stupid prejudices and soccer hooliganism cannot wholly be laid at the door of the fashion trade and the media. It is noted by George Ewart Evans,[5] the 'oral historian', how much more colourful and individual is the language of very old country people than that of the younger people from less settled communities even though those are 'educated'. His old men and women are not good at abstract thought—most people are not—but they evince true feeling in a racy turn of phrase. So we cannot blame the new generations pouring out of their educational factories for not appearing 'fully human', cannot blame them for the loss of something taken away by industrialisation and the disappearance of settled communities. Teachers of English try to recover the very values, feelings and apprehensions which the oldest generations now alive had naturally. Good luck to them but what has this to do with compulsory secondary education up to the age of sixteen? Teachers do not know whether to prepare their charges for boring work by teaching the old virtues of patience and inner serenity, whether to indulge the children at school to make up for the boring work to follow, or whether to prepare them for 'creative' use of their leisure.

What I feel should be made clear, whether we are dealing with traditional 'subject teaching' or not is that the crisis in schools is not methodological. Good teachers have always achieved success by a variety of methods —what matters is that they believe in them. Many 'conservative' educationalists would see the rot setting in with what they are pleased to call 'play way' or with for example the oral-aural teaching of languages or with ignorance of the multiplication tables. No, although bad teachers may be even worse when they try to be 'free', the crisis is one of ends, not means. The majority of children see no purpose to their education beyond learning some basic skills (which of course are at present far from being acquired by all). The crisis of ends is also one of authority, not only of social authority but part of the crisis of relativism versus absolute values which in a sophisticated form is at present raging in the sociology of knowledge. This leads to uneasy relations between teacher and taught, neither quite knowing what his role is, quite apart from how to play it.

The traditionalists are not the only people with a yen for the absolute. We even have the spectacle of Christianity being invoked in favour of comprehensive schools which should have caused a good deal of soul searching. No good Catholic could believe in selection by academic ability was the gist of one widely quoted headmaster's remark. As Christianity has been invoked in past centuries on behalf of quite other points of view, it is perhaps better not to invoke it at all. The Christian umbrella covers many social attitudes.

In the general confusion which I have tried to describe, it is not surprising that certain topics are perennial and often lumped together and blanket solutions proposed which will for example reduce vandalism *and* make learning interesting, teach children of different social mores to love one another *and* increase the level of O Level passes. Teachers in present-day unselective schools find it difficult enough to be 'a person the kids can relate to' *and* a successful instigator of difficult processes of thought. Techniques which worked on the whole in Grammar schools are manifestly not workable in comprehensive schools of the Seventies. Ex-progressive often end up wishing human beings were different, that society was different, that adolescents were less free, less well-off or less addicted to an easy hedonism to which it is beyond the schools to offer an enticing alternative. What is most objected to by teachers is what is seen as the wilful refusal of progressive educationists and politicians to recognise facts, admit the difficulties and set limits to the aspirations of the schools. It is not that they object to children being treated in a friendly fashion but that they see that this is not an end, only a means to an unspecified objective.

It has been obvious for some time that opinions about education have taken on the tinge and fervour of the religious debates of the last century. The educational process has become a matter of faith and faith leads to dogma. Except that ye believe in unstreamed schools, mixed ability classes, integrated curricula, the rejection of 'middle class' values and the pursuit of happiness ye shall not be saved. More important, ye shall not be taken seriously. Many people would very much like to believe in some of this at any rate. Honest doubt is never easy and to stand out for the evidence of one's own eyes and ears seems curiously naïve. It is not a very rational debate nor one that gives much hope that any-one will ever change his mind after considering the evidence, Then the debate has became politically polarised—indeed comprehensive schools seem to be about the only item upon which the warring factions of the Left can agree! In a recent TV interview Harold Wilson was asked by David Frost about his views on education in connection with equality and could think only of the apocryphal lad who failed the eleven plus but went along to the local comp. and thence to university where of course he got a First. The Prime Minister obviously approved of Firsts but signally failed to recognise that the concern is not about *these* children but about the large numbers of adolescents on the one hand who are unwilling scholars and who have inherited a watered down academic syllabus suitable for about 15% of the population—and also about the concern felt by the parents of those 15% who will no longer have the chance of education on the 'knowledge criterion' unless they can pay for it. There is a deep division in the comprehensive schools themselves between those who ape the grammar schools and those who have scrapped the old criteria. Obviously the motivated parents will do their damndest to see that their children go to the former type not wishing to hold off the acquisition of basic skills till the advent of Higher education. A few middle-class progressives will try the other sort first until they realise their children are not going to get any O levels at which time they will be removed. Those who will suffer will be the talented working-class

children who chose the wrong parents. We have then a breakdown of consensus about the content of education (fashionably named curriculum theory) which mysteriously becomes a consensus again when children reach sixteen. Like clerics in a communist society, teachers hover in the wings until such time as the converted ask to be educated. Until then the teachers are uncertain of their claims to authority and the children are uncertain as to how far they are obliged to do any work at school. Our liberal society has very few sanctions.

Interwoven into all this is the heredity/environment, nature/nurture controversy which is then subtly used to prove that the 'working class' has the dice so heavily loaded against it that in our 'class ridden society' no working class child could possibly succeed. The fact that we have had a meritocracy where working class children have succeeded in large numbers seems to conflict somewhat with the preceding thesis. Unless of course we are to have a future society which no longer depends on or needs skills. Ability to think and a will to work have manifestly not been confined to the middle class and must play a powerful part in the 'success' of working class children in a 'capitalist' society. If however the conditions for learning are abysmal and our society's opportunities and needs do not fundamentally change it *will* be more difficult for the poor child to succeed. Reformers seem to have wanted to prepare children for a non-existent society—or perhaps they hope that by changing schools they will have gone some way to altering the direction of society? The dancer is part of the dance, If academic standards decline in the non-selective state sector it will be stated by the reformers that either a) academic standards are not everything and we are in the business to promote 'morality' or 'maturity'; or b) the examinations themselves will be altered—a euphemism for lowering the distinction mark and pass mark so that more children will appear to pass. Something like this has already happened in the O Level exam, where the lowest two grades actually mean failure but this is only in small print and ambiguously stated on the back of the result slip.

The imposition of a combined O level/CSE and then of a CSE/A level would help the academic decline. Obviously all these policies are egalitarian and equate the quality of learning with its distribution, equate the progress of the individual with a statistical 'truth'. One cannot conceive of a Soviet educationalist (and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*[6] recently gave a page to Eysenck's theories!) agreeing with either the theory or muddle-headed practice of increasing numbers of bright ideas emanating from our own 'left wing'. How far marks are given in the Soviet Union for 'virtue', compulsory knowledge of Marxist-Leninism, is of course another matter. It is better to be free but how do we show what 'freedom' is to children who resent the slightest encroachment on their individual appetites? Should we continue to regard education as the secular church with its optimistic belief in the resolution of problems by airing them? Certainly if we do not safeguard our own academic freedom and intellectual integrity we shall lay ourselves open to the threat of a totalitarian society which has little sympathy for fashionable anarchy in education as in anything else.

Those who have shifted our secondary school system towards 'reform' have not on the whole been working class or lower middle class parents (who are either strongly aspirant or strongly uninterested.) Apart from the politically motivated the largest section of parents in favour of the old eleven plus disappearing were the middle class parents who were no longer able after the 1944 Act to pay for a grammar school place and whose children were not likely to pass it! The parallel confusion between secondary education for all and a system where all are expected to profit equally from an unselective school led in less than thirty years from allowing children to leave school at fourteen to forcing all adolescents to stay on at school for longer or as long as the average grammar school boy or girl stayed in the forties. The majority of grammar school children did not themselves stay on to the sixth form. If the school is no longer a challenge to the average child and it is possible to drift through the statutory years without much effort it would seem that little has been achieved for the average child, much has been lost for the brighter than average, and nothing gained for the dull—except an eternal resentment and a quick departure to unskilled labour, any of course being available.

If we try to be more optimistic and point to the undoubted successes of some of our new schools by taking the wider view and saying that education must be concerned with 'development of the imagination' (perhaps through art, music and drama) it is still the case that it is as difficult to be truly creative in a chaotic atmosphere as in a repressive one. The sheer physical fatigue and nervous tension felt by many teachers in very large schools has to be experienced to be believed; it takes every member of staff's time and ingenuity to begin to organise and control minimally before teaching or learning can begin. There are of course many ways in which the remaining grammar schools could be 'liberalised' but the work ethos is central to them and I believe not to be despised, If the same need for work could be stressed in many state secondary schools and if society were to provide sanctions so that this could be put into practice without disruption there would be hope for the future. The development of the imagination partly depends upon the ability to achieve self-discipline. Good feeling and good thinking must not be regarded as separate entities. Putting this into practice is very difficult. Perhaps it always has been. Perhaps we expect too much from our schools and perhaps my pessimism will be confounded by some unknown quantity arriving on the scene—perhaps a revolution in favour of knowledge—leading to wisdom on the part of the pupils themselves. The Secular Church may spawn a new schism from within the ranks of its parishioners!

Notes:

[1] Matthew Arnold *A French Eton, or Middle Class Education and the State.* 1864.

[2] *Observer.* Nov. 16th, 1975.

[3] *Times Higher Education Supplement* on Malcolm Bradbury's novel *The History Man.* Nov. 14th, 1975.

[4] *The Times Educational Supplement*, Dec. 1975.
[5] George Ewart Evans: *The Days That We Have Seen.* Faber. 1975
[5] Nov. 12th, 1975.

[Mrs. June Wedgwood Benn has taught in both grammar and comprehensive schools. She is at present lecturing in a College of Education and is a member of the Governing Body of the London School of Economics. A graduate of Somerville College, Oxford, she has translated Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique du progres de l'esprit humain* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson) and is the author of an anthology called *The Woman's View* (Routledge) as well as of articles and broadcast talks on education.]

The May issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Anglo-Soviet Relations: The Individual Aspect* by Sir Duncan Wilson, *The EEC's Attack on Poverty* by Helen Tobert, and *New Zealand After the Elections: Part Two* by Juliet Lodge.

THE NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION OF 1975 (Part One)

by Juliet Lodge

IN 1972, after twelve years of National Party government, a Labour Government led by Norman Kirk was elected to office on a 4.4% swing enabling it to win 14 seats from National. However, like the previous 1957-1960 Labour administration, this Labour Government too was to be restricted to one term in office. At 10 p.m. on 29th November, 1975, the Prime Minister Mr. Bill Rowling conceded defeat to the man who was to become New Zealand's fifth Prime Minister in as many years, Mr. Robert Muldoon, Leader of the Opposition.

During the months immediately preceding the election a definite but not unexpected swing to National was detected with the size of the swing fluctuating between 13% in September and 2% in early November. As in 1972, almost a quarter of eligible voters remained undecided and an abstention rate of 11%-12% was again expected. Although it was clear that a uniform nation-wide swing of 3.5% would return a National Government in 1975, and despite the fact that the Labour Party expected to lose some votes and seats, the magnitude of the swing against Labour had not been anticipated. Instead, feeling was that the election would be a close-run contest with one or other of the two major parties gaining office on the rather slender majorities of their overseas counterparts in Britain and Australia (prior, that is, to the December 1975 election). Mr. Muldoon announced that he would be willing to form a government if his party had a majority of only three—gaining 45 of the 87 seats being contested.

From the first computer predictions based on partial counts of selected polling booths in key seats, it became apparent that if the trend towards National were nation-wide, Mr. Muldoon could expect to take office with a majority of 12 seats. Once the counting of special votes (postal and overseas votes) had been completed, it was clear that not only had the National Party reversed Labour's 22 seat majority by winning 55 seats, but that it had also captured safe seats vulnerable only in the event of a swing to National of more than 10%. The average nation-wide two-party swing to National was 8.4% but a good deal higher both in marginal and safe Labour seats. In the safe Labour seat of Henderson, for instance, a swing of 16% against Labour was recorded and the Labour candidate's majority was greatly reduced. Labour majorities were also cut in the four traditionally Labour Maori seats; the Prime Minister's majority fell from 1,834 to 719 in a seat vulnerable to a 6.8% swing, and several Cabinet Ministers lost their seats including the Minister of Social Welfare, Mr. King, who had held his seat for more than twenty years; the Minister of Health, Mr. McGuigan, who lost his seat on a 9.5% swing to one of National's two women members; the Minister of Education, Mr. Amos, who lost his seat to a schoolteacher; and the Minister of Overseas Trade, Mr. Walding,

whose 1972 majority of 1,766 fell first to 68 and then disappeared following a recount and counting of special votes. Two Maori members were elected for the first time in non-Maori seats.[1]

The National Party's share of votes cast in 1975 rose from 41.45% in 1972 to 47.70% whilst Labour's share of the vote fell from 48.48% to 39.50%. The two most important minor parties also increased their share of the vote with the Social Credit Political League rising from 6.7% in 1972 to 7.5%, and the Values Party from 1.84% to 5%. Many candidates representing a variety of different political persuasions and owing allegiance to one of the other 26 minor 'parties' contesting the election lost their deposits, having failed to gain 25% of votes cast in the seat they were contesting; and in many cases failing to muster more than a handful of votes. Polling figures for such groups were of this order: Imperial British Conservative candidate standing in Christchurch, 32 votes; Feminist (Island Bay) 25; Progressive Kiwi (Wellington) 10; Alpha (Awarua) 4.

Although voting turnout was down from 81.3% in 1972 to 75.5%, the number of votes cast rose from 1,284,285 to 1,468,559. However, the newly eligible 18 year old voters do not appear to have had the impact on the distribution of votes for the two major parties that many expected they would have: the 'youth vote' did not, in fact, benefit the Labour Party. Where younger voters have not followed the political preferences of their parents, they seem to have given their support to the Values Party rather than to either of the two major parties or the established 'third' party: Social Credit. This is not surprising since the Values Party support base is strongest among 18-24 year olds, and the party itself exudes a vigour and social awareness which seemed to be obfuscated, rather than lacking, in the major parties. Moreover, Values campaigned on social and environmental issues appealing to idealists in the electorate. In addition, it also gained the support of those disillusioned with the major parties and seeking an outlet for a 'protest' vote. Somewhat paradoxically perhaps, those who might have been expected to have a high sense of political efficacy voted for a party that returned no candidates to Parliament. This might be explained either by the 'protest vote' hypothesis, or by the fact that it is conceivable that those with a high sense of personal political efficacy better appreciate the potential role of an extra-parliamentary political force and expect the effectiveness of such a force to increase according to its numerical strength. The leader of the party stressed that only if its support base increased significantly could it expect the major parties to take account of its views on environmental and social issues, and therefore advised people that a vote for Values would not be a wasted vote suggesting that if voters generally agreed with Values policies but felt unwilling to vote for a third party, they should vote Labour.

Having initially decided to restrict the campaign to three weeks, the Labour Party later reversed this decision in favour of a longer campaign. This provoked speculation that on the one hand Labour Party morale was low and the confidence of the Party waning, and on the other hand that Labour needed more time to convince voters of its superiority and would

gain a tactical advantage by changing the duration of the campaign especially if the National Party were ill-prepared for a lengthier campaign. Mr. Rowling, however, kept his official campaign to three weeks, opening it on November 11, with the announcement of a family bonus scheme costing the country $30 million.[2] It was construed as an election bribe and an attempt to divert attention from more pressing issues like housing. From the inception of the campaign there was a good deal of acrimonious debate over the relative merits of both policies and the personalities of the major parties' leaders. This effectively deflected public attention from issues, inviting it instead to scrutinise the personal attributes of Mr. Rowling and Mr. Muldoon in order to ascertain who would be the most desirable Prime Minister.

Mr. Muldoon was portrayed by his opponents as a tough right-winger with authoritarian proclivities. Mr. Rowling, on the other hand, was characterised as a flexible and reasonable man; a man who would assume the role of *primus inter pares* without being tempted to play a dominant role in Cabinet. Although the media made much of the personalities of both men, neither Party leader condoned the emphasis on personalities rather than policies. Indeed, rather like the German Social Democratic Party in 1961, the New Zealand Labour Party stressed a team image, stamping fly-sheets and pamphlets with the slogan: LABOUR—the only Party with a team people can trust. The aim had been to focus attention on the cooperative spirit of Labour Ministers but this approach was unconvincing since, although there had been few jurisdictional disputes among Labour Ministers, there had been some friction, and some team members were considered weaker than others. Moreover, the team was ill-equipped to compete against the charismatic leader of the Opposition. As this became increasingly apparent, a group of influential public figures and clergymen formed pro-Rowling groups. Again, the overall effect of these groups was to detract attention from policies.

The first pro-Rowling group to form was the *Citizens for Rowling* association, among whose membership numbered Sir Edmund Hillary, Bishop Reeves, Sir Jack Harris, Walter J. Scott and many well-known and respected public figures and academics. *Citizens for Rowling* was convened by David Exel, one of New Zealand's best-known journalists and broadcasters. His involvement with the group led to his prompt exclusion from commentating on the election lest he fail to observe impartiality in reporting. However, his statement in the brochure produced by *Citizens for Rowling* was typical of those of his colleagues.

The thesis of the brochure was that whereas Sir Keith Holyoake, Sir John Marshall (both former National Prime Ministers), Bill Rowling, and the late Norman Kirk, were consensus-promoting and tolerant leaders, Mr. Muldoon's style of leadership would be less so: unlike the 'restrained, rather unexciting but cool-headed Mr. Rowling,' Mr. Muldoon was authoritarian rather than authoritative and his leadership could be expected to be 'too autocratic and individualistic for any society in the modern world.' It was alleged that Mr. Muldoon would be too willing to resort to 'confrontational

tactics' as he was 'altogether too aggressive, too inclined to go in for the lowest common denominator of public taste, too ready to appeal to prejudice, and too conscious of his own place in history to be capable of maintaining a cooperative industrial and political climate.' Mr. Muldoon's personal campaign was criticised, and the comparatively large attendance at his public meetings condemned as introducing elements into New Zealand politics 'outside the New Zealand political tradition': the question being posed: 'Wouldn't you be worried about the mass meetings, the surging Messiah touch?' The imagery of Muldoon as demagogue permeated the brochure with it being suggested by Mr. Exel that New Zealand had 'never before . . . faced a clearer choice betwen responsible government and demagoguery. . . . It happened in the United States during the era of Senator Joe McCarthy, it happened in Germany in the 1930s. I used to believe it would not happen in New Zealand. Now I am not so sure.'[3]

The second group urging the public to elect Mr. Rowling comprised 42 clergymen. Inevitably, the formation of the multi-denominational *Clergymen for Rowling* group aroused public debate over the role of the Church in society and ran along familiar lines: those in favour of the group supporting it with vague references to Nazi Germany; those opposing it calling for the impartiality of the Church.

Whether or not either of these groups did influence electors is a moot point. The only tangible effect they produced was Sir Keith Holyoake's suggestion to the public that citizens send telegrams of support to Mr. Muldoon. Given the fact that voters tend to opt for 'strong leaders' in times of economic uncertainty, it is perhaps not surprising that Mr. Muldoon's appeal was the greater. The dilemma for the Labour Party now is akin to that of the German Christian Democrats in that both recognise the necessity of confronting a charismatic figure with a similarly flamboyant man. Whether Mr. Rowling will be considered the right man to oppose Mr. Muldoon in 1978 remains to be seen.

Despite the highly personalised nature of the campaign, numerous issues were raised, although it cannot be asserted that the election was fought and won over one in particular. Throughout the campaign, the National Party stressed economic questions and 'the economy' was its opening issue in its Manifesto. The Labour Party appeared to have some difficulty in clearly isolating what it perceived to be New Zealand's most pressing problems and its copious, typographically uninspired, black manifesto underlined this impression as well as contrasting unfavourably with the thinner National manifesto, and the thick, but very glossy, colourful and attractive manifesto of the Values Party. Only the conservative and unimaginative manifesto of Social Credit compared unfavourably with that of Labour.

The general theme of the Opposition's campaign was the classic one of 'economic mismanagement.' The Government's policy of overseas borrowing, which Labour argued held down unemployment and inflation, was condemned as permitting New Zealanders to 'live beyond their means' when restraint was necessary, especially since the balance of payments deficit

was estimated at NZ$1,800 million. Arguments that Labour was mortgaging New Zealand's future economically (National) and environmentally (Values) seemed not entirely unfounded. While the Opposition's election theme was broadly concerned with economic questions, it was the social implications of the Labour Government's policies that aroused public interest during the later stages of the campaign. This was both paradoxical and interesting. It was paradoxical in that opinion polls in preceding months had consistently showed 'the economy' and 'inflation' to be the most pressing concerns of voters. It was interesting since it meant that attention was once again diverted from an area in which the Labour Government prided itself on its record not least because it had managed to keep unemployment to below one per cent. It also meant that less time was spent discussing crucial economic issues. The Opposition did not advance major alternative economic policies and, apart from emphasising the need to reduce overseas borrowing, seemed unwilling to attack the specifics of Government policy in this sector. The Government had therefore less opportunity of convincing the public of the success of its economic policies as it became engaged in a defence of its social policies and plans. Again, it adopted a rather negative, defensive stance and again failed, despite its achievements in this area, to impress the public.

The election campaign crystallised around issues which, with the exception of health, housing and universal superannuation, had been non-issues throughout the Government's term of office. This observation applies in particular to moral issues which provoked a good deal of heated public debate and especially to reform of New Zealand's comparatively outmoded homosexual and abortion laws. Both major parties had been unwilling to commit themselves one way or the other on these issues, and only the Values Party unequivocally undertook to 'recognise the right to freedom of conscience on abortion.' Government statements were more circumspect as Ministers awaited the report of the Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion which the Labour Government had established. Despite the contentiousness of the so-called Hospitals Amendment Act (a Private Member's Bill designed to make abortions less readily obtainable), retrial of a doctor shortly before the election on illegal abortion charges (on which he was acquitted), and feeling that the National Party would adopt a less permissive attitude on abortion than Labour Party members (a feeling subsequently justified when it was announced by the new Government that the area would be subjected to close scrutiny), moral issues in general had little impact on the election outcome.

[Juliet Lodge is lecturer in politics at the University of Auckland. Part two of The New Zealand General Election of 1975 will be published in the May issue and will include note references.]

TWO MAJOR EXHIBITIONS IN LONDON

by Ernle Money

1. **MILLET.** The Hayward Gallery.

IN 1969 a previous but much smaller exhibition than this was held at the Wildenstein Gallery in London. In the same year, writing in the foreword to the catalogue of another loan exhibition at the same gallery, French Painting from the Mesdag Museum in The Hague, Mr. Denys Sutton wrote: 'Of all the great nineteenth-century artists, Millet is the one who most requires revaluation, especially as in his lifetime he enjoyed such world-wide fame.'

As so often, Mr. Sutton was right. It is satisfying, therefore, that just such an opportunity for reappraisal has presented itself in the shape of the present exhibition, which was mounted in Paris to mark the centenary last year of the painter's death and now is to be seen in London this spring. This is certainly comprehensive enough in scope to give us a chance to look at Millet in depth, since it contains one hundred and fifty of his works (oil paintings, pastels, drawings and watercolours) which have been brought together from a wide variety of sources in a way that is not likely to be repeated for some time. These cover the whole of his career and include many of his best known pictures such as *The Angelus, The Gleaners, The Man with a Hoe* and no less than two versions of *The Sowers*. both from American collections. The selection also includes a good deal of his work that will be unfamiliar to most people in this country, although some of the things in it were seen at the Wildenstein in 1969. Inevitably, from an *oeuvre* of over 500 oils and 3,000 other pictures, there are some which it has not been possible to include, such as the delightful early portrait of his first wife from the Musée Thomas Henry at Cherbourg (another version of which was at the Wildenstein), *Agar and Ismael* in the Mesdag Collection, and the Burrell Collection's *Shepherdess Resting* which one would like to have seen but it is, nevertheless, a highly imaginative selection.

What are we, then, to make of Millet? That he was an immensely accomplished painter and a consummate draughtsman no one who visits this exhibition could deny. Over the course of the years his stock has gone up and down violently, both in terms of critical opinion and of public appraisal. In 1859 he sold his most famous picture, *The Angelus,* for the equivalent of £72, yet by the 1880s and 1890s he was to be one of the most popular artists in terms of the international market. Baudelaire, who saw Constantin Guys as the Painter of Modern Life, did not greatly care for Millet's work. Gautier denounced *The Man with the Hoe* expressively when it was shown in the Salon of 1863, but as Linda Nochlin puts it in her recent book on *Realism,* 'it later became one of the best-known works in the history of art, immortalised by Edwin Monkham's verses in 1899, and adored by many who were otherwise ignorant of artistic matters'. As early as 1848 Ledru-Rollin, the Minister of the Interior of the Republican government, com-

missioned a work from Millet, who painted the *Agar and Ismael,* now in The Hague, for this commission. According to his friend and biographer Sensier, the artist substituted *The Winnowers'* which is in the Louvre, for this when he heard someone say in connection with one of his pictures that was on show in the window of the dealer Deforge that he considered him *'un spécialiste attiré de la gorge et du fessier. Il ne chante pas d'autre chanson que celle-là.'*

Although Millet was in fact an accomplished painter of the nude, the fact that he was attracted by a good deal more than just bosoms and bottoms is proved by the range of subjects in the present exhibition. The width of that range is a good deal wider than most writers on him have been willing to allow for. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, encouraged by the popularity and multiplicity of engravings of *The Angelus,* which hung in pious homes all over Europe and America, his reputation as an artist became one for sentimentality, moral uplift and bucolic propriety and platitude. Conversely, others have tried to type cast him for their own particular brand of Socialism or Social Realism. As Professor Bodkin has expressed it: 'Writers have never been wanting to read all sorts of propaganda into his work.' Millet himself would have none of this. 'In what club,' he said, 'have my critics ever encountered me? A Socialist, they cry! Well, really I might answer the charge as the Commissary from Auvergne did when he wrote home: "They have been saying that I am a Saint-Simonite: it's not true; I don't even know what a Saint-Simonite is." ' And he indignantly refused proferred membership of the Commune's *Fédération des artistes* in 1871.

Even today it is hard to disentangle him entirely from the claims of the didactic and the devout. So perceptive a critic as Mrs. Nochlin can write, of *The Gleaners,* that his composition in this picture 'implies something beyond the fact of specific nineteenth-century peasants performing a routine task—an extremely low one even by farm-labour standards—and conveys a comforting suggestion of the timeless, quasi-religious, validity and moral beauty of labour in general.' Even Professor Bodkin himself went on to say, of *The Man with a Hoe,* in equally sententious terms, 'this picture is, undoubtedly, something more than superb decoration, more even than marvellously observant representation. It illustrates with vehement force the saying: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return into the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." '

As Mr. Nigel Gosling pointed out in a recent article, we need to accept him as a religious force without piety and a social force without political belief. As he himself said, 'it is the human side, the frankly human side which touches me most in art,' but he had a reputation, as Mr. Denys Sutton says, of being known 'as rather a bear, distinctly stand-offish in fact' among his neighbours, the peasants at Barbizon. Before Millet is submerged in a flood of transcendental values, it is certainly time, as Mr. Sutton suggested, to have another look at him as a painter.

He was amazingly in advance of his time. Although his contemporaries and friends were such figures as Courbet, Daumier and the Barbizon painters, his work anticipates the achievements of the Impressionists, Monet, Seurat, Gaugin and Van Gogh in particular. His landscapes, particularly the sea pieces like the *Cliffs at Gruchy* (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) or the *Cliffs at Gréville* (Buffalo Art Gallery) painted near his childhood home in Normandy, show a remarkable affinity for Monet, as does the extraordinary *Pasturage in the mountains of the Auvergne* (Art Institute of Chicago). Drawings like the exquisite *Le Lieu Bailly*, from the Ashmolean and *Monaux, near Mont Dore*, from the Louvre, have a great deal in common with Cezanne.

As a far cry from the low-keyed colouring of his earlier scenes of moral life or 'epic naturalism' the vivid colouring of some of his later portraits such as *The Vineyard Worker* (Mesdag Collection) and *The Goat Girl of the Auvergne* (The Louvre) are remarkably close to Renoir. It would be very much easier if we were able to treat him in fact as an Impressionist, but this, even in historical terms, he certainly is not. If we compare, however, the fine winter scene called *Solitude* (*La porte aux vaches par la neige*) (Philadelphia Museum), painted in 1853 with the work of the Russian artists who painted later in the century which was seen recently in London, it is easy to realise just how far ahead of his time (and of Théodore Rousseau and his other Barbizon neighbours) Millet was, particularly in terms of his treatment of space, colour and atmosphere. Look, for example, at the black crayon drawing *Lobstermen Throwing their Pots* (The Louvre) of about 1857-60 or the *Fishing Boat at Cherbourg* (Boston) a late picture of 1871 and then look at Edouard Manet's *The Escape of Rochefort* in the Kunsthaus, Zurich, which was painted as late as 1880-81, It is certainly not Millet who appears dated in that comparison of similar type scenes.

He covered, it is true, an immense range of subject-matter as well as a wide variety of technique. Although they are still by far his best known works, one increasingly feels that his earlier scenes of rural life, despite their obvious and immediate qualities, are only a step on the way to the broader more fluid work of his later years. Take, for example, the immensely vivid *Flighting Wild Pigeon with Torches* (Philadelphia Museum) and the four magnificent *Seasons* pictures, assembled in the exhibition from Paris, Boston New York and Cardiff respectively.

It is worth spending some time at the Hayward Gallery comparing these four pictures alone, apart from the rest of Millet's work. As an experience it is similar in a way to the comparison of the Monet's various views of the Thames in the same gallery's recent exhibition *The Impressionists in London*. But the *Seasons* are amazingly different, even among themselves, separate in character and even in their technical approach. *Spring* (The Louvre) has a vividness of colour and an accuracy of detail that brings to mind almost Ford Madox Brown or another of the Pre-Raphaelites. *Winter, the Faggot Gatherers* (Davies Collection, National Museum of Wales) can only remind us of Daumier.

Although he is always an individualist—and how much of one this exhibition makes clear—Millet was an artist who was also strongly conscious of his roots in the great tradition and of the work of other artists. His early study of masterpieces in the Louvre in about 1837-39 may well have been responsible for this. He painted only a few still lives, two of which, a *Still Life with Leeks* (Mesdag Collection) and *Still Life with Turnips* (National Museum, Algiers) are in the exhibition, but when he did these are worthy to stand beside Chardin. The American artist W. H. Low recounts that Millet appeared to be prouder of a small still-life of pears that he showed him than of anything else he had painted. 'Some subjects,' Millet told him, 'are more interesting in the sense that they add to the problems of a painter. When he has to paint a human being, he has to represent truth of action, the particular character of an individual; but he must do the latter when he paints a pear. No two pears are alike.' Of colour, he said, 'the point is to know where to find truffles.' The dignity and simplicity of his peasant interiors may remind us of the Dutch painters but suddenly when we come on a dazzling work like *The Young Shepherdess Seated* (Boston) we find in this all the charm and delicate colour of a painting by a French eighteenth-century master. When it came to landscape, Millet acknowledged Poussin as the major force—'I could spend my life with the work of Poussin and still not be satisfied.' But he also, unusually for the period, bought himself a picture by El Greco, the *San Idelfonso,* now in the National Gallery, Washington. Interestingly enough, this was subsequently sold to Degas, who also owned several of Millet's drawings. Despite the curiously varied manifestations of his subsequent reputation, it would be right to see Millet above all as a painter's painter.

He is a great painter, certainly, and a major of somewhat solitary voice in the history of nineteenth-century art. Just as he has proved a dangerous artist to try to interpret other than in his own terms, so the work of his imitators shows that he is an equally difficult artist to copy. Like Braque, he had an immense feeling for the craftsmanship of his art.

It is a pity that this exhibition was only here for a comparatively short time (22 January-7 March 1976) since to appreciate Millet at his real stature we need to know and study a good deal more about him. But the pleasure of it has been greatly enhanced by the excellent and very full catalogue of Professor Robert Lehmann of Yale University which will remain of permanent value as a work of reference. Incidentally, I hope that someone at the Arts Council is giving serious thought to how to keep down the price of catalogues for exhibitions such as this so that students and ordinary visitors will be able to continue to afford to buy *and keep* these). No one who has seen this exhibition will, I think, be inclined again to sneer at Millet as the painter of *The Angelus,* but nor will they be inclined to underestimate *The Angelus* itself.

2. **THE GOLDEN AGE OF SPANISH PAINTING.** Royal Academy of Arts.

The Royal Academy has had bad luck in recent years with its winter

exhibitions. Although there have been some exceptional exhibitions at Burlington House in the last couple of decades—one thinks in particular of the shows of Portuguese and Polish Art, of French Art of the Eighteenth Century, of European Art in the same period and of Goya and his times—during the last few years they have not been inclined to hit the jackpot either, on the whole, financially or aesthetically.

A good deal of stock, therefore, was placed by this winter's exhibition and as the late, much lamented Sir Thomas Monnington, the then PRA, said in his foreword to the catalogue, it was with delight and surprise that he received a telephone call from Professor Xavier de Salas, director of the Prado, telling him that a major historical exhibition of Spanish Art would at last be possible for London.

The last general exhibition of Spanish Art to be held at Burlington House was in 1920/21. (*Goya and His Times* was in 1964). In between times an interesting and important exhibition of Spanish Painting, from British collections, was held at the National Gallery, just after the war, in the spring of 1947. It was personally my first experience of Spanish pictures and I remember being absolutely bowled over by it.

Let me say, straight away, that I do not think that the present show of Spanish pictures of the Golden Age is nearly as bad as it has been made out to be in some circles. For an exhibition which, like Sir Thomas, we might be expected to greet with 'delight and surprise' it has got some substantial shortcomings, which I shall deal with in a moment. It is also capable of giving a great deal of pleasure and includes several paintings of very considerable quality which have not previously been available to the British public.

First, the bad news. There are currently on show at Burlington House some 88 pictures painted between approximately 1550 and 1700. Of these, five are by El Greco, a further six by or of the school of Velázquez and six are by Murillo. The remaining seventy-odd paintings are made up of a selection of work by Ribalta, Ribera, Zurbarán, Sánchez Coello, Pacheco, Maino, Carreño and other lesser artists. It is fair to say that the latter group contains a number of works of admirable merit.

The 'Golden Age' of Spanish Painting still, to a considerable extent, means in this country the work of Velázquez, El Greco and Murillo in that order and to a lesser degree that of Ribera and Zurbarán. Velázquez above all has come to be accepted as the greatest of Spanish artists and probably one of the five greatest painters, if not the greatest, that European art has ever produced. Like it or not, he was bound to be the star of this particular show.

When we come to the six canvases on view, from the considerable riches of the Prado and other Spanish institutions, they could by no means be considered as a typical example of the master at his best. It so happens that in this country we are by no means badly off for top quality pictures by Velázquez, though the ranks of these were sadly depleted only three years ago by the departure of the superb portrait of *Juan de Parega*, from Lord

Radnor's collection, for foreign shores. We have still got, however, at the National Gallery, among other works, the *Rokeby Venus*, the Christ after the *Flagellation*, and the 'Silver' *Philip IV*, at Apsley House the wonderful *Water-Carrier*, at the Wallace Collection, *The Lady with a Fan* and at the National Gallery of Scotland the splendid *An Old Woman Frying Eggs*, formerly in the Cook Collection, to name only a part. Apart from the *Lady with a Fan*, which for legal reasons could not be moved, all these pictures were included in the National Gallery exhibition in 1947. We are not therefore wholly inexperienced of the artist, although there are clearly many more masterpieces in Spain by him than there are in Britain.

Of the five pictures on loan to the exhibition by Velázquez, one, the head and shoulders portrait of the ageing *Philip IV* (Prado no. 1185), is a work of considerable importance from the last decade of the painter's life, of which Velázquez experts from Lázaro Díaz del Valle to Stevenson have written with great respect. Of the other four, the full-length portrait of *Conde-Duqne de Olivares*, from the Várez-Fisa Collection, Madrid, is possibly a school picture and was included in any case in the 1947 London exhibition, when it was in a British private collection, the *Doña Maria de Austria* is a small head and shoulders picture and by no means among the greatest which the artist painted, the *Infante Don Carlos* is a fine early 'black' Velázquez but would make more sense if it was accompanied by its companion portrait (Prado no. 1182) of his brother Philip IV as a young man and the other *Madre Jerónima de la Fuente Yáñez* (from the Fernán dez Araoz Collection, Madrid) is an early portrait (1620) of considerable interest, of which another version hangs in the Prado and which was re-established as an authentic work during the present century. All five pictures have interest but there is nothing here to send the viewer away overwhelmed as a previous generation were, for example, by the great Prado loan exhibition in Geneva in 1939.

If we turn to El Greco, there is one great *Annunciation*, lent by the Museo Balaguer, Villannera y Geitrú on deposit from the Prado, splendid paintings of *St. John the Evangelist* and St. Luke (to be matched against our own *St. Peter Repentant* in the Bowes Museum, Barnard Castle) from the Prado and Toledo Cathedral, a *Purification of the Temple*, from the Várez-Fisa Collection, which is similar in many respects to our own version on permanent view in the National Gallery in London, and a portrait of an unknown gentleman not greatly dissimilar in character to the *Portrait of a Bearded Man* lent to the 1947 London exhibition by Sir John Stirling-Maxwell. All these examples of the Cretan master's art will give great pleasure but they will not produce the sort of effect that would be given by, say, the *Burial of Count Orgaz* from Santo Tomé, Toledo or *The Crucifixion* and *The Resurrection* paintings in the Prado.

Murillo is comparatively well represented in British museums and there is nothing here which is particularly new so far as this artist's work is concerned, though the *Virgin and Child* from the Museo de Bellas Artes, Seville is a charming picture, badly in need of further cleaning, the *St. James*

of Alcolá Feeding the Poor is an interesting early work and the other paintings are all good examples of the Sevillian master at the formidable best of his maturity. Murillo was, in fact, the first of the Spanish masters to be recognised outside his own country, and as Professor Xavier de Salas reminds us in his foreword to the present catalogue, legislation had to be enacted there as early as the eighteenth century to prevent the excessive export of his works.

None of this is said to cavil at the generosity of the Spanish authorities, particularly those of the Relaciones Cultivales and the Patrimento Artistico y Cultural, and in particular the *Patronato* of the Prado, who made this exhibition possible. But it is obvious if the Royal Academy are looking for a cup run here rather than a local derby they will have to depend on more than these seventeen paintings by the major masters. Fortunately there is in fact a good deal more on offer and this is what, I believe, most people will remember the exhibition by, in particular the rediscovery for many of the real quality of Ribera and Zurbarán. Irritatingly, a good deal of the pre-publicity was centred on the inclusion of the picture of the *Bearded Woman from Naples* (Magdalena Ventura with her husband and son) (Tarera Hospital, Toledo) a 'one-off' item painted by Ribera to satisfy the curiosity of the Viceroy of Naples in 1631. Once we forget the strangeness of this offering there are other and infinitely more interesting pictures included by this strange Caraviaggesque painter. Perhaps the most startling work in the whole exhibition is the highly moving *Calvary,* lent by the Colegiata of Osuna, where it has recently been partially restored and recovered. This is an extraordinary work combining mannerism, the tenebrism of Caravaggio and Terbrugghen and the intensity and individuality of a Grünewald. The rhythmic feeling of the three figures grouped at the foot of the Cross and the braced effect of the crucified Christ himself give out an exceptionally touching impact. Better known by far but of a very different type is the *Penitent Magdalene,* one of Ribera's best known major works from the Prado. Ribera's master, Francisco Ribalta, is represented by a powerful and typical counter-reformation painting, *Christ Embracing St. Bernard,* from the Prado and a very different *St. Matthew* from the Museum in his own Valencia. Of the other earlier masters there is a gracious *Dolorosa,* Titianesque in effect, by Luis de Morales, from Toledo Cathedral, a good portrait of Don Carlos by Sánchez Coello (though not as fine as the one by the same artist of an unknown young man, probably Alessandro Founesse, in the National Gallery of Ireland), and an unusual *Immaculate Conception* by Pachace, *Velázquez's* father-in-law and master, who was one of the most interesting and civilised figures in the highly cultured city of Seville during the early sixteenth century. Juan Bantista Maino, half-Italian, half-Spaniard, one of the very few artists in the Spanish peninsula to work regularly in landscape, is represented by a pair of beautiful scenic pictures, with St. John the Baptist and St. John the Evangelist respectively, both from the Prado. The coming of the Baroque is exemplified by such artists as Francisco Herrera the elder, Alonso Cano, Juan Carreño de Miranda and Claudio Coello and the High Baroque by a colourful altar

piece by Francisco Herrera the younger. There is also a room full of the curious *bodegónes* pictures by Sánchez Cotáu, Juan Van Der Hamen y León and Tomás Yepes among others.: These still-lives, or tavern pictures, together with the *floreros,* even though they were sometimes painted by painters of Flemish origin, as the name Van der Hameu suggests, are as typically Spanish and as different from the to us more familiar still life pictures of the Netherlands or French schools as are, for example, the equally curious Alsatian still lives of Sebastian Stosskopf. Many of these pictures are very fine and were highly regarded by purchasers and even Velázquez and Zurbarán did not hesitate to paint them.

Zurbarán will be the other great attraction of the exhibition for many people. Writing of the painting by this artist at Seville of *St. Hugh of Grenoble Visiting the Refectory of the Carthusians.* Sir Sacheverell Sitwell says that he 'makes such play of loaves and peasant bread and mugs and plates of blue and white pottery that he invests them with the degree of delighted attention that they might evoke in someone just emerged from a costly water and fruit juice cure.' Here he is a living reminder that religion is a joyous as well as an intense experience, even in Spain. His *St. Catherine* and *St. Agnes* from the parish church of Bollullos de la Mitación in Seville almost dance off the wall with their delicacy and beauty of execution, his *Virgin as a Child* (Alvaro Gil Collection, Madrid) though a portrait of a real child, is already full of grace and favour, his *Immaculate Conception* (Prado) is a real bringing of good news to troubled earth and even in his portraits of ecclesiastics like *San Buenaventura* (Church of San Francisco el Grande, Madrid) and *Fray Jeronimo Pérez* (Real Academia de San Fernando, Madrid) have an intensity which is tempered by both love and gladness of heart.

THE SINKING OF THE S.S. PATRIA

by Donovan Young

THE 10,000-ton French liner Patria, with 2,000 illegal Jewish immigrants on board, sank in Haifa harbour on the morning of November 25th 1940, with the loss of 252 lives. The unfortunate immigrants were refugees from the Nazi terror in Europe. They had survived the dangerous voyage only to be refused admission to the National Home. The Patria was to have taken them into exile in Mauritius. She was to have sailed with her human cargo that afternoon. Shortly before nine o'clock a bomb, planted in her engine-room, intended to damage her engines and so prevent her departure, exploded and sank her. It was a foolhardy, ill-conceived plan which went tragically astray — an appalling tragedy that should never have happened.

When I arrived in Palestine in May, 1940, I came back to a country which I had known in the days of World War I. I had taken part in the pursuit of the Turks from Gaza to Jerusalem. Probably the most thrilling moment of my life was the surrender of the City to General Allenby in January, 1918, to be followed by the famous Balfour Declaration, proclaiming to the world that henceforth the Holy Land would be the National Home of the Jews. It was an unforgettable moment of history, which I still recall most vividly. The ideal of the National Home had appealed to me very strongly. In taking part in that campaign, I felt that, in some minute measure, I had helped to make the achievement of that ideal possible.

World War I had been over two years before I left the Holy Land. In those two years, Jews from all over the world flocked to the Holy Land and the National Home had become a living reality.

And so, in 1940, after a lapse of twenty years, I was back again in the Holy Land. It was to find the Jews desperately unhappy and frustrated. They had seen the door, which had been wide open for more than twenty years, slammed on immigration just at the moment when it most needed to be kept open. Jews in their thousands had taken refuge in the National Home from their Nazi oppressors in Europe. Thousands more were waiting to follow. Their hopes were now shattered.

The decision to halt immigration had been taken reluctantly by the British Administration in Palestine. It had been forced on them. The stepping up of Hitler's vicious campaign against the Jews had caused a marked acceleration in immigration. This, together with the big influx of troops from Britain, India and the Dominions for the war in the Middle East, was having a serious effect on the country's wartime economy, which was now stretched to its limits.

Despite the ban, some hundreds of desperate refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe, with the aid of relatives and friends in the Holy Land, succeeded in evading the net and reached the country.

They arrived off the coast in old and often dangerously unseaworthy

vessels, mostly salvaged from the scrapyards of Eastern Europe. Under cover of darkness, the passengers would be put ashore on some remote beach. By dawn, they would have disappeared — 'lost' in the towns or hidden in remote kibbutzim.

Sometimes, the vessels were beached as their passengers scrambled ashore, and left to become wrecks. It was a dangerous game but, for those who survived, it was worth it. Those unfortunate enough to be apprehended were sent to the immigrants' camp at Athlit, a pleasant spot on the coast just south of Haifa. Life here was far from being unbearable.

Up to this point, the problem of the illegal immigrant appeared to be not unduly worrying for the authorities. But, unhappily, this situation was to undergo a dramatic change. A Royal Navy frigate patrolling the coast encountered two ancient vessels filled with Jewish refugees. They were dangerously overloaded; their decks almost awash.

They had almost reached the end of their perilous voyage from the Black Sea port of Constanza. The Promised Land was in sight. But for their interception, the two vessels would have put their passengers ashore that very night. Instead, they were ordered into Haifa Harbour. A few days later, a third vessel, packed with refugees, was taken in charge by the frigate and ushered into port. Between them, the three vessels carried the staggering total of 2,000 illegal immigrants. What would be the reaction of the British to this massive influx of immigrants? The Jews were worried — and with reason. Their worst fears were realised. The Administration decided they could no longer cope with the increasing numbers of illegal immigrants. They would be banished to the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius and remain there until the end of the war. Lying idle in Haifa harbour was the three-funnelled Patria, uninviting in her black war-paint. She would serve to carry the unfortunate refugees to their war-time home.

My outspoken Jewish friend put his objections bluntly. 'It's inhuman', he protested. Couldn't I understand? The trouble was I understood only too well. My sympathies were wholly with the unhappy immigrants.

I had been on the quayside as the two immigrant vessels limped into harbour and tied up. They had been luckier than some. At least one vessel had foundered in the Dardenelles with all on board. The scene on the quayside was unforgettable. Every face bore a look of undiluted joy. The dangers of the voyage were forgotten. They had reached the Promised Land. That was enough.

One old Jew put a question to me in his broken English. I caught the word 'Athlit' and concluded that his query related to the immigrants' camp.

'You will be all right there', I told him with assurance.

He smiled happily.

It was a few hours later that the shock decision to banish the new arrivals to Mauritius became known. It was totally unexpected, and aroused bitter resentment throughout the Jewish homeland. For the unfortunate immigrants themselves, it spelt the end of their dreams. For myself, I could only think

of the happy smile on the face of my old friend, On that fateful morning of November 25th, I looked down on Haifa harbour from the balcony of my quarters on Mount Carmel. All was peaceful. Below me, lying just off the harbour wall, lay the ugly, three-funnelled Patria.

During the past few days, I had watched the embarkation of the unhappy passengers. Some 1,500 had been put on board, many of them old and infirm. Some of them had been carried up the gangway, resisting violently. Today, the remaining passengers would be embarked, and the Patria would sail for Mauritius.

As I watched, the explosion that wrecked the Patria shattered the peace of the harbour. The ill-fated vessel gave a convulsive shudder, and heeled slowly over on her side, finally coming to rest with her hull half-submerged.

Within seconds, the water became alive with a mass of humanity, struggling frantically to reach the safety of the harbour wall. Help arrived speedily from the shore, but for those unable to swim or too old or infirm to make the effort, it came too late. Many, too, were trapped below in their cabins or between decks. For them, death must have come quickly.

Unjustly, the Jewish world held the British responsible for this unfortunate tragedy. In Palestine itself, anti-British feeling reached a new high pitch of intensity. *'Young Jews. Do not join the army of the British murderers'* read a slip which mysteriously appeared one morning on my office table. Posters appeared on the walls of Jerusalem and Tel-aviv — 'WANTED FOR MURDER' over a picture of Britain's High Commissioner.

To end on a happier note, the survivors of the Patria were spared the anguish of banishment. The much-abused British Administration mercifully decided they had suffered enough.

[Colonel Donovan Young, author and journalist, has served in Palestine during and between World Wars I and II.]

JOHN CLIFFORD — A VICTORIAN RADICAL

by J. E. B. Munson

AS Englishmen become less concerned with their history, the great names of the past fade in significance. This is, perhaps, most often the case with Radical leaders of the last century. Men like Chamberlain, Bradlaugh or Bright, struck terror in the hearts of conservative Victorians on the one hand and were revered as household gods by millions of others. They devised a philosophy of history, politics, morality and economics which met every need and which was enunciated in the great Liberal reviews like the *Contemporary* and the *Fortnightly*. Their goals of disestablishment, temperance, free trade, local government reform and state education have been won in the main and in that victory, perhaps, lies the cause for their decline in popular history. John Clifford, whilst only one of a host of Victorian Radicals, embodied many of the traits of Victorian Radicalism. His name is now, outside a few limited circles, almost forgotten yet his career remains one of the more fascinating of the nineteenth century. His fame as a Baptist minister has been eclipsed by Spurgeon; his renown as a Nonconformist leader has waned with Nonconformity and his influence in British Socialism has dwindled as Labour turns its attention from the weekly sermon to the monthly trade figures.

Clifford was born on 16th October 1836, at Sawley in Derbyshire, when Lord Melbourne was Prime Minister; he died on 20th November 1923, on the eve of the first Labour government. His father, who had six other children, was a warp-machine worker and his mother, a mill-hand, working mainly at home. The family was of sturdy Nonconformist stock and his father was a keen Chartist. By the age of eleven Clifford left school and began work at a lace factory, arising at 4 a.m., working from between 5 and 6 a.m. until 7 or 8 p.m., six days a week, for 2s. 6d. He later recalled that 'I began life in a factory and I have never forgotten the cruel impressions I received there of men and work.' His sparse schooling was not lost for the boy read in his spare time and his favourite work, and one which was to help shape his life and that of numerous other liberals, was Emerson's *Self Reliance*, a copy of which was by his bed when he died. He also had before him the examples of his mother's brothers who had risen in the world of provincial England through the Nonconformist ministry. In November 1850, Clifford was 'converted' and soon began preaching and in 1854 or 1855, he entered Midlands Baptist College at Leicester, in the hey-day of the anti-Church rate controversy.

In 1858, he accepted the 'call' to become pastor of Praed Street Baptist Chapel in the, then, new suburbs of Paddington. The chapel was in poor health with only sixty members and Clifford only accepted the call on the condition that he be allowed time to complete his education at the new University of London. In 1861, he earned the B.A., followed in 1862 with a B.Sc., in 1864 with a M.A., and in 1866, with a LL.B.

His studies, however, did not limit Clifford's efforts to revive his chapel and he was one of the pioneers of the 'institutional church'. His belief was expressed in the first *Church Report* of 1859:—

> We exist as a church . . . not only for our spiritual improvement but also and specially for saving the souls and bodies of the people in the neighbourhood. . . . We have a public object, the decrease of the evils of society and the increase of individual and social good by the dissemination of the Gospel of Christ.

He initiated a series of Sunday evening talks on 'current affairs', including politics: still a novel experiment. In 1861, he established a Mutual Economical Benefit Society in which members paid 4d. a week and received 12/- a week and medical attendance when unable to work because of ill health. His plan was to make the church a centre for a variety of social activities. Thus he established a Mutual Improvement Society with lectures and social gatherings which later developed into the Westbourne Park Institute, grew to a membership of 1,300, received L.C.C. and government grants, and was finally absorbed by the Paddington Polytechnic.

In addition, there was a Preacher's Institute to train young men and, by the end of the century, a Home for girls stranded in London. There were, likewise, cricket, cycling and rambling clubs as well as slum missions and, in 1907, a temperance 'pub' called 'The Clifford Arms' opened in his honour. The church helped build a public park in Paddington and there was a Westbourne Park Permanent Building Society with 6,000 members by 1908, as well as a Labour Bureau to help those seeking work. The church also helped to establish the Praed Street Y.W.C.A. and there was a church committee on Social Questions. Clifford's maxim was clear: 'Do something for somebody else; love your neighbour enough to take trouble for him; work, take your share of the struggle against selfishness and injustice; serve, and you shall "save yourself" in saving those you serve.'

The church prospered and stands as an example of the Victorian Nonconformist church which was built by and centred on the dynamism of one man and, which, through its various institutions, served the community. From 1858 to 1870 the congregation added 811 new members and the total membership rose from sixty to 503. In 1877 'Praed Street Baptist Chapel' gave way to 'Westbourne Park Baptist Church' when the congregation moved to Porchester Road and dedicated a new and larger building. Between 1877 and 1906 the congregation gave £160,657, a figure equal in to-day's debased currency to about £1,125,000.

Although Clifford made his reputation at first by his innovations on behalf of 'institutional religion', he soon became known as one of the leading 'political parsons' of Dissent. Clifford boldly stated from the beginning of his ministry that 'My politics are part of my religion' and he never varied from this belief. *The Times*, which had attacked him bitterly during the educational controversies of 1902-1906, commented on his death with the hypocrisy peculiar to journalism, that he was 'a great Christian pastor but . . . an even greater politician'. He had insisted always that 'Politics are one of the organs and instruments by which true Christians hasten the coming of the Kingdom of God'. His political creed was the 'little England' Radicalism of Bright and Gladstone and when it later

developed into Socialism, that of Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald. Not a few Baptist worthies must have been shocked when Clifford, as President of the Baptist Union in 1899, declared that Christ 'does not expect revolutions to be made with rose-water'.

Clifford's Radicalism matured with the century and eventually he left behind his Liberal friends. In 1872, he had said that 'The Church of Christ should . . . take upon itself . . . the real burden of the pauperism of the nation', radical enough in itself; but, by 1899, he was proclaiming that 'the monstrous wrong, by which an increment of value, due to the increase of the population, is grabbed by the few for their own aggrandisement, will be abolished'. To Clifford, the *community*, whether it be city or nation, was the important factor for 'that separate entity called the individual is not a concrete existence. . . . The highest life of the unit is only attainable through the fullest life of all'. To Clifford, 'the State is more sacred than any Church . . . for the State stands for the whole people in their manifold collective life; and any Church is but a fragment of that life, though one of the most important fragments'. Such optimistic confidence could only be possible in a Victorian Radical.

Clifford's oratory, writing and thinking were all of one kind for he spoke, wrote and thought in vivid colours. His was not a subtle mind, at least not in the intellectual sense. As a consequence it is difficult to define exactly his political philosophy. Broadly speaking he was a Christian Socialist. He supported the Independent Labour Party and he was a member of the Fabian Society, for which he wrote two Tracts although he was also a member of the Liberals' Eighty Club. Above all he hated the human chaos and misery which industrialised capitalism had brought to the working people of Britain. He formed the Christian Socialist League and worked in the Christian Union for Social Service yet he acknowledged that he preferred to call Socialism 'Collectivism'. Not unlike many late Victorian Radicals he found sharp distinctions unnecessary and in many ways his philosophy was not dissimilar from New Liberalism. To a fellow Radical, the Baptist minister J. C. Carlile, Clifford

> belonged to a political school of Radicalism which seems to have passed away. His sympathies were all with the bottom dog; he believed in creating an ideal social state through political action. Clifford did not know how to be double-minded.

Clifford's power and influence seem to have been greatest during the period from 1890 to 1914 and were based on his leadership of Radical Nonconformists, through his oratorical prowess. Whilst critics admitted that he was not a preacher of the class of Spurgeon or Liddon, he was a 'mighty man of the platform' and his oratory 'kindled audiences into a perfect fire of enthusiasm'. His style appears to present eyes as overwrought and exaggerated. His language is violent but oratory was a means by which men used symbols to present the truth as they saw it. His attacks on the Church of England were aimed at an institution, not a person: 'When he attacked the Archbishop of Canterbury. . . . he was thinking of a composite . . . Archbishop, gathering up into his fictitious

personality all the arrogant and illiberal things that Archbishops have ever done.' Clifford's confidence, like that of so many, was based on the belief that if not England and her Empire, then at least the 'Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth' contained all that was essential for human perfection. One must also remember that oratory was no bar to co-operation and Clifford often worked with Cardinal Manning and with Archbishop Frederick Temple.

Clifford began his adventure in politics in traditional ways: he supported temperance, the removal of Nonconformist 'grievances' and disestablishment of the Church through the Liberation Society. He followed Gladstone over Ireland and remained true to justice for Ireland despite the strident cries of Ulster Protestants. Gladstone also remained his leader concerning foreign policy and Clifford was a leading spokesman in the controversy over the Armenian atrocities. He represented the Baptist Union at the Anglo-Armenian Conference in 1895 and he invited Armenians in London to use his church for their services. He fought in most general and by-elections for both Liberal and, in time, Labour candidates. In 1908 and 1909 he supported Lloyd George in the battle over the 'People's Budget' and the House of Lords. When war broke out in 1914 he had just attended a peace conference at Worms and, after an initial opposition to the war, he gave it his whole-hearted support. He could not do the same for Lloyd George who had worked with Clifford in the Boer War and Education controversies and who said in tribute: 'There is no man in England upon whose conscience I would sooner ring a coin than upon John Clifford's.' A journalist asked Clifford, after this tribute, if he would support Lloyd George and the Coalition Government. Clifford replied that he would not but would urge Nonconformists to support either Independent Liberals or Labour. Clifford likewise supported the conscientious objectors during the War as he had supported the suffragist movement. He was keen on prison reform, supported the movement to abolish the death penalty, was a Vice-President of the National Council for Civil Liberties and supported the State Medical Service Association.

Despite his involvement in various Liberal causes, Clifford remained (unlike some Nonconformist ministers) aloof from the party intrigues of his day. One searches in vain for more than a sprinkling of letters from him in the papers of various Liberal leaders. Part of this is due to a dislike on the part of professional politicians for his uncompromising stands which, to them, only made their tasks more difficult. Rosebery especially disliked his 'violent' and 'polemical' methods which to Rosebery's refined tastes were 'quite hateful'[1]. Clifford was liked, however, by two politicians. Campbell-Bannerman, Liberal Prime Minister from 1905 to his death in 1908, described Clifford as 'by far the manliest of the Non. Cons.'[2] J. Ramsay MacDonald and his wife had often attended Westbourne Park and 'for years they set aside a small room in Lincoln's Inn Field where Dr. Clifford could slip in and rest'. The charm of Lloyd George, as has been shown, had little effect on Clifford.

Clifford's fame in politics, however, rests on two notable events. The

first was the Boer War. Clifford joined W. T. Stead, editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* until 1890 and after that, the *Review of Reviews* in opposing the War through the 'Stop the War Committee'. For his efforts to bring Nonconformity into total opposition to the war Clifford had the windows of his Church broken by jingoistic mobs; his efforts were, on the whole, in vain.

The second notable event was the Education Act of 1902 which made the County, County Boroughs and larger boroughs the local education authority and which gave rate aid, for the first time, to denominational schools. Public education was, arguably, the most important domestic political issue both to Nonconformists and to Radicals. It was Clifford who led the Radical-Nonconformist opposition to the measure, an opposition centred almost exclusively amongst Baptists, Congregationalists and Primitive Methodists who advocated a state comprehensive system with little if any room for denominational schools. A small but influential 'no rate' campaign was organised and flourished between 1903 and the general election of 1906; at its height it had some 10,000 adherents. Clifford's work on behalf of Liberal and Labour candidates (as well as that of other Nonconformist leaders) earned for Dissent a powerful, if not universally welcomed, influence in forming Liberal educational policy between 1906 and 1914. It was not just Clifford's attack on private education for those with money and technical instruction for those without that made him infamous in Tory eyes but his religious unorthodoxy as well.

Theologically Clifford was indeed unorthodox. He readily accepted Darwin's evolutionary teaching and the German inspired 'higher criticism' of the Bible. Likewise he accepted that modern research had, for him, 'reduced the "miraculous" element to a minimum' in the Gospel.[8] He remained, nevertheless, a staunch 'evangelical' to whom the person of Jesus as well as a personal experience of that person was the basis of religious belief. Spurgeon, who decried Clifford's liberalism and remained a convinced, if broad-minded Calvinist to his death, once asked Clifford why he could not be purged of his sinful rejection of the teaching of the Pope of Geneva. Clifford replied, 'Because, Mr. Spurgeon, I only see you about once a month, but I read my Bible every day.' To Clifford, God was the 'God of progress' and Christianity was a religion of service: the Kingdom of God could and would be realised on earth and God would make even 'trade into a sacrament'. Politics therefore were an integral part of religion and through the State, God would achieve His aim, albeit with the help of the Liberal party.

Clifford's heterodoxy made him readier than most to defend liberty of thought and as Vice-President of the Baptist Union he successfully weathered the 'Down Grade' controversy of 1887-1891 when Spurgeon launched an attack on 'liberalism'. Later Clifford gave his support to the Revd. R. J. Campbell, the Congregationalist pastor of the City Temple, in his 'New Theology' movement. Above all it was Clifford's broad-minded attitude towards Biblical criticism which showed that one could accept the Bible as a work of literature whilst not putting aside the truths it con-

tained: 'Clifford's influence was by no means confined to the Baptists and is one of the factors that brought the Nonconformists safely through a difficult period of transition in their approach to Scripture.'[4]

The portrait which emerges is of the prominent Nonconformist leader (twice President of the Baptist Union, President of the National Free Church Council and President of the Baptist World Alliance, 1905-1911), active Liberal and Labour supporter, Radical spokesman, successful pastor and leader of radical theology. His personal character is of an extremely hard-working, kind, humble and self-effacing man, thin in body, with a long white beard, high forehead and piercing eyes with a sparkling quality which is still visible in photographs. Unlike many, his radicalism was real and based on years of deprivation for himself and his class. He owned but one home and always travelled third class for the simple reason that 'there was no fourth'. He disliked pomposity of any type, especially Nonconformist and distrusted any form of ritualism. He loved London passionately and devoted years of unceasing labour to the bettering of the lives of its toiling millions. His kindness must often have annoyed others: after a meeting about the concentration camps established in South Africa during the Boer War, Clifford and a party of about ten adjourned to the old A.B.C. restaurant on Ludgate Hill. After giving their orders, Clifford asked the waitress when the restaurant closed. She told him it closed at 7 p.m.; as it was then 6.50 Clifford told his friends that 'This girl will be kept here after her time to go home . . . I'm not going to keep her.' With that the party was led out to find another restaurant.

Yet it is with Clifford as a Victorian Radical that one must finish this portrait. Clifford stood with other Nonconformist ministers as a prophet to the Liberal party and, in Clifford's case, to the new Labour movement. He was observed to have had 'the heart of a little child' and whilst this made him compassionate it also made him uncompromising. There was a 'Puritanic simplicity and integrity about John Clifford' and a 'certain "mass" of manhood . . . which set him in a class by himself'. His noble simplicity stands in stark contrast to the affluent hypocrisy of many of his followers in the Labour party.

Clifford left behind him, however, few permanent memorials. His Church was bombed during the Second World War although rebuilt later. Even though his name is commemorated in Paddington, London is changed beyond recognition and not necessarily for the better: his own neighbourhood is ripped in half by an unseemly motorway. The social justice for which he fought seems as elusive as ever. The old Radical cries of 'Disestablishment' and 'Temperance' are gone and Labour seems to find little room for prophets. Clifford, the 'cheery apostle of progress' seems dated after two world wars, the loss of Empire, confidence and seemingly of purpose. Nonconformists wonder if the 'institutional' church as well as the identification with Liberalism did not do more harm than good. Many to-day wonder if an identification of Christianity with current beliefs, so easy for Clifford, is still possible or desirable. Has not Clifford's

belief in a religious instruction in schools which was 'civic' produced not a more enlightened Christianity but a race of children ignorant of the basic and unchanging truths of our Christian inheritance? Clifford's confidence has disappeared with the England of the shilling and the half-crown yet he remains that rare phenomenon: the democrat who loved democracy.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Rock Island Line. David Rhodes. Secker and Warburg. £3.90. *Ragtime*. E. L. Doctrow. Macmillan. £3.50. *White Candles, Sex and Michele Dubois*. Danielle Bourde. Exposition Press. $7.50. *The Sobbing Sounds*. Omunjakko Nakibimbiri. Longmans African Creative Writing Series. 75p. *The Gamekeeper*. Barry Hines. Michael Joseph. £3.50. *Hannah Hereafter*. Elizabeth Sutherland. Constable. £3.50.

The ever-increasing number of American novels published in this country by British firms poses a problem for the dedicated reader of current fiction. If it is true to say that the novel is expected to mirror life as the reader knows it, he will need to identify himself with a set of circumstances very different from his own. Not that this is always a disadvantage. The naturalistic American novel has in many cases been an international best seller. Yet the fact remains that the English reader may find himself disorientated in the world of the Americas until he establishes a common identification with his own everyday reactions.

This, fortunately, is abundantly possible with the boy hero of *Rock Island Line*, the third novel by David Rhodes, a young American writer who has been compared with Sherwood Anderson. July Montgomery is a likeable child, submissive to the discipline of his parents and grandmother. He enjoys listening in on their discussions while his own personal fantasies thrive on a meagre diet. All too soon, he suffers a catastrophic blow. His parents are killed in a car crash and bereavement sends him into a state of shock. As a result, he flees from the supervision of uncongenial relatives and takes to the road.

Dickens would have relished the pursuit of July's adventures, although he might have conveyed them less brutally. July evades capture, fends off those who wish to persecute him, and finally reaches Philadelphia, where he sets up as a paper boy despite determined opposition from the 'regulars.' Companioned only by a faithful cat, the intrepid child takes up permanent residence in a bricked-up tunnel many hundreds of feet underground. He feeds, works, sleeps and eventually acquires some degree of culture and education by means of self-imposed discipline. Eventually, his life branches out in three directions: he takes a conventional job, meets a girl, Mel, who attracts him, and is accommodated in luxurious surroundings as a useful cover by a well-meaning crook. When the police catch up with the racket and July's future parents-in-law see him as a bad social risk, he decides to return home and claim his inheritance. He succeeds, with surprisingly little opposition. Then comes marriage and a brief 'do it yourself' idyll while the young couple struggle to rehabilitate a derelict building for their future home.

It would have been better if the novel had ended there: for as the record of an invincible orphan it would have ranked highly with readers on either side of the Atlantic. Instead, the narrative proceeds to explore a theme familiar in American fiction—the pitfall of a lofty approach to life's mundane and ethical problems. Alas, in the final analysis, July and Mel are very ordinary people. In order to balance the weekly budget, Mel, an aspiring artist, turns to dishwashing, and July lays aside his studies to struggle with the work of an unskilled labourer

in a courageous attempt to identify himself with the lowest common denominator. All to no avail, for the dice are loaded against them. Mel is raped and murdered by a group of mindless drifters and July himself narrowly escapes a violent death. All rather rushed and theatrical after the careful build-up; but it is for the courage and perseverance of a destitute child that *Rock Island Line* remains in the memory.

Identification with the situations and characters of *Ragtime* is more difficult to achieve. Astronomical numbers of copies have already been sold in the United States. F. L. Doctrow's elaborate explanation about his intention to appeal to people not normally interested in serious fiction inevitably stiffens the reader's resistance. However, patronising as this approach may seem, the policy has paid off, not only in sales, but with a flood of prestige reviews in the American press. Yet under the fairest scrutiny, the reason for the popularity of *Ragtime* is not easy to determine, let alone analyse.

F. L. Doctrow has chosen a straightforward enough background theme—life in America at the beginning of the present century. Onto a tale of simple folk struggling to make their way in the years of the great depression are pasted several real life characters such as Freud, Houdini and Henry Ford. Intimate and possibly authentic details about them are revealed in passing.

The central characters are hard to isolate from the labyrinth of satire, buffoonery and warm-hearted camaraderie among members of a modest family. 'Coalhouse' Walker is a concert party pianist. When his car is damaged almost beyond repair by a crowd of belligerent firemen, a serious situation results, and a blackmailing threat to use explosives threatens to do unestimated damage. But this melodramatic confrontation and all that results from it is little more than the skeleton plot of *Ragtime*. Clothing the bare bones of it are all kinds of personal dilemma, ranging from a slanted lesbian affair to other more orthodox involvements. It would be unfair to deny that much of the trimming is vivid and original. The puzzle is to discover what, if anything, *Ragtime* can convey of interest to the U.K. reader.

It comes as something of a surprise to realise that a young French writer, Danielle Bourde, chose 'swinging' London as the most suitable setting for her first novel about 'liberated' society. In *White Candles, Sex and Michele Dubois,* Michele and her friend, Sylvie, are *au pair* girls with uncongenial English families, in whose employ they see little of the gay life for which they hanker. Sooner than return ignominiously to their homes, they move out into a bed-sitting room and obtain employment at a 'disco' where conditions of work are infinitely more depressing than in domestic service. Their most pressing problem is to circumvent the unwelcome overtures of the proprietor and customers. Eventually, they give up the struggle and go to work in all all-night club which provides better pay and living conditions; advantages offset by the importunate 'male pigs,' each one more smelly, overweight and generally repulsive than the last. Mostly, if not always, they contrive to evade the final capitulation. At last, worn down by the arduous time-table, they are introduced to a very superior 'madam,' who enages Michele to join her exclusive band of 'call-girls." The regular patrons pay highly for the hire of these carefully selected companions and Michele's 'regular' introduces her to his friends and even offers marriage. Yet to this beautiful and still fastidious girl he is just one more 'pig,' to be treated as roughly and coldly as may be deemed politic. From time to time, sickened by enforced proximity to the hated males, Michele returns to her family in France, the character and background of which are interestingly

portrayed. Eventually and perhaps understandably, her emotions go into reverse and she forms a lesbian association with Catherine, Lady Bakefield, a close friend of her client. And, once embarked on a course of achieving sexual satisfaction with a member of her own sex, she finds herself also the object of desire by Evelyne, mother of a cousin she had once considered marrying.

In an uncharacteristic outburst of hysterical despair, Michele announces to her astonished family that she intends throwing in her lot with Lady Bakefield, whereupon Evelyne, shocked and humiliated by this public rejection, contrives her own death and Michele's. And so ends the strange saga of a talented and well-educated girl whom destiny led along some of the ugliest byways ever to be so frankly described in a contemporary novel.

That promiscuity is no more likely to provide a blueprint for personal fulfilment in a simple African community than in the sophisticated capitals of the Western world is soon apparent in *The Sobbing Sounds*. This is a first novel by a new Ugandan writer, Omunjakko Nakibimbiri, one of a valuable and unique series of *Creative African Writing* edited by Michael J. Echeruo, Professor of English at the University of Ibadan. The opportunity to discover at first hand the intimate thoughts and reactions of a young African holds a particular fascination at the present time. What is revealed through the observations of the chief character, Kanyira, is mainly the joyous if ribald concern with the act of sex common to adolescents all over the world. Throughout his boyhood the desire for sexual experience develops into what might be termed a healthy obsession. Even while at a university in America, Kanyira's chief concern is for the frigidity and inaccessibility of white women, rather than with the door opening into the more complex and sophisticated Western way of life.

One cannot but admire Kanyira's boundless self-confidence and *joie de vivre* as he samples numerous women, mostly of his own race, assessing them by their readiness to emit the right kind of 'sobbing sounds' at the climax of their ecstasy.

But if Kanyira himself is never so much as bruised by his romantic 'progress,' the same cannot be said for the men and women of his own village black community. Here there is little liberality for the wives and daughters who are caught red-handed in adultery, nor for the maurauding male poaching on his neighbours' preserves. But the dissemination of social or moral propaganda is no part of Omunjakka Nakibimbiri's objective, but rather to describe people and situations as with his sharp eye he has observed them, and in this he is entirely successful.

Turning to another young writer, Barry Hines, whose concern is for one of the most idiosyncratic of English settings, provides a mesmeric experience. *The Gamekeeper* is Barry Hines' fourth novel and possibly his best. It keeps close to the 'documentary' by taking the dour breeder and preserver of game birds through his seasonal routine at a steady, even pace; offering neither justification nor explanation of a way of life which is rapidly becoming an anachronism. In fact, the gamekeeper, George Purse, has other skills but finds himself glad to exchange a coal shaft for the privately owned glades and moors—so extensive that both human and wild creatures have ample room to indulge their instinctive urge for domination. George Purse is essentially a loner,' generally resistant to dependence on his absentee employer, the Duke, yet paradoxically without pity for any creature weaker than himself. As it is, in many cases, the wildlife of the forest is a match for him and the overall impression remains that an important aspect of conservation is to preserve sufficient manoeuvring ground for both animals and humans to work out their basic impulses, however brutal.

Cruelty lurks not far below the surface in *Hannah Hereafter,* but of a very different kind—the refinement of torture human beings inflict upon each other. It might have been sufficient punishment for Hannah Sheldon's mis-spent life that she believes herself to be dying of an undiagnosed disease. Additional burdens are the distressing flashbacks of past events evoked by uncongenial visitors. Hannah adored her father and detested her mother for her prejudices and hostile attitudes. Yet, despite parental restriction, Hannah contrived to emancipate herself sufficiently to lie in the heather first with a handsome youth and later with Will Shelden, an army major home on leave from Africa. When she becomes pregnant she cables the major and he chivalrously arranges a wedding. Only after the birth of her son is the extent of his indifference apparent. The years drift by. The couple return to England and Hannah seeks out Will's first wife. She learns that Will is sterile and so, of course,he knew all along that the child could not be his! The reader, as well as Hannah, had almost forgotten the carefree youth and his effective wooing. Remembering him, Hannah is overwhelmed by remorse. There is no half measure in her self-condemnation for having deceived Will, and against all advice she leaves him and obtains a divorce, forbidding her son to see the man whom he regards as his legal father; setting herself, with characteristic arrogance, by alternate wheedling and bullying, to fill the role of both parents while the 'love-child' passes through boyhood and becomes a man. Only her removal to hospital leaves him free to work out his own salvation.

When her illness is diagnosed as curable and she returns home, she discovers that he has married in her absence. The couple and their baby are installed in her flat and the only true service she can perform for them is to remove her presence and leave them in possession.

This she does, apparently without rancour, though at a time when welcome and sympathy would have meant so much. What is the moral of this frustrating cautionary tale? That personal relationships must be nourished if they are to pay a dividend at the crucial time? Recording shrewdly and economically, Elizabeth Sutherland leaves all or nothing to be inferred from Hannah's sorry progress through marriage and motherhood.

Also received:

Cauldron. Stuart William Thonnesen. Clifford Allen (New Writers). £1.60. *Cauldron,* which includes a rather longer work, The Mere, is an interesting example of collaboration between author and publisher, the objective of which is to provide the new writer with a completely free hand. Stuart William Thonnesen's work is not easy to assimilate and requires several readings before the message gets through; although it is not necessary to look beyond the first page of *The Mere* to know that he has very considerable talent.

The Hounds of Hell. Edited by Michael Parry. Arrow Books (Hutchinson). 50p. A companion book of horror stories to the same editor's *Beware of the Cat* is as welcome as it is original, for it provides the opportunity to gather together some little-known or forgotten examples of the macabre. Thus, apart from such obvious choices as *The Hound of the Baskervilles* and *The Hound of Death* by Agatha Christie, we have Catherine Crowe (1800-1871) a much acclaimed expert on ghost stories during her lifetime, and the American writer H. P. Lovecraft, whose tales of the supernatural merit attention, among many others.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

A GREAT AMATEUR DIPLOMAT

Special Relationships. Sir John Wheeler Bennett. Macmillan.

In what proved to be the last year of his life, Sir John Wheeler Bennett turned his attention not to the lives of other people but to his own. After *Knaves, Fools and Heroes,* an autobiographical volume on the Europeans whom he knew in and before World War II, he now gives us what is presumably his last piece of writing, his own account of his American activities in the years of World War II. It is delightful, gossipy, anecdotal, and—not least— a roll call of great names. He interviewed Wilson and Coolidge, he stayed at the White House in FDR's day, and he tutored John F. Kennedy.

First and last, this is the story of a love affair with Virginia. He was by descent, on his mother's side, a Confederate, and indeed he planned at one stage to write a history of the South, a subject that would have come naturally to his romantic Tory nature. But he gave it up after—as he admits—a long session with Douglas Southall Freeman, the redoubtable editor of *The Richmond News Leader,* who managed between 5 a.m. to 9 a.m. each day, and amid the most prodigious of editorial and public timetables, to write his splendid four-volume biography of Lee, his studies of *Lee's Lieutenants,* and six of the seven volumes of a major life of George Washington. This industry drove Wheeler Bennett back to the safer and smoother waters of his own diplomatic world. Even organising wartime propaganda was less exacting than this.

This reviewer has the good fortune of recalling Wheeler Bennett on the Lawn at the University of Virginia, where in 1939 he was a Special Lecturer in International Law, and where at fortnightly intervals he would give to a group of *aficionados* his views on the war as it ceased to be 'phoney.' He was also, of course, attached to the British Embassy in Washington, and had a certain air of always being—as indeed he was—on the inside edge of great affairs. His address in particular to the Summer Institute in 1940 just after the fall of France—to which he makes modest reference here—remains for all who heard it one of the most moving public speeches of the years of war. He revived the Information Service in Washington, lectured widely, and sought to act as liaison officer and special emissary between the two states. He was unusually popular and widely respected in Virginia, and from coast to coast, and as much at ease with Alexander Korda as with F.D.R.

There is, however, an air in the book of one on the edge of, rather than a full participant in, the policies of the Great Game. John Wheeler Bennett fell for Virginia, and he is not alone in that. But his special expertise was Germany, and the reader is left with a lingering query why his considerable gifts of diplomatic skill, and his special and detailed knowledge of Europe and Europeans, were left at such a remove from the centre of the action for so long. For after Pearl Harbour, the job of diplomatic salesman in the U.S., though still a job to be done and done deftly, hardly seemed to warrant a man of this calibre. He moved into S.O.E. and in the end into Political Warfare, in Bush House and at SHAEF. He was one of the last—perhaps the very last—of our great amateur diplomats, and of our great amateur diplomatic historians, a debonair, highly cultivated man of two worlds, enjoying life in style, and playing his many roles with immense zest and grace. All his judgements here are typically kind—except that on Count Sforza, for he found bores hard to take—and the army of

his friends was clearly vast. He does not tell us much that is new, and he clearly wanted to be closer to power than he was, but he gives a vivid picture of the work of the wartime Washington Embassy, and helps to explain how skilfully the alliance was held together in the trying times of the U.S.'s official neutrality.

ESMOND WRIGHT

GREECE'S TRAGEDY

The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949. C. M. Woodhouse. Hart-Macgibbon. £15.00.

This book is unique, because it is written by a scholar-soldier-historian who was himself involved—far more than his book allows—in the actual struggle. His name was a legend, as I learnt at first hand during many visits to Greece during the years 1945-1950. The Greek people themselves are unique and not easy to understand, especially by persons who presume to have a knowledge of the 'classics.' Anyone who understands the differences between the initials E.A.M., E.D.A., E.L.A.N., E.L.A.S., S.K.E., S.N.O.F. (to name a few) and finally K.K.E.—the Communist Party of Greece, must command our attention. Such a man is Woodhouse and a Double First in Classics. The titles of the chapters give some indication of the depth of the tragedy. The First Round. Prelude to Revolution: Resistance and Reaction; War on Two Fronts. The Second Round, Return to Legality; the December Events: The Bitter Truce. The Third Round. Disorder into Guerilla War: Guerillas into Battle Order; Deadlock and Stalemate: The Final Breakthrough. Translate these phrases into killed, wounded, executed, refugees and kidnapped children and you begin to measure which country suffered longest and most in World War II.

The struggle for the soul of Greece has been in continuous momentum for the last sixty years. Communism has played an important part in that struggle, though at times it has been synonymous with the words 'liberation' or 'nationalism' or even 'patriotic' front. Colonel Woodhouse sums up the Civil War in this book: 'There was right and wrong on both sides. But when the Greek people had to choose, on balance, and without enthusiasm or euphoria, they deliberately chose the nation-state they know rather than the communist paradise they were offered.' Perhaps we tend to forget that Greece had to fight not only Germany and Italy, but three northern countries, Albania, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria. Macedonia was always a disputed area, though it became more Greek after the Greek-Turkish War of 1922. Bulgaria was the most reliable Soviet ally in the Balkans; Jugoslavia was always difficult and needed watching. Stalin never seemed to attach much importance to Greece and Greek communists; indeed, he said as much to Britain and America. However, it was only due to the resolution of Churchill, Eden (continued by Bevin), the Truman Doctrine and later General Van Fleet that the Communist tide was turned and the Northern Guerillas were defeated. Here was a rare case when Britain and America worked together. Things looked pretty black in 1947-48 and there were plenty of critical voices in the so-called liberal press of London and New York. The author of this book, in a concluding passage, writes: 'The K.K.E. rank and file and in particular its leaders were expendable. Without a trace of compunction, Stalin let them go to their doom.'

The Greek Communists had few if any outstanding leaders, but Greece is more interested in human beings than in theories. Among the wide variety of politicians, Papandreou and Sophoulis are the most often mentioned, but over the years Karamanlis has been the most consistent. I remember visiting his constituency with him when he was Minister of Labour in the forties and again when he was Prime Minister in 1956. Now once more he has been recalled to

office. In between the 'democratic' periods Greece has fallen for dictators like Metaxas and 'the Colonels.' The monarchy has too often been an irritant to the politicians, but King Paul initiated many wise projects for the good of Greece.

Friends of Greece must hope that peace and good government will last long in this beautiful and tragic country, though Greece with her sensitive political temperament and embarrassing geographical position must always be influenced by the tides of world events.

KENNETH LINDSAY

A TORY BISHOP

The Tory Crisis in Church and State 1688–1730: The Career of Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester. G. V. Bennett. Clarendon Press, Oxford. £10.00.

Francis Atterbury (1663-1732) is a familiar name to anyone interested in the history of Stuart England and the Jacobite movement. Perhaps the most oft-told anecdote of this colourful bishop is the story that he wished to proclaim James III as king after the death of Queen Anne. This story owes its popularity to Lord Macaulay who tells it in one of his worst pieces, a short life of Atterbury in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. This is just one of the tales about Atterbury that G. V. Bennett disproves in his excellent study of this controversial cleric. The author, chaplain and fellow of New College, Oxford, approaches Atterbury with a moderated sympathy although he is alive to the bishop's faults.

The book is not, strictly speaking, a biography of Atterbury. Rather it is a study, focusing upon him, of the problems that the Church faced in this period. Atterbury and many other Churchmen were unable to accept that dissent had a permanent role in English life. They adhered to the traditional concept that the state should support one Church and make it incumbent upon its subjects to conform to that Church. The first chapter is a superb study of the problem of the Church of England after 1688 until the torpor of the Walpole era. Such problems as occasional conformity (the practice where dissenters qualified for public office by an occasional attendance at the parish church) and the role of Convocation occur throughout the book. Indeed, the information on Convocation should be of interest to anyone concerned with the behaviour of the recent Synod.

Atterbury, like many other Tory leaders such as Harley and Bolingbroke, came from a family that had been tinged with Puritanism during the Civil War. His father, a country clergyman, was never able to advance to high rank during the Restoration because of his Cromwellian past. In spite, or perhaps because of this, Atterbury was raised both at home and at Oxford in the strict Tory creed of obedience to the Lord's Anointed. Nevertheless, he showed no sympathy for James II in 1688 and began his career as a protege of the Williamite Dean of Christ Church, Henry Aldrich.

Atterbury had a strange personality. He was capable of great friendship and affection. This was particularly shown to his literary friends, Swift and Pope. Indeed, one regrets that there was not space in this book for more of the delightful correspondence between Atterbury and Pope. However, Atterbury was also capable of the most vicious diatribes against his foes and, more so, against former friends. Like many clergymen, he reserved his choicest epithets for fellow clergymen. Readers of Trollope will relish the delightful account of Atterbury's battle as Dean of Carlisle with his local bishop. This reached the rather extreme length of the citation of the bishop's sister for adultery in an action brought by one of Atterbury's allies. Atterbury became Dean of Christ

Church in 1711 where he provoked great resentment by his tyrannical rule. He owed his rise to his considerable literary gifts. He was one of the best of Tory pamphleteers and orators. After he became Bishop of Rochester in 1713, he exercised great power in the House of Lords. He was the last of the English bishops to play such an important political role and the last to languish in the Tower. Atterbury soon became an ally of Bolingbroke and Harcourt rather than the more moderate Harley (Earl of Oxford) in the strife within Tory ranks. The bishop's main concern was to secure the absolute domination of the Church of England. Unlike many other political ecclesiastics, his main concerns remained rooted in his clerical office. G. V. Bennett shows that Atterbury was not a Jacobite in 1714 and he officiated, as Dean of Westminster (an office usually held by the Bishop of Rochester) at the coronation of George I. However, he became disaffected when he felt that the Whigs were using the Hanoverian succession to destroy the position he had sought to ensure for the Church. Rather reluctantly, he became a Jacobite plotter. The tale of Walpole's surveillance of the Jacobite conspirators, the arrest and trial of Atterbury and his consequent banishment read like a modern spy story. It must be confessed that Sir Robert Walpole does not emerge very well from these pages. Atterbury became the chief minister of James III, although he became rather disgusted with the incompetence of the Jacobite court. Atterbury died in exile in France.

This is an excellent book. It is well written and free from stylistic enormities so common in many academic books. It can be highly recommended to both scholars and to the general public. Unlike many biographical studies, it makes no attempt to disguise the faults of its subject. It is an absorbing introduction to the central political problems of his period: the role of the Church and the succession to the throne.

R. F. MULLEN

AFRICAN DRAMA

The Marriage of Anansewa. Efua T. Sutherland. Longman. 75p.
Shaihu Umar. Umaru Ladan and Dexter Lyndersay. Longman. 75p.

An interesting cross-fertilisation between African and European drama has taken place over the last few years. It is most evident with the work of Peter Brook, who has travelled through Africa with his actors, under the somewhat ponderous title of The International Centre of Theatre Research, to learn from African audiences both the basic response of people towards theatre, and the movement and ritual of African drama.

In *The Ik,* which was seen recently at the Roundhouse, London, Mr. Brook has taken his drama from a book by the anthropologist Colin Turnbull on a famine-stricken tribe in Northern Uganda and, through his observation of African life, worked a poetic metamorphosis on it. His multi-national cast convince us through their movements and speech patterns that they are this tribe, the Ik. It is certain that they would not have carried this conviction without being able to draw on their own impressions of Africa. How far *The Ik* was improvisational by the time it had reached the Roundhouse is difficult to say. It had its beginnings in improvisation, but one would imagine that fairly early on the performance had evolved into a set structure. Mr. Brook says that in Africa, improvised shows, often comic ones, 'took their form without any prearranged pattern, depending entirely on the elements present at the moment of the event. The language of a performance is just like language in everyday life, and must be totally adapted to the person or persons whom one is addressing.'

Mr. Brook's play owes much to a camera-like study of African life, but differs from the African drama which is being developed in countries like Nigeria and

Ghana. The African Creative Writing Series, which has been launched under the general editorship of Professor Michael J. C. Echeruo, Professor of English at the University of Ibadan, aims to combine the flavour of traditional African drama with a formal script that inevitably allows less scope for improvisation. The first two titles, published by Longman, are *The Marriage of Anansewa* by Efua T. Sutherland and *Shaihu Umar* by Umaru Ladan and Dexter Lyndersay.

The Marriage of Anansewa is an adaptation of the story-telling art in Ghana called Anansesem, which literally means Ananse stories. In this play, Ananse tries to make money by betrothing his daughter to several rich chiefs simultaneously. Ananse represents a kind of Everyman, who serves society as a medium for self-examination. Although he has a sharp awareness of the nature of human beings and animals, he constantly over-reaches himself and ruins his schemes. Most of the stories are in a combination of narrative prose and poetry which is meant to be sung or rhythmically recited on the basis of solo and choral response. The storyteller tries to prove his artistry by spontaneously refreshing and up-dating his story as he tells it.

Anansesem is a community art, and all the people present are performers in one way or another, either actively or potentially. Though the specialists control the action, their performance requires the participation of the audience. Efua Sutherland, who is a Research Fellow in Drama at Ghana's Institute of African Studies, admits that in adapting this drama form to the traditional theatre, the most difficult problem has been to keep alive the element of community participation. She has used the device of moving on to the stage a pool of players representing both the performers and the participating audience. The onus for making the public audience feel at one with the on-stage participating audience rests with the director.

Shaihu Umar is based on the novel by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. It tells the story of a great Islamic teacher, kidnapped as a child and sold into slavery. The aged Shaihu Umar acts as storyteller while the events he describes are taking place on the stage, until it catches up in time and he himself steps into the final scenes. The play is preceded by seventeen pages of stage notes—including advice on whether a real camel should be used in the play. As one of the directors was chased round the stage during rehearsals by the camel he had chosen, one gathers the advice is better not!

CLARE COLVIN

EDITH WHARTON

Edith Wharton: a Biography. R. W. B. Lewis. Constable. £6.50.

Edith Wharton was one of those writers who believe in living as much as in writing. By this is not intended any truism as to some kind of Lawrentian interfusion of the life of the mind and the life of the body, but rather that she 'compartmentalised' her life, retreating at pre-ordained times, rather modestly to write her novels, and then emerging to pursue those social and peregrinatory activities to which, to the end of her productive life (1862-1937), she attached so much importance. This must be accounted for by her upbringing in fashionable, Philistine, New York society, as a result of which she tended to deprecate her own work. Her way of arranging her life-pattern shows also her efficiency, and her diabolical energy. Her biographer confronts a daunting task: his teeming pages must be criss-crossed by her restless wanderings about the civilised world, as well as by the webs of the relationships in which she delighted. Professor R. W. B. Lewis plots and counter-plots, with admirable patience and perseverance attaching this busy figure to its changing setting.

The crowded life somewhat ousts the fuller discussion of the novels which an English readership might have appreciated: she wrote powerfully about rich American society in her lifetime in, say, 'The Age of Innocence' or 'The House of Mirth', and although she was, in her long prime, the most celebrated American novelist of her generation, her reputation has not remained constant. She was an intimate of Henry James, but Professor Lewis is concerned to point out their dissimilarity. Unkind critics might complain that Professor Lewis's background detail is a little cumbrous; if Edith Wharton merely mentions the tango, then he provides a comprehensive social history of the evolution of that dance. World War I is more than adequately sketched in as the arena for her most effective practical charity work. Yet what matters is the quality of the evocation of the age and of the personality. If Edith Wharton does not quite spring, fully-armed and glowing brightly, from Professor Lewis's abundant pages, then this is almost certainly because of certain austerities of her own character. The biographer must grapple with 'a legend in her own lifetime': Edith Wharton was supposed to be a dragon—cold, austere, aloof, arrogant, snobbish and downright rude. She was also indecently rich. Professor Lewis rides in most valiantly to her defence and, through much new research, finds her only to be mortal. Her life was marred by vain regrets; soirées in gilded salons were mere sand; her sumptuous landscaped gardens, filled with the song of a hundred birds, where nasturtiums and goldfish ran riot at the feet of an image of the great God Pan, withered away at the touch of one untimely frost. Yet she built them all up again, and her wealth went marching on.

She was a resolute woman, and, moreover, a remarkable devirilising one: she was fortunate in that her husband did not despatch her urgently into the next world. Her troubles lay in her ill-judged marriage to a sporting Bostonian, Teddy Wharton, who in no way approximated to her intellectually, and, worse, left her completely unsatisfied in any passionate context. Even her frenetic activities left him exhausted and shut-out. Thus condemned to playing second-fiddle, locked in a conviction of inadequacy, he faded tiresomely away, but not before he had erupted into full-blown manic-depression. Edith soldiered on, weathering their divorce, undeniably upset, even disdraught, but always proceeding forwards.

She drew more substance from the company of men, than of women. She herself realised, and must be presumed to have regretted, that if she had been a man, she might have received greater respect as a novelist. She was a masterful figure, creator of her own domains, and many, including Henry James, felt threatened by her. It was not until her mid-forties that she enjoyed a passionate connection with Morton Fullerton, a successful cosmopolitan journalist, not unknown in the Wilde circle; and, before and after the logical death of her affaire with him, she carried on some kind of special relationship with Walter Berry, a somewhat enigmatic, cultivated lawyer who pops up startingly in Edmund Wilson's 'The Twenties' (1975): 'When Elinor and Wylie got to Paris, Wylie's attention one day was attracted by a man who recognised him on the other side of the street. When he came back, he warned Elinor to note and remember the other man and never to have anything to do with him: "He has syphilis. His name is Walter Berry".' How Professor Lewis must have shuddered. He discusses the little-known territory of Edith Wharton's private life with great tact and sympathy, not unaided by her revelatory papers, which were made available at Yale as late as 1968. Percy Lubbock and Louis Auchincloss have contributed lesser lives, each of considerable interest, and so the Dragon of Montmorency, where she held court in her pavilion, permits us to look upon ever more of her concealed coils.

MOLLY TIBBS

THE SECRETS OF CAMP X

A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War, 1939-1945. William Stevenson. Macmillan. £4.95.

Revelations of secret service intrigue in the 1939 war grow apace. This latest is an epic of artful dodgery, a devil's cauldron of technical witchery—and a tribute to unsung heroes. Intrepid, code name of the genius behind British Security Co-ordination, was Sir William Stephenson, Canadian millionaire, thrice-decorated air ace of the 1914 war who bagged 26 enemy planes before being himself shot down.

His first task, as head of BSC in New York, was to conduct the secret diplomacy between Churchill and Roosevelt; his next, after the US entered the war, to direct the closely guarded work of Camp X, on the north shore of Lake Ontario, which could be reached easily, secretly, by US co-agents crossing the border. It was created as a complex nerve centre remote from enemy eyes when our regular secret service was cut off by withdrawal from continental Europe.

Its functions were limitless. It faked documents, forged currency and material for insertion in diplomatic bags, trained agents for air-drops in occupied Europe, made mock-up models of Nazi strongholds and hideouts, including the Prague area for Heydrich's assassination. It tested one-man submarines and underwater demolition devices in the Lake; kept in touch, by underground transmitter, with secret intelligence stations around the world. It used Jasper Maskelyn's illusionist magic to create fake armies, cannon, air bases, fleets, anywhere they were needed, to fox the enemy. An ex-Drury Lane scenic artist, Elder Wills, who had escaped from Dunkirk, specialised on camouflage, hid mini-radio sets in European refugees' suitcases, produced a secret infra-red ink, readable only under infra-red light from pocket flashlamps with infra-red discs.

Film producer Alexander Korda and his brother were recruited to reproduce sites in Nazi territory for rehearsing raid missions; and even Noel Coward's glib showbiz aplomb, to aid British intelligence on his travels in Asia and Latin America. Ingenious devices included explosive loaves, cyanide-squirting fountain-pens, artificial logs that blew up when tossed on a fire, plastic animal droppings for use on enemy trails. The imprint of standard typewriters of any make anywhere could be reproduced. Girls were briefed to watch at US ports and airfields for refugees from Europe bringing in clothes, stationery, rubber stamps, other authentic items that could be acquired to equip agents sent into enemy areas.

Intrepid writes in a Foreword: 'Battles were won because we had advance knowledge of enemy plans, could influence those plans, and could anticipate enemy actions by methods heretofore concealed.' The whole complex 472-page story, covering other aspects, is vitally told by his friend and colleague of similar name. It should be not borrowed but bought and read absorbedly at leisure.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

British Government in an Era of Reform (Collier Macmillan. £6.95). This anthology compiled by Professor W. J. Stankiewicz is a sequel to his earlier *Crisis in British Government* published in 1967. The Editor has now brought together a further series of contributions by distinguished experts, academic and otherwise, published in the intervening years, on the continuing theme of constitutional reform in depth. The Professor argues

that we need to get away from purely ad hoc measures. Tinkering with the constitution on immediate problems, without regard to the basic principles of our democratic system, is not only ineffective, but endangers the whole structure. 'A system which has no written constitution places a special obligation on the shoulders of constitutional interpreters.' The age of Dicey is gone, and Professor Stankiewicz seeks to fill the void by bringing together experts in different constitutional fields to discuss reform in the wide contexts of the whole. There are five Parts. The first is devoted to constitutional principles and the road to reform, and includes contributions from Professor M. J. C. Vile, Professor J. D. B. Mitchell, Anthony Lester, Lord MacDermott, Stanley Alderson, O. Hood Phillips and Lord Hailsham who favours a new Bill of Rights. The Second Part is concerned with the electoral system. Both the contributors, Enid Lakeman and Edward Mortimer, are concerned with proportional representation. Part Three has six articles on Parliament. Different aspects are covered by Professor John Mackintosh, Professor J. D. B. Mitchell, Sir Richard Clarke, PEP, Professor Bernard Crick and Michael Stewart, the former Foreign Secretary. In Part Four, Government and Administration are covered by Patrick Cosgrave, Brian C. Smith, Sir Richard Clarke, C. H. Sisson and Professor W. A. Robson. There are four articles in Part Five on Local Government by N. T. Boaden, G. W. Jones, Ivan Yates and Dennis Johnson. The final Part Six has two contributions on the Commonwealth by Professor John Holmes and Margaret P. Doxey. The articles are drawn from a number of publications, including three from the *Contemporary Review*. It is altogether a penetrating volume which focuses the need for reform over the whole field of government. The contributors overlap inevitably and their views are not always the same. The articles are short, but valuable and influential.

A Family of Kings (Cassell. £5.50). Mr. Theo Aronson has written a fascinating and delightful account of the descendants of Christian IX of Denmark. In 1852 the Great Powers designated 'an obscure and impoverished princeling,' Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, as heir to the Danish throne. In 1863 he succeeded and died in 1906. This book is the remarkable story of the impact made, particularly through marriages, of his family among the royal and reigning families of Europe. His daughter Alexandra married the future Edward VII, another daughter, Dagmar, married Tsar Alexander III of Russia, as he became; and his son Willie was elected King of the Hellenes. This was only a start; for through later generations the family spread to Norway, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Romania and Spain. This, then, is the domestic story of the family, their personalities, marriages and private lives, and of the Courts where they lived. They all seem to have had a homing instinct whenever possible to the modest Danish Court with its simplicity and lack of ostentation. It is an enjoyable book.

International Film Guide 1976 (Tantivy Press. £2.10). The 1976 edition of the International Film Guide is its usual mine of information. The directors this year who are selected for special consideration range from Cassavetes to Francis Ford Coppola. The special articles include one on Fifty Years of Film Societies, quite apart from such diverse articles as Film Festivals, Film Bookshops, Animation and a World Survey. The book is incredible value for the buff.

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Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 37 Union Street, London, S.E.1. Tel 01-407 0497. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

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incorporating The Fortnightly

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Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £6.48; U.S.A. and Canada $20.00. Rates for all other countries on application.

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Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

May 1976 Vol. 228 No. 1324



ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE INDIVIDUAL ASPECT

by Sir Duncan Wilson

THOUGH the great majority of people in this country have no direct dealings with Russian people, my theme is, I believe, of importance in international relations and any conclusions about it may apply not only to the Soviet Union.

The first problem is, I suppose, whether it is possible to have relations with Soviet citizens in any other capacity than as the committed instruments of a hostile Super-Power. Some preliminary analysis of Soviet Government policy and of the state of Russia therefore cannot be avoided. The following are some important though disputable assumptions.

The Soviet Government is anxious to draw level with or ahead of the U.S.A. and other Western powers in military and other forms of national strength. It may have plans for actively imposing Communism on the world, but if so, these plans probably count for less than the tactics imposed by short-or medium-term international developments. What matters most is the latest telegram at the top of the in-tray. Meanwhile, though militarily very strong, the Soviet Union has an economic and technological base inferior to that of the U.S.A. It has further to meet demands, not only from a 'defence lobby,' but also from an industrial lobby beyond that and of a consumer public. These demands are not so insistent as in the West, but they are growing. In consequence, after various inadequate attempts at industrial and agricultural reform, Brezhnev decided to increase to the maximum commercial and particularly technological contacts with the U.S.A., Japan and the countries of Western Europe.

At the same time, Soviet authorities are determined that one sort of contact shall not lead to another. The Soviet technologist may be encouraged to learn from his Western opposite number the maximum of technical information; he is also meant to close his eyes and ears to other aspects of Western society. To this extent, Soviet policy is determined by ideological conviction. But it is a negative sort of determination, designed to preserve a society officially closed to ideas. The concept that in a free argument

communist ideology can prevail seems to have been tacitly abandoned. The assumption is rather that communist theory cannot stand up to detailed intellectual argument. We should not conclude, however, from this that the Soviet Union is riddled with hostility to the present régime, and that only a strong stimulus from outside is needed to destroy it. Nor should we assume that Soviet society is totally sealed off from non-Soviet ideas.

The last points need some elaboration. There are important factors, apart from the secret police and the use of force, making for the stability of the Soviet régime. The leaders may argue fiercely about policies and priorities, but there is still an enormous common vested interest for the caste of Party and Government officials in maintaining the system. At the bottom all sorts of petty officials enjoy the exercise of their little authority. At and near the top it is a matter literally of life and death that the system should be maintained.

Then, too, among the less political sections (a great majority) of the population, there is a deep-seated longing for peace and quiet, and some satisfaction at progress achieved. I was once shown round the big stores of a small town in Western Russia, with its rather scanty display of consumer goods. I was asked my opinion about it. Before I could answer, my guide intervened tactfully: 'Well, you should have seen it two years ago.' After what my surviving contemporaries have endured in the Soviet Union, they can hardly be blamed for welcoming the gradual increase in prosperity that the present régime has brought them. And this very increase will incline them to turn their backs on the sort of fundamental questions raised by Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, among others.

The younger generation may not have the background of a tragic past, against which the drab present seems quite desirable. Many of them, particularly in the deep countryside or more remote towns (to which Western visitors have virtually no access), are no doubt ignorantly and crudely loyal to the idea of Communism—even if their stock of political ideas is very small. On the other side the Soviet Union is not a completely closed society. In the major cities of Western Russia the younger people in particular know much more than they are meant to about where comparatively reliable news and better consumer goods come from. Many listen to radio services from outside the Soviet Union. Many have properly cynical ideas about official propaganda. The Lenin centenary in 1970 provided some over-ripe examples, such as the story of the furniture factory which produced a triple bed, because, in the words of a popular slogan, 'Ilich is always with us.' They know too that for the normal citizen the Soviet economy functions mainly through the 'parallel market' as the Russians themselves call it—not so much a 'black market' as an extension of barter exchange.

Apart from the young cynics, there are many 'apoliticals' among the better educated of all ages—people whose ideal of prestige and happiness is, for example, a good post in one of those great museums which do much credit to the Soviet régime. None of these are revolutionaries or 'counter-revolutionaries', but in Soviet terms their attitude is far from 'politically

positive.'

And finally there is the numerically small leaven, which has rightly received much publicity, a few open intellectual opponents of the Soviet régime, and probably some thousands of less famous and equally gallant resisters—some of them urging a return to 'socialist legality' and the letter of the 1936 Constitution, some fewer in favour of more fundamental revolution and reconstruction.

This, then, is a crude anatomy of the Soviet end of Anglo-Soviet relations. What should be the attitude of us all, professional men and women and moral agents to representatives of Soviet society? The choice can be indicated by stating polar extremes: we can indicate implacable hatred of the evil aspects of Soviet society by refusing to travel to the Soviet Union, boycotting Soviet goods, boycotting cultural events involving Soviet artists, and confining any contact with Soviet individuals to the minimum times and occasions necessary to tell them how much we dislike their régime. Alternatively we can encourage every form of contact on the grounds that East-West links are the only means likely to mitigate Soviet policies, and that the Soviet Government's fear of them is the best possible proof of their subversive effect.

The first of these polar alternatives may be called the Solzhenitsyn line, the simple and logical attitude of one who has earned by personal heroism the right to say things very unpleasant to un-heroes. Solzhenitsyn's message is that the Soviet Government is a régime evil in itself and implacably hostile to us. For economic reasons it needs co-operation with the West much more than the West needs co-operation with it. If we agree to economic and cultural exchanges we must insist on an adequate political price. Otherwise by supplying them with materials and technique that they lack, we release their resources for building more tanks and rockets. We may perhaps dangerously increase our own dependence on Soviet raw material imports. We shall certainly strengthen the Soviet régime and thereby betray not only the small minority of political dissidents in the Soviet Union but also millions of essentially decent Soviet citizens who are waiting for a lead from the West. Meanwhile, institutional exchanges below Governmental level do much less good than we like to think—indeed, they probably work against our interests. The Soviet expert representatives are official nominees, sufficiently educated to acquire information useful to the authorities, but immunised by conviction or lack of courage against ideological infection from the West. At the individual level, the policy of maximum contact is senseless. The average British citizen's contact with his Soviet opposite number is so carefully channelled and watched as to be of little value in promoting international or individual understanding. When we visit Moscow and Leningrad, we see only the carefully arranged shop window of a very unsavoury business. The sole duty of the conscientious British citizen, in relation to the Soviet Union, is to swell the volume of protest against the Soviet Government's contraventions of human rights, and to make sure that our own Government pursues as tough an official line as possible on all inter-Governmental matters.

The opposite thesis about the value of maximum contact is derived from a premiss as indubitable as the Soviet Government's iniquitous behaviour in the matter of human rights. That premiss is the Soviet Government's fear of ideological infection. Now over many areas of international affairs Soviet and Western interests need not be opposed. But here is a case where it seems logically necessary that they should be. If the Soviet Government want to limit contact with the West in the hope of keeping their society closed, it must be in the Western interest to multiply contacts in the hope of opening up Soviet society. Two rough analogies come to mind—the Fabian socialists who hoped at the turn of the century to 'permeate' British capitalist society, and the Fabian planners for the League of Nations who hoped to develop general international co-operation from such technical organisations as the Universal Postal Union. Let technicians of various kinds work together on concrete tasks, whether in municipal government or on an international plane; their common professional interests will gradually override their national affiliations, and their Governments will gradually see the advantage of less narrowly nationalist policies.

This is, of course, a very long-term argument. More realistically it can be claimed that the Soviet Government can only import effectively the Western technique which they need by opening their society to some extent—whether by admitting Western technicians or by exporting their own. And however hard they try to limit contacts to technicians, and to technical themes, there is bound to be some spill-over. Even the most securely immunised and most closely escorted Soviet technician is bound to learn something more than the minimum technical information from his Western contacts. Gradually the incidental knowledge which he acquires will stimulate him to demand more realistic economic and social theories at home, and a more liberal political climate in which such theories may be put into practise. Thus Western businessmen, professional experts such as doctors, and academics would all be engaged after their kind not only directly in an exchange of knowledge—from which admittedly the Soviet side may learn more—but also in indirect and usually unconscious demonstration that our own way of life in the West is in many important aspects better than the Soviet way. Even the private citizen who visits the Kremlin or some Bolshoi Ballet performance in London is doing more than enjoy himself. Given Soviet theories about strict reciprocity, he is paving the way for more Soviet tourists to visit Britain and for more British ballet companies to visit the Soviet Union.

There are some important assumptions in this argument. It is assumed (by Professor Sakharov as well as myself) that the Western social pattern is more genuinely liberal, and therefore more efficient economically. It is assumed also that there is little danger of East-West technical contacts resulting at this stage (unlike the 20s and 30s) in conversions from liberal democracy to Soviet-type communism. There is a further more involved assumption, about time-scales, which falls into the next stage of the argument.

Here, then, are two opposing theories of East-West relations, with all

their implications for Western individuals. What have the proponents of each to say in criticism of the other? The disciples of Solzhenitsyn would probably criticise as follows those who favour maximum contacts: Essentially the West has been pursuing maximum contacts from 1956 onwards —when Khruschev himself exposed the dark side of Stalinism—with only minor breaks to show disapproval of Soviet policy on Hungary, Cuba or Czechoslovakia. What has been the net result?A marked increase in Soviet armed strength vis-à-vis the Western alliance, and no relaxation—indeed, since 1963 a toughening—of Soviet policy towards their own citizens and repression of human rights. Western statesmen have lulled themselves and their own citizens, by indulging in charades like the Helsinki Conference, into a sense of false security about Soviet power and intentions. The policy of maximum contacts may have long-term and indirect effects which are favourable to the West. But the immediate and direct effects are to strengthen Soviet industry and technology. By the time that any long-term mitigation of Soviet internal policies has been achieved, the West will probably have had to surrender to Soviet power and purpose. The individual citizen must undeceive himself about what he can achieve by private or professional contacts. He must press his own Government not to relax its military or civil defences, and to demand a political price for economic help to the Soviet Union. He must finally not cease from mental strife, or ideological war, and add his voice to public protests against oppression by the Soviet Government within or outside the Soviet Union.

What can be said on the other side by those in favour of maximum contact? The argument from history can be countered. The Soviet Union has certainly become more powerful in the past twenty years vis-à-vis the U.S.A. But this is due more to the Soviet Government's own concentration on its primary aims, or to Western lack of national or 'alliance' purpose, or to American pre-occupations in Vietnam, than to the effects of commercial and technical imports from the West into the Soviet Union. Moreover, as Soviet strength has increased, so have the formidable problems which face the Soviet Union in its role as a super-power—one may mention particularly China and the Middle East. The fear of direct confrontation with the U.S.A. seems in fact to be greater than in the days of Khrushchev and what are now called his 'hare-brained' policies. On the Western side there is indeed continued reluctance to spend enough on defence as a national insurance premium, but this is not correlated exactly to optimistic theories about developments in the Soviet Union.

Then, have commercial and technical dealings with the Soviet Union worked out entirely to Western disadvantage? Apart from any gains for Western industry, there has been some modification of Soviet internal attitudes. Could the most prominent dissidents have survived, could so many Jews have emigrated, without public protest from the West? More important in the present context, would the Soviet authorities have paid any attention to such protest if they did not need continued injections of Western technology? We could, of course, ask a higher political price for this. But would the Soviet authorities agree to terms more absolute than

are laid down in the Helsinki agreements? If (improbably) they did, would they carry them out more effectively than at present? If they did not, would we be willing or able, as an alliance, to apply any drastic limitation to commercial, technical and cultural contacts? It would clearly cause great political difficulties on our side, both within Western countries and between the member-states of the Western alliance, if the present general policy were put into reverse. In the medium term such a reversal might significantly weaken the Soviet economy, but in the short term it would do nothing to revive individual liberties in the Soviet Union. Not only dissidents but large numbers of non-politicals would suffer from the tightening-up which the Soviet authorities would probably undertake.

The conclusion of this imaginary debate is, I believe, that both parties are nearly right. This sounds like an intolerably academic-cum-diplomatic compromise, and needs some explanation. I believe that the 'maximum contact' line in East-West and Anglo-Soviet relations is the right one, partly because the opposite is by now virtually impracticable, partly because the Soviet authorities have shown serious and continuing concern about its possible long-term effects on their society. However, the fact that they decided to adopt what might be called a 'technical contact' policy for their own advantage imposes obligations of caution on us, individually and collectively, in pursuing it.

In the first place we have individually some intellectual obligation to understand something of what the Soviet Union is today. If we are likely to meet Soviet citizens, let us understand something of what they stand for, of their probable convictions, and of the pressures to which they are probably exposed. This first point implies a second. Do not let us hope too much from academic, technical or any private contacts which we can make. They may be specially immunised or chosen by the Party for their political impermeability. More probably they will be reasonably decent practitioners in their own field, with no reverence for the Party, but no desire to cross its path. We must understand their limitations, and on this condition it can do no harm and may do good to make professional and personal contact with such Soviet citizens, if opportunity presents itself. To think otherwise is, in my opinion, to lack faith in the virtues—which are indeed not always over-evident—of our own society.

On a different plane, as citizens of our own country, we must bear in mind, and ensure as far as possible that our rulers bear in mind, the dangers of doing business with a super-power which is avowedly hostile to us. We must make our contributions willingly towards, so to speak, a defence insurance policy against risk from the Soviet Government. We should bear in mind the risks of becoming too dependent on the Soviet Union in any crucial sector of our own economy. We should bear in mind too that we have some leverage against the Soviet Government's internal policies. It may not be great, and it would be counter-productive, I believe, to act as if it were. But particularly while the Helsinki agreements are, so to speak, on approval (they are due to be confirmed in summer 1977), some leverage exists. We should not hesitate to protest on behalf of victims of Soviet

inhumanity within the Soviet Union, so long as the case is reasonably clear. The inter-professional protest is probably the most effective—of archaeologist for archaeologist, of psychiatrist for psychiatrist and so on. Something has already been achieved by these means, if not yet nearly enough.

These are not very ambitious conclusions, and they might prove contradictory on an individual level. I doubt, for example, if Bernard Levin, publicist of many doughty protests, could also indulge in useful conversations, supposing that he had a mind to them, with the editors of *Krokodil* or *Contemporary Music*. Nor do I suppose that the President of the GB/USSR Society, whose function is to increase our understanding of the more positive aspects of Soviet Russia (and vice versa) should sign too many protests. Collectively, however, and nationally the policy recommended is reasonably coherent. Subject to an understanding of what is involved, I believe that a greater mix-up, as Sir Winston Churchill put it, of British (or Western) and Soviet affairs can be useful and need not be debilitating for us.

[Sir Duncan Wilson is at present Master of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. He worked in the Diplomatic Service from 1946-71, and was Chargé d'Affaires in Peking (1957-59) and Ambassador in Belgrade (1964-68). He ended his diplomatic career as Ambassador in Moscow (1968-71), where his wife taught at Moscow University and his younger daughter studied (1964-69) at the Moscow Conservatoire under Rostropovich. He was a Fellow of the Centre for International Affairs at Harvard University from 1959-60, and has lectured and written since 1971 about Communist affairs; he has also written a book on early 19th century Serbian history (*The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic*, Oxford 1970) and edited for the Harvard University Press (1962) a collection of Chinese Communist official documents in translation (*Communist China* 1955: *Policy Documents with Analysis*).]

The above article is based on the Wood Memorial Lecture, given at Hughes Hall, Cambridge, on 23 October 1975 and has been specially adapted for the *Contemporary Review* by the author.—Editor.

POWER AND SUCCESSION IN A MILITARY REGIME: THE CASE OF NIGERIA

by James O'Connell

THE coup that last July overthrew General Gowon had its origins in a set of cumulative grievances: military governors among the twelve states were notoriously corrupt and General Gowon seemed to be procrastinating indefinitely in removing them; inflation raged through the economy, aggravated by sharp salary increases in both public and private sectors, increases in the cost of imported goods, and shortages of goods as a result of the congestion at Lagos port; the national census had been bungled, leaving the country without accepted demographic data on which to base a return to civilian rule; and Gowon had in any case gone back on his pledge to introduce civilian rule in 1976 and had put it off indefinitely. The army commanders were angry and embarrassed by indecisive and corrupt government that was being carried on in the name of the military. The decision to remove Gowon was implemented by the army high command—it is less sure that the actual coup was initiated by them—and the change of government took place without bloodshed.

The government that took shape after the coup combined different groups; there were top army officers—Murtala Muhammed, a Hausa, who became head of state and Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba, who took over as his deputy—who had made their reputation during the civil war but who though respected had no strong personal following in the army; next there were Lieutenant Colonel Shehu Yar'Adua and others of similar rank who represented the younger officers who had promoted the move against Gowon; and, finally, there were Brigadier Yakubu Danjuma and other Middle Belt officers who controlled the combat forces of the army. The new government quickly made it clear that it had no ethnic bias and that it was going to function through collective decision-making. In practice, Muhammed and Obasanjo functioned as the day-to-day executive; Yar'Adua and others took over some executive posts and remained an influential ginger group that kept up pressure for a 'clean up' of government; and Danjuma and other army officers took the army in hand, retained the right of ultimate veto over government decisions, and formed part of the bodies making the most important decisions.

The new government startled the country with its decisiveness. It laid down a time-table for a return to civilian rule and set up a committee to work out a draft constitution; it removed the old state governors, replaced them with its own men, and reduced the power of state governors; it set up a committee to propose new states and it quickly implemented a 19-state structure as soon as the report came in; it set up a committee to consider the possibility of a new capital, and after its report had come decided on a new capital in the centre of the country; and it postponed and scaled down the holding of the World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture

which had become a symbol of the waste and corruption in the previous regime. It also gave a more dynamic image to foreign policy by supporting the MPLA in Angola. The government made a traumatic impact on the country's elite groups by instituting a purge of the public services: senior and junior men alike were eliminated for corruption or inefficiency from federal and state structures (the overall number came to about 10,000); both the police and the army officer corps were purged; and the universities were relieved of a certain number of their members. The purge has had ambivalent effects on the functioning of the country. On the one hand, it has opened up new opportunities for younger men and consolidated support among them for the new government—and generally it has conciliated socially aware Nigerians who were convinced of, and angry with, corruption in high places. On the other hand, it has resulted in great nervousness among senior bureaucrats who are now more afraid than before to take decisions. There has been a slowing down of administration because of this unease and because of the damage caused by the loss of experienced (if not always upright) public servants. It is significant that though the new government has had some success in reducing the number of ships waiting at Lagos, it has not had considerable success in coping with shortages, breakdowns in the various public services (the electricity corporation, airways and railway, not least), and inflation.

Certain immediate pressures built up against the post-Gowon government from the circumstances of its take-over, from its collective make-up, and from its own deliberate policies. Much more than the Gowon government through most of its history, its successor government has confined real power to military officers and has spread officers throughout the federal authority structures and reserved the governorships of the 19 states exclusively to them. At the same time the government has consciously risked trouble with its army's 'other ranks' in deciding to reduce the army's size by half so as to lessen financial costs and improve efficiency. The increased militarisation of the government was bound to create tensions (for reasons different from those for the dissatisfaction with Gowon) within the army. These tensions seem, in fact, to have been a factor in the recently attempted coup on February 13th, 1976, in which the head of state, General Murtala Muhammed, was killed. They have, moreover, been exacerbated by the attempted coup. The level of distrust within the officer corps was revealed by the long hours that it took the army to react to a move by a small group of soldiers—all the top brass had dived for cover. Power has also awkwardly shifted within the government as a result of the coup. The three groups that emerged after the Gowon coup have had their lines blurred; the head of state is now a Yoruba; a Hausa presence has been effected by promoting a young colonel, Yar'Adua, to Brigadier and giving him Obasanjo's former post as chief-of-staff (supreme headquarters), thus technically placing him in charge of army generals; and the executions after the coup suggested that the Middle Belt officers were to some extent tearing themselves to pieces.

Apart from the problem of tensions within the government, it has other problems to deal with. Though the purge generated support for the new

regime, the junta does not have the kind of legitimacy that Gowon built up in the course of the civil war as the 'saviour of the nation.' This reduced legitimacy leaves the government more vulnerable than its predecessor in the event of political or economic conflict. Furthermore, as a Nigerian observer remarked recently, each coup lowers the threshold for the next coup—and since Nigerians value stability almost certainly more than anything else they must be acutely unhappy that one attempted coup and rumours of others bedevil the record of the post-Gowon government and create anxiety within the country—for example, the Yoruba students at the University of Jos left en masse for their own part of the country in the aftermath of the February coup. Finally, as tensions within the government and pressures from aspiring civilian politicians coincide, a conceivable outcome could be a hurrying up of the return to civilian rule.

Serious social and economic problems—some of which have already been mentioned—are likely to confront for some time to come any government that rules in Nigeria. Inflation is still rampant; relations between social classes and between different occupational groups remain uneasy in the wake of new parities set by the Udoji Commission under the Gowon government; the unions are chafing over pay curbs and differentials; petrol and other shortages persist, adding to inflation and creating hardship; breakdowns and inefficiencies continue in the federal corporations; the setting up of the new states brings with it costs in temporarily lowered administrative efficiency as well as in capital and recurrent expenditure on more buildings and increased establishments; and the congestion in Lagos port—though reduced by measures taken by the present government—is almost certain to prove intractable for several more years. Against these problems, however, must be set certain positive aspects of the Nigerian economy. Petroleum revenues, which have benefited enormously from the OPEC initiative in raising prices, remain currently just as high as the Nigerian government wants them—and the Central Bank is faced with the happy problem of deciding how to place expertly its reserves in foreign currencies. Within the economy a veritable industrial revolution is taking place: new investment is multiplying and industries are proliferating. And the government is carrying on with just and sensible measures (they were inherited from its predecessor) to leave a much greater share of their earnings with the producers of export crops—and for those farmers who produce cash food crops increased urbanisation and higher prices have been bringing a greater prosperity.

Whatever the immediate pressures on the existing military government—which are too powerful to be ignored and which could erupt and cause another break in governmental stability—there are serious longer term problems facing the country. Summed up in broad categories these problems are four: finding a new political class, creating economic growth and employment, working out a more equitable social distribution of wealth, and easing the tensions between the main peoples.

1. There are difficulties in finding a new Nigerian political class of good calibre. First, honest men seem hard to find. The independence regime and the Gowon regime went out in a cloud of corruption. Those who take over

government do not apparently easily resist the temptation to enrich themselves—with the exception of an honourable minority. Moreover, discerning Nigerians remark with some pessimism that corruption marks not only ruling groups but permeates society. A dismaying feature of the last years of the Gowon government was that highly placed public servants who, as a class, had previously been largely immune from suspicions of corruption, became heavily implicated in dishonest practices that flouted both professional and social standards of integrity. It might be argued in mitigation of political and administrative corruption in Nigeria that a certain level of corruption is inevitable and tolerable in a country where no great loyalty to the state exists, where opportunities for gain are abundant and technical controls over malpractices weak or non-existent, and where all too frequently bribery seems the only way of getting the wheels of administration into motion. But the degree of corruption that has come to light in the Nigerian regimes passes any tolerable limit. And public reactions to perceived corruption in Nigeria suggest that whatever plausibility there may be in the 'inevitability of corruption' the Nigerian political audience will not condone the phenomenon. In a strange way Nigeria, which is no puritan country, has a puritan backbone.

The second difficulty in finding a new political class derives from both the shortness of the time available and the artificiality of the conditions. Officially, political activities have been illegal for over ten years. Though the present military government intends to lift the lid on politics before the 1979 return to civilian rule, the time is going to be all too short for groups to make their mark on the national scene. Moreover, a military regime resembles a terminal colonial regime in that, though it may permit politics, it does not hand over power fully until it itself withdraws. But not until they actually wield power can politicians obtain a proper sense of power—its use, its timing and its crucial restraints and limits. Moreover, not until politics enters into full play can the political class discern the location and the strength of the various political forces in a country. This discernment becomes all the more acute in Nigeria if, as is rumoured, the constitutional committee comes up with proposals for a presidential system of which there has been no previous experience in the history of its civilian politics. But more important again the 19-state system alters all the previous patterns of power. Though the large number of states and the existing revenue distribution formula suggest that the centre will take on increasing power, the state structure creates a new situation for recruitment into federal and state politics and adds an element of unpredictability to the future of politics and parties.

2. The Nigerian economy is booming at present. The expansion of administrative posts and opportunities for promotion in the public services and the growth of the private sector greatly conciliate the elite groups who most benefit from this pattern of growth. Yet there are few signs that the government has a coherent grip on the direction of the economy — the third national development plan is an ill-assorted collection of projects that have not been costed properly and that are based on few feasibility studies. In

many respects the lack of governmental control permits the economy to grow less inhibitedly than otherwise. Positively, government is wisely putting an enormous amount of investment into the infra-structure which will serve to underpin growth. But a lot of money is also going into the construction of government buildings and into paying the civil bureaucracy and the military. Nigeria can ill afford to waste money or to indulge in ventures that commit budgets to unnecessary recurrent expenditure. Once the country develops beyond its present level, it will quickly discover—as Iran has discovered—that seemingly large oil revenues are not sufficient to meet the capital needs of a huge country. This discovery could also coincide in good measure with aggravated urban unemployment that the expanding educational system is bound to contribute to. Experts estimate that no matter how fast industrial expansion takes place it is only going to be able to absorb about 10% of the work force coming on the market in the foreseeable future. Though there is evidence to show that the commonly accepted belief that all school leavers desert the land is not true, the move to the cities, particularly Lagos but also Kaduna, Kano, Warri and Enugu, is such that severe trouble could arise both from the dissatisfaction of the unemployed themselves and from the burdens they place on the employed relatives and townspeople with whom they live. Such social trouble could be compounded by discontent within the ranks of secondary school leavers and university graduates who may have, with time, to settle for posts lower than those their earlier hopes aspired to.

3. Behind the technical problems of economic growth lies an unresolved ideological problem on the role of the state. Only the state controls enough indigenous capital in Nigeria to implement industrial and other schemes of economic growth. But the state does not have the ideological will nor the executive capacity—nobody has made this point about capacity more trenchantly than the present head of the federal civil service, Mr. Alison Ayida—to take over the major sectors of the modern economy. In consequence, the state has to accept the existence of a large-scale private sector in which foreign firms play a disproportionately important role. Recent indigenisation measures have understandably sought to reduce foreign holdings by obliging firms to sell a proportion of their shares to Nigerians and by requiring foreigners to withdraw altogether from certain sectors of the economy. Governments have also been trying to channel as many of the contracts as possible to local firms. The trouble with these solutions is that they provide enormous money-making opportunities for the wealthiest section of the Nigerian elite. They may also be economically detrimental, at least in the short run, to the majority of the population—and they most benefit entrepreneurial groups in the coastal towns who are well placed to take advantage of federal spending. In essence, the indigenisation measures create a class of client capitalists who depend on government patronage and on the concern of foreign firms to associate politically influential persons with them rather than on genuine entrepreneurship. The upshot is to make a small number of Nigerians immensely rich and to deepen, often visibly, the gulf between their levels of personal spending and

those of the middle-level elite groups. Such income disparity combines with the more general if less steep gap in income between senior service bureaucrats (and thir counterparts in the private sector who earn even more than they do) and all the other salary-earning members of the economy—not to mention the peasants who remain massively underprivileged. The discrepancy that exists between senior and other ranks in the civil services is paralleled by income disparities between the officers and other ranks in the military. The existing disparities are evoking sentiments of relative deprivation among the middle and lower paid workers. While the latter still cherish hopes of social mobility for themselves—to join them rather than to beat them—they may go on finding income disparities tolerable. But once upper mobility slows down, there is bound to be frustration; and harsh judgements are likely on a social order that is highly unjust.

4. The problem that complicates all other problems in Nigeria is 'tribalism' or competitive and modernising ethnicity. The country is a multi-national state that contains different national groups—some of them like the Yoruba, the Ibo and the Hausa of great size. Only colonisation brought these groups together under the same political rule. Before the conquest no one of them had even been united on an ethnic basis. The strong linguistic and cultural differences between the ethnic groups or nations and traditional suspicions of control or domination by other groups leaves them all uneasily together with one another within one country. Ethnicity has provided the most accessible basis for organising competitively in the modern sectors of the economy and in the struggle for posts and promotions in the public service. The Ibo attempt to secede in 1966-70 was only the most extreme embodiment of ethnically organised competitiveness. Ibo secession aspirations have almost certainly not been exhausted with the failure of Biafra. Ethnic rivalries generally remain bitter and deep in contemporary Nigeria—and they are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The new 19-state structure may soften aspects of the political collision of the peoples but it will not eliminate ethnic conflict.

In spite of the conflict that ethnicity brings with it, the confluence of peoples and their numbers within wide boundaries is one of the greatest assets that the Nigerian federation has. They provide a market for industries and agriculture that makes many projects viable which in a small country would be hopelessly uneconomic. Moreover, in times past—and in good measure still—the diversity and spread of cash crops among states and peoples have helped to stabilise the economy and prevent dependence on a single crop that characterises a country Ghana. Finally, the existing extent of the Nigerian state makes it possible to spread oil revenues throughout all the states and peoples—luckily in this respect the oil is mainly found in the areas of the smaller peoples—and to underpin a more general economic growth.

Nigeria has two great sets of assets—leaving aside the huge oil revenues without which, since the end of the civil war, the country would have had a balance of payments problem alongside which Ghana's would look minuscule. The first is the enormous investment in education that has been

going on since the early 1950s and is now paying off as great numbers of skilled persons pour into the economy. As many as 5,000 university graduates are being produced each year; and primary and secondary graduates number hundreds of thousands. Moreover, the new universal primary education drive—in spite of poor organisation in the most needy states—is bound to step up the availability of skills in those Northern areas that have lagged behind the rest of the country in education. It is true that middle level skills—plumbers, electricians, motor mechanics, etc.—are still in short supply and the educational system is still less geared to producing them than it should be. But as the need for such skills is made clear by the expanding economy and remuneration for them improves there will certainly be a greater will to produce them. Finally, the expansion of education suggests that there is hope for a political class that is better informed and more able than the previous lot of civilian leaders and that is aware that its performance is being judged by a relatively sophisticated political audience.

The second great asset Nigeria has is the sheer ambition and energy of its inhabitants. Few places in the world must be able to match the sheer determination to make good that marks Nigerians who have moved into the modern sectors of the economy. In this respect education seems to fuse healthily with qualities that arise out of traditional values, social structures and attitudes to productivity. Clearly a revolution of rising expectations could go sour in a revolution of rising frustrations. But that risk is a much happier situation than the presence of inertia. Nigeria can hope to avoid a stereotypical Latin American stagnation.

There is danger that should labour strife and social upheaval against privilege occur in Nigeria, disgruntled middle-level persons may take over power from the currently ruling upper intelligentsia. That outcome could be disastrous as the prevailing regimes in Uganda, the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea amply illustrate. A takeover by the sergeants and control by the clerks is something that the sheer common sense of Nigerians and their respect for skill mays avoid. At the same time some disorder may be the price to be paid for faster economic growth, more upright commitment to the affairs of state and greater social justice than the upper intelligentsia, left unpressured, would provide. In short, there are many reasons for being optimistic about Nigeria's longer term prospects. But the country can scarcely look forward to development without tears.

[Professor James O'Connell is a Visiting Professor in the Department of Politics in the University of Warwick. Until last year he was Professor of Government at Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria.]

THE EEC's ATTACK ON POVERTY

by Helen Tobert

A MAJOR breakthrough in the field of European social affairs was achieved on 21 January, 1974 when the Council of Ministers of the European Community resolved 'to implement, in co-operation with the member states, specific measures to combat poverty by drawing up pilot schemes'. Up until then the Community's principal motivating force — its drive towards economic advance, had dominated its activities in the field of social affairs and focussed attention on people simply as members of a labour market. Social policy was seen as a means of promoting full employment, to achieve an efficient use of manpower. The new Poverty Programme breaks away from this framework, to investigate the general conditions of those who have failed to cash in on Europe's growing prosperity and who may spend an entire lifetime on the poorer fringes of society.

In its new gesture towards poor people, the Community is not trying to usurp the role of the member states, who remain primarily responsible for the care of this group of people within their own borders. The Poverty Programme can however perhaps achieve something that national policies can't do, by drawing together the experiences and knowledge of different countries and co-ordinating this information for the mutual benefit of all of them. The limited resources and experimental nature of the Programme make any direct impact on the problem of poverty impossible at this stage, but the intention is to stimulate cross-national co-operation and a new exchange of ideas to bring about more far-reaching solutions in the long term. Following the Resolution of the Council of Ministers, the Commission was charged with drawing up the Programme in detail. Consultations were held with member governments and voluntary social welfare organisations throughout the Nine, culminating in a seminar of both government and non-government experts, held in Brussels in June '74. Even at this early stage the mutual learning process among the various countries was already apparent. Speakers from different national delegations put forward contrasting definitions of poverty, but many felt that the essential problem was the way in which poor people were excluded from established society because of their extreme lack of money. There was a gradual concensus of opinion on the interrelationship between these economic and socio-cultural aspects of poverty and it was agreed that action to combat poverty must contain both economic measures (re-distribution of income and social security for example) and socio-cultural measures (such as social work and education). Strikingly, countries such as Denmark, Germany and Holland considered that they had eliminated the economic factors causing poverty, while Italy, Ireland and the UK admitted that this was the major hurdle they still had to cross. These differences in national priorities emerged clearly when countries finally came to choosing their projects.

These discussions with national experts provided the Commission with much of the framework for the Programme itself, in particular the finally accepted definition of the poor as 'an individual or family whose resources are so small as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life of the member state in which they live'.

The aim of the Programme drawn up by the Commission is to focus attention on those who fail to take advantage of existing benefits available to the poor, and to discover why this happens. Countries were asked to submit a number of pilot schemes which would investigate the problems of a particular group of people or those living in a specific area where poverty was widespread, or alternatively schemes concerned with creating special new services for the poor or with adapting existing services aimed at the population at large to make them more responsive to the needs of poor people. The Commission stressed that the kind of schemes it was looking for were those which would cover new ground and would have a significant impact on the development of future policy. It was particularly interested in projects which were concerned with problems found in more than one member state. In every project there would have to be scope for the poor themselves to participate not just in the running of the scheme but if possible in planning it also. Furthermore, the Commission wanted to encourage schemes involving a multi-disciplinary approach, with contributions from social scientists, social workers, psychologists and others. As well as those pilot schemes there was also scope for granting aid to pilot studies which could carry out research into the nature, causes and extent of poverty.

The Council of Ministers finally approved the Commission's proposals in June 1975 though regrettably by this stage economic stringency had dampened Community enthusiasm for extra spending on social affairs. Germany, the largest contributor to the Community's budget, was particularly reluctant, and the Council finally had to agree to cut the Programme from a possible five years to two. Just over £1m was made available from the 1975 budget, with somewhat over £1.1m to come in 1976, which may have to be raised from savings on other items of social policy. The Community funds in general about 50% of the cost of projects, the other half being contributed by member governments.

While the Poverty Programme was having a rough passage in Brussels, it was also running into difficulties in Britain, where the process of selecting projects for submission was giving rise to a considerable conflict of interests. Following its involvement in the seminar of national experts in Brussels, the National Council of Social Service had established an advisory committee, consisting of voluntary organisations working in the field of poverty, to put forward suggestions for possible projects and to ensure that the expertise of non-government agencies in this field was put to good use. The Department of Health and Social Security, the Government Department responsible for the Poverty Programme, had originally seemed inclined to ignore the work of the Committee and submit its own projects, but it was a tribute to the months of hard work put in by the

members of the Committee that the DHSS finally abandoned its own schemes and accepted seven family day care centre projects submitted by voluntary organisations.

The victory was only partial however. Apart from family centres, the Committee felt that welfare rights projects were of the most pressing importance, given the Programme's definition of poverty and the burden of the economic recession carried by the poor. The Government's final submission however included no welfare rights projects, the reason given being that no money could be found in existing expenditure programmes to supply the funds for this kind of project. (The Government is not setting aside any additional funds to pay for the Programme but taking it from existing sources such as the Urban Aid Programme). The Committee suspected that in fact in the present economic climate the Government didn't want to take on projects which might lead to additional demands on the Exchequer, as welfare rights projects would obviously do, by encouraging people to take up their benefits.

Another explanation for the financial pressure on the Government was that the Scottish Office had latched onto the fact that a quarter of UK poverty is supposed to be in Scotland, and therefore laid claim to a large slice of the poverty funds. By the time the Government had made similar gestures towards Wales and Northern Ireland, very little was left to be spent on anything else, but why the residue should have gone to family centres rather than welfare rights remains unanswered.

In the end, the Government decided to award grants for four main types of project:—

a) Aid to voluntary organisations providing family centres essentially designed as self help projects.
b) Community resource centres.
c) Certain community action projects.
d) Small research studies into deprivation.

The total amount of cash to be granted to the projects is about £850,000 over two years, which is roughly shared between the Commission and the UK Government.

In detail, the UK projects which were finally given the go-ahead at the end of last year are as follows:—

1. *Family day centre project.*

The seven voluntary organisations concerned, who will each run their own individual schemes, are the London Council of Social Service, Gingerbread (Croydon), Aide à Toute Détresse (Camberley), Defoe Day Care Project Committee (Hackney), Cambridge House and Talbot (Southwark), Camden Family Service Unit, and Liverpool Personal Service Society.

The aim of the project is to experiment with different approaches to the job of helping the poorest families to come to terms with the particular ill effects of extreme poverty — social and cultural isolation, depression and the sense of despair. There will be many kinds of different activity:— help with bringing up children and encouraging them to play; providing after school and holiday time play facilities for children of one-parent

families; running discussion groups; increasing educational opportunities for both mothers and children; training older mothers to help younger, more vulnerable families, and giving people the chance to learn domestic skills as a temporary release from the pressures of home. All these various kinds of help are in response to the expressed needs of the people they are designed to support, who themselves choose the kind of activity and the setting.

2. *Area Resource Centre — Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation*

The centre will be based on a major town which has widespread areas of deprivation. It will act as a focus for community work, by providing advice and practical help for field workers and local organisations, particularly self-help groups. The project will also assess the value of such centres in general.

3. *South Wales Anti-poverty Action Centre*

A consortium of local groups has been formed to set up a centre employing a team of workers which will include a lawyer, community workers and a research and development officer. The objectives are to provide information and assistance to groups, to ensure feedback so that deprivation is better understood and consequent policies more effective, to look at the practical implementation of existing policy and to give special attention to poverty in rural areas.

4. *Lothian Regional Council — Social and Community Development Programme*

The Local Authority will run the project with the aim of eventually achieving full participation of the local community in decision making. Using a method which combines the principles of corporate and area management, the project will concentrate on varied areas of multiple deprivation within the city of Edinburgh. The result of the scheme should be that more resources are attracted to these areas, that decisions taken are more in line with the total needs of the community and that the poor themselves gain more of a sense of being able to control their own destiny and improve their position.

5. *Edinburgh — Craigmillar Festival Society*

The plan here is to bring together a professional team of social planners, architects, artists, educationalists and so forth to reinforce an existing team of local people, including local councillors and officials, and together carry out a comprehensive local plan. The project will form part of the ongoing activities to improve the ward and aims to give the local community greater understanding of factors which inhibit developments within the area.

6. *National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux*

The aim is to improve the effectiveness of CAB in giving advice and information about the rights of appeal to social security tribunals and the procedures involved, and also organising lay advocates to attend these tribunals. As a first step an extended CAB service will be provided in six or seven CAB areas.

7. *Northern Ireland Department of Health and Social Services — Two*

Surveys

The first survey will be carried out by an interdepartmental team who will look at the extent to which government and other services are being taken up and fulfilling their purpose in the field of housing, health and education. As well as improving the effectiveness of services the survey also aims to reveal the extent of multiple deprivation and estimate the value of treating certain areas as areas of special need.

The New University of Ulster's Department of Administration will carry out the second survey, to look at the role of voluntary organisations in meeting social needs.

Cross-national Projects

In addition to these schemes the UK will also make a contribution to the two cross-national studies being organised under the Poverty Programme. The first of these involves the Institute of Community Studies in London, together with the *Institut für Angewandte Sozialwissenschaft* in Germany and the *Centre de Recherches et de Documentation sur la Consommation* in France (more manageably known as INFAS & CREDOC). These three organisations will carry out a comparative survey of poverty in the three countries, to investigate the composition of poverty groups and the operation of social services. The project has two stages and will have to prove its value in the first part before money is granted for the second.

The EEC Commission is responsible for the second cross-national survey. This will be achieved by adding an extra poverty dimension to its existing questionnaire, which goes to consumers in some 5,000 homes in each EEC country, to find out people's views on the current economic situation.

The wide range of British projects is impressive, with seven schemes out of an EEC total of 25 and a major share of the total funds available for the programme. However this doesn't only reflect the varied approaches to poverty in Britain, but also underlines perhaps the severity of the problem in this country compared with our wealthier European partners.

In terms of new ideas and approaches however the Programme has rather more to offer. Already common themes and problems have emerged throughout the member states, reflected in the choice of projects. Notably the social isolation of the poor has been stressed, their need for self determination and the necessity to give support both to the family unit and in the context of the community. Although the extent and nature of poverty may vary widely from country to country, the experience gained from different methods may now be evaluated and applied more widely and to greater effect. Not least, the Poverty Programme is an example of the potential powers of co-operation between European nations, a chance to prove that they can in fact act as a community, not just a common market.

[Helen Tobert is in charge of the European Desk of the National Council of Social Service and is Editor of *Look Europe.*]

THE NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION OF 1975: Part Two

by Juliet Lodge

IT has been argued in New Zealand that once social issues became the dominant concern of the electors, an Alf Garnett mentality achieved prominence. This is perhaps seriously to under-estimate the public's ability to comprehend and differentiate between discrepant policies, but it does suggest the degree of issue over-simplification consequent upon concentration on such issues as immigration and housing and other related social issues. Indubitably many electors felt that by curbing immigration, health, housing, law and order, and industrial relations problems would be alleviated. Superficial 'causes' of the doubling of housing costs coincident with Labour's term of office, scarcity of mortgage finance, especially for middle income earners, and lengthy hospital waiting lists for some forms of treatment could be attributed to the rate of immigration which had been restricted to 30,000 per annum—an entry rate considered excessive by many. Deteriorating industrial relations could also be attributed to the alleged infiltration of New Zealand unions by 'pommie agitators,' and increasing law and order problems especially in Auckland, to the inflow of Pacific island immigrants, and short-term work permit holders.

There was certainly a good deal of support for National's policy on immigration. Where Labour declined to stipulate numerical limits on immigration, favouring instead the regulation of immigration 'at a level that the country can absorb without social or economic strain,' and a humanitarian policy of restraint, National promised to reduce immigration to 5,000 per annum and announced on December 12th 1975 an immediate provisional halt to immigration from Britain which has since been lifted. National's undertaking to deport 'any person, who, within two years of his arrival, is convicted of an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment' was widely interpreted as a policy both to curtail immigration from the Pacific Islands, to control law and order problems, and as a threat to industrial law breakers.

The link between immigration, industrial relations and the preservation of industrial democracy was tenuous but not insignificant, given the degree of issue over-simplification that took place. Those who attributed strong unions to British influences, those who believed strong unions to be antithetical to the New Zealand way of life, and those who suspected that the operation of 'closed shops' would ultimately be detrimental to employee interests in addition to employer interests if it inhibited the mobility of the former, not only approved of National's immigration policies but supported National's pledges to abolish compulsory unionism in favour of voluntary unionism, and to insist upon respect for industrial dispute-solving procedures. That the National Government intended taking a more active part in industrial relations became immediately apparent when it successfully

averted serious industrial action by junior doctors and bus drivers.

Not surprisingly, foreign policy hardly entered the election debate. There was some discussion of relations with South Africa given the divergent attitudes of the major parties to sporting contacts with South Africa; and references were made to priority areas: the National Party stressing its intention to reassert the primordiality of relations with OECD countries, Britain and its EEC partners. On assuming office, the National Government announced its intention to intensify relations with these countries and to send a Minister to the EEC in early 1976. While it is unlikely that the National Government will reverse Labour's policy of increasing contacts with countries of South-East Asia and the South Pacific, it will refocus attention on traditional allies. There is likely to be a fair degree of continuity in New Zealand's policies towards the EEC, although it is possible that the National Government might endeavour to take a stronger line.

Both parties have been concerned with New Zealand's crisis of identity, but this has manifested itself in different ways. The outgoing Labour Government's concern was establishing New Zealand's international identity as a small South Pacific country, whereas a priority for the National Government is maintaining New Zealand's identity as a developed member of the community of western nations. The aims are not mutually exclusive. They simply alter the relative emphasis accorded foreign and domestic policies.

The Labour Party attributed its failure to gain re-election to the rapidity with which it implemented new policies, and to its failure to adequately communicate its ideas to the public both during its term in office, and during the campaign. The Labour candidate for Hamilton West maintained that the election result showed that voters 'did not want the very things that (Labour in 1972) had been elected to accomplish.' But perhaps it would be truer to say that whereas in 1972 voters had agreed with Labour's slogan that it was 'Time for a Change,' in 1975 they were not satisfied that Labour could adequately cope with deteriorating economic circumstances. There was, in addition, some support for the views of the late Prime Minister's wife, Dame Ruth Kirk. She maintained that some of the culpability for Labour's defeat lay with 'trendy lefties' and 'intellectuals' and told the press that 'You can't fool people with a lot of fine words today. They want the basic things . . . something stable.' She felt that Labour had suffered through the loss of her husband (whose son was elected in his seat) and that the three year term of office was too short to allow a party to prove itself. Critical of aspects of Labour's policies, she condemned the propensity of New Zealand parties to follow overseas trends: '. . . too many gimmickry things were looked at. They happened overseas so they were tried here. Not only Labour but all parties tried them.'

The National President of Federated Farmers offered an alternative explanation corresponding to an analysis of electoral trends. He argued that the majority of voters were swinging voters, 'fickle and devoid of political philosophy.' This is an exaggeration but it is probably true that New Zealand electors tend to opt for the more experienced and conservative

candidates in times of economic stress.

Analysis of electoral trends suggests that the 1972 election result was an aberration, and that 1975 reinstated the conservative bias in New Zealand politics. This further suggests that in 1972 voters were not so much voting positively for a Labour Government as against the National Government. It could be that the 1975 election result was similarly a function of negative voting: high expectations of the Labour Government having been generated which it was only partially able to fulfil, but which it failed to be seen to be fulfilling.

In allocating ministerial positions, Mr. Muldoon's aim was to avert excessive fragmentation of responsibility for various sectors, and to ensure that as far as possible Ministers did not hold overlapping responsibilities. Multiple portfolio holding is common in New Zealand and other small democracies. It is not unusual for Prime Ministers to hold the Foreign Affairs portfolio, but whereas both Mr. Kirk and Mr. Rowling held these, Mr. Muldoon chose to rationalise ministerial responsibilities in such a manner as to combine the Foreign Affairs and Overseas Trade portfolio, taking Finance as his second portfolio and appointing a Deputy, and an Associate Minister of Finance to assist him. This is an unusual and formidable combination, not least because of the key role of the Treasury in government, and its primordial role in the Economic Committee. This functions as a type of inner Cabinet to which the full Cabinet delegates details of policy-making. Its role was downgraded by Mr. Kirk in 1972 in favour of his Policy and Priorities Committee whose focus was broader than that of the Economic Committee. However, Mr. Muldoon intends to obviate problems of co-ordination and communication consequent upon this, and to reassert the pivotal role of the Finance Ministry since he believes that sound social policies can only be expected within the context of a sound economy. To facilitate this, he reorganised the Prime Minister's department; and recruited both his own team of economic advisers, and specialist press liaison staff. The major tasks of his economic advisers is to liaise with interest groups, and to produce original reports in conjunction with government departments: the aim being to keep the Prime Minister well-informed of economic developments, the impact of government policies and to maximise economic efficiency.

One of the Government's first objectives is to prove wrong the gloomy OECD forecast for New Zealand in 1976 which predicted an inflation rate of 17% against the 8.5% norm for other OECD members; a drop in GNP by 0.5%, and industrial production by 1%; no growth in private and Government consumption; a $1,200 million deficit in the balance of accounts; a 3% drop in import volumes but a 12.5% rise in import bills; a 4% rise in exports, and 14.5% rise in export earnings; plus a trade deficit of $350 million compared with those of $700 million and $941 million in the preceding two years. Shortly after being sworn in, Mr. Muldoon raised petrol prices by 22.7% (with immediate effect), rail and freight charges by 60%, electricity by 30%, and post office charges by 25%, arguing that the alternative was a 50% increase in income tax. Increases in the price of

bread, and reduction of the milk subsidy were also announced. Further stringent measures including tighter monetary controls and wage increase restrictions are expected to be introduced during the early months of 1976. The National Government consulted the Federation of Labour with a view to limiting the January wage-order, but stressed that a wage-freeze was 'inappropriate.'

There was little public reaction to these measures, the most controversial issue thus far being Mr. Muldoon's request that Citizens for Rowling sitting on various boards and bodies resign. Thus far, the Government appears to have public support for measures of economic stringency. However, leading unions have indicated their opposition to measures that would result in redundancies, but unless the Government is able to solve the bus drivers' dispute there could be some industrial strife, since the bus drivers have the backing of other unions including the seamen. On assuming office, Mr. Muldoon solicited the cooperation of the Federation of Labour 'for the good of the people of New Zealand.' He wishes to minimise the possibilities of industrial strife and has emphasised that the burden of righting the economy must be fairly shared.

Although Labour Party members privately admit that New Zealand could now face the prospect of a decade of uninterrupted conservative rule, the Party has no intention of using industrial strife for politically expedient ends. Shortly after his defeat, Mr. Rowling stressed that in Opposition the Labour Party would be 'forthright, fair and constantly vigilant, [acting] in accordance with the rules of Parliament.' Despite his earlier announcement that if re-elected he would serve but one more term, it seems likely that for the foreseeable future, Mr. Rowling will remain leader of the Labour Party and will lead the Opposition in Parliament.

NOTES (for Parts One and Two).

[1] In 1867, a Maori Representation Act was introduced as a temporary measure giving Maoris separate representation for an initial five-year period which was subsequently indefinitely extended. Under this system, Maoris have four seats by right in Parliament, giving 8% of the population 5% representation in the chamber. The system of separate representation remains contentious and a satisfactory solution has yet to be found.

[2] This was dubbed the 'baby bonus' since, under the scheme, every mother (irrespective of marital status) would receive $600 for the first child born after the introduction of the scheme, and $300 for the second. The money was to be paid into a superannuation account. Alternatively, parents could decide to have a lump sum family benefit of $500 on the birth of the first child, and $300 on the birth of the second.

[3] *Citizens for Rowling Campaign*, Auckland, 1975: 10-13.

An analysis of the voting in the recent elections, based on opinion polls conducted by the National Research bureau and the *New Zealand Herald* and details of the National Cabinet (in order of seniority), may be of interest. Part One of *New Zealand After the Elections* appeared in the April 1976 issue of *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 228 No. 1323.—Editor.

R. D. Muldoon	Prime Minister; Minister of Finance; Minister in Charge of the Legislative Department; Minister in Charge of the Audit Department; Minister in Charge of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.
B. E. Talboys	Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs; Minister of Overseas Trade; Minister of National Development.
J. B. Gordon	Minister of Labour; Minister of State Services.
D. MacIntyre	Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries; Minister of Maori Affairs; Minister in Charge of the Rural Banking and Finance Corporation.
L. R. Adams-Schneider	Minister of Trade and Industry.
D. S. Thomson	Minister of Justice.
G. F. Gair	Minister of Housing; Minister of Regional Development; Deputy Minister of Finance.
L. W. Gandar	Minister of Education; Minister of Science and Technology.
T. F. Gill	Minister of Health, Minister of Immigration.
Sir Keith Holyoake	Minister of State.
C. C. A. McLachlan	Minister of Transport; Civil Aviation and Meteorological Services; Railways.
W. L. Young	Minister of Works and Development.
E. S. F. Holland	Minister of Energy Resources; Electricity.
A. McCready	Minister of Defence; Police; War Pensions; Rehabilitation.
H. J. Walker	Minister of Social Welfare; Government Life Insurance Office; State Insurance Office; Earthquake and War Damage Commission.
P. I. Wilkinson	Attorney-General; Customs; Statistics; Assoc-Minister of Finance; in Charge of Inland Revenue Department; Friendly Societies.
V. S. Young	Lands; Forests; Environment; Valuation.
H. R. Lapwood	Tourism; Publicity; Government Printing Office.
H. C. Templeton	Post-Master General; Broadcasting; Public Trust Office.

	Seats		% Votes	
	National	Labour	National	Labour
1960	46	34	47.59	43.40
1963	45	35	47.07	43.74
1966	44	35	43.64	41.44
1969	45	39	45.22	44.18
1972	32	55	41.45	48.48
1975	55	32	47.70	39.50

Trends in the popular vote:

%	Nov 75	Sep 75	July 75	May 75	Mar 75	Nov 74	Sep 74	May 74	Nov 73	May 73	Nov 72
Labour	44	39	40	43	42	44	50	44	47	51	48
National	46	52	51	46	46	44	40	44	44	39	42
Socred	6	5	5	5	6	7	5	6	6	5	7
Values	4	4	4	6	6	4	4	5	3	5	—
Others	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	1

THE NATIONAL THEATRE: THE EARLY STORY AND SOME PERSONAL ASPECTS

by F. D. Littlewood

IN the House of Commons on the 11th November 1975, Mr. Hugh Jenkins, Under-Secretary with responsibilities for the Arts, answering a question addressed to the Secretary of State for Education and Science, said that steady progress had been made towards the completion of the new building with a view to the National Theatre Company opening in it to a paying public in March 1976. At last one can look forward with confidence to an event that has been planned and battled over with high hopes and bitter disappointments for longer than a full life-time.

Even so the opening will be somewhat piecemeal, a situation brought about by the current economic situation. The National Theatre building is divided into three; the Lyttleton Theatre (890 seats, proscenium-stage); the Olivier Theatre (1,160 seats, area-stage) and a small theatre to be called the Cottesloe. It is in the Lyttleton where the first production will take place, with Olivier Theatre opening in the late spring, and it is hoped the Cottesloe about the same time.

Despite this opening by instalments, official or otherwise, there will no doubt be speeches, congratulations, statistics relating to the thousands of pounds that have been spent for this and that, and to the size of this and the area of that, and a list of architects, designers, artists and technicians of all kinds who have played a part, and also some tribute to the Government bodies, the Arts Council and other organisations who have contributed money. Much of this may now have to wait for the 'formal opening-day celebration' that has been announced and is expected to take place soon after the theatre opening is complete. All this will be recorded for posterity to see and wonder about, and perhaps this is a good moment to recall the work of some of those countless people who over the years have taken part in the struggle and contributed their suggestions, criticism and enthusiasm, and hours of work and concern.

Very early in life I was made vividly conscious of two things, first that to have a National Theatre was a supremely important idea, but as it led to long and tedious argument was a subject to be avoided, and as was natural in the circumstances for many years I had little understanding and no sympathy with the project. An attitude I gradually learned was often shared by many older and apparently sensible people.

My father, Samuel Robinson Littlewood, who was born just over a hundred years ago, was a dramatic critic completely devoted to the theatre and to all that was good in it. He did not spare his family at any time during his working life of fifty-two years in and around Fleet Street from his passionate hopes as they rose and fell that a National Theatre would be achieved some day. As a schoolboy I was able to detect the

opening moves, say at the Sunday dinner table in Wimbledon, to get the conversation round to the topic. Filial deference and loyalty could however not restrain me from time to time reminding him that we had already heard of how he came to convene the critical meeting at the Lyceum in 1908, nor how Sir Henry Irving, to whom he was completely dedicated, was a staunch 'supporter'.

The National Theatre first came into my life when as a small boy of about six I had been taken to the Earls Court Exhibition and, after spending a little time on a replica of Drake's ship the 'Golden Hind', I went with my father to what I gathered was a reconstruction of Shakespeare's 'Globe' theatre. The word 'Shakespeare' did not come strange to my ears for I knew that he was a very great person indeed and even more godlike than Henry Irving, but I saw little attraction in standing around in a chilly breeze listening to my father and friends talking seemingly without end in front of a wooden scaffold-like structure upon which some kind of rehearsal was going on. It did not seem to me to be at all like a theatre, a place to which from the earliest possible age I was accustomed to be taken to see pantomimes, and was associated with curtains, lights, warmth, comfort and ultimate happiness. However it was clear my father was talking to important people. The word 'Archer' kept coming up with regularity, and I fancy that a big man with a deep voice was possibly Patrick Kirwan, a Shakesperian producer from whom I learnt a good deal in later life, and another I feel sure was William Poel, Founder and Director of the Elizabethan Stage Society to whom the others listened with deference and who I gathered more by his manner than by what he was saying, was strong in his condemnation of something that had been said. Poel was no doubt expressing comments in line with those that he subsequently wrote in *Shakespeare in the Theatre*[1] — I still have the volume he later gave to my father — 'Unpleasant and ungracious as these remarks may appear to those who look to the Earls Court Exhibition as a means for raising money for a national theatre, they are not unnecessary'.

The day however ended fairly disastrously, for in recompense for being so patient at the discussions that had taken place in this so-called theatre, I was taken to the 'water shoot' in what would be termed these days a nearby amusement park, and as the flat bottomed boat in which we were sat on benches careered down a steep incline into a pool, my father slipped off the seat and did an injury to his back from which it took him a long time to recover, and was a source of sciatica which troubled him for many years. I can well remember the look of agony on his face as he lay curled up in the bottom of the boat, and am not likely to forget how the reward given me for patience over that theatre argument ended.

As the years went by, however, I mastered the prejudice and became a better audience for my father, who on journeys to and from the West End or to theatres farther afield, or on walks in the West Country where he was fond of going in search of Arthurian legend, would talk at length in the most unlikely places on his hobby-horse, and even against my will some of his buoyant enthusiasm brushed off on me.

Looking for a practical starting point, one can go back a long way into theatrical history. Certainly David Garrick had ideas and later on so had Charles Dickens; in 1848 a concrete suggestion for the establishment of a national theatre was put forward by Effingham Wilson, a London publisher. However I was brought up to believe its real foundation was the book by William Archer and H. Granville Barker *A National Theatre* and subtitled a *Scheme and Estimate.* Though actually compiled and privately printed in 1904, it was not published till 1907[2]. The authors said in a preliminary note 'We need not enter into our reasons for not publishing it at that date: it is sufficient that they have now ceased to operate.' The authors however set out the names of seven outstanding theatre personalities of the day who had 'carefully considered' the scheme and had expressed their belief that it could in all probability be successfully established. The delay in publication may very well have been due to the persuasion needed to getting all the distinguished sponsors to agree; the signatures were — Henry Irving, Squire Bancroft, J. M. Barrie, Helen D'Oyly Carte, John Hare, Henry Arthur Jones and A. W. Pinero.

Archer and Granville Barker prefaced their book with a long quotation from Mathew Arnold's famous essay of 1880 'We have in England everything to make us dissatisfied with the chaotic and ineffective condition into which our theatre has fallen'; after apt references to 'clap-trap', Arnold went on to urge the nation to concern itself about the theatre 'The theatre is irresistible; organise the theatre!' Mathew Arnold was another parental enthusiasm, and in later years I can well remember being taken off to devote a cold Sunday afternoon to explore the churchyard at Laleham where Mathew Arnold was buried, at a time when my father was preparing his anthology of the *Essays in Criticism* — another occasion when I was treated to an open air dissertation on the need for a national theatre.

In 1905, the year in which I was born and Henry Irving died as my father would oddly remind me from time to time, at a meeting at the Mansion House, a Committee had been set up to prepare for a Shakespeare Memorial in connection with the tercentenary in 1916 of the poet's death. This Committee, with many important names on it, did not seem able to agree on anything but a statue. Certainly after an offer of £1,000 had been made by Richard Badger to the London County Council for the setting up of a statue of Shakespeare Sir John Hare, a leading actor and manager of the day, demurred to the use of the offer in this way. Sir John asked instead for the founding of a National Theatre. 'Such an institution', he declared, 'would at once remove the existing stigma on our stage, rescue it from the chaos in which it finds itself, raise the position of drama in this country to the same dignity it obtains in France, Germany and Austria, and be a noble and lasting tribute'. However, for a number of reasons, some of them unexpressed, but which were possibly personal an atmosphere was created against anything that embraced a theatre. The self interests that were at work in this connection made my father very angry; at that time he was not at all like the 'genial critic of the Morning

Post' that Geoffrey Whitworth describes in *The Making of the National Theatre* to which I refer later. My father's feelings were best reflected in a letter he wrote some years later (I still have Sir John Hare's note of approval) in the *Pall Mall Gazette* in reply to Sir John Forbes Roberston,

> Red herrings have been dragged across the path at every turn, and every spark of sincere and unofficial enthusiasm for the theatre adroitly quenched in favour of tercentenary celebrations, land purchases, buildings, gardens, statues, balls, exhibitions, Shakespeare huts, anything else but the theatre.

The conflict of ideas reached a critical pitch in 1908 when the Committee nominated at the 1905 meeting, headed by the Lord Mayor of London, wrote a lengthy and rambling letter to the *Daily Chronicle* for which my father was writing at that time concluding that

> The proposal for a national theatre appeared to be fraught with so many elements of controversy that the originators of the Shakespeare Memorial Movement who had set among their aims a permanent memorial to serve as the token of a world wide homage to Shakespeare came to the unanimous decision that the Memorial should be an architectural and symbolical monument.

In publishing this letter the editor Donald (later Sir Robert) who was solidly behind my father's activities if he did not in fact encourage many of them, added a stinging note pointing out that it had 'an evident bearing on the great Shakespeare Memorial Demonstration to be held at the Lyceum on May 14 and the unanimous decision of the Lyceum Committee in favour of a National Theatre is being confirmed every day'.

According to my father, who had with the co-operation of Ernest Carpenter, then running Romeo and Juliet at the Lyceum with Matheson Lang and Nora Kerin in the title parts, and given him 'without a word of controversy' the use of the theatre, the 'Monument Committee' were completely defeated on a popular vote and the theatre was decided upon. The meeting was chaired by Lord Lytton and it was the occasion when Bernard Shaw delivered his still famous apophthegm 'The subject is not exhausted but we are!' The subject was certainly by no means exhausted — the two Committees were amalgamated. Dr. Israel Gollancz who had been secretary of the 'Monument Committee' was, again to quote my parent, 'by way of consolation' and on a 'profession of faith in the theatre', appointed honorary secretary of the new blend. This Committee, which my father joined — and at times he must have been an awkward member as for many years he was suspicious that aspirations of the 'theatrical side' were likely to be thwarted — was only formally disbanded when the legal arrangements drafted in 1963 for the theatre on the South Bank site were finally completed.

During the Committee's existence there were of course all sorts of conflict such as ideas of using (and possibly adapting) existing theatres, for instance the Lyceum, Drury Lane, and in particular the Old Vic — a source of inspiration for so many and whose incorporation in the final arrangements was only decided in the last years of the negotiations that led to the final phase. But to retrace a little, 1909 was a significant year in the National Theatre's story. It was then the Committee presented their first petition to the London County Council, and possibly linked with

this, it was the year in which Sir Carl Meyer made his all important gift that enabled the Committee to think seriously about site acquisition. Like so many human affairs, the spark that lights the flame is someone who is actually prepared to give something and does so. In this case it was £70,000 given through the Hon. Mrs. Edith Lyttleton (late Dame Edith) and of course mother of Oliver Lyttleton (later becoming Lord Chandos) who played such a devoted, patient and outstanding part in making the National Theatre a practical and successful proposition.

The petition to the London County Council in 1909 sought assistance in finding a site in general terms; a second petition presented in a somewhat different manner in 1911 was more specific and asked for an option on the site of the old County Hall, Springfield Gardens, when the new County Hall at Westminster Bridge should be completed. In fact an option was given and once extended before being dropped. These two petitions which are still carefully preserved at the County Hall on the South Bank not far away from where the present National Theatre building operations are in their final stages, are really most notable for the illustrious array of their signatories, politicians like Winston Churchill, F. E. Smith (Lord Birkenhead) and Sidney Webb; literary figures like Barrie, Pinero, Galsworthy, as well as leading stage personalities such as Beerbohm Tree, Irene Vanburgh and Lilian Braithwaite. Critical opnion and thought as represented by the editors of the leading periodicals of the time were in support as evidenced by the signatures of both Edmund Gosse then editor of the *Fortnightly,* and Dr. G. P. Gooch, editor of the *Contemporary Review,* and as my father would have noted if not ensured, that of Robert Donald, editor of the *Daily Chronicle.* Bernard Shaw replied to the form sent to him with a telegram of one word — 'Yes'.

Besides serving on the Committee, Shaw was very adept at giving his support sometimes with some apt phrase or in some subtle way. *The Dark Lady of the Sonnets* (1910) was a skilful piece of propaganda though as he said with his own charm later it brought more applause than subscriptions.

In 1913 the Committee bought a site in Bloomsbury, at the corner of Gower Street and Keppel Street where the School of Tropical Medicine now stands. Here for many years stood the structure, used during the first world war mainly by the Y.M.C.A. for the entertainment of the Forces and often referred to in disparaging tones as the 'Shakespeare Hut'; the much heralded tercentenary slipped by in 1916 buried almost unnoticed in the struggles of the war. With peace, the argumentation and conflict started again, and the Bloomsbury site was sold in 1923. As a young man trying to find a suitable career, hopefully interested in the theatre and writing but wisely guided by my father into the comparative security of the law and local government in particular, two contrasting impressions remain in my mind of National Theatre discussions. One was a visit to Dr. Israel Gollancz at Kings College in the Strand — distinguished in the world of English literature he might have been, but I found what he had to say dull and dreary, and on leaving he offered me

the limpest hand I have ever tried to shake; all this brought me into full agreement with my father, who averred that in dealing with 'Old Golly' as in family conversation he irreverently referred to the learned professor, one had to remember he knew little about the theatre. A pleasanter and livelier discussion was at dinner with Henry Arthur Jones dramatic author, a friend of my father's and famous in his day; he however was not well, and found it difficult to get away from what he said in *The Foundations of a National Drama*[3] but personally saw to it that my portion of caviar was an ample one. The full story of these years (and up to 1951) has been told in *The Making of a National Theatre* by Geoffrey Whitworth, a dramatic critic and founder of the British Drama League (now the British Theatre Association) and who became Hon. Secretary of the Shakespeare Memorial National Theatre Committee, to give its full name; a position to which my father recorded he 'had pleasure in recommending him.'[4]

Geoffrey Whitworth was a man well versed in the performing aspects of the drama and the dangers from purely literary figures receded, though much of his steadfast work and patient enthusiasm over the years is often overlooked in the galaxy of names that now appear in the credit lists. In his work for the theatre, Geoffrey Whitworth had the advantage of the full support of his wife. Phylis Whitworth (Phylis Bell), an actress with organising ability and one who had a zest for promoting newer but worthwhile plays, and was a person not easily discouraged, must have been a great help during the difficult years of the late twenties and early thirties when so much apathy reigned. Geoffrey Whitworth described in his book the obstacles, and recollected an instance in which I know my father found considerable encouragement

> Except for a purely formal meeting in the early spring of 1929, the Committee was not called till October and then only three members, apart from the Honorary Secretary, turned up — Sir Frank Meyer in the Chair, Mr. Holford Knight and Mr. S. R. Littlewood. Yet this meeting was of crucial importance, illumined as it was by a new ray of hope from an unexpected quarter.

The Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, in answer to a question asked by Mr Holford Knight in the House of Commons, said in effect that if the divergent interests who were pressing for a National Theatre came to an agreement 'my answer is partly an invitation for them to do so'.

The Making of a National Theatre then tells of the steps that led up to the next important stage, the purchase in 1937 of a site in Cromwell Gardens, opposite the Victoria and Albert Museum, South Kensington, and the unusual ceremony of 'taking seisin' in April 1938 when Bernard Shaw, who was in his best form, handed over to Geoffrey Whitworth, as representing the Trustees, a sod of Kensington turf dug from the site and a twig, saying he was there as 'the next best thing to Shakespeare'. Shaw went on to affirm that not only had the land been paid for but it was the ground on which the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre would one day be built. Right in so many things, Shaw was wrong about this. However Sir Edward Lutyens, one of the country's foremost architects, was engaged and started work straight away on his designs.

Everything seemed set fair; an appeal was launched and got under way with an attractive brochure issued on 1st July 1939 (the cost donated by the Worthing Arts Development Scheme) in which the notable theatrical and other figures of the day, following a 'Foreword' by the Earl of Lytton, pledged their support. Those who wrote ranged from Dame Sybil Thorndike (*You shall take seisin*) to C. B. Cochran (*A National Theatre; a National Asset*), from Yvonne Arnaud (*My Dream Theatre*) to the Rt. Hon. J. R. Clynes (*Our Dramatic Need*), from Gracie Fields, C.B.E. (*It's Champion*!) to Lord Snell, representing the London County Council of which he was Chairman; Geoffrey Whitworth promised the support of the *Amateurs*, for though earlier he had a lot to do with the Little Theatre Movement, he used the word also in its literal sense — he nevertheless pointed out that there were 3,000 unprofessional societies affiliated to the Drama League and clearly implied their keen support. My father's contribution to the booklet started, as I would have expected, with a quotation from Henry Irving 'Our art alone has no local habitation. Should the scheme of a National Theatre be carried out great results might follow. The difficulties of systemisation would be vast; but the advantages would be vast also'.

The appeal really only had moderate success though the aim was only a further £95,000. A special effort was made to interest local authorities, possibly the first endeavour to get their support to a cultural affair in the national sense. With my background I felt involved in this, as I was working at the time for the County Borough of East Ham (of which I later became Town Clerk) and had to own up to the optimistic representative of the Appeal Committee that I had miserably and completely failed to get any support from my employing Council. The idea being promulgated was that seats in the theatre should be 'endowed' in the name of a famous place or person. At the handing over ceremony Lord Snell had been only able to quote success with fourteen councils, all broadly in the London area, who had pledged the required donation of £100. Others no doubt followed later but not as I recall in any large numbers. I was much saddened by this failure, for just as my father was suspicious of any state or local government entanglement (indeed later as editor of *The Stage* he had some hard things to say about the Arts Council) I was very much of the mind that more should be done by local authorities for theatre. My views were sufficiently strong to lead me a little later to take the lead in establishing in Cheltenham (from where I watched the national theatre complexities from a distance) a Civic Playhouse along lines that delighted Geoffrey Whitworth, and also to persuade the Council to buy and continue the local professional theatre to which he also came. Incidentally both these ventures are still going strong. Successful at the time, though now out of print, was my *Law of Municipal and Public Entertainment* welcomed by Lord Ismay (Chairman of the Festival of Britain 1951) who wrote an introduction as a means of persuading Councils to use the entertainment powers given them in 1948 through the

instrumentality of the Rt. Hon. Aneurin Bevan. This was the year in which the historic National Theatre Bill was introduced into Parliament following the formation of a Joint Council in 1946, and on 21st January 1949 Geoffrey Whitworth records as he listened to the debate he saw 'party strife give way to party concord and that any criticism which arose took the form of a complaint that the sum voted was not even larger . . .'. The sum was limited to £1,000,000. Matters had taken this turn as during and after the second World War it had been realised that the South Kensington site was really too small, and with the South Bank beginning to be thought of as London's exhibition and possible cultural centre, an exchange of sites was negotiated and agreed upon.

During these years the Old Vic had been battling on magnificently, sometimes closely involved and sometimes not (the Governors actually signed the 1946 Joint Council Agreement). My father was a devoted and ardent supporter of Miss Lilian Baylis, the Old Vic's heart, soul and manager, whose praises he was always singing. In the nature of things I met her many times, from my school days on, when I was often taken to those splendid performances during the days when players whose names are now household words performed in ill-fitting costumes, battered scenery and props before patched and faded claret colour curtains. My father would have been immensely proud of the illustration of Lilian Baylis in Richard Findlater's recently published book of her life[5] and showing him seated next to her in the stalls, and even more so that his shadow appears behind her on the cover.

After the war new and great influences were at work in the theatre world — the greatest perhaps Laurence Olivier (afterwards Sir Laurence and now Lord Olivier). In 1951 H.M. the Queen (now Elizabeth the Queen Mother) laid the foundation stone on the South Bank though the actual site has had to be moved. I recall my father, much heartened by this, wrote joyfully that this Royal backing ensured that there was little doubt that sooner or later the theatre would be built. Conflicts of policy, administration and finance arose, and it proved to be much later, very much later. However, in 1963 a National Theatre acting company started life with a production of *Hamlet;* in the same year Denys Lasdun was appointed Architect. 1966 saw the taking of a key decision to proceed with the theatre at a cost of £7½ million with the Government and the Greater London Council contributing £3¾ million each. All this public money will be spent before the National Theatre Company move over from their present London home at the Old Vic and their *Hamlet* once again walks the boards in March 1976 — this time in an actual building of the National Theatre. I'm not sure how my father would view all this; appalled at the cost no doubt, he would have been content.

1. Sidgwick & Jackson 1913.
2. Duckworth & Co.
3. Chapman & Hall, 1913.
4. Article in *English.* Magazine of English Association (Vol. VIII. No. 48).
5. *Lilian Baylis.* Richard Findlater. Allen Lane, Penguin Books Ltd.

CLASSICS IN THE SUN

by D. W. Thomson Vessey

IN September 1974 I left London to cross the Atlantic to Washington; from there I continued my journey through Atlanta, Georgia, to Gainesville in north central Florida, where I was to take up my duties as Visiting Professor of Classics at the University of Florida. It was with some diffidence, despite the promise of a mild winter, for long exposure to a subtropical climate is not to every Englishman's taste. When I stepped off the plane at Gainesville Airport, still clutching my London raincoat (but without other luggage, for Heathrow had, for unexplained reasons, decided to send that on later), the temperature was well up in the nineties with commensurate humidity. For a few days I wondered if teaching and research were possible in the steamy heat and learned to thank the Muses of Science, not usually my favourite deities, for air-conditioning and ice-machines. This, for someone who had waited for three months in Britain, deckchair poised, to move into the garden and acquire a tan, may seem like ingratitude to Apollo. But what the Floridians call acclimation does not occur overnight; even they, in moments of candour, admit to looking forward to autumn and winter. The exceptions to this rule are generally those bronzed and brazen youngsters who spend much of the day by the pool and most weekends at the beaches. But in a surprisingly short time, helped by the generous hospitality of my new colleagues, I learned to appreciate the climatic character of the Sunshine State. From November until March the weather was—with rare interludes—almost perfect.

One of the first impressions, surely, of any British academic visiting an American campus for the first time and surveying the students, must be that there are giants in these days. So many of them look as if they have been reared like prize Texan cattle that it produces in the rest of us an unjustified sense of nutritional deprivation. The commonest explanation for this phenomenon is the cult of Vitamins and Good Red Meat, supported by a passion for sports and games, mostly incomprehensible but all strenuous and requiring a panoply of protective costumes: but I find this answer unconvincing. It is probably just a result of the national obsession with Bigness that is projected, by psychic osmosis, from sprig to sprig.

There are nine universities in the State System of Florida, of which UF is the oldest. It has been established in Gainesville since 1905 and it is no exaggeration to say that the University is Gainesville. With about twenty-eight thousand students (a number still expanding) and a proportional supply of faculty, ancillary staff and service-industries, the domination of Gown over Town is inevitable. The campus itself, of about 2,300 acres pleasingly dotted with palms and other trees lacy with Spanish moss, is large by American standards and enormous by British. It includes Lake Alice, in which dwell the University's mascots, alligators. All over the city you will see representations of these reptiles, with varying degrees of biological credibility; it took me a mere two days to realise that the Fighting

Gators, urged to 'Go!' on store-fronts, bill-boards and bumper-stickers, were in fact the University football team. (It had quite a successful season, I understand, but I did not succumb to visiting Florida Field for a home game. Sixty thousand people regularly did, so my absence went undetected.)

Situated on and around campus are the houses of those national fraternities and sororities that have established chapters in Gainesville. The Greek Community (inaptly named, as it seems to a classicist) is now flourishing again after a few years of decline in the radical sixties. These Greekless Hellenes are alleged to wield power and influence in student politics. Though dressed à la mode in tee-shirts and cut-offs, they drive about in Cadillacs and Mercedes. As my apartment overlooked two fraternity houses I was able to gain some insight into the pastimes and social mores of the rising generation of Sunshine-staters. From a distance, it seems a pleasant life. The remaining students, who are unsuccessful in ingratiating themselves at the Rush Parties of the frats and sors, are unsympathetic to their ambience or simply cannot afford them, make other housing arrangements, on or off campus. Some, it is said, 'live in dorms and study a lot,' while others rent apartments and mobile homes. For graduating at College is expensive. British students have their grants, however derisory they may seem in face of inflation, and should be grateful for them. Their American counterparts pay their own way. If they have no wealthy relatives (and many in Florida do, for wealth is everywhere in evidence), this means seeking part-time employment. Students serve in restaurants, run boutiques and seek dollars wherever they may be found. Such independence in the quest of education is to be admired, evidence of a continuing resistance by Americans to the Omniprovident and therefore potentially Despotic State.

If the principal undergraduate anxiety is often financial, that of faculty may frequently centre on job security. After five years, each professor may be granted a permanent position (tenure) by vote of the tenured members of his department. If he does not obtain a majority, he is automatically dismissed. The criteria on which he is assessed are three-fold, publication, teaching, service—excellence is desired in two respects. Untenured faculty obviously face problems; their quinquennium of probation is potentially daunting. An outsider might well feel that revision is required in this system. Strange too are the differentials in pay between academics of the same rank and seniority in the various colleges—Medicine and Law are most favoured financially. Such a scheme would be looked at askance by the AUT. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Yet the primary consideration should be service not subject.

What of the Classics in Gainesville? During the year the Board of Regents (who govern the State University System) gave permission for the establishment of a separate Classics Department within the College of Arts and Sciences. Heretofore, Greek and Latin had come under the aegis of the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures. The recognition of the independent status of classics at Gainesville is a matter for jubilation for those concerned with teaching the subject. The credit for this development is to be assigned to Dr. Gareth Schmeling, who combines his role as Chair-

man of Classics with that of Chairman of Humanities in University College (in which freshmen and sophomores are enrolled). Schmeling too has been predominantly instrumental in obtaining for the University a grant of about one million dollars from the National Endowment for the Humanities, a government sponsored foundation which channels both public and private money to institutions and individuals working in the humanist disciplines. The grant to UF will be used to develop courses in those colleges—such as Business Administration, Law, Medicine—where the perspectives of literature and art have been eroded. These and other plans by the Florida Endowment for the Humanities are rightly based on a recognition that liberal ideals are fundamental to the whole educative process in Universities. In Britain, as I wrote in the *Contemporary Review* some years ago,[1] such ideals have sadly faded: perhaps an American example will be properly considered here. Let it not be too late.

The NEH grant came at an auspicious time. While I was there, the University of Florida had to adjust to the threat of a recession and to the need for economies across the board. The Regents imposed a limit on faculty appointments and quite stringent fiscal restrictions. The annual budget did not expand in accordance with predicted needs. It is to be hoped —and the omens are at present encouraging—that this economic situation will soon improve. (This is particularly vital in relation to the Library, for current limitations on book purchases, however short-lived, are prejudicial to scholarship.)

In December I attended the Convention of the American Philological Association in wintry Chicago. This gathering is held annually, conjointly with the American Institute of Archaeology. An astonishingly wide selection of papers and meetings take place, yet time is still available for special excursions and for those informal exchanges between academics which are so valuable for those working in specialised areas. The Convention is also the occasion for people seeking placement—and they are not a few in number—to be interviewed by prospective employers, for there is no American equivalent to *The Times* for advertising university appointments. With about fifteen hundred delegates drawn from all over the States and Canada the atmosphere is at times hectic but nonetheless stimulating.

In Chicago I was able to see that the classics are by no means in such a moribund condition in the US as they are in Britain, though optimism was not entirely universal. From my discussions with representatives from various states it was apparent that student demands for knowledge of the life and literature of antiquity was on the whole waxing rather than waning: new approaches were, therefore, needed in a new situation but many experiments were already operative or at least on the stocks. Here, too, the University of Florida may be expected to provide an imaginative lead. The teaching of the Greek and Latin languages from the most elementary stage to graduate level will be maintained and augmented. But it is recognised that other terrain is equally worthy of cultivation. It was a useful experience for me to be able to teach a course—on Mediterranean Narrative Literature —to students who, though unversed in the ancient tongues, were willing to

read Homer, Herodotus and Virgil with (in most cases) a genuine enthusiasm and no little critical acumen. Other courses of similar type, for example on the Ancient Novel, Archaeology, Mythology and Women in Antiquity, are already part of the UF syllabus. The FEH intends to pioneer classes on Greek Medicine and Roman Law in the near future for those studying for medical and legal qualifications. There can be no doubt that broader horizons lie ahead to be explored, with the over-riding aim of fostering literary, aesthetic and historical awareness among all the students of the University, irrespective of their chosen 'major.' Classicists must, and will, show the adaptability needed to meet this challenge. The day in which Rome was not built was at least a day in which the vision of Rome was actualised in the minds of its builders. In America the urgency is understood; Britain cannot afford to lag behind.

During my stay I also had the pleasure of visiting the State University at Tallahassee, Florida's attractive capital. This was originally a women's college, Gainesville's female equivalent. Both have, of course, long been co-educational and Tallahassee's Seminoles are traditional sporting rivals of the Gators. At FSU there is an active Classics Department; even my somewhat technical lecture on Flavian epic was gratifyingly well attended. It seemed pleasantly exotic to cross the Suwannee River to provide an account of recent work on Valerius, Statius and Silius. Later I addressed the Language and Literature Club at UF on *Love's Fantasies*: *Catullus, Donne, Rimbaud*. This Club serves as an excellent forum for communication between those professors and students engaged in humanist studies.

Post-Watergate America may be peculiarly sensitive to the fact that technology unleavened by liberal perspectives is an instrument of self-destruction. An ecology of the mind is as vital as conservation of natural resources. The establishment of the FEH has revealed that it is possible for co-operation to exist and fructify not only within the various disciplines that make up the humanities but also on a broader inter-disciplinary basis. Attempts to achieve the same type of cross-fertilisation in this country remain largely thwarted by rigid infra-structures at most universities which is a tragedy and a disaster. Since I speculated on the future of classical studies in 1971, the rays—such as E. J. Kenney's Inaugural Lecture as Kennedy Professor of Latin at Cambridge last April[2]—that have penetrated the prevailing gloom have been regrettably few and far between. My experience in Gainesville has, however, not only left me with many happy personal memories and new friendships but also hardened my conviction that, given the will, there is still a place for classics in the sun.

NOTES

[1]'Classical studies: have they a future?', *Contemporary Review*, February 1971.
[2]*New Frameworks for Old*: *The Place for Literature in the Cambridge Classical Course* (CUP 1975, 50p).

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE FUTURE

by Terence Davidson

MORE people are out of work in the Western industrialised countries than at any time since the great depression of 1932-34. A generation that has become accustomed to fairly full employment is disturbed to find that perhaps one worker in 20 is now out of a job.

Few realise that 40 years ago the ratio was in some places as high as one person in five. And fewer still, probably, are aware that unemployment rates as high as 10 to 20 per cent prevail in many of the larger cities of the developing countries to this day.

In terms of massive human deprivation, there really is no comparison between the 300 million of the developing countries who are out of work, or performing menial jobs yielding inadequate income, and the 18 million plus who are unemployed in the industrialised West. The socialist countries do not usually publish statistics of this sort, and so they cannot be taken into consideration here.

However, the 18 million unemployed, and the 25 million or so family members who depend on them for a living, do represent personal suffering in the Western world on a scale that merits concern. A nation such as Britain can perhaps 'afford' five per cent unemployment in an economic sense; but there is far more to the problem than mere economics.

There is, for example, the crushing blow to the self-respect of a man who has to tell his family that his services are no longer required, even though this is through no fault of his own. There are the middle-aged people with few skills who, as time drags on, slowly come to realise that they simply might not get another job again, ever.

There are young school-leavers, eager to make their way in life, who find every door closed to them and who are quick to feel a chill sense of rejection by their world. And there are migrants, often poorly treated at the best of times, who are particularly vulnerable to loss of income. Where will they go? What will they do? It is not difficult to imagine their feelings, especially for those with wives and children looking to them for support.

How did the Western world get into this plight of five per cent unemployment? There is no shortage of theories; a number of causes ranging from oil to inflation have their advocates. One likely interpretation is that in the past, the economic ups and downs of the industrial West were uneven: Europe might be riding high on a boom while North America was in the dumps. At other times it was the reverse. But in 1972, all the industrialised countries had a boom at the same time. And having all gone up together, they all came down together.

In the 12 months to last September, there was an increase of six million in the number of people unemployed in Europe, Northern America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand: a huge jump from 11 million to more than 17 million in one year.

More than half the increase occurred in Europe, where the upward trend appears to be continuing. In July 1975 the United Kingdom passed the million unemployed mark for the first time since 1940. In March 1975 the proportion of unemployed United States workers to the labour force reached 9.1 per cent (8.5 million out of work), the highest rate since 1941; but the situation picked up somewhat during the year, so that the overall rate for 1975 was below eight per cent.

Another indicator is the duration of unemployment, and this too has been increasing. To take the United States again, the average duration of unemployment was 16 weeks last November, nearly twice as long as it had been a year previously.

There are two relatively bright spots in this bleak picture. One is that industrial countries provide much better social security protection to the unemployed than they did 40 years ago—not entirely out of charity, but because they try to preserve the purchasing power of the workless, so as to prevent unemployment from spreading. The second is that more attention is paid today to the need for retraining, for channelling people out of jobs that are disappearing and into sectors where employment growth can be expected.

Enlarging our view to take in the developing countries, as well as the developed ones, we can say that governments in general are learning to pay far more attention to employment than they did in the past.

Fuller productive employment is increasingly (but still not sufficiently) recognised as an effective means of promoting national development and of giving each citizen a share in the fruits of that development.

It is also increasingly recognised that there are limits to what many governments can do by themselves to improve employment within their own borders: external factors, such as falling commodity prices, can more than offset a nation's efforts to create jobs.

There is a need then for international co-ordination in tackling the vast task of providing productive work for the 300 million or so who are already without it, and for the 800 million additional people who will join the world's labour force between now and the end of the century.

Consultation between nations on specific problems has in recent years become an accepted technique for defining possible solutions. The current series began last autumn with the special session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss a new international economic order. Earlier this year, rich and poor countries came together in Paris to discuss energy, raw materials, development and finance.

Employment will have its turn in June, when the International Labour Organisation, a specialised agency of the United Nations, is to hold a World Employment Conference in Geneva. A prime objective of this world gathering of governments, management and labour will be to see that employment is given due weight in development planning.

Discussion will focus on the following main topics:

1. National employment strategies and policies, with particular reference to developing countries.

2. International manpower movements and employment.
3. Technologies for productive employment creation in developing countries.
4. The role of multinational enterprises in employment creation in developing countries.
5. Active manpower policies and adjustment assistance in developed countries.

The ILO hopes that the conference will endorse a set of principles to guide national governments in devising development policies, and that it will adopt concrete proposals for international action to complement national strategies.

For British industry the fifth item of the agenda, manpower policy and adjustment assistance, will be of special interest. How far can a democratic industrial country go in accommodating the employment needs of the developing countries, without being accused by its own unions of exporting jobs? Yet is it not better to prepare ahead of time for structural changes in industry by means of planned retraining and adjustment schemes, rather than to wait for structural unemployment to impose decisions on us?

We may have clearer thoughts on these sensitive topics by the time the World Employment Conference comes to an end on 17 June.

[Terence Davidson is Information Officer for the International Labour Office in Geneva.]

The June issue of the *Contemporary Review* will include a symposium of articles on *The World of Islam Festival 1976* to be held in the U.K. April-June. Particulars of the Festival may be obtained from The World of Islam Festival, 37 Queens Gate, London, S.W.7.



LITERATURES IN ENGLISH

by A. Norman Jeffares

WE sometimes forget how long literature in English has existed outside England. Until recently we tended to read histories of English literature which included all writing in English. But there were the Scottish Chaucerians, for instance, and in Ireland there were the anti-colonial writings of Molyneux and the more impressive ironies that Swift based on Molyneux's arguments—*The Story of the Injured Lady, A Modest Proposal, The Drapier Letters* and *A Plea for the Universal Use of Irish Manufactures,* to name but a few of them. While both Molyneux and Swift were antedated by an American author, eighteenth century American authors do not seem very different from those of Britain. The label 'Chaucerian' had indicated the closeness of the Scottish writers to Chaucer himself. And Swift is generally regarded as part of 'English' literature for *The Battle of the Books, A Tale of a Tub, Gulliver's Travels* and, of course, the political propaganda which propped the Tory ministry, helped to topple Marlborough and bring about the peace. (Molyneux, perhaps, is duller going, not easily accessible and known mainly to historians or *aficionados* of Anglo-Irish literature.) Irish versions of the English language became more widely known through the development of the regional novel as an art form by Maria Edgeworth's *Castle Rackrent* of 1800; Scottish versions were made popular by Scott who was inspired by her example.

Eighteenth century American writers did not seem to differ much from their contemporaries in Britain; characteristic American writing in English probably first emerges clearly in Emerson and, especially, Whitman. The latter proudly and selfconsciously sounded his yawp barbaric over the roof of the world, proclaiming his faith in the American way of life, a democratic civilisation *en masse,* as he put it. The educational system of the United States has developed its own ethos increasingly through the melting pot effect of a universal system of school education, deliberately designed to produce an homogenous society out of immigrants of many races. Indeed, American literature, formerly represented by the work of a few American authors on an English literature syllabus, is now often considered as a school or university discipline in the States, and—generally at university level—outside them also. There is an amply sufficient corpus of texts, containing a widely varied range of vigorous writing, and an almost overfull apparatus of criticism to guide readers' appreciation.

In the Commonwealth, however, literature in English presents widely different patterns of achievement. Until recently there was a common denominator, the traditional British educational system. As a result of this common experience it was possible, up to a decade or so ago, to think of the growth of literature in commonwealth countries in images which suggested the continuity of a common culture. There was, for instance, the convenient image of the tree: the sturdy Anglo-Saxon stock, on which had been grafted the universality of Latin and the elegance of French, and, in the

Renaissance, the lively flexibility of Greek literature, classical and Biblical. And in the course of time the tree burgeoned, by the twentieth century a positive Yardley Oak, its branches spreading to carry writing from Africa, the antipodes, Asia, the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent.

The image was useful. Educational systems in former and actual colonies did not diverge suddenly or greatly from British patterns, particularly in the teaching literature. So most writers grew up with some knowledge of the canons of English literature. Whether this image can still be used is dubious. Apart from new emphases on diversity, in the UK as elsewhere, apart from what must be regarded as a regrettable refusal to teach literary history systematically, most of all in the UK (where few children now realise the extent of their heritage) and elsewhere, there has been a very significant and indeed natural development in other parts of the commonwealth: a desire to explore identity through indigenous literature. In part, this is a stimulating exercise in self exploration. An Australian child, for instance, may well find reading Norman Lindsay's *The Magic Pudding* or Randolph Stow's *Captain Midnite* or, later, his *Tourmaline* a more rewarding experience than that afforded by *Winnie-the-Pooh,* or, later, *Adam Bede.* He or she may enjoy Patrick White's *Voss* more than Hardy's explorations of Wessex. There is usually a more immediate impact from, a more instantaneous attraction to writing which is based on the reader's own country. A West African child may have his awareness of what is happening in his country shaped by, say, Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* or *Man of the People,* where movements from village to city, where conflicts of religious and political traditions are exemplified for him in novels set as textbooks for school leavers. In the same way James Ngugi's novels affect young people in East Africa. Naturally these novels create a more obvious response than *Hard Times* or *Middlemarch* or some sweatier-palmed Lawrentian text. To say this, however, is not to diminish the need to extend experience by reading books which are not initially easy to come to terms with.

What is happening is that the heritage of the past is being diminished not only in the commonwealth as a whole but in Britain itself. There is pressure for contemporary writing on contemporary themes. Some of this arises from the muddled, perhaps basically politico-sociological idea of 'relevance,' that catch-cry of the demi-educated. Some of it, however, may come from uninspired teaching and some from the idea of studying texts 'in depth' often, alas, at the cost of not giving pupils or students a panoptic view of how a literature develops and of its general achievement.

There is, then, a possibility of English literature becoming like the classics: respected but remote. There is a real danger that university or school teachers, themselves brought up within the large vistas, the vast and sensible vocabulary which serves English literature, may deprive their pupils of the advantage they themselves had, in order to concentrate solely on the contemporary, or indeed, even more restrictively, on the local literature alone. And yet the local literatures have mostly been written by authors who themselves have had this background of English literature, who rely upon resonances, who refer, inevitably, to their own reading by which, in part,

they have been shaped in their attitudes and nuances.

They have themselves enriched, in turn, this now virtually classical, yet still fortunately living literature with their own diverse experiences and with other traditions, aged as in Indian writing, middle aged in Australian or Canadian, and mixed as in African, where long standing oral and fresher written patterns blend. And there is also the impact of the vitality of American writing to consider. The existence of English as, in effect, a world language means that the energy and impact of good lively writing in English, wherever it is written, can reach large audiences throughout the world. And so the commonwealth writer draws upon yet another living tradition.

It is probably because of the powerful influence of English and American literature, the economic force, too, of those who publish both literatures, that commonwealth writing is rarely considered comparatively. The texts of writing from one commonwealth country are not readily available in other commonwealth countries. There are some welcome signs of improvement, but so far they are very small signs. So the reader in a commonwealth country may often be unaware of parallel developments, unaware indeed of the achievements of writers in other countries who have continued and are extending the range of literature in English. This is a loss, for some of the liveliest writing in English has emerged from commonwealth countries over the last twenty-five years. Patrick White's Nobel Prize crystallised this: but there are others, inevitably, reaching towards this level of achievement. There is Narayan in India, for instance, with his detailed and lovingly created imaginary southern Indian-born Malgudi against the details of which he ironically deploys a regiment of highly compulsive and comic characters. There are the two Caribbean brothers, who capture pathos and comedy in both West Indian and English scene, while Wilson Harris creates, partially out of his experiences as a surveyor in Guyana, new and complex patterns of human consciousness.

Thomas Kenealy's study of man's physical brutality to man in *Bring Larks and Heroes*, in a historical novel about Tasmania, is matched by Janet Frame's *Owls Do Cry*, a horrifying account of mental disturbance in New Zealand. In Canada there is the Jewish vitality of the novelist Mordecai Richler, or of Leonard Cohen, who combines the role of poet and writer of popular songs. In Africa, Wole Soyinka's plays, J. P. Clark's plays, poems and translations, match Achebe's superb novelistic qualities.

But there are so many to think of among those who are writing today that the reader is in danger of forgetting that some commonwealth countries now have their own literary histories: there is, for example, the massive achievement of Carl Klink's history of Canadian writing, or Eric McCormick's elegant account of New Zealand literature. It is in reading the histories that the subtle differences between the literatures emerge. The Indian writers of English must be seen against Indian desires to enter into Western knowledge in Macaulay's day: their approach was founded not only upon love of English literature (which has lasted to this day, as anyone who has taught in Indian universities or had Indians as students in other countries will agree) but upon a sense of the importance of literary achieve-

ment stretching back into mythology, into oral as well as written traditions. Writers from the Antipodes wrote home to describe their new lives in new settings; they often paralleled the earlier painters who saw the Australian bush through European eyes. But despite the numerous theses on the subject is it not really too soon to write a history of West African literature, which has burst so effectively into life in the late 50s with Amos Tutuola's *Life in the Bush of Ghosts* and which has careered on headlong since then? And there are so many other things to be reminded of—that Sri Lanka has its literature in English, for instance; or that there is now a flourishing school of poets writing in English in Singapore; or even that 'Monk' Lewis (author of that Gothic extravaganza *The Monk*) brought the calypso back to England from his West Indian plantations.

The differences probably will finally centre upon mythology. And it is curious how mythologies become accepted, while life itself grows away from them. The Australian mythology, for instance, seem to have been created in the days of the pages of that lively paper *The Bulletin* in the 1890s. This emphasised the values of mateship; it stressed the role of the pioneering men of action who opened up the country, the drovers, the shearers, the squatters; and the levellers in this particular democracy were concerned to cut the heads off the tall poppies. But while modern Australia is roughly nine-tenths urban, the myth created was one of men in an empty countryside, struggling against hardships of all kinds, against the flies and heat and drought in the bush itself. It could be argued that for a long time England apparently operated upon a nineteenth century public school mythology: possession of a stiff upper lip, a sense of duty, a capacity for understatement, and a relish for playing the game, had spread beyond the middle class boys whose rigorous education suited them for posts in an expanding economy and empire. These values spread through literature, through the boys' books written by R. M. Ballantyne, G. A. Henty and others. But now it might be suggested that a mixture of a working class and a classless mythology has affected Britain—witness the impact of the Beatles in the 'sixties. Mythologies emerge clearly in literature, and their clashes can often be the stuff of fiction. Joyce Cary explored the collisions in his African novels, and Achebe has continued the investigation, has built upon the foundations of such a novel as *Mister Johnson* several more elaborate structures which demonstrate the tensions between tribal and urban ways, between pagan and Christian theory and practice.

Into the corpus of writing in English, then, has come a rich variety of human experience and it has been matched by a corresponding variation in the English used by Commonwealth writers. The vocabulary has been enlarged, the syntax affected. This is no new development, for in 1800 Edgeworth, in the first regional novel, had shown how the English language was used in Ireland, with a richness that came from the blending of English and Gaelic, the result a lively, imaginative and flexible speech; later to be exploited by the Irish dramatists—by Synge and O'Casey. And so it has gone on—the effect of the Bible in the Caribbean, for instance, bringing an old richness of vocabulary back into the central stock again; the inventive-

ness of pidgin often giving West African writing an extra dimension; the blend of nineteenth and twentieth century diction creating yet another kind of English in some Indian fiction.

Can one say that there is a distinct Commonwealth English—as opposed to British or American English? Hardly so, because of the interplay of the different factors, the influences of television, film, radio and paperback, which mean a writer can draw upon a language which is continually being extended, in order to reach an audience which can also be regarded as extensible. And having drawn upon its wider resources he can blend them with his own local usage.

The universities are perhaps the best catalysts in this process. There is a natural curiosity in the best departments of literature: a desire to know what is happening as well as what has happened to writing in English. It need not necessarily be through a process of courses and examinations: awareness can exist outside these formalities. Yet there is a steady process to be seen at work. What is most to be desired is that, throughout the Commonwealth, there will be enough intellectual curiosity to counter chauvinist tendencies to shelter behind national borders. The dangers of 'Little England' attitudes are known enough for the phrase to sound alarm signals; are writers creating similar phrases elsewhere in the commonwealth to counter other kinds of national exclusiveness? Comparison is far from odious in literary criticism: indeed, it is a basic ingredient, and particularly in the study of commonwealth literature.

[Professor A. Norman Jeffares is Professor of English at the University of Stirling. Publications include *The Poetry of W. B. Yeats* and *Swift* (Modern Judgements Series).]

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

ORCHESTRAL

DVORAK. Cello Concerto in B Minor. Harrell/LSO/Levine. RCA ARL-1 1155. £2.99.
SIBELIUS. Symphony No. 6/Pohjola's Daughter/Luonnotar. Bournemouth SO/Berglund. EMI ASD 3155. £3.20.
CORELLI. Christmas Concerto (and works by VIVALDI, FARINA, FERRABOSCO, WIDMANN). Cantilena/Adrian Shepherd. Grange Records SGR 1124. £1.95.

CHAMBER MUSIC

SHOSTAKOVITCH. Piano Trio No. 2 Op. 67/IVES. Trio (1911). Beaux Arts Trio. Philips 6500 860. £3.10.
SCHUBERT. Octet in F for Strings and Wind. Cleveland Quartet with Tuckwell/Brymer/Gatt/Martin. RCA ARL-1 1047. £2.99.

CHORAL AND VOCAL

TIPPETT. *A Child of Our Time.* BBC SO and Chorus/Davis. Philips 6500 985. £3.10.
ORFF. *Catulli Carmina.* Leipzig Radio Chorus and Orchestra/Kegel. Philips 6500 815. £3.10.
HANDEL. *Messiah.* English Chamber Orchestra and Chorus/Leppard. (3 records.) RCA/Erato STU 70921-3. £8.97.
SCHUMANN. *Frauenliebe und-leben*/SCHUBERT. Lieder. Ameling/Baldwin. Philips 6500 706. £3.10.
SCHUBERT. Lieder. Ameling/Baldwin. Philips 6500 704. £3.10.

OPERA

KORNGOLD. *Die Tote Stadt.* Munich Radio Orchestra/Leinsdorf. (3 records.) RCA ARL-3 1199. £8.97.
MOZART. *The Magic Flute.* Swedish Radio Orchestra/Ericson. (3 records.) BBC Records REK 223. £6.95.
VERDI. *Rigoletto.* La Scala Milan/Serafin. (3 records.) EMI SLS 5018. £6.60.

WITH the enormous range of recorded music that comes onto the market every month, a quarterly record review such as this in no way aims to be comprehensive. Nor indeed is it my intention to observe any hard and fast rules as to the types of recordings I shall consider each quarter. A long-playing record today costs anything between something over £1 to over £3, and issues range from the most modern recordings in quadraphonic as well as stereophonic sound, to reissues of great recordings made twenty, fifty, sometimes even seventy-five years ago. The only criteria I shall attempt to observe are those of interest and quality—there would be little point in burdening the reader with issues that have neither. That is not to say that all recordings here discussed will escape criticism, merely that on balance they are records which the music lover will be pleased to possess. Each quarter I shall attempt to spread my selection broadly across the categories of orchestral, chamber, choral, vocal and operatic music, though it may be that in a particular issue one category will outweigh its companions. Where possible I shall discuss interesting additions to the recorded repertoire in preference to the umpteenth recording of a much-loved work,

however glossy its performers. Nevertheless, I shall try to point out particularly interesting performances of familiar works, as for example the Lynn Harrell/James Levine recording of Dvorak's Cello Concerto for RCA.

Lynn Harrell is an American, just 30 years of age, who here makes his recording debut accompanied by the London Symphony Orchestra under James Levine who, though scarcely any older, is already Music Director of the New York Metropolitan Opera. It is a tribute to Harrell's immense talent that in this recording he has not merely tackled one of the most formidable concertos in the cello repertoire, but gives a performance that bears comparison with those by great exponents of the instrument such as Rostropovitch, Fournier, Tortelier, even Pablo Casals in his recording of nearly 40 years ago. Indeed, it is the fact that, like Casals, Harrell is not afraid to take a 'view' of the work that makes his recording memorable. Thus there is an exceptionally pensive, long-breathed account of the *Adagio ma non troppo* second movement, and then, after a crisply positive *allegro moderato* finale, a movingly meditative *andante* epilogue—taken far slower than it is usually heard—which sets the seal on a searching interpretation. Levine and the LSO give responsive accompaniment, and the recording is bright and well balanced between soloist and orchestra. Although most other versions have an additional fill-up, and Rostropovitch has more burnished tone, I do not hesitate to recommend this recording for reawakening interest in a much recorded work.

Sibelius' 6th Symphony, first performed in 1923, lacks the drama of some of his others, and is a more relaxed, almost pastoral, work in a bleakly northern fashion. Paavo Berglund, the Finnish conductor of the Bournemouth Symphony Orchestra, is establishing a considerable reputation as a Sibelian, whilst doing wonders for his orchestra. They give this symphony a warmly committed performance which, if it lacks the sheer polish of the Karajan and Bernstein recordings, has a fidelity that compensates. The coupling also makes this an attractive recording: a well defined, affectionate account of *Pohjola's Daughter* and an immensely impressive performance by the Finnish soprano Taru Valjakka of the composer's rarely heard *Luonnotar*, the first song of the Finnish folk epic *Kalevala*. Its vocal hazards put it beyond the reach of most sopranos, but Miss Valjakka gives an impeccable, indeed thrilling account which makes me impatient for her operatic debut here.

The Scottish National has become one of our great orchestras, and it is thus not surprising that Cantilena, an ensemble of 15 of their key players formed and directed by their principal cellist, Adrian Shepherd, should be of conspicuous quality. They make a detailed study of Renaissance and Baroque music, paying keen attention to sonorities and the placing of instruments within the circle in which it is their practice to play. The result in this their first record is a warm, alive sound as well as meaningful interpretation of the Corelli and Vivaldi concertos. The Pavanes by Farina and Alfonso Ferrabosco II (another of their goals is to disinter forgotten music of worth) display the remarkable quality of Cantilena's tone. The players formed their own record company, Grange, and this first issue is astonishing

value at £1.95. One gathers their enterprise has paid off and that they are to make a series of recordings for a major company—good luck to them.

The Beaux Arts Trio's coupling of Charles Ives' Trio for Violin, Cello and Piano with Shostakovitch's superb war-time trio in E minor is a boldly successful move. It demonstrates how remarkably ahead of his time was Ives in 1911, and how seriously one can underestimate Shostakovitch's war-time music by considering only his symphonies. The largo 3rd movement leading into the eerily jocular *allegretto* finale is composition of considerable depth and power, and it is brilliantly played here by the Beaux Arts, as is the remarkable Ives work with its frighteningly demanding piano part in the first movement and witty *scherzo* entitled *Tsiaj* (work that one out!) which Ives had originally planned to call 'Medley on the campus fence.' An impressive record. Another distinguished American chamber ensemble is the Cleveland Quartet. When they attended the London South Bank Music Festival in summer 1974 they teamed up with the distinguished British wind players Barry Tuckwell, Jack Brymer and Martin Gatt and Thomas Martin, the LSO's principal double bass, and gave a memorable performance of Schubert's great Octet in F. This they have now recorded on a finely engineered issue which demonstrates their polish and brings out the sunny optimism in the work. In so doing there is, however, a feeling of loss: their playing is almost too assured, the mood too confident—I have heard performances which evoked a greater sense of struggle, revealing undertones which left me more keenly aware of Schubert's greatness.

Last year was the 70th birthday of Sir Michael Tippett and the 80th of Carl Orff. Tippett's first great work—the one that put him on the map—was his magnificent contemporary passion *A Child of Our Time*. Provoked by the spread of Nazism and written as a universal protest against persecution and tyranny, it has scarcely dated since when written in 1941. Since 1958 there has been an Argo recording by the Royal Liverpool Philharmonic conducted by John Pritchard, That has now to be measured against a fine new one by the BBC Symphony Orchestra under Colin Davis with a distinguished quartet of soloists including Janet Baker and John Shirley-Quirk. The recording, fitting onto one record (Pritchard's needs three sides), is superbly balanced and orchestra and chorus respond nobly to the burning commitment Davis invariably displays when conducting Tippett. Yet somehow there is an authenticity, a directness, in the old Pritchard recording somewhat lacking in this present issue. Possibly it lies in the approach of the American soloists Richard Cassilly and Jessye Norman: certainly neither Cassilly's gravelly tone, nor Miss Norman's self-consciously dramatic delivery enhance the performance and there remains something more penetrating in the singing of Elsie Morrison and Richard Lewis in the old recording. Yet this is a distinguished issue which no admirer of Tippett's music should be without.

Though not on the same level of inspiration, Orff's setting of the love poems of Catullus, *Catulli Carmina*, composed in 1942, is skilfully written and a gift for a virtuoso chorus such as that of Leipzig Radio. Together with the Radio Orchestra conducted by Herbert Kegel, they give a performance

of stunning precision, excellently recorded, with the result that an inherently slight work gives a great deal of pleasure. On more traditional ground, Handel's *Messiah* is conducted with commendable unfussiness and lightness of touch by Raymond Leppard in a clear, well defined recording with especially strong solo singing from Felicity Palmer and Ryland Davies. The English Chamber Orchestra play with polish and their Chorus is flexible and with crisp attack. A highly satisfactory version for anybody who does not already have this work in his collection.

Elly Ameling, from Holland, is undoubtedly one of the most notable exponents of *lieder* to have emerged in the past decade. Her voice has a clarity and accuracy, and her delivery a sensitivity which make her a pleasure to hear. Elegantly accompanied by Dalton Baldwin, she sings on two recent records Schumann's eloquent cycle *Frauenliebe und -leben*, where her care for words and purity of tone fully convey the anguish of a young woman in love, coupled with songs by Schubert, and a further record of Schubert songs concerning night time and love. Both records please, the former having perhaps the edge in expressiveness.

Erich Korngold wrote *The Dead City* in 1920 at the age of 23 and attained instant success. Sadly, both his and the opera's star waned and he ended his days writing scores for such films as *Captain Blood* and *The Sea Hawk* in Hollywood. The opera was recently revived to some acclaim by the New York City Opera and has now been recorded with a powerful cast. An enjoyable, if melodramatic work, it abounds in melody and atmosphere which mask its lack of subtlety. It is conducted for all it is worth here by Erich Leinsdorf with the Munich Radio Orchestra, and he draws committed performances from Carol Neblett in the dual role of Marie/Marietta, Rene Kollo, Hermann Prey and Benjamin Luxon. It deserves hearing. Those who enjoyed BBC TV's screening at Christmas of Ingmar Bergman's brilliant production of *The Magic Flute* can now buy the complete recording with the Swedish Radio Orchestra conducted by Eric Ericson. It is a pleasure to listen to and demonstrates that the quality of the television performance was not merely visual. The booklet contain's Bergman's fascinating commentary on his production. Finally, those who do not already possess it should hurry to buy the HMV reissue of Verdi's *Rigoletto*, with La Scala, Milan forces conducted by Tullio Serafin. With Tito Gobbi at his greatest in the title role, Giuseppe de Stefano a powerful Duke, and Maria Callas unforgettably perfect as Gilda, this bargain is simply not to be missed.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

RUBENS AS DIPLOMAT

The Political Career of Peter Paul Rubens. C. V. Wedgwood. Thames and Hudson. £3.00.

Walter Neurath was one of the outstanding art publishers of our time and it is a fitting tribute to him that an annual lecture in his memory should now be given at Birkbeck College in the University of London. The subject of each of these lectures, which are given by distinguished archaeologists, art historians or historians, is intended to reflect Mr. Neurath's own interests, which were catholic, in the art world. This book is the text of the seventh of these, published in a very elegant form of which no doubt even he might have approved, and it is an undisputed bull's eye.

Dame Veronica Wedgwood is at pains to point out that Rubens's other activities, manifold and distinguished as these were, were subsidiary to his *dolcissima professione,* that of artist. She therefore makes the very sensible comment that his achievements in the political sphere, worthy of respect as these might be, are little more than a footnote to his career as a painter. Accepting this level of priorities, however, it was almost inevitable that at various stages in his career he would be sucked into the maelstrom of diplomatic activity. Although he was born to the upper bourgeoisie—his father, Jan Rubens, was a lawyer in the service of the House of Orange until he became involved in an unwise *affaire* with Ann of Saxony, wife of Prince William of Orange—Rubens moved freely in the world of kings and princes.

His family's early Calvinist sympathies did not preclude him from service with the House of Hapsburg and he became himself a devoted Catholic and a loyal servant of the Spanish-Burgundian crown. At an early stage in his career he took service with the Gonzaga dukes in Mantua, who also employed Monteverdi, and it was at the behest of the Duke of Mantua, Vincenzo Gonzaga, that he undertook his first diplomatic mission to present a wedding present of a coach, six matched bay horses, gold, silver and crystal vases and sixteen copies of paintings by Italian masters to King Philip the Third of Spain on the occasion of the latter's marriage in 1603. At the Spanish court he made impressions and contacts which were to cause his subsequent employment by his own sovereign on political missions, the most notable of which was his visit to King Charles the First of England in 1629.

Although in terms of his own genius he was to remain a man of all the world, he was also a deeply attached son of the Netherlands and of his own city of Antwerp in particular. As Dame Veronica shows, the driving force behind his political ambitions was the, as it proved, vain hope, of seeking a reunification of the northern and the southern Netherlands and a restoration of the glory of Antwerp which had suffered so much from the northern provinces' blockade of the Scheldt.

What made Rubens of particular use to his royal patrons and gave him such outstanding repute among the court circles in which he had to move was undoubtedly not just the brilliance of his talent but the singular strength and charm of his own character. In his reply to an order to restore some of the pictures which had been damaged by rain on the way to Valladolid in 1603, he agreed, but added, 'It is my principle never to allow myself to be mistaken for another man, however great a man he may be.' He had the highest view of the

nobility of his own avocation as a painter and this gave him a dignity which enabled him to cope firmly with some of the more devious characters in the international scene with whom he had to deal, such as Annibale Chieppio, Vincenze Gonzaga's secretary, and the Duke of Buckingham. It also enabled him to be accepted with friendship and respect in his relations with such important diplomatic figures as Sir Dudley Carleton, the English ambassador at the Hague and himself a great collector and connoisseur, Sir Francis Cottington, Charles the First's urbane and pro-Spanish minister, and the Abbé Scaglia, the agent of the Duke of Savoy and a firm supporter of peace between Spain and England. The Earl of Carlisle, although in general he doubted Spanish duplicity, spoke of Rubens, whom he met when passing through Antwerp on a mission to Savoy, as a *real* (i.e. a reliable) man: 'He made me believe that nothing but good intentions and sincerity have been in his heart: which, upon my soul, I think is true, because I find him as well affected to the King of England's service as the King of Spain can desire.'

When he was accredited to Charles for the purpose of his mission in 1629, the English King expressed his wish 'to know a person of such merit.' The results of this mission were not only the Anglo-Spanish treaty, which, although it was subsequently formally ratified by a Spanish grandee, was the work of Rubens and of Cottington, but, to our great good fortune in this country, the ceiling of the Banqueting House, Whitehall and a number of masterpieces, including the *Allegory of Peace and War,* presented to the King, and *St. George and the Dragon,* acquired by the connoisseur courtier Sir Endymion Porter. Although Rubens never achieved his ultimate object of bringing together the two halves of the Netherlands, his diplomatic activities were to prove entirely honourable and, on the whole, fruitful and resulted in his being awarded not only a patent of nobility from Spain but a knighthood from Charles the First. Distracting as these must have been, they did not deter him from his main and dedicated purpose to create great works of art.

Although there is nothing in Dame Veronica Wedgwood's book that is entirely new, she has made, as one would expect from a professional historian of her standing, accomplished use of the existing sources, Ruelens and Rooses' great work on his letters and the original documents on the English mission among the State Papers in the Public Record Office, in particular, to produce an admirable summary of this aspect of Rubens's activities. As a leading authority on the politics of Caroline England her account of these events is authoritative and enlightening. Her sympathetic understanding of Rubens's pictures is happily equally apparent. As Burckhardt wrote: 'It is an exhilarating task to evoke the life and personality of Rubens; good fortune and kindliness abound in him as in hardly any other great master, and he is well enough known for us to feel sure of our judgement of him. In the consciousness of his own noble nature and great powers he must have been one of the most privileged of mortals.'

ERNLE MONEY

A STUDY IN ETHICS

The Ethics of Reason. F. A. Lea. Brentham Press. Hardback £3.50. Paperback £2.50.

In one of a series of his *Uncontemporary Studies,* Mr. F. A. Lea undertakes an examination of the philosophical bases of moral philosophy. The book, called *The Ethics of Reason,* deals vividly and freshly with the perennial questions about moral beliefs raised in the work of some major philosophers from

Locke, Godwin, Bentham and Kant to Spinoza, Hegel, Marx and Nietzshe. At a midway point, the author adds an 'Intermission,' a chapter on 'The Moral Problem of War,' a comment on the most pressing of contemporary problems and one with which Mr. Lea's earlier work has been much associated since he became Middleton Murry's successor as editor of *Peace News*. His enquiry throughout the book concerns the question of 'what man should be' and what decisions he should therefore make about his acts. The decision to kill other men is patently neither rational nor 'good' in any of the senses in which his philosophers use those terms. But since few serious ethical works have pinpointed 'making war' as a paradigm case of unethical behaviour, Mr. Lea cogently argues in a separate chapter the case for regarding such an act as central to any consideration of man in his necessary relation to his fellows. In this matter, as in others, he comes squarely down on the side of commitment to belief and particularly to belief in an ideal, for 'where there is no ideal, there is no morality, and therefore no moral problem.'

Mr. Lea does not, however, arrive at this conclusion glibly. His book gathers up the answers of eight major writers to questions inescapably posed when the rationality of any ethical view on the conduct of human affairs is under consideration. He does not claim that his observations and conclusions are in any way new: only that, in restating some of the positions arrived at in the long course of the history of ideas, he shows the logical necessity for taking account of both idealist thought and scientific, empirical knowledge. That idealist and empiricist have to co-exist in the real world is his most important postulation. The form of his book is designed to reveal this necessity. He provides an exposition, for instance, of the main difficulties attendant upon swallowing whole, and taking a hard line towards, Hume's discovery of the 'naturalist fallacy': that is, assuming in a substantial sense that, whatever facts about the external world could irrefutably be shown to be the case, no deduction of moral principles could be derived from the facts alone. No 'ought' could be deduced from an 'is.' But to have grasped that analytic truth is only to have encountered further problems, most of which cannot readily be stated, let alone resolved. Is it, for example, simply a matter of deciding upon paramount moral principles in relation to making love or war, and bringing selected facts to their support in stating an ideology? Clearly this will not do since rational belief cannot require us to pay attention to a few of the facts and ignore the rest.

Do we, then, merely take account of all the known facts, assuming that, if 'known,' they are capable of being validated? Suppose, then, that all the characteristics of a man, as distinct from other living beings, are 'known,' including the widest possible range of idiosyncrasies, are we then able to say with certainty what it means to be not only a man but a good man? It seems not, since this is the point at which all ethical arguments begin, not end; the point where belief about what ought to be takes over from what is the case. And the evidence of what man himself has thought and written about his ends and the ways in which he tries to achieve them is particularly relevant in adducing the 'facts' about human beings. Hence the title of Mr. Lea's series, *Uncontemporary Studies*, is appropriate to his purpose. He has written more than an account of a selection of moral deductions. His book is an illuminating study of the ways in which such deductions may inform human action.

BETTY ABEL

HOMOEOPATHIC TREATMENT

The Patient, Not the Cure. Margery G. Blackie. Macdonald and Jane's. £4.95.

It was an orthodox German physician, Christian Friedrich Samuel Hahnemann, who, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, was the founder of the homoeopathic principle. Dissatisfied in his practice with the results achieved by the blanket treatment of the allopathic method, he embarked upon an analytical investigation of therapeutic methodology, its historic origins, evolution and theoretical basis, and noted in the process the recurrent concept of 'like curing like.'

Experimenting upon himself, his family, and such of his friends and colleagues as would permit it, he established that symptom complexes could be produced by the administration of remedies (i.e. drugs) to healthy persons, and that the symptoms were those found to occur in a specific illness. The demonstrable corollary was that the most beneficial drug for administration to the sick patient is the specific drug which produces the identical symptoms in the healthy individual. And the application of this therapeutic technique shifted the emphasis of treatment. In homoeopathy, it is the individual patient, not the objective cure, that is all-important. It was the difference between 'bespoke' and en masse curative methods.

In *The Patient, Not the Cure,* Dr. Margery Blackie, a distinguished homoeopathic practitioner, Physician to Her Majesty the Queen, and Dean of the Faculty of Homoeopathy, authoritatively dispels any misapprehension that the layman, and even some allopathic doctors, may harbour as to the status and medical credentials of homoeopathy. She elucidates its rationale, explaining its diagnostic province as the study of the *whole person,* his idiosyncratic reactions to such factors as heat and cold, weather and food, work patterns, age and environment, and how, in the light of all these things, the homoeopathic specialist is able to interpret why that particular person reacts in that particular manner to a known infection, and prescribes for that person's unique symptom pattern response.

At a time when the concepts of modern medicine are undergoing a peculiarly rapid change, the challenge of homoeopathy is being accorded a new importance, and in countries all over the world orthodox medicine is increasingly turning from hit or miss polypharmacy to the Hahnemann principle of the single remedy and the similimum tailored to the *patient's* complaint rather than the *disorder's* supposed demands. In France, Germany and America, homoeopathy is in the midst of a revival, and in Britain it is now accepted as an official part of the National Health Service. Dr. Blackie's excellent and informative book provides the reason why.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ROLE OF WOMAN

Perceiving Women. Edited by Shirley Ardener. Malaby Press, London. £6.95.

Within the discipline of social anthropology, it appears that the rôle of woman in society is imperfectly studied, that women are 'muted' and 'mere black holes in someone else's universe.' Curiously, women anthropologists have shown a tendency to accept and perpetuate this situation by their positive reluctance to challenge male models of society. This new collection of essays, mainly by female anthropologists, shows both how certain groups of women

perceive their relationship to the world around them, and how the observer is to perceive their rôle and activities. It is not a work of protest, not a rabid product of the Women's Liberation Movement, and yet in work of this kind, the tension between man and woman is always implicit, the situation where, like Isabella in *The White Devil,* woman complains,

'O that I were a man, or that I had power
To execute my apprehended wishes!'

The tone is set by the first essay in the book—Edwin Ardener on *Belief and the Problem of Women*—where this male observer writes of the Bakweri people who inhabit the 13,000 ft. Cameroon Mountain area on the West African coast. Here, the Bakweri men wait in their leaking huts for the evening meal, while the wretched, rain-soaked women who have spent the entire day in the forest outside the fence, farming and collecting firewood, return with their back-breaking loads of wood and cocoyams, screaming with fatigue at their husbands. The anthropologist permits himself no direct criticism, but his judgment is latent in his rhetorical comment, 'It is no wonder that the women seem to be forest creatures, who might vanish one day for ever.'

We turn for relief to the freedom and romance of the gypsy woman: George Borrow wrote that 'the poetry, the sorcery, the devilry, if you please to call it so, are vastly on the side of the woman.' Here our anthropologist is a young woman, Judith Okely, who has lived amongst gypsies and, alas, she destroys the ideal fantasies of the outsider to show that the gypsy-woman's existence is little short of misery—although, of course, she does not use such an emotive word. 'Within marriage, a wife is supposed to be subordinate to her husband's orders.' Fair enough, perhaps, in many creeds and connubial settings, but the list of prohibitions is long. To maintain her reputation she must avoid being alone with another man. She is condemned if she initiates a separation. She is expected to give birth to numerous children. On top of all her heavy domestic duties, she is *also* required to work outside the camp, earning a living from housedwellers. In the past, 'the men sat in the camp all day and the women went out.' Today, there is some amelioration of the women's employment duties, but the tradition dies hard. When out calling, the gypsy woman must travel on foot or by public transport; she is not permitted the independence of driving her husband's vehicle. Moreover, while expected to be humble and submissive at home, she must become aggressive and outgoing when invading alien territory to sell her pathetic wares. Woman is 'polluting' and therefore her dress is restricted and even her movements are circumscribed. Fire is the penalty for infidelity. Interestingly, the gypsy women choose hospitalisation for childbirth as a convenient way of giving the 'Giorgios' the task of dealing with a polluting act—not, as has been thought, because they see the wisdom of the modern methods. In hospital they have an uncomfortable time, refusing food, misunderstood by hospital staff, 'crying a lot' and discharging themselves too early. Some case-studies on breakdowns in non-conforming gypsy women would be illuminating.

Next we turn for relief to what must surely be the civilised area of diplomatic life, armed even though we may be with certain preconceptions about 'stuffiness' and protocol. The reality is deadly and stultifying. Our female anthropologist, Hilary Callan, goes further than merely 'living amongst' her subjects; she is herself a diplomat's wife, and although she treats her group clinically enough, she permits her anger about what she clearly sees as oppression and interference to break through. Occasionally she relaxes her choice of language, and this is deliberately, not unconsciously done. Thus, she writes of 'the cosy literary style

of the circulars and notices that go round the various wives' groups, spattered with chummy exclamation marks.' She is urged to conform and to subscribe to the doctrine that 'Official duties come first.' Any form of standing aside is most strictly castigated as subversion which is harmful to the husband's career. Moreover, the diplomat and his wife are *never* off duty. The wife assumes the rank of her husband in the pecking order. Hilary Callan says, dryly enough, 'It often happens that I am asked to do something by another wife, in the tone of one giving friendly instructions, where no formal relationship exists between us beyond the fact that her husband is a senior colleague of my husband.' Lapses from expected feminine conversation at social gatherings lead to comments like, 'How intellectual you are for such a charming young lady . . . ' The commitment demanded leads to a great deal of unease if a diplomat's wife takes outside employment. Yet she has to tolerate the presumption that she is morally bonded to an institution from whose central operations she is necessarily excluded. Her expected contribution to the Embassy machine takes little account of her individual talents and interests. Every officer is subject to an annual report by his superiors. This report includes provision for comment on the wife's performance.

And so, with socio-anthropological criticisms of this kind, the more that woman is seen to be a creature of the rain-soaked forest, the closer she draws to the fire within the pallisade.

MOLLY TIBBS

INSIDE THE 'RING OF BRIGHT WATER'

Maxwell's Ghost: An Epilogue to Gavin Maxwell's Camusfearna, with decorations by Robin McEwen. Richard Frere. Gollancz. £5.50.

Gavin Maxwell, author of *Ring of Bright Water* about his ottery on Scotland's northwest coast, was a complex, baffling personality. When Mr. Frere first met him at Sandaig he was not greatly impressed. As business manager, he came to know intimately a man with a dry humour, rather shy at heart, with 'a spike of vindictiveness in him' that didn't permit him to suffer fools gladly. 'He was fiercely possessive of both objects and people, and seemed to believe that money can buy loyalty and friendship as it does goods and chattels.' His two otters, Teko and Edal, were then housed under zoo conditions, not as in the book.

Frere's first task, with his wife's help, was to renovate and furnish two lighthouse cottages Gavin had bought near Isle Ornsay and Kyleakin to let at high rents. It involved rough, hazardous boat crossings of the Sound of Sleat, described with vigour and a sensitivity to loch and mountain beauty. The subsequent narrative concerns his often difficult relations with Gavin and the sometimes intractable youths he employed, the wobbly finances and properties, the visitors to the ottery including a TV feature crew, a film director whose initial script, with its Americanisms, prompted Gavin to call it 'a shame, a prostitution, a crime' in which he could have no part unless it was entirely rewritten.

We are given a close account of the everyday life, the man and his work, his wayward impulses, likes and dislikes, the underlying magnanimity that emerged after the tragic fire of 1968 that gutted the Sandaig house and killed the female otter Edal. Frere blamed his own oversight in having allowed the insurance premiums to lapse, but Gavin's only reproof was: 'Now you are found to have

made one mistake; it is undeniably unfortunate that its results are so disastrous. But since we are both rational people we surely realise that the degree of blame is not proportional to the outcome of what at most is a sin of omission.' He at once revived an old scheme to found an eider duck colony and wildlife park on Kyleakin isle, which Frere proceeded to tackle.

The stoic in Gavin sustained him in the final painful suffering from the cancer he knew would soon kill him. Frere praises 'the bravery with which he approached the most private and solitary moment of un-being; and the courtesy he showed in making light of it, in so convincing a way that one did not feel that one had to follow to the very edge of the abyss down which he must so soon fall.' This exemplifies Mr. Frere's good writing, which will please all who enjoyed the otter books. He is, however, chary of dates, even in his deeply poignant account of Gavin's last ordeal and death, and at times overdoes minor detail.

TREVOR ALLEN

SOME NEW POETRY

New Poems 1975: a P.E.N. Anthology of Contemporary Poetry. Edited by Patricia Beer. Hutchinson. £3.25.

Enigma Variations. Paul Roche. The Thornhill Press, 7 Russell Street, Gloucester. 60p.

Since their first appearance way back in the fifties, the P.E.N. anthologies of *New Poems* have established themselves as one of the very best annual or bi-annual shop-windows for contemporary verse. Broad, representative, non-cliquish, it is one of those printed purlieus where the reader expects to meet not only Uncle Tom Cobley and his cronies but some of their interesting nephews and nieces, emerging into the light of promise. Thus in *New Poems 1975*, edited by Patricia Beer, the oldest contributor Hugh MacDiarmid was born in 1892 and Patricia Duncker, the youngest, in 1951. The danger of such comprehension, of course, is the temptation to 'get 'em all in', simply because, in large or lesser measure, these are names spoken about. Miss Beer has wisely resisted this lure of total comprehension, making personal enjoyment of the poems her sole criteria; and as she rightly claims 'I think that the range of style and subject matter is sufficiently wide for many readers to find something to their taste'.

With her principle of selection I am in hearty agreement, but not with the method of presenting her trophies. She tells us that she has 'departed from accepted procedure' by not arranging the poems alphabetically because she felt 'a growing conviction that certain poems positively demanded to be placed beside certain other poems'. This leads, for example, to Isa Weidman's pieces appearing on pages 29, 40 and 136; and so on, with all those poets represented by more than one poem (the volume includes 75 poets represented by anything from one to seven poems apiece).

If the book contained an index of poets, this division of their work could be clarified by a simple indication of the pages upon which their separated poems appeared. No index is provided, however; neither do the interesting Notes on Contributors append page numbers to the relevant poems. These Notes, nonetheless, can be commended for their unusual frankness, or for their idiosyncratic colour as instanced by the comment on Tom Lowenstein 'at present living in an arctic Eskimo village working on a book of oral poetic history'. I was also glad to see the work of two of my City Lit. students included: the Jamaican James Berry and the Scot Alex McColm.

Paul Roche (b. 1928) is one of those British poets possibly better known to

American readers (due to his frequent trans-Atlantic sojourns) than he is in his own country. A phenomenon of the poetry-reading circuit, he has all the fluency which that role calls for. At his best (as in *Post-Coital Triestesse*) he is lyrical, classical and harmonious, but is sometimes sidetracked by the merely trendy (*Half a Glass Of*). When Mr. Roche's fine and facile ear does not lure him into digusiveness, he proves himself an attractive poet.

DEREK STANFORD

SHORTER REVIEWS

Energy and World Politics (Collier Macmillan. £5.95). This is a valuable study and projection by Professor Mason Willrich, published under the auspices of the American Society of International Law, following a working group on international energy policy in the autumn of 1973 under the chairmanship of the author. This volume does, however, reflect the views and analysis of Professor Willrich. He attempts 'to illuminate the fundamental national and international interests that are deeply embedded in the evolving world energy situation.' Discussing oil in the widest context, he concludes that it would be to the advantage of the United States to withdraw from the world oil market and pursue fossil energy independence. This, in turn, would enable the other major industrial countries to 'bargain most effectively as a group with OPEC.' Should Britain be permanently committed to this? Writing early in 1975, the author takes the view that the North Sea oil reserves 'may dramatically improve the energy security' of Britain and Norway in the 1980s 'but have relatively little impact upon the supply security of Western Europe as a whole unless the reserves prove to be very large indeed.' What would Professor Willrich see as Britain's role in the almost certain event of Britain's self-sufficiency? One of the difficulties in a study of this kind is to keep abreast of events.

The Selective Ego (Harrap. £5.75). Lord Beaumont has brought together a new and concise collection from James Agate's diaries. Originally in nine volumes, *Ego* was condensed into three volumes by Agate himself. In 1961, *An Anthology* was published, edited by Herbert van Thal. These are now all out of print and Tim Beaumont in his present selection has endeavoured quite successfully 'to keep the feel of Agate the diarist' while projecting his views on acting, plays and players. For twenty-four years before his death in 1947, he had been the distinguished, controversial and provocative dramatic critic of the *Sunday Times*. He was vain and arrogant, particularly within the field of drama and acting. He regarded his diaries as helping the social historian of the future. Lord Beaumont, his great admirer, quotes Agate's old friend, Alan Dent, as to the truth of the diaries. 'He was not exactly a liar. But in his writing he was inclined to soar into something which he defined and defended as "the higher truth." It consists in embroidery upon, or elaboration of, what actually happened or was said.' In spite of his failings, Agate had intellectual gifts, was a great character with considerable impact upon the theatre of his day, and had an unexpected strain of kindness and charm. Time will tell whether he was a great diarist. Meanwhile, this new anthology is welcome.

The Blue Lamp (Macdonald and Jane's. £2.50). This classic tale by the Brothers Grimm has been republished with eleven coloured illustrations by Lilo Fromm. They are delightful and charming and add to the child's excitement and pleasure in reading this short, magical tale.

8 JUL 1976

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Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 37 Union Street, London, S.E.1. Tel 01-407 0497. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

111th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

JUNE 1976

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Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

June 1976 Vol. 228 No. 1325

THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPANSION

by Neville Brown

ALL matters appertaining to international security have been regarded throughout the West these past few years with a somewhat baleful euphoria. And with this mood has waxed a disposition to treat the curiously large panoply maintained by the Soviet military-industrial complex as being of little consequence to us. Some have seen it as but the reflection of an intense yearning for total security which has its roots deep in Russia's anguished historical experience. Others have always linked the maintenance of this strength directly to a genuine and legitimate concern lest the fish of Maoist insurgency make a sea of the Gobi desert.[1] There were those, too, who were persuaded that it mattered not because the advance of *détente* was inexorable and all-embracing. In certain quarters, indeed, even the invasion of Czechoslovakia was treated much as a medieval cosmologist might have regarded the meanderings of a planet across the undersurface of the firmament: a fact too much at variance with received wisdom to be accorded full recognition.

Suddenly, however, concern about the military threat posed by the USSR is being widely expressed again, a concern epitomized by the hearing Alexander Solzhenitsyn has received in several Western countries. Evidently, this reaction owes not a little to what may be identified as the central Solzhenitsyn theme—the dubious worth, after all, of the kind of *détente* negotiations which culminated in last year's Helsinki summit. But it stems, too, from a growing awareness, forcefully articulated by James Schlesinger in the United States and now by Mrs. Thatcher in this country, that the panoply in question is steadily growing weightier.

Not that any very dramatic upward trend is readily revealed by every yardstick. Let us look, for example, at the basic criterion of manpower in the light of the highly reliable assessments made each summer by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ten years ago the active manning strength of the Soviet armed services was put at 3,400,000 whereas the current reckoning is 3,575,000. Of these 1,900,000 are in the army and 900,000 in the tactical and strategic air forces. The remainder

can be divided into half a million sailors and a quarter of a million security troops. Apparently, the numerical balance as between these several echelons has not altered much over the interval in question, except that aviation may have gradually improved its position.

Where, on the other hand, a big change has taken place is at what can loosely be spoken of as the other end of the contemporary military spectrum: the intercontinental missiles and bombers—i.e. those weapons designed to deliver thermonuclear warheads across five to eight thousand miles. Thus one reality often overlooked is that, throughout the half decade 1961-6, the intercontinental deterrent possessed by the Soviet Union stood utterly exposed to virtually complete destruction on site by an American missile salvo. This is because this deterrent basically consisted of just a few dozen long-range rockets of a kind too cumbersome to fire at short notice or to emplace securely in steel and concrete. It was also because, in the autumn of 1961, the United States Air Force had begun routine reconnaissance from Space, thereby becoming able to ascertain very precisely both the nature and the location of the opposition strike forces. Moreover, the Soviet submarine fleet was still ill-adapted to missile strikes against the American homeland. Almost certainly, Moscow's decision the following year to try and rush medium-range nuclear missiles into Cuba was, first and foremost, a panic reaction to what she had belatedly recognised to be a most dangerous weakness apropos strategic weapons.

But within several years this situation was to be transformed by the improvement and expansion of the Soviet deterrent elements. Today, in fact, each of the Superpowers has over 1,000 intercontinental rockets of advanced design and also well over 500 more rockets installed in submarines and ready to be fired deep into the territory of its main adversary. This being so, neither of the states concerned has (or is likely ever again to acquire) the option the United States retained as its ultimate recourse during, most notably, the Caribbean crisis of 1962: a short and sharp Total Counterforce blow.

To an extent, of course, this nuclear stalemate has proved a good thing all round. In so far as it makes the Kremlin leaders more relaxed, it makes them more willing to engage in a couth and tolerably purposive dialogue not only with Washington but with the West as a whole. An obvious example is the way in which, since 1969, the stalemate itself has been institutionalised and codified, however imperfectly, through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Yet even as the talk gets softer and more reasonable, the Soviet hierarchy may be casting aside its inhibitions (formerly greater than perhaps we realised) against using various of its non-nuclear big sticks in local crisis situations. We might do well to recall the apprehension on this score once expressed by that highly professional and by no means illiberal student of strategy, the late Sir Basil Liddell-Hart. He warned that 'Nuclear nullity', as he called it, '. . . inherently favours and fosters a renewal of non-nuclear aggressive activity'.[2] What he was mainly getting at was that

the advent of this state of affairs would all but preclude Washington's using its strategic nuclear weapons to offset, in any manner, Moscow's advantages in respect of other facets of military strength.

One on-going development that makes this shift in the Superpower balance of added consequence is the progressive extension geographically of Soviet naval forces. A Red Navy presence was re-established in the Mediterranean in 1964 after a six year hiatus; and it was built up considerably after the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Now the first Soviet fleet carrier ever—the 40,000 ton *Kiev*—is completing trials in the Black Sea following her construction at Nikolayev. Presumably, she will soon seek to pass through the Turkish Straits to join either the Mediterranean squadron or else the one maintained in the Indian Ocean since early 1968. Meanwhile, two sister ships have been laid down.

Nor has the northern flank of Europe been neglected. On the contrary, in 1968 and again in 1970, major naval manoeuvres were carried out which involved *inter alia* the movement of an amphibious task force out of the Baltic to assault the Kola peninsula! The first of these operations —Exercise Sever—was staged just a month before the invasion of Czechoslovakia; and it came shortly after a practice transit of a convoy from Murmansk to Tromsö had coincided with land deployments on a divisional scale right up against the Norwegian border. The second—Exercise Ocean—took place in the spring and extended across the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific as well as much of the North Atlantic.

Last year another Exercise Ocean was held and this embraced the Arabian Sea as well as the areas just cited. Over 200 ships and submarines were involved as were air bases in Cuba, Guinea, and Somalia. Suffice to add that hunter-killer submarines have been among the types of Red Navy vessel observed in the South Atlantic; and to note that the submarines equipped with strategic missiles are routinely on station off both the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts of the United States.

No doubt this ramification has gained extra impetus from memories of the 1962 confrontation over missiles to Cuba. For, so far as the Russians were concerned, not the least humiliating aspect of this ill-starred episode was the manifest impotence of their navy. A small number of its submarines did proceed towards the Caribbean but six were obliged to surface after persistent shadowing by the United States Navy and, in some cases, had to be towed home. Around the same time, two more were towed back from the Norwegian Sea and a third from the Alaskan coast. The whole business was a painful *exposé* of an inability to operate satisfactorily in distant waters.

Nevertheless, the geostrategic revolution the Red Navy has effected since is not simply a kind of dialectical reaction to this experience. More fundamentally, it stems from a technological evolution that was already destined to take place. Easily the most important strand in this has been the wider application of nuclear propulsion in the submarine fleet, in the hunter-killer boats as well as in those designed to fire strategic missiles. But other

spheres in which progress has been marked include electronic warfare, the replenishment at sea of surface vessels, the acoustic detection of submarines, and—as witness the *Kiev*—naval aviation.

Furthermore, this burgeoning must now be set within the context of an all-round and on-going improvement in the equipment of Soviet forces everywhere, not least in East Germany and most markedly in respect of electronics. To gauge what this could mean for the global military balance, it is important to realise how persistently, and how far, Soviet weapons technology has lagged behind that of the West. Jet fighters are a conspicuous case in point. Although she has put a big developmental effort into this sphere ever since 1945, the USSR's designs have to date consistently proved inferior especially as regards electronics. Hence the one-sided outcome of aerial combat over Korea, the Formosan Straits, North Vietnam, the Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights.

We might usefully look a little more closely at, for example, three tactical aircraft, each of which first appeared in squadron service between 1959 and 1962 and all of which, in fact, figure prominently in the crucial Middle East arena today: the MiG-21 (USSR), the *Phantom* (USA), and the *Mirage III* (France). Having a loaded weight only a third that of the *Phantom*, and barely half that of the *Mirage*, the MiG-21F carries much less elaborate aids to navigation and attack and is operational across far shorter radii of action. A further handicap it labours under is inadequate armament. When all three are equipped with cannon, the other two machines achieve between two and five times the MiG's rate of fire. When air-to-air missiles are borne, the superiority of the French and American aircraft is even more pronounced.

Nor did the entry into squadron service in 1971 of the much bigger MiG-23 do a great deal to redress the balance. Quite apart from anything else, the model in question was specifically designed for high altitude interception and reconnaissance and seemed less versatile than, in particular, the ubiquitous *Phantom*. But this does not mean that the MiG-25 or a MiG-27 might not be a formidable proposition, at any rate in combination with other new types. On the contrary, the signs are that, in the course of the next five or ten years, the technology gap will be reversed in various branches of aeronautics and military science.

This adverse prospect, coupled with the other shifts in advantage, means that we need pay close attention once again to the sheer mass of the Russian juggernaut and, above all, of its land arm. Neglected though it may have been of late, the theme is one which is embedded in our strategic thought, not to say our folk-lore. Almost throughout the nineteenth century British strategists were greatly exercised by the threat latent in Czarist armies of vast size and enjoying the allegedly inestimable advantages of 'interior lines of communication'. Hence the enunciation by Sir Halford Mackinder in 1904 of the thesis that control of the Eurasian 'Heartland' was the key to world supremacy. He defined the Heartland as the area in which all the rivers drained into lakes, the Caspian, or the Arctic.

When divisional orders of battle are compared at face value, the situation today looks worse than Mackinder or anybody else of that generation could have imagined possible. So bad, indeed, as to hold out little hope of defence and to afford little scope for arms control bargaining. There is a total of 165 divisions in the Soviet army as against sixteen in the American or as against twenty-three NATO divisions (five of them American) in West Germany. Admittedly there are only twenty-five Soviet divisions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia but alongside them stand six similar East German divisions and ten Czech. Besides which, the Warsaw Pact garrison in this Central European theatre could be reinforced much more heavily during the first month or so of a crisis than could the NATO contingents.

Mercifully, however, things are not quite as simple as that. Most of those 165 Red Army divisions are in peacetime kept at something between 35 and 70 per cent of their war establishment and so would take between several weeks and several months to bring to full strength. What is more, even when it is fully mustered, a Soviet-style division (plus its supporting corps troops) is considerably smaller manpower-wise than is its typical Western counterpart. Even so, it will be well-endowed with battle-tanks and field artillery, these having secured for themselves a cardinal place in the Russian military tradition. However, it will be relatively weak in respect of infantry and some important ancillary elements: logistics, command and control networks, tactical nuclear support being prominent among them. Nor should one forget that, in Central Europe at any rate, the air balance is less unfavourable to the United States and its allies than is the ground.

To all of which must be added the truism that the application of the military might of the Soviet bloc will usually, if not invariably, be subject to constraints of various kinds. As a rule, moreover, the more closely any particular scenario for potential conflict is studied, the more binding these constraints appear.

This last observation was, in a sense, neatly anticipated a century ago by Robert Arthur Salisbury, the then Secretary for India. Anxiety was especially rife in official circles in the London of the 1870s because the Russian frontier edging south-eastwards across Turkestan was drawing close to the town of Merv, regarded by some as a gateway to India. 'Mervousness,' said Lord Salisbury, 'will not stand the test of large-scale maps.'

Taken figuratively, this aphorism can be said to encapsulate a general and basic truth about the contemporary balance of power. Let us, for example, work in turn to diametrically opposite assumptions apropos an outbreak of war in Germany: the surprise attack scenario that lately has been receiving more attention, and the fighting after a few weeks of mounting tension which has been among the more orthodox assumptions. The first would be a terrible gamble because it would allow no time to test and to influence the psychological response of the West and so would leave

wide open the possibility of savage, and perhaps insensate, nuclear retaliation. The second might enable the Warsaw Pact to consolidate its numerical advantages in theatre. But by the same token, competitive reinforcement would make the forward zone as a whole progressively more congested, thereby limiting manoeuvre and so necessitating set-piece attacks against which the new defensive weapons would come into their own. One thinks, for instance, of minelets sown broadcast and of portable anti-tank missiles.

Yet, when all is said and done, both the current situation and certain trends within it do give cause for anxiety. No account has here been taken of socio-cultural flux: an overriding reality of modern life and one which a ruthlessly authoritarian regime could, in certain circumstances, turn much to its advantage. Nor has there been any examination of the social mechanics that induce the Kremlin to spend far more on arms than ever it needs for legitimate defensive purposes. Nor of what could ultimately prove the catastrophic logic of this contradiction. To which one might add that Soviet policy *vis-à-vis* arms control and disarmament is altogether too negative in certain respects. For instance, the blanket opposition so long displayed towards any on-site inspection of nuclear facilities has been an appalling manifestation of anachronistic chauvinism.

Moreover, little reflection is required to see as hopelessly flawed two arguments still regularly being advanced in favour of continued complacency on this score. One asserts that the USSR's political intentions matter more than military capability and implies that these are, and indubitably will remain, benign. The other stays on the well-trodden path of the military threat from China.

The most obvious point as regards political intentions is that they may change much faster than military capability—either offensive or defensive—ever could. And where the Kremlin is concerned, indeed, may they not change—and possibly much for the worse—almost at the drop of a hat? As much has surely been the recent experience of Berliners, Cubans, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and Yugoslavs, to say nothing of Chinese.

In military balance between Moscow and Peking, the former holds all the cards. China's small and entirely land-based strategic deterrent will be vulnerable to a Total Counterforce strike from the USSR (or, for that matter, the USA) well beyond 1980: at present, it is remarkably akin to the Russian one in 1962. Her tradition of partisan warfare is almost sublimely irrelevant in this context, given the character of the borderlands in question. In a limited mechanised war the Soviet Union would be at a marked advantage, not least because of its regional monopoly of tactical nuclear warheads. All of which points to the conclusion that the expansion of the Soviet army's strength in the Far East from seventeen divisions in 1967 to forty-five in 1973 was more to lean on China politically than to contain her militarily. It was not, in any case, at the expense of Red Army force levels in Europe.

Nor dare we discount the possibility of Moscow's healing its split with

Peking a while after the departure of Brezhnev and Mao, doing so perhaps as dramatically as was rapprochement effected with Paris in 1807 and Berlin in 1939. Occasionally, of course, the assertion is made that things have already gone much too far for this, that involuted competition between these Communist giants in areas as far afield as Southern Africa and the Indian sub-continent renders their divergence irrevocable. What we must ask ourselves, however, is whether far-flung patterns of Sino-Soviet rivalry can either determine or indicate the central relationship in the future. France and Britain have competed with each other in Africa throughout this century. But this has not precluded their fighting as allies in two World Wars.

NOTES

1. 'The popular masses are like water, and the army is like a fish' [CHAIRMAN MAO].
2. B. H. Liddell-Hart, *Deterrent or Defence*, Stevens & Co., 1960, p. 43.

[Neville Brown is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Birmingham and an Academic Consultant at the National Defence College, Latimer. He is the author of a major report, *The World Strategic Environment, 1977-1990*, which is to be published this autumn by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.]

BRITISH LABOUR'S SCOTTISH DILEMMA

by Alex Neil

THE elevation of Jim Callaghan to the job of Prime Minister and Leader of the British Labour Party has highlighted yet again the dilemma now facing the BLP in Scotland.

For the first time in over thirty years the electoral supremacy of the BLP in Scotland is under serious threat. No serious commentator on the current political scene in Scotland would pretend otherwise. From being the 'natural' party for working people in Scotland to support it has, over the past few years, come to represent all that is distasteful in Scottish politics. Its image is now that of an establishment party, with a vested interest in keeping things as they are. Both at national and local level it is seen as the party which represents bigness, bureaucracy and expediency, rather than decentralisation, democracy and honesty. It is also seen, along with the Conservative Party, as being totally out of touch and out of sympathy with the new Scottish dimension in Scottish politics and a party devoted to Westminster and positively hostile to the whole idea of Edinburgh government. This state of affairs is almost solely of its own making. The BLP's attitude to Scottish affairs is based on a number of assumptions, almost all of which are fallacious. It is these false premises which have led it into its present state of decline and ineptitude.

The most obvious of these beliefs is that the SNP will prove to be a temporary phenomenon and that the recent 'burst' of nationalist support will wither away, especially as the economy picks up and as the devolution bill goes through the House of Commons. British Labour believes that the history of the SNP's performance is one of sudden bursts, particularly when governments are going through rough mid-term periods, followed by equally sudden drops in support. The example of how the SNP captured and then very quickly lost control of Glasgow Corporation in the late sixties is quoted often in Labour circles as proof of this theory.

In fact, however, this theory of the development of the SNP simply is not true. If we were to trace the performance of the SNP at every General Election since 1951, we would find that far from moving in bursts of rise and decline, electoral support for the SNP has risen steadily, with no drops or setbacks, as the BLP would like to believe. Indeed, at every General Election between 1964 and February 1974 inclusive, the SNP not only increased their vote on each occasion, but actually more than doubled every time. So that the recent successes of the SNP are not a sudden boost but rather reflect a general trend that has been taking place since 1951 and which has accelerated significantly in the last ten years. Indeed, the election of February 1974 represented a take-off point for the SNP in the sense that it was the first election in which they fought all the seats in Scotland, with the sole exception of Orkney and Shetland, which they agreed to stay out of, and the average vote per SNP candidate rose dramatically from the 4½-6,000 mark, where it had stayed for the previous twenty years, to over 9,000 votes

on average. In other words, February 1974 pointed to a genuine growth in SNP support amongst the electorate, whereas previously their increased share of the vote in Scotland had come simply from putting up more candidates. This process was accelerated in the election of October 1974.

The second big mistake that the British Labour Party has made in their assessment of what is happening in Scotland is their belief that the politics of nationalism are the effects of poverty, unemployment and deprivation. In fact the bulk of nationalist support has not come from people afflicted by these ills, but rather from those sections of Scottish society which are relatively better off than the average family, but whose aspirations and expectations have outpaced the increase in their standard of living. In other words the politics of nationalism are the politics of prosperity and not the politics of poverty. That is why the SNP have found the Clydeside and Glasgow areas the most difficult to 'crack' to date.

The belief therefore that the 'economic miracle' envisaged by Mr. Healey would lead to an equally stunning political miracle for the BLP in Scotland shows a basic misunderstanding of the roots of nationalism in Scotland. The more prosperous the Scottish people become the more likely they are to become increasingly nationalistic. Thus the flow of oil over the next few years will by itself lend further stimulus to nationalism in Scotland. As the potential wealth from the oil revenues becomes more apparent and as it becomes more obvious that the Scottish people are not getting a fair share of the oil money, then Scottish feeling is almost bound to grow in strength.

Thirdly, the British Labour Party does not appreciate the changing economic relationship between Scotland and the rest of the U.K. and the effect of these changes on Scottish self-confidence and national identity. It used to be the case, during both times of relative prosperity in the economy as a whole and times of depression that the unemployment rates and income levels in Scotland were always markedly lower than those in the English regions. Indeed, in the late fifties and early sixties people like Willie Ross made great political capital in Scotland out of these differences, thus presenting an image for the Labour Party in Scotland as the 'nationalist' party, employing Willie's favourite ploy of making Labour sound more nationalist than the nationalists.

In fact average income levels in Scotland are now on par, and in some cases, actually higher than the U.K. national average. And the differentials in unemployment are much lower than they ever used to be. This is not just the result of oil jobs or just about the alleged success of U.K. regional policy in Scotland, but is part of a general trend of the Scottish economy getting much stronger relative to the English economy. This changing relationship has been happening not as a result of Scotland getting richer but simply because we are getting poorer at a slower rate than the rest of the country. In other words it is a side effect of the long term decline in the British economy. The crucial factor that Labour has not taken into account is that the political axis must move in accordance with the changing economic axis. In other words as Scotland gains relatively to England

economically, she also wants to gain politically, not at the expense of the English but simply in order to be able to plan her economy and generally further improve her position, in absolute as well as relative terms.

The other economic factor that British Labour has ignored are the changes that have been taking place within Scotland itself. There have been two movements of population that have had major political effects. These are the drift from the older cities to the new towns and from the west coast to the east coast of Scotland. Not only have these people moved physically, but they have also moved politically. Their traditional loyalties have been broken down and they are now making independent political decisions for themselves rather than simply continuing to vote as their parents did. They are also developing new tastes in all aspects of their lives, such as the desire to own their own home, which Labour has never responded to in any real sense. Their political tastes change as well and to date that has meant in most cases switching their support from British Labour to the SNP, although of course I hope and believe that that will come to the SLP in the years ahead. Fourthly, the British Labour Party has had no strategy for dealing with the basic changes in political debate that the advent of nationalism has brought. They fail to realise that the SNP is an effect, rather than a cause of more basic changes which are taking place in Scottish society and that had they adopted a correct policy stance convincingly on the Scottish Government issue then the BLP need never have got itself into the current mess. The basis of political debate in Scotland has been the relatively straightforward one of left versus right, capital versus labour, for the past thirty years or so. It was in that situation that the Labour Party naturally flourished. However, increasingly the debate between left and right is being replaced by the debate between nationalists and unionists. In this situation then the nationalists and unionists flourish. That is not to say that a party must adopt an out and out separatist position, in the classical sense of that word. It would suffice to be keenly nationalistic without being forced into an SNP-type position. But the BLP has proved itself incapable of even beginning to appreciate, let alone articulate, the current feeling in Scotland. It is getting the worst of all possible worlds, because its devolution stances have always been too little, too late and even then not adopted with any degree of real conviction. They are really old-fashioned Unionists which is why Tam Dayell is right in saying that the Parliamentary Labour Party will not let a strongly devolutionary bill through the House of Commons.

Indeed, the BLP has even proved itself incapable of trying to ensure that the left/right debate, which to Socialists is the most critical at the end of the day, is kept up. A Labour Party supporting a Labour Government with a record on unemployment, etc. like this government has got does not carry the moral authority to promote Socialist thought and beliefs. Indeed it is this inability of the BLP in Scotland to carry credibility both on the national question and on the fundamental principles of democratic socialism that led a number of us to set up the new Scottish Labour Party.

There are other more general pointers that the BLP has not begun to appreciate. For instance, there is a widespread movement now in both East

and Western Europe societies for the restoration of national identities by small nations. In France, Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia, Rumania, etc. there are similar movements going on in certain areas as there are in Scotland. This is part of the reaction to the growth of big government and the multi-nationals in recent times.

Then there is the decline of Britain itself in the post-empire period. The concept of the British nation carries much less conviction and respect than before. The long term decline in the British economy is adding fuel to this fire. The feeling of being British is growing weak among the Scots, because it no longer carries the kinds of values which are inherent in the Scottish character. But probably most important is the organisational and political decline of the British Labour Party in Scotland. The history of its approach to the devolution issue has served to prove how old and moribund the BLP machine has become in Scotland to the point of being totally incapable of responding to the needs and aspirations of a modern dynamic society.

Since June 1974, when a small meeting of the Scottish Executive of the BLP voted 6 to 5 against the principle of having a Scottish Parliament or Assembly, the Labour Party and Government have changed their minds on the devolution question at least seven times. Firstly they rejected the principle then, forced on by the national executive, in August 1974 they came out in favour of the principle of having an Assembly; in September of that year the NEC policy statement, Bringing Power Back to the People, committed the party to very radical devolution with the proposed Assembly having wide ranging economic powers. Then the first Government White Paper later that month accepted the principle but not the need for trade and industry powers. Next, at the October election, the party, with government ministers then acting as the party's official spokesmen, committed a re-elected Labour Government to trade and industry powers, then the 1975 Aberdeen conference reversed this commitment. Then the second White Paper in November rolled back the proposed powers for the Assembly even more, and then at the Troon conference the party rejected the White Paper for not going far enough, as did the Scottish Group of Labour M.P.s. At this moment (June 1976) the BLP has three policies on devolution—the election commitment, the White Paper and the Troon decision. You pays your money and you takes your choice!

Their new Prime Minister is the man who, as chairman of the party in August 1974, tried desperately to stop the publication of the policy document committing the NEC to the principle of a powerful Assembly after it had been agreed by the Home Policy Committee, which had been empowered to issue the final draft as party policy. The new Minister of State has spoken out strongly against the whole principle of an Assembly and did so at the special conference in August 1974. And the Tribune Group are fighting for the use of a referendum to ditch the inevitability of having an Assembly with trade and industry powers. As Eric Heffer has honestly admitted, the BLP's heart is not in the devolution exercise. On top of all

this the state of the BLP in Scotland is very poor indeed. As an internal document prepared for the Home Policy Committee last year admitted, the Labour Party in Scotland is an a state of rapid decay, with the bulk of positions and activists in a very high age group and with the youth section dominated by the Trotskyist militant group. It has become a councillors' party, with a realistic individual membership of less than 5,000.

The traditional sources of Labour support—men rather than women, young people rather than older (and less radical members of society), the Catholic vote, and the working class vote—are now moving in varying but nevertheless significant force to other parties and to date in particular to the SNP. It is now very difficult to see how the BLP is now going to be capable of arresting this decline. Which is why we have a new Scottish Labour Party, with the joint aims of restoring national rights to the Scottish people for them to have their own powerful Parliament and to ensure that the Scottish Parliament pursues democratic Socialist policies which are relevant to modern Scotland.

Therein now lies British Labour's Scottish dilemma.

[Alex Neil is General Secretary of the Scottish Labour Party.]

SCIENTISTS ENCOURAGE GIFTED SCHOOLCHILDREN

by Christian Schröder

THE way from learning to study will be paved in the GDR by the School Students' Academy, an institution jointly established in Karl-Marx-Stadt last year between scientists of the Technical College, the town council and the leadership of the youth federation. This ambitious name is linked with an ambitious programme for the encouragement of gifted children in socialism. In their spare time, pupils from the schools in Karl-Marx-Stadt may be introduced to the secrets of certain specially selected problems in the natural sciences, technology, pedagogy, production engineering and politics by famous scientists of the college.

The 250 participants in the first course were delegated to attend by the teachers' collectives of their schools and by the school branches of the youth federation. The only requirements were outstanding educational achievements and a certain degree of natural talent, which will hopefully lead them to become scientists. The boys and girls from the 8th to the 11th grades who participate in the two-year training period follow a foundation course and an advanced one. The foundation course comprises eight meetings which are organised by reliable college professors. The topics for discussion are near to life and very varied. These range from an introduction into the methodics of study and the role of the technical sciences in the life of society to the discussion of economic questions. The participants may also take part in many scientific meetings of the college, that is in colloquiums, seminars and panel discussions on 'Students' Days' which are organised by the youth federation every year. During the eight meetings of the advanced course in the second year, special discussion groups cover topics on sociology, engineering sciences and natural sciences. From time to time, talks are held with professors from the college.

This School Students' Academy is of great benefit. On the one hand, the participants become acquainted with a study atmosphere, learn how to pick out the essential points of a lecture, receive helpful stimuli in the development of their private study and their own creative scientific work. All this gives them an advantage at school and a head start in the transition from schoolchild to fully-fledged student. On the other hand, the academy helps them to choose their courses. This is extremely valuable, as the many young people coming from Karl-Marx-Stadt working class families will agree. Finally, they become acquainted with scientific knowledge in a very interesting way at the colloquiums and lectures, which deepen the knowledge which they have gained at school, and provide the necessary stimulus for further scientific study. It is therefore a most effective form of encouragement of the gifted.

Whoever receives his participant's certificate here after two years is well prepared for university life. But the School Students' Academy goes far

beyond the confines of the college. Its young listeners report back at study conferences in their schools in afternoon youth group meetings and naturally tell their friends about their impressions, and thereby help many others to learn and choose their professions.

TRAINING FOR A LIFE WORTH LIVING

by Peter Niecke

THE social programme of the 8th congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) initiated in 1971 is being systematically materialised with the help of practical measures. A group of new decrees considerably increased certain benefits of the unified annuity and social insurance fund as well as of the social welfare, especially for persons needing care and help, as from July 1st, 1973.

Diplomaed lawyer Siegfried Schirmer, M.D., who is medical director of the county mental hospital of Brandenburg, with 2,500 beds the biggest of the GDR, informed us on existing and improvable forms of care for mentally ill and affected persons. Psychiatric care in the GDR is organised according to the political-territorial structure of the country, which is divided into counties and districts. Health service in these territorial units is directed by the county and district medical officers who are appointed by the local councils. They cooperate closely with specially qualified and experienced physicians who work as county or district experts for various medical fields. Thus in each district of the GDR there is also a district psychiatrist who is head of a corresponding dispensary. He has to make individual decisions for every patient as to whether and which therapeutic measures are necessary and whether the patient will be treated as an out-patient or an in-patient. For special diagnosis and therapy as well as rehabilitation and metaphylaxis there are 41 highly specialised neuropsychiatric clinics with more than 20,000 beds in the GDR. The care for mentally affected persons including dispensary, diagnosis and therapy, rehabilitation and metaphylaxis represents a graduated scientifically-founded system of socialist health care. The care for the diseased, and especially for people needing help and attendance, is regarded as a social maxim. Mentally affected persons have equal rights as members of socialist society, too, and deserve respect and esteem just like all other citizens.

This principle corresponds to the GDR's Constitution and is reflected in a large number of measures taken by the party of the working class and the government. Its practical impact can be shown by the example of mentally diseased children who get systematically prepared for a life worth living and, if possible, are enabled to arrange their life in society themselves.

In the case of mentally diseased children whose mental disturbances are subject to registration, the children are classified as capable of attendance at school according to the results of medical care initiated as early as

possible. Special kindergartens and schools help to supply the children of the first group with a relatively high standard of education, enabling them to learn a trade and to lead an independent and normal life, to a certain extent.

Those children who are not capable of attendance at a school—there are about 20,000 in the GDR—are cared for in an exemplary way in the GDR. A large number of highly specialised physicians, psychologists, pedagogues, nurses and welfare workers in a sacrificing way try to enable these children to master the daily routine. This is an extremely hard venture both for the little patients and for their nurses. What is mere child's play for a sound child who, though still a baby, knows how to eat, wash, open a door, dress and undress—in one word the fitness for life—is no matter of course for mentally affected children and they have to be trained with special methods for this purpose.

In some cases even more is achieved: the Brandenburg Mental Hospital furnishes examples of severely mentally handicapped persons performing easy work in production. Actions such as milling, filing and polishing are performed in the rehabilitation workshop of the Brandenburg Hospital. Examples of metal work, optical and electrical spare parts are produced. This work gives unimaginable pleasure to the youths, and even a little success gives them courage to use their hands creatively. This shows how the interest of the mentally ill and their families is compatible with the interests of society. In the first place, it is a question of smoothing the way for the handicapped towards a relatively normal life, of integrating them into the social working process according to the abilities and skills for which they were trained.

It is the object of progressive psychiatry to guarantee a step-by-step transition from the 'secure' atmosphere of the hospital to life 'outside.' At present, hostels and 'protected' workshops with special jobs for mentally handicapped persons are being built in the GDR. There they lead a normal life and work in the social production process. They are, however, protected through special conditions tailored for the respective group of rehabilitation patients, especially as concerns norms and questions of industrial law. Doctors and nurses are still at their disposal.

Many efforts are made in order to give mentally handicapped citizens a good starting position for a normal life, so that they can stand their ground and need only a little support and guidance. Physicians and psychologists, pedagogues and technologists jointly undertake the preliminary work for this purpose. They visit the patients' families and go to the enterprises where the patients will work. There they talk to the working teams and discuss the way the rehabilitated patients should be welcomed and made acquainted with the team. Their main concern is to awaken the working team's understanding and readiness to help in order to exclude harmful pity. To further mentally affected persons means also to require reasonable work of them. This is not mere theory but a result of research work thoroughly tested in practice. Work in this field goes on, at Brandenburg's Mental Hospital, for

example, at a model of a 'therapeutic community' which is a guidepost for all psychiatric hospitals of the GDR.

This therapeutic community is made up of patients, doctors and nurses, psychologists and pedagogues, and even administrative and technical staff-members of the hospitals. In such a community the patient is no longer—as hitherto in 'classical psychiatry'—merely the addressee of orders and directions and no longer occupies the lowest place in the hospital hierarchy. The working hospital team respects the patients and accepts them as team members with equal rights. The patients also have a share in decisions to be taken, such as the setting up of hospital and ward regulations, timing of meals, visits and hours-off—as well as the arrangement of thousands of other things necessary for living together in a big hospital. This raises the patients' self-confidence and lays bare intellectual abilities so far blocked, in an amazing way. Hitherto often predominant inferiority feelings give way to new standards which in turn serve as a mobilising factor for rehabilitation and integration into life 'outside.'

Following Pat Wood's article on *Gifted Children* in the January 1976 issue and *Employment Services for the Mentally Handicapped in Holland* (page 260 Vol. 227) by David Whiteman, it is hoped that the above information recently received from the G.D.R. may be of interest.—*Editor.*

CHRIST AND THE POLITICOS

by Bernard Simmons

AN accepted way to advertise a product is to imply that it is preferred by a person well-known to the public; the name of a champion driver may be used to sponsor a make of car, or the name of a sportsman to sell sports goods.

Few people know or greatly care whether the star performer really prefers that product. (I remember a tobacco on the tin of which was written, 'As smoked by the Right Honourable Stanley Baldwin'. Some years later one of his private secretaries told me that in fact Baldwin used to smoke an American brand.)

When the name of Christ is used to guarantee the quality of a political ideology it is more serious. Again, there need be no intentional dishonesty, but in effect there is a deception. Christ took no part in politics, to the disappointment of those Jews who, up to a few days before his death, expected that he would lead them to found a Jewish state independent of Rome.

Though he deliberately avoided political issues, Jesus has always been a victim or tool of political schemers. The chief priests and Pharisees convened the council and said: 'What are we to do? For this man performs many signs. If we let him go on thus, everyone will believe in him and the Romans will come and destroy both our holy place and our nation' (*John* 11). They were shrewd enough to understand that Jesus had no political ambitions or influence. But if 'the people' insisted on treating him as a revolutionary, which he was not, the Romans would assume that there was a revolution, destroy the Temple and end the liberal semi-autonomy which they had allowed to the Jews. The High Priest Caiaphas devised the ruthless stratagem which was, accordingly, used. He said: 'You know nothing at all; you do not understand that it is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, that the whole nation should not perish'. It was agreed that the life of Jesus, who was innocent of any intention to disturb the *pax Romana*, should be sacrificed to prevent his being used as a rallying standard by aggressive Jewish nationalists who would bring retribution on all Jews. The Jewish leaders therefore pretended to the Roman Procurator that Jesus was a man who intended to set himself up as King of the Jews in opposition to Caesar, and they presented themselves —and the mob—as loyal subjects of Caesar, opposed to the (fictitious) King Jesus. When the Procurator, Pilate, saw through their pretence ('I find no crime in him'), the Jews cried out, 'If you release this man you are not Caesar's friend; everyone who makes himself a king sets himself against Caesar'. Pilate then realised that if he did not order the execution he, as well as Jesus, would be called to answer a charge of treason. He co-operated in the plot and Jesus was executed for a crime of which, as all the plotters knew, he was innocent. He had said, 'My kingship is not of this world'.

There are three reasons why the name of Christ is used in association with politics: a hope by politicians to recruit Christians to their side, a

hope by Christians to win-over political activists, and as self-defence against any possibility of religious persecution by an actively atheistic state authority.

Christ's compassion for the sick and poor, and his awareness of the potentially bad effect of riches on the rich man, give colour to the insinuation that he would have supported party programmes to confiscate, nationalise or tax property.

There is seldom any warrant for saying that Christ 'would have' done or said anything. So many of the things which he said and did were unexpected, and sometimes unwelcome even to his followers, that it has never been safe to say that he 'would do' anything; he could as well have done the opposite.

There are, however, more important reasons for seeing Christ and politics as, literally, worlds apart. I will not pause over his distinction between rendering to God the things which are God's and to Caesar the things which are Caesar's. I point instead to his whole approach to people. His one intention was to change them into something better, never by compulsion but through their own free co-operation. The politician is only incidentally concerned with making people better, more directly with making them better-off (and why not?). He acts by the force of law and not through the love of God. That is his business; he is not to be blamed.

Christ warned rich people of the peril they were in and told them what to do,

'Woe to you that are rich, for you have received your consolation' (*Luke* 6).

'But God said to him, "Fool! This night your soul is required of you; and the things you have prepared, whose will they be?" So is he who lays up treasure for himself, and is not rich towards God' (*Luke* 12).

'One thing you still lack. Sell all that you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. How hard "(but not impossible)" it is for those who have riches to enter the kingdom of God' (*Luke* 18).

Christ's compassion for the poor is famous but his still greater anxiety for the rich seems not to have been noticed. Yet it is plain that he regarded the rich as needing him more. 'Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick' (*Matt.* 9)

The point to grasp, of no interest to the mere politician (it may repel him), is that Christ was concerned more with the immortal soul than with the mortal body. 'Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell' (*Matt.* 10).

A programme of taxation or nationalisation may or may not make political and economic good sense; it can—though need not—lead to a greater measure of justice; but it does little or nothing to benefit the soul —simply because it is coercive. A body can be saved by force but a soul cannot: there lay the terrible mistake of the Inquisition. On the contrary, if force includes lawless violence it can destroy the souls of those who

employ it. The body is not to be despised—far from it; but Christ was concerned with something still more important.

Christ wanted rulers among his followers because they had souls rather than because they were rulers.

I am not saying that politics are of no importance to Christians; of course they are; and I hope they will be better politicians because they are Christian. I am saying that Christ's name is not to be used vainly, as a selling-point for an ideology any more than for a soap-powder.

It has been objected that Christ's teaching can be used to the advantage of those who wish to exploit the poor, in order to make them non-resistant. Yes; it can. Perhaps it has been. But the mere fact that a teaching can be abused does not make it false. It is the abuse, not the teaching, that is at fault. People like St Francis of Assisi understand the danger. They see that, while all have the right—sometimes the duty—to preach the Kingdom, no one can convincingly speak of the blessings of poverty unless he is himself poor.

It is regretted that the publication of a symposium of articles on the Islam Festival of the Arts has been unavoidably delayed. We hope to publish some of these articles at a later date.—*Editor.*

REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND CHRISTIAN REALISM

by E. M. Sidebottom

THE current Christian approach to politics is called Christian realism. When the 'perfectionist' love of the gospels is set over against the 'necessities of politics', when we hear that Jesus' teaching was not intended to be practised, when Christians justify terrorism on the grounds that the 'love-ethic of Jesus is beyond fulfilment in history', when the World Council of Churches sounds like the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a Christian journal asks in reference to a hypothetical strike situation, 'Can Christians say that nobody should be put against the wall and shot?', the language is that of Christian realism. With it, Reinhold Niebuhr fascinated the youth of the thirties who are now the Establishment. They were intrigued by his then combination of right-wing theology and left-wing politics. They were also confused. A limerick went:

> When Niebuhr at Swanwick had quit it,
> A young man said, 'Now I have hit it:
> Since I cannot do right,
> I will go out tonight,
> Find some sin to commit and commit it.'

But the teaching had a completely political reference. Raven and others said he was 'not a theologian', which he and his followers accepted but for different reasons, and as late as 1964 the Expository Times repeated of his first influential work: 'in the strict sense of the terms it is an ungodly book'. Yet Jacques Ellul's judgement that Niebuhr influenced neither Church nor State is surely wrong. A generation bred on his thinking and, it must be admitted, frozen into attitudes by it, has left a heritage to present-day young people which restricts them even when they seek to escape from it.

The scepticism of realism is, however, most refreshing after hot-house idealism and the liberalism which imitates the Gadarene swine at sight of the nearest precipice. It is better to be governed by an unprincipled rogue who keeps order for convenience' sake than by a fanatic. The world is unlikely to become better, and certainly not as a result of our actions; the exaltation of finite ends to the status of final commitment and all talk of saving the world is idolatry. In particular, to identify salvation with the defeat of one's foes is 'the most primitive of all religions. It is tribal religion'. Man's finitude means he cannot arrogate the right to exploit his environment or his fellows, as 'coming of age' talk might suggest. There must be structures of justice to allow people to defend themselves against the loving who are sure what is good for them, balances of power because no one can be entrusted with unchecked power over others. Not only politicians but educationists, medical men, ecclesiastical legislators, officials of all kinds wield power and the fact of original sin means they should not have or want power without control.

All this is not foreign to our century, and it is paradoxical that one should have been hailed as a prophet who became (in R. V. Sampson's

words) 'the doyen of political thought on the other side of the Atlantic', where he received the Congressional medal. Neibuhr originally retreated from a naive pacifism under Marxist influence but later veered to the right in politics while his theology became liberal. Barth's Christian radicalism which branded atomic weapons as 'infamous' and the dilemma of freedom at the expense of annihilation as 'madness' estranged the American. His political realism alone remained constant, and it was typical of the age. His interpretation of original sin recalls the doctrine so fiercely attacked by Camus that since all is impure nothing can be ruled out for political ends. But it recalls too the right-wing T. E. Hulme, who influenced left and right between the wars. Niebuhr also leaned heavily on Freud who had exposed the weakness of Christian ethics in inculcating love of enemies and therefore unfairness to friends, leading to self-righteousness, and putting a premium on wrong-doing. Here also come the doctrines of a gulf between individual and community, that a state of peace is unnatural to man, and that religion is a source of illusion. In fact, in our age, innocence and not guilt is suspect; the patron martyr is the ambiguous Bonhöffer and not, say, the consistent if somewhat naive Max Josef Metzger, beheaded by the Nazis for peace-making; and the folk-hero of entertainment is the unscrupulous if reluctant spy. Above all, Niebuhr is representative of the doubt which is in us all whether we dare face or advocate martyrdom in the stark faith of the cross.

But we need still more realism. There is extraordinary unreality about the language in which Christians discuss politics, setting 'the power of love' against the necessity of compromise, as if anyone believes that love by itself can remove a child from the path of a bus or justifies the killing of children except for political ends. The language of Christian realism bids fair to become a joke outside Christian circles: 'With sad hearts we take the path of unavoidable Christian violence, take upon our consciences the burden of responsibility and involvement, of Necessity' says a comic parson in a television play. It is in this matter of violence that realism is most lacking, and when 'responsibility' and 'involvement' become catch-phrases for killing millions, then Koestler's theory of a strain of criminal lunacy in human genetic inheritance gains in plausibility. An estimated two hundred million have died in wars this century. One wonders if juggling at the political level ignores the dynamic nature of evil, if Niebuhr's designation of war as 'temporary anarchy' is not, despite Luther, parasitic on the outmoded doctrine of inevitable progress which he denounced. Violence is not a method but a disease. The tragedy of invoking it against tyranny is that both are part of the same retrogressive process.

Niebuhr found corroboration of the Marxist analysis in his Lutheran background. We cannot avoid sin; we must do what is necessary and rely on forgiveness. The Reformer himself was reluctantly involved in politics, and made his famous and fateful division between public and private ethics, advising his patrons to 'stab, kill and strangle' the peasants in revolt and Philip of Hesse to commit bigamy and cover it with 'a good strong lie'; justifying war ('a small misfortune that prevents a great one') on the ground that 'The hand that wields the secular sword is not a human hand but the

hand of God. It is God, not man, who hangs and breaks on the wheel, beheads and scourges'. Niebuhr's 'interpretation of Christian ethics' is a resuscitation of the Lutheran doctrine that Jesus' teaching is an impossible ideal, not to be practised but only to reduce to despair and reliance on God's mercy. This view has so positively won the field that few clergy reject it. Yet it runs counter to the recorded teaching of Christ; to his insistence on obedience; on fruits which show the quality of life; on the hypocrisy of calling him 'Lord' and not doing what he says, that his family are those who do God's will, on the need for building on rock, not sand. 'Jesus expected from his disciples that they should do as he commanded . . . ', wrote Joachim Jeremias. 'When the waves of the last judgement beat upon the rock then the man will stand firm who "hears these words of mine and does them", and only he'. The emphasis upon Jesus' teaching in the gospels is strikingly disproportionate to modern depreciation of it. Even at the Transfiguration the Lord appears not as judge or saviour but as teacher: 'Listen to him'. Throughout the Fourth Gospel he is Son because of his obedience; to keep his sayings is to be his disciple. Practice of his own teaching leads him to the cross which is the victory for that way of life and enables it in others.

The common application of the somewhat sickly term 'perfectionist' to Jesus' teaching is unfortunate and misleading. It stands in psychological jargon for a neurotic meticulousness and urge to so-called 'selflessness', a concept logically senseless even in heaven, since if everyone were selfless none could be served. The Christian principle is 'If I wash you not, you have no part with me'. Another meaning of perfectionism is that of Herbert Spencer, the nineteenth-century apostle of progress, who meant by it behaviour only appropriate to an ideal world. Niebuhr extracted this meaning from 'Take no thought for your life' and 'Resist not evil' taken literally in the King James version, saying, 'No life can be lived in such unconcern for the physical basis of life': and speaking of Jesus' 'intransigence against forms of self-assertion which have social and moral approval in any natural morality'. From this eminence it is possible to accuse others of watering down Christ's teaching while ensuring that it need not be obeyed. We have stumbled on a way of having our cake and eating it. The sayings of Jesus, as Schweitzer said in another connection, are left lying about like explosive shells with the charges removed. Now, it is hard to see how these precepts, which involve response to evil, could apply except in an imperfect world, or in what sense 'Turn the other cheek' can be considered an ideal objective; you either do it or you do not. Niebuhr was not troubled that Jesus on his showing could not have practised what he preached. For the gospels do not represent him as supinely giving in to his enemies or seeking to avoid conflict; he attacks hypocrites who rob widows, retorts when struck, counsels 'If your brother sins against you, tell him'. He in fact 'speaks the truth in love', and love and truth are akin. If he counsels the 'harmlessness' of doves, he also recommends the shrewdness of snakes. He authorises the payment of taxes. His parables show a grasp of the realities of society and industry, from which he even derives lessons on the mode of

God's judgement. His teaching, even though in proverbs and not laws, is plainly not intended to belong to an inner world of wistful aspiration only. It is true that a tendency towards extremism appears early in the traditions. 'Do not turn from a borrower' becomes 'Do not ask back what has been taken'. In the missionary charge 'only a staff' becomes 'no staff', and 'wear sandals' turns to 'no sandals'. The reading in Luke 'They neither spin nor weave' for 'They toil not nor spin' looks more original in view of his tendency in this direction. But 'Do not worry over food/clothes for your life' really encourages man to use his superior powers which birds and flowers do not possess. 'Do not set yourself against an evildoer' (as the NEB translates) is only Matthew's headline in a context which requires 'Do not return evil for evil', and so Paul has it. The reason given for such behaviour is that the nature of the universe demands it; God is like that, and those who so act share his nature. It is not the wicked but the fool who builds his house on sand. Moreover, there is a strain of teaching in the gospels that in this same real world the tortures we inflict on others we inflict on God. The way, although it has distinctive features which may lead to martyrdom, for much of the time overlaps with the behaviour of all moral beings. This is why the New Testament writers can combine the ethical codes of the Graeco-Roman world with it.

But the doctrine of the impossible ideal is really an irrelevance. Niebuhr confused such things as the impossibility of being on intimate terms with everybody in China with moral weakness, and the greater difficulty for groups to achieve 'sympathy and a fair measure of objectivity' (to say nothing of an 'absolute love ethic') with its impossibility, though the more difficult and the impossible call out opposite responses. Similarly, that grace is pardon rather than power has nothing to do with the problem of finding a viable compromise in corporate living. Niebuhr attributed the fact that a man cannot behave entirely according to his own lights as a member of a group to sin. But compromise can be a sign of saintliness, of love and humility; it was the Pharisees, not Christ, who were bigots. Nor does it help to appeal to the very oft-quoted saying of Chamfort, 'the moralist of rebellion', that we must be just before we are generous, for justice is protean. Is it just to give equal shares in time of shortage or more for special groups? Do we give equal pay or more for greater qualifications or responsibility? Ought the vineyard owner to have defined a living wage as 'right' or should longer hours have been taken into consideration? The best definition of justice is Paul's (and Augustine's) of giving each man his due, which is in the end to be treated as a human being, one whom God loves. Justice is what love has achieved; it cannot be regarded as a heavenly equilibrium for which men must be sacrificed. There is in fact no rigid dichotomy between private and public ethics. Luther himself saw that the father of a family is in a sense a public figure; he involves them in his sacrifices. Moreover, the idea reduces itself to absurdity. If we must love our own enemies but not those of our friends, then, as Shaw's Charles II pointed out, it is an excellent family arrangement; for we can exchange enemies and remain good Christians. But in fact corporate man is not

wholly bad unless he convinces himself that he must be. Despite the dangers of depersonalisation complex formations often extend more aid to members than simple societies, firms and even countries sometimes act with integrity and even generosity, and apparently impersonal crimes, as Butterfield said, can be traced to many individual derelictions of duty. Not even accepted standards constitute an absolute norm. Nels. F. S. Ferré has adduced some irreverent difficulties here, pleading for consideration of the plight of the Methodist minister who was asked in an expensive hotel, 'Will you take your drinks at the bar or at the table?' and of the predicament of a famous divine who urged that social relativism could never be transcended when he was asked, 'If you were out on a moonlit night with a gorgeous woman who was not your wife and she began to make improper advances to you, what would you do?' In more serious vein, he went on to say that the Christian errs when, in the interests of perfectionist purity, he refuses the best relative choice open to him, but that he just as surely errs 'when he participates at all wherever no genuinely constructive choice is offered, but when a concerned non-conformity, on the other hand, would constitute a witness and a redemptive force'. Unconditional obligations can arise where there is no question of choice or wilfulness but only unavoidable constraint. Hence the agony through which genuine decisions are reached.

The weakness of Christian realism is that it offers no direction to specific attitudes. Altruism is a poor basis for ethics. Some of the worst crimes in history have been perpetrated from perhaps genuinely altruistic motives. Such are the burning of heretics, the bombing of Hiroshima (where proponents of 'situation ethics' speak of an 'agapaistic background'), and the crucifixion itself, with Caiaphas' classic statement of the lesser of two evils, 'It is expedient that one man should die rather than the whole nation perish'. Not that the principle is accepted by common moral judgement; 'necessity' is no defence on a criminal charge. In 1884 two men were tried for saving themselves from starvation when adrift for many days on a raft by killing and eating the cabin boy. No surer instance of the lesser evil could be conceived. The law condemned them, and it is perverse to quote Augustine's pernicious maxim 'love and do as you like' to prove that Christian morality is a step ahead of it in this respect. There are actions implying attitudes to human beings which are so contrary to what is owing to them that their utility or the purity of our motives are irrelevant. Of course, consequences are part of our actions and must be considered, though this is very difficult in politics. How many statesmen in 1914 would have pursued their policies if they had been able to foresee the consequences over the next fifty years? Moreover, a man may judge that the frightfulness of his immediate actions can bring no good result in the long run. This is not the same thing as an estimate, but it is clear that the 'no limits' doctrine will have disastrous effects on society as well as on morality and religion, and the true deduction from the relativism Niebuhr stressed is, as H. H. Farmer put it, not to play providence to our own affairs, despite, and even because of, man's new responsibilities. The warning has obvious value over a wide field today. But even in politics, pure opportunism is an impos-

sibility; the politician does not change his policy from day to day. And a man prepared to do literally anything that circumstances seemed to demand would have no character at all. A century which denies principle in the name of principle needs what Camus called 'a principle of limited culpability'. It is mere darkening of counsel, and in Niebuhrian language smells of dishonesty, to label all actions sinful in order to open the door to anything and everything. The desire to have a finger in the political pie at all costs may disqualify us not only from other roles in history—like Roland Bainton's schoolmaster who joined the Nazi party to protect his staff, only to find himself thereby excluded from the reconstruction—but from the one role which matters, that of being human. By the fact that limits are set to compromise human finitude is affirmed, humanity remains an option in many areas where it is threatened, and due regard is paid to the New Testament teaching of a distinctive Christian way. No doubt a theology of God's character lies behind this, and a philosophy of history derivable from the account of the refugee slaves on whom God's purpose rests, the Remnant, the Suffering Servant and the one like a son of man, from Jesus the crucified one who is exalted, and the lamb in the midst of the throne. But if the weakness of God is really strength and historical failure can produce humanity, we cannot rely on these things. Any concession to morality means weakness, and Christ can still appear as the madman who will scatter all our hopes and securities.

[The Rev. E. Malcolm Sidebottom is the author of *The Christ of the Fourth Gospel* and other books.]

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE TIGER IN THE TANK?

by André van Dam

If you do not think about the future, you cannot have one.—John Galsworthy, in 1928.

A FRESH element in international relations promises to emerge in the 1980s: the ownership of strategic resources will lead towards a mutual dependency, of political nature, between their producers and consumers. The vehement acknowledgement of such interdependency may well unfetter a wave of co-operative ventures between otherwise rivalling powers, be they governments, business corporations or societal segments.

This new phenomenon will introduce fundamental changes in the process of development in both industrial and emerging nations: (1) growth is to be selective rather than exponential, (2) technology is to be adapted to man rather than the contrary, (3) the market mechanism may be muzzled in the process, but (4) a new economic world order will eventually be fashioned in order to allocate a larger share of the expanding global output to the aspiring nations of Asia, Latin America and Africa.

In consequence, countries which hitherto fuelled their economies into haphazard growthmania by 'putting a tiger in their tank', may henceforth be impelled to subdue the beast or substitute it by a gentler feline. This mutation, which upon accomplishment will enhance their quality of life, may well exact blood, sweat and tears. Future research by all concerned—north and south of the equator—may facilitate this metamorphosis.

In a world feeding on emulation, the proposition of mutual dependency may have an arcadian tang. This is so because interdependency requires teamwork, and co-operation and competition seem mutually exclusive. Mutual dependency abruptly moved into the limelight when, on December 23, 1973, petroleum prices were unilaterally doubled once more and an oil embargo imposed for political reasons. In quick succession the interdependency became evident in mineral resources, especially copper, tin and bauxite. In time this new relationship will presumably extend to cereals, proteins and, in a distant future, fresh water, forests and oxygen.

In *A world without borders*, Dr. Lester Brown enumerates other examples of interdependency. For instance, the fallout of an atomic bomb over a Pacific atoll creates a dangerously high level of strontium 90 in the milk served in Milan's school luncheons. The US Government depends upon those of Laos, Pakistan and Turkey to stave off the social threat of heroin addiction. The scramble for the seabed ownership reflects a new awareness of globality. Rampant inflation painfully reminds us how sensitive our nations have become to each other's lack of monetary discipline. In the area of the human environment, Dr. Barry Commoner's first 'law' of ecology postulates that everything is connected with everything.

This interconnectedness has odd ripple effects, often related to unpredictable forces such as the vagaries of the weather. For instance, in 1972 Soviet

Russia suffered from very low rainfall. This compelled its government to purchase 28 million tons of cereals lest they impose hardship on the population. Drought in Argentina and Australia prompted the government to purchase most cereals in North America. At the same time the huge anchovy catch off the Peruvian coast vanished, trebling demand for soybeans elsewhere. Tornadoes hit the Philippines, whereas the monsoons were exceptionally low in southern Asia. Throughout the world food stocks dwindled and food prices soared. A year later when the US soybean harvest suffered from wet weather, China acquired 10 million tons of grains on the world markets. In a speculative buying fever, including such commodities as sugar and cocoa, food prices reached dizzy heights. They contributed more to world inflation than petroleum.

Hitherto, collaboration on a global or regional scale surfaced in wartime or otherwise under conditions of compulsion. There are too many ideological, tribal, linguistic and geographic barriers between nations to facilitate mutual understanding. The spread of pressure groups within the industrial nations themselves testifies to the conflicts which result from separate claims on resources exceeding their total availability.

The shocking crises of the 1970s may create sufficient turmoil and fear of worse to come, so as to render the world receptive to some form of co-operation. One is tempted to paraphrase Winston Churchill, in that co-operation is the worst kind of international relations except for all the others.

The resource-rich developing countries will insist, for example, that raw materials be increasingly processed, refined, improved and packaged in the countries of origin. It is there that the pressure on the labour market is most intense, energy plentiful and income creation most urgently needed. The political bargaining power of such nations will confront that of the industrial countries, which are at liberty to seek regional autarky, search for substitute resources, or reciprocate in other modes. In the end, when the pendulum will have swung widely and destructively, the spectre of political embargoes and requital may chime into some measure of geopolitical equilibrium.

Co-operation will involve business corporations, since they play a vital role in the worldwide extraction, processing and distribution of resources. According to futurist Dr. Erich Jantsch, either corporations lead in helping resolve some of the ongoing crises, or they may be turned into appendages of governments. Such teamwork may change the industrial apparatus from being product-oriented to outcome-oriented. This is the crux of the matter, since it will affect the ilk of growth and technology that takes shape. In this process, universities, foundations and other not-for-profit research organisations are to play a catalytic role—the objective of fresh research that requires further appraisal.

The foremost task of inter-disciplinary research should be to blueprint development processes that allow industrial and emerging nations to grow interconnectedly. That design leaves little room for the classical concept of

development, whereby poor nations pass eventually through the same five stages of development which North America and Europe experienced over the past 150 years.

It is opportune to outline these five stages, as envisioned by Dr. W. W. Rostow as recently as 1960. *Stage 1*, the traditional society: science and technology are not available or not applied; the social system is overwhelmingly rural and opposed to change. *Stage 2*, the transitional society: external influences initiate a process of modernisation of agriculture; a midle class emerges; political power is exercised by a central government. *Stage 3*, take-off: the watershed of modern society; exponential growth sets in; emphasis is on industrialisation, urbanisation, technology, productivity and modernisation of agriculture; managerial talents appear in private sector and government. *Stage 4*, maturity: country plays a role in world economy; exhaustive process of import substitution; infra-structure and basic industries create ripple effect in entire economy. *Stage 5*, mass-consumption: the emphasis shifts to consumer durables, and to services such as education, social welfare, research and finances. (In those days, *Stage 6*: the post-industrial society, was not yet envisaged.)

It is clear that any analogy between the past of the West and the future of Asia, Latin America and Africa is evaporated by the ongoing emergencies. Asia, Latin America and Africa must henceforth reckon with geopolitical realities that the West ignored in the past: demographic explosion; vocality of minority pressure groups; global demonstration effect of transistor radio, cinema and television; revolution of rising expectations, reflected in social legislation from cradle to grave; environmental constraints; technological innovation; mounting pressure for a distribution of wealth as it is being created by industrialisation.

These thrusts are compounded by the current crises which essentially modify the worldwide allocation of resources. For instance: the Arab emirates, in stage one, play a role in the world economy that surpasses stage four and can afford all the technology of stage five, yet they are limited by the manpower of stage two.

The skewed allocation of resources is a global problem as well as one of the developing nations themselves. Huge amounts can be wasted upon sophisticated hospital equipment to treat a few while amoebic dysentery remains endemic amongst millions in the myriad shantytowns. India spends twice as much on nuclear research as on agricultural investigations, Africa four times more on law and liberal arts than on all other faculties combined. Giant traffic jams clutter up São Paulo while countless Brazilians in the northeast flee the droughts by walking hundreds of kilometres.

These examples, a few amongst thousands, urge different processes of development on industrial and emerging nations. If their problems are inter-connected, so are their solutions. In his article *The threat from the third world*, economist C. Fred Bergsten of the Brookings Institution acknowledges that the West needs positive help from the third world on a number of critical issues. I believe the most urgent areas of such 'help' to include: growth, technology and distribution.

In the first report to the Club of Rome, the limits to growth were determined by ecological constraints. In the second report (*Mankind at the turning point*), only organic growth—of the type experienced by the human body—is held to assure the wellbeing of global society. The stoppage of exponential growth in its tracks is no alternative to continued geometric growth. The costs of both are intolerably high.

The past 20 years have witnessed the pursuit of growth for the sake of growth. Economic growth is a deeply ingrained concept of modern industrial society, well-nigh a dogma. To question growth is tantamount to heresy, although no longer taboo. For it dawns upon the world that the sum total of all individual unquenchable thirsts for resources exceeds the carrying capacity of the global eco-system. It is also evident that economic growth has no built-in mechanism to spread its fruits more equitably amongst the social classes. The immensely complex network of interdependent subsystems of society, all growing at different celerities and in contrary directions, threatens to tear the fabric of mankind apart. It is time to pause and ponder.

Growth based on over-industrialisation and the consumer society is no panacea of development. (If left to itself it produces stress, alienation, violence, unmooring of values and, in the end, low spirits.) Moreover, in the context of reciprocal dependency it seems futile to resolve the world's problems of per capita economic growth by cutting the 'capita' in the developing countries in order to salvage 'growth' in the industrial nations.

Bigness, intricacy and nomad driftage render our industrial state all but ungovernable. Perhaps only selectivity between economic sectors, countries and time periods can return our planet to a sane pace and pattern of development in which economic expansion and technological innovation serve man rather than the other way around. To this end, we must restrain our mobility, anchor our transience, bid farewell to the throwaway economy, and make a thrifty use of energy and other strategic raw materials. In short, we must select a model of economics as if people mattered, to quote Dr. E. F. Schumacher's *Small is beautiful*.

Future research can determine criteria of selectivity and build a mechanism of choice, on the explicit assumption that (a) ecological constraints do appear, (b) strategic resources remain in short supply, and (c) interdependency inevitably enlarges the share of the third and fourth worlds in the global output. It may well take blood, sweat and tears to slenderise the acquisitive contour of the industrialised countries. But in the end we conjecture that a lifestyle will emerge that, by figuratively 'living down with the Jones', will set the scene for co-operation under conditions of reciprocal dependency.

Not so long ago, a provocative advertising slogan swept the world: 'Put a tiger in your tank'. It embodied society's faith in the union of energy and progress. At all events, the industrial nations are now urged to replace the tiger by a kitten, so to speak—or to remove the tiger and the tank to Asia or Africa. This depicts the gravity of our dilemma. Trust widely prevails

that the high price of strategic resources will inevitably uncover substitutes. It is argued that in the same fashion that coal replaced wood and petroleum replaced coal, solar energy, nuclear fission and geothermics can come to substitute petroleum. In that perspective, total energy consumption would continue to swell at a lofty speed, endlessly.

Only solar, tidal and wind energy are replenishable and non-pollutant and thus ecologically acceptable. What remains objectionable is the social cost of energy, in terms of mobility, ephemerality, the throwaway economy and other expressions of the over-consumptive society. It is this human price of technology rather than the ecological expense of its energy contents that on balance censures exponential growth. At the threshold of the technetronic era, it is opportune to opt for a more compassionate model of development —one that gives birth to technology with a frugal energy content.

Future research into adaptive technology is urgently needed. Technology has to be adapted to the human environment. If people are the aim of development, a type of technology must be designed that renders work creative and provides workers with a sensation of self-fulfilment. Technology will have to be adapted to the local culture, availability of manpower and energy. Built-in premature obsolescence is to be discouraged. A new emphasis on the quality of life should favour unmingled technology. This is the kitten in our tank, the symbol of the problématique of the 1980s.

If selective growth and adaptive technology are touchy issues, bandaging Adam Smith's invisible hand is outright contentious. In the Cocoyoc declaration, signed by 33 foremost development experts, the market mechanism is singled out as a foe of development. A good case in point are fertilisers. North America sprays as much fertiliser on golf links, lawns and cemeteries as India on cropland. Yet there will soon be 3 times more people in India than in North America. One ton of fertiliser does many times more good in India than in North America. What with the acute world-wide shortage of fertilisers and their role in growing food, critics accuse the invisible hand of allocating fertilisers where these are least wanted.

Champions of the marketplace point to the disastrous effects of price control, rationing and other forms of distorting the law of supply and demand. They argue that only the market mechanism leads to abundance and that in turn plenitude squeezes prices, creates employment and wages. Critics retort that the market is a function of competition and that rivalry precludes co-operation which is the essence of developing the world under conditions of interdependence.

Future research will have to balance the assets of the invisible hand (creation of wealth) with its liabilities (inequitable distribution). For in the final analysis the global distribution of resources will determine the viability of co-operation.

Selective growth, adaptive technology and a handcuffed market must be perceived in a global context. In his famous article *The tragedy of the commons,* Dr. Garrett Hardin demonstrates how maximising individual benefits turns remorselessly into collective catastrophe—for instance when

unfettered national appetites clash with limited global availabilities. This will inescapably lead to a struggle for the world product, as pointed out by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the April 1974 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. He anticipates that political bargaining will replace the price machinery of strategic commodities. For what determines the price of petroleum, tin and coffee? The OPEC cartel, the International Tin Council and the International Coffee Agreement, that is. Copper, bananas and pulp may well follow suit.

A birdseye view of the breakdown of the world product, expressed in the unavoidably fallacious gnp measurement, demonstrates the need for a different economic world order based on a global redistribution:

(In US$ of 1975 value)	1975 estimate	2000 forecast extrapolated	2000 forecast desirable
	trillion	trillion	trillion
World output	4.0	10.0	10.0
industrial nations	3.2	8.0	5.2
developing nations	0.8	2.0	4.8
	billion	billion	billion
World population	4.0	6.6	6.0
industrial nations	1.0	1.2	1.2
developing countries	3.0	5.4	4.8
Per capita world product	1.000	1.500	1.600
industrial nations	3.200	6.600	4.400
developing countries	270	370	1.000

The goal for the year 2000 reflects a gnp spread of almost 5:1—which is the one advocated by Nobel prize-winner Jan Tinbergen. The Cocoyoc declaration insists that the 'gap' need not dictate the future development strategy, since it reflects neither the quality of life nor cultural dissimilarities in tropical and temperate climes. However, in view of the limits to growth of the world product, the industrial nations will be called upon to curb their expansion in a selective fashion so as to enable Asia, Africa and Latin America to consume proportionately more of the world's output.

If such a proposal has a utopian ring by the measurement of the 1960s, it is outright realistic in the perspective of the 1980s, when the newly found political and economic leverage of the third world will re-order global priorities. I anticipate that Europe, North America and Japan will have no choice but to slacken the negative elements of their growth pattern, to witness: excessive mobility, armaments, throwaway products, overeating and impermanence. In so doing, the West will underwrite a tranquil interdependency and enhance the quality of life of its people.

The curtailment of overconsumption should, of course, be extended to the prosperous enclaves in poor countries. Only a reconciliation of the property rights of the world's well-to-do with the amenity rights of the world's poor can ensure the latter access to a decent minimum of food, shelter, education and clothing. The industrial nations, mindful that in 1963 their per capita product averaged US$2.200 in today's values, will

cheer up at the prospect of a US$4.400 product by the year 2000. Thus, the selective growth, adaptive technology and handcuffed market that will guide them there, can become instrumental in shaping a new world economic order in favour of the third and fourth worlds.

When the dust settles on the resource crises, perhaps as early as the 1980s, the threat from the third world to which Dr. Bergsten refers, may prove to be a blessing in disguise. For in the 1980s the world's affluent citizens will all of a sudden remember futurist Nabutene Kiuchi who, back in 1970, wrote in *Fortune* magazine that the Japanese will eventually discover again an old truth of their culture, namely that man is never pleased with over-abundance. The same might hold good for the Protestant work ethic and for the Roman Catholic concept of 'charity'.

By the 1980s, I conjecture, the regret may fade away that exponential growth, modern technology and the invisible hand might have taken Europe, North America and Japan to an average per capita product of US$6.600 by the year 2000, in today's purchasing power—but at what risk, one is inclined to wonder. For in the final analysis the kitten may prove to be a much more pleasurable companion than the tiger.

[André van Dam is a Dutch economist and corporate planner who engages in research of the future development process of Asia, Latin America and Africa.]

THEY KILLED A MAN

A citizen's eye view of the sad administration of President Richard M. Nixon

by Doris Overland

WHEN President Nixon resigned, I broke the news to a friend on the telephone and she exclaimed, 'They killed a man!'

I felt no one could have expressed it better. Although I and my friend may have been in the minority, there were many Americans who felt as we did and gave voice to their feelings in the last forum permitted to Nixon defenders—the readers' columns of the newspapers. Nixon's last days in office were overcast with a pall of dread, heralding Doomsday, affecting all of us. The spates of hate pouring over 'the man's' head had suddenly become an overwhelming torrent—in the newspapers, on television, and in so many public voices.

I hoped he would hang on through an impeachment trial, which, I was sure, would clear him after all the evidence was in and the plea bargaining witnesses against him had been thoroughly cross-examined.

But it was all over before we, who hoped for a hint of sanity in the proliferating allegations of perfidy, could believe it. The new President Ford announced, 'The nightmare is over!' I don't suppose he meant Nixon's nightmare, because that would go on until he died—or until his name was cleared of a multiplicity of charges of terrible crimes against the people.

I don't think any of us were quite clear in our minds as to what he had been charged with. Unindicted co-conspirator in everything for which his staff had been indicted—obstruction of justice—cover-up—payer of hush money—what did it all mean when applied to a very busy President of the United States in a time of continuing energy crises, international crises, threat of nuclear war—and a Marxist country as close as Cuba?

My friend who exclaimed, 'They killed a man!' could not believe it either. She shook her head over his terrible press as the 'Commander-in-Chief' of Watergate. 'He was not that sort of a man,' she said. I remembered that soon after he came into office, the deadly surtax—a tax on one's individual income tax—disappeared from the yearly income woes of the 'little fellow,' and the exemption for dependents was raised from $600.00 a year—which wouldn't keep the family dog alive—to $750.00, which helped, at least, to feed and clothe a child.

Startling headlines in 1970 advised us that he had banned germ warfare —a horror which most of us did not even realise was being contemplated by the mysterious CIA in our midst. Perhaps he should have won the Nobel Prize for this bold, angry order. Another president might have kept silent about such a hideous little plot hatching in minds reminiscent of Hitler's goon squads. Also, while bearing full brunt of alleged responsibility for all

the war horrors of Viet Nam, he was flying off to confer man-to-man with Kosygin and planning the establishment of diplomatic relations with Mao's China.

He seemed to have a unique and simple idea of how world peace could be achieved—that is, by these man-to-man conferences with other world leaders—and no matter how much his enemies hated the idea, he was himself a world leader, exploring every avenue for peace on a humanitarian basis of confrontation and dialogue as opposed to espionage and secret war councils. As such a man—and president—he was obviously more admired in other countries than he was in his own—he was the proverbial prophet without honour. At the same time, he was such a jealous guardian of the security of his own country that he became incensed when the Pentagon Papers were leaked to an avid publisher. But the whole tenor of his public life and character gives the lie to the accusation that he would be interested in Ellsberg's psychiatric problems.

Why did the American Press dislike him so intensely as to give him no quarter in his difficult job? There is something about this that smacks of a mass psychosis in newspaper circles. Nixon was hardly charismatic; he was a deadly earnest man, and he had achieved success in his one marriage to a beautiful woman who was both a companion in all his world travels and dangers as Vice-President and President, and a model of wifely serenity. In a sense, Nixon is an anachronism in our time, and as an anachronism, the sophisticated press of our day may have suspected him as some persons suspect anyone who does not conform to their life style and way of thinking.

The trickiness which was projected on Nixon could well be no trickiness on his part, but the trickiness of our huckster times. The real hero of Watergate seems to be 'Deep Throat,' whose identity has been jealously guarded by the media as the source of all their 'dope' on Nixon. While it is understandable that newsmen must keep the secret of their sources of information in murder cases and narcotics ring cases, it is incredible that 'Deep Throat' should receive such protection.

Somehow the division between the anti-Nixon people and the pro-Nixon people in the Watergate crisis reminds me of the division between the Bolsheviki and the Menshiviki during the Russian Revolution. It was that great Menshevik leader, Emma Goldman, who gave me one of my few slight lessons in Russian in her autobiography, *Living My Life*. *Menshiviki*, she wrote, meant those in the minority and *Bolsheviki* meant those in the majority. In Lenin's Russia, the Bolsheviks were the majority party and the Mensheviks were the minority party. The Bolsheviks were Marxists and the Mensheviks were Anarchists (the equivalent of a least-government social democracy by consent of the governed). It was popular to be a Bolshevik Marxist, but it was very unpopular to be a Menshevik Anarchist. Anyone who has marked the course of history cannot doubt this.

It is very unpopular to be a Nixon supporter in our country today and I think that is because the anti-Nixon forces, like the old Bolshevik leaders, have demonstrated a superior power to sway the people—probably because

they were better organised and possessed of greater means to wage war against Nixon in the form of a saturation campaign in the press and on the networks. Like Lenin, they were indefatigable and financially well endowed. Also, like Lenin, they were abundantly endowed with the wit and delivery to disturb and arouse the masses which constitute the majority.

The thousands of faithful who streamed to Lenin's tomb in the ensuing decades give ample testimony to his canonisation by the people. Who remembers Emma Goldman and Peter Kropotkin, the intellectual leaders of the Menshiviki?

It seems we are always being overwhelmed by numbers, and Nixon's case is no exception to the rule that a popular cause must always defeat a just cause. Those of us who see justice in Nixon's cause are laughed out of countenance or lectured so severely that we end up wondering if we really are traitors in maintaining that the man has been disgraced and routed out of office without an iota of clear and reasonable cause.

'It's all hearsay and innuendo,' we claim desperately. 'The evidence he has presented as President has been either totally ignored or distorted into further cause against him. Nobody has read the tape transcripts through with a clear mind and judged them in perspective, as he hoped. We have looked to the newspapers and the channels to do our thinking for us.'

We are told that we are only stubbornly supporting a man who co-conspired the Watergate outrage, tried to cover it up, instigated a file burglary in a psychiatrist's office, cheated on his income tax, helped his closest friend to increase his wealth sevenfold during his term of office, etc., etc., etc. Even an incident of investigation of Nixon as choice for vice-president was brought up, and although he was cleared by this old investigation, it is now judged that he was guilty of that, too. Apparently we are to believe that nobody who has ever been investigated is innocent because nobody would lie about a man about to be advanced. Judgment by investigation!

'Why didn't you read the tape transcripts?' we despaired.

'Oh, we read them in the newspapers,' they replied airily.

Yes, they read them in the newspapers, where they appeared in editorial translations by hostile journalists, with frequent interpolations as to how certain portions should be interpreted by the reader. It was something like reading the Douai Bible with footnotes by the priests to guide the reader in the proper interpretation of Holy Scripture.

To one who has worked for several years in an attorney's office as clerk, secretary and legal writer, the continuing allegations against Nixon without recourse to legal trial of the issue seemed especially appalling. A complete reading of the tape transcripts as transcribed by White House secretaries reveals no effort to whitewash Nixon nor to rewrite his words. In discussions of men under pressure, their minds are apt to wander and sometimes they talk at cross-purposes with one another, quite deaf to the other's drift. It would seem that the multitude of tapes monitoring these conversations

would have to be heard from beginning to end by the same auditors and not in bits and pieces or relays. Then and only then could the whole picture of what Nixon encountered in his staff emerge.

In the White House transcripts, the tapes are often puzzling and ambiguous and you have to read on to the next tape and the next in order to draw any conclusions. Nixon spared himself nothing in releasing those tapes, and to us 'Menshiviki' it seems incredible that the tapes could be claimed to convict him. But such charge appeared constantly in the newspapers, sometimes with a photograph of our legislators, with earphones clamped to their heads.

When the President balked at releasing certain earlier tapes to the Judicial Committee, another crime was added to the long list and eventually cited in the House's Articles of Impeachment. In spite of the fact that he had every legal right to appeal to the Supreme Court to rule on his reason for refusing to release these tapes, that reason was swiftly labelled a lie, an evasion and further abuse of his powers as President, and one of the many Articles of Impeachment was entered as refusal to comply with the Committee's subpoena of these tapes.

When he lost his appeal to the Supreme Court, he then complied with what the 'Bolsheviki' no longer recognise as American law and released the tapes to the Committee. He also went to the people and made an admission which was seized upon as a confession of guilt as soon as it was out of his mouth. It seemed that he had personally delayed the FBI investigation of Watergate until current operations of the Central Intelligence Agency had been checked out, and when the CIA advised him that an FBI investigation would not interfere with any CIA security matter, he then gave the FBI the go-ahead signal on Watergate.

In view of the fact that a CIA agent and two or three Cubans were caught red-handed in the Watergate burglary, this seemed like a sensible precaution for a President to take in the interests of the country over which he presided. The furore which arose over this disclosure was absolutely incredible to us 'Menshiviki.' Top Republican leaders turned against Nixon overnight and demanded his resignation for the good of the country. All the Republican legislators who had supported him turned against him to a man and vociferated their anger to an inquiring press. Apparently the emotional climate for this volte-face had been prepared so thoroughly that the least human error on Nixon's part was sufficient to trigger it.

'This,' they screamed, 'is why he did not want those tapes to be released. He is guilty of covering up, and therefore guilty of everything!'

We 'Menshiviki' found it sad that Nixon felt he had to make this admission and that he also admitted he had kept silent on his part in temporarily halting the FBI investigation even to his attorney. His silence on the matter was 'small potatoes' and could have been due to anxiety for security of the country. The CIA has been every President's headache since Eisenhower's tenure of office. Least of all does a President want to 'blow' the security of his country.

However, Nixon's legal fight to retain those critical tapes still appears in the papers as the crime of 'withholding evidence,' typical of the journalistic framing of public thought against him. 'Withholding evidence' implies that you have evidence to withhold. Nixon gave the nation his word that he knew no more about Watergate than we did when it broke in the papers, and backed up his word with the White House tape transcripts, on which his surprise at the disclosures of John Dean should be clear enough to anyone who can read—as well as his concern for the families of the 'Watergate burglars.'

To be for Nixon was not necessarily to be a Republican or to approve of his domestic and foreign policies. To be for him was simply to be appalled at the forces arrayed against him and the saturation campaign to deprive him of everything—including his good name. No one seemed to consider that a President who would tape his conferences was not interested in double dealing, but in an open, recorded administration which could some day be analysed for historical purposes. After all, he could have been assassinated in office and the tapes would then have remained as testimony of his doings. Shady dealings thrive on secrecy—on meetings of which there is no record.

The tapes might have provided a more dignified and considered record had it not been for Watergate. 'At this point in time,' to quote John Dean, it seems that emotions were rubbed raw in the White House conferences—especially the emotions of the President who seemed to have forgotten his taped image in horror of the disclosures which his staff were slowly, tantalisingly leaking to him.

At this point in the tapes, Nixon showed himself to be a man amazed and angered at the unknown forces which had set Watergate in motion, but not quick to judge and condemn his White House staff. John Dean, John Ehrlichman and Robert Haldeman, on the contrary, seemed totally conscious of their own taped images as they talked rings around the President, combatting his tentative proposals for a presidential investigation as untenable. It occurred to me as I read on that poor Nixon must have developed some dreadful headaches trying to follow them—and when they harped continually on their duty to protect him as President and keep the dirty waters of Watergate from reaching him, I thought they played the roles of three plaster saints nauseatingly well.

It seems that the self-serving, plea bargaining testimony of Nixon's staff members has provided more ammunition for his 'killers' than the tapes and, perhaps, has conditioned a hasty, adverse interpretation of the tapes. In the end, he resigned with simple dignity, admitting no wrong other than errors in judgment, declaring that his sole reason for resigning was to provide the country with a full-time president, as his personal vindication in an impeachment trial would take too much of his time away from his country's needs. Perhaps he is the first president to sacrifice his reputation for his country.

Surely, as my friend said, 'They killed a man.' Indeed, they are still at it,

so that no scrap of him should remain in the minds of the people. Every day a charming elderly gentleman persuades me to read a *New York Times* editorial, and the last one I read darkly insisted that Nixon's best gift to the nation, Henry Kissinger, should also resign. What the mysterious 'they' most object to is the foreign policy of Nixon and Kissinger, reconciling Russia and China with the so-called 'free world.' 'At this point in time,' it seems rather like the pot calling the kettle black.

Isolationism, sectionalism and parochialism will surely launch us into nuclear warefare quicker than the blink of an eye. Then, I am afraid, the omniscient, omnipotent 'they' will wish they had listened to the Quaker and the Jew who laboured for the brotherhood of Man. Nuclear fall-out is no respecter of race, religion or political creed.

NORWAY

by Nicholas Emmett

THERE are places in Norway where winter temperatures are as low as the Eskimos experience in Greenland, yet summer can run up over 35 C. As late as the middle of April trams, festooned with skis bound by leather straps, chug into the hills around Oslo. Turn a bend in a forest ski track and you may come upon a family sitting on a tree trunk, drinking coffee, eating sandwiches, their coloured anoraks and sweaters bright against the snow. Weeks later the snow is gone from the forest and the ice melted on the lakes. By the end of May the fiord and lake bathing places are crowded with sun worshippers. Norwegians are a fit, healthy, handsome people, and one often sees the myth come true,—a tall blue-eyed blonde girl, running through the forest like some modern wood-nymph.

It seems strange that the country is separate from Sweden, having a thousand-mile common border. The only other countries she borders are Finland and Russia. The Russian border is, of course, the reason why NATO has a base in Norway.

A half of the country lies within the Arctic Circle. This includes the world's most northerly town, Hammerfest. And even north of Norway, the large frozen island, Svalberg, is under Norwegian sovereignty. On this bleak island, which is as near to North Russia as Norway, Norwegians work the coal mines. The workers get tax remissions, yet one wonders what induces people to live in such a frozen hell. A visit there during a summer or winter blizzard will give an idea how Norway produced such polar explorers as Nansen. As Norway has sovereignty over this desolate place, speculation arises as to what the Russian reaction will be if oil is found in a nearby sea. Certainly, since the oil discoveries in the North Sea and since the E.E.C. question, there has been little peace in Storting, the not very impressive seat of government on Karl Johan, Oslo's main street.

Many say that E. Gerhardsen is the father of modern middle of the road policies in Norway. Certainly much of the country's present shape came about under Gerhardsen's period as Prime Minister—1945 to 1951 and 1955 to 1965. This man, who laboured putting down tram tracks in his twenties, governed the country during periods of great political stability.

The E.E.C. question brought an end to peace in Norwegian politics, and with a people less placid than Norwegians there might have been revolution. In 1971, Prime Minister Per Borten, leader of the centre or farmers' party, had to step down because he gave secret information about the E.E.C. to his own party, who were violently anti-E.E.C. The next Prime Minister to lose his seat because of the E.E.C. issue was T. Bratteli, who had taken over leadership of the Labour party from Gerhardsen. Mr. Bratteli was for E.E.C. entry, and when the referendum decision was 'No' by a small majority, he felt obliged to resign. A caretaker government under L. Korvald, of the Christian People's Party, was almost the next casualty of

E.E.C. tension. Mr. Korvald secured a much better trade agreement with the Common Market than had been expected, but it was later revealed that he had not told the house that he had made a deal to buy a French rocket system. For this, France was supposed to have taken a benevolent attitude toward Norway's trade agreement. For a while it was doubtful if Korwald could continue in office.

The present government is a coalition, with more extreme leftish elements than in any previous government. So far they have tried to nationalise banks, insurance and homes, but received a firm 'No' from the people in each case. Many people in Norway would like to see N.A.T.O. off Norwegian soil. The question is, can a tiny country, with a population of only four million, stand alone with the E.E.C. to the south, and Russia to the east?

After Norway's rejection of the E.E.C., the British Economist was of the opinion that Norway would have great difficulties if, during a trade recession, the E.E.C. raised trade barriers against Norway, for most of Norway's goods are exported to the E.E.C. (This was before Norway's great finds of North Sea oil.) The Economist also pointed out that Norway would be locked out of many issues that concern her (pollution from E.E.C. countries often travel as far as Norway).

Since the North Sea oil finds there is much talk about the trouble the country will have spending the money. As there are some of the highest taxes in the world, atrocious roads and overcrowded hospitals, one wonders what the problem is.

At the end of one of these diabolical roads is my father-in-law's cabin. The cabin is the essence of what is best in Norway. Thirty-five years ago he bought an acre of ground in the mountains of Hemsedal. His father, a carpenter, helped, as did every aunt, uncle, and relative they could rope in, when they built the place in one hectic summer. It has four rooms,—a sitting room, kitchen, and an outdoor toilet fifteen yards from the cabin. The sitting room has the usual copper and brass nick-nacks, there are carpets hanging on the walls and a big open fireplace: and in the kitchen a wood stove, where all the cooking is done. Lighting is by paraffin lamps, which hang and balance dangerously all over the place. Often on winter week-ends my mother and father-in-law, both over sixty, leave their comfortable home in Oslo and travel to the cabin. Then skis line the walls, the fireplace and wood stove are blazing and trips are taken to Skogshorn, a mountain (1,700 metres) ten miles away.

Two hundred metres below the cabin are a couple of the highest farms in the country. This is the border line (800 metres above sea level) at which farms can survive in this country. The farmhouses are beautiful wooden buildings, dwarfed beside the great red barns, which house the animals for up to seven months a year.

Until a few years ago the farmers' daughters used to take the animals up to the higher plateaus and live there, while the farmer cut the grass around the farms for winter feed. Now the practice of taking animals to high

ground in summer is dying out all over the country, as girls refuse to live in the plateau huts for weeks on end (not fear of violence, just boredom) and government subsidies are enabling farmers to buy winter feed.

In fact, farming is dying out. It is understandable, as farms in this mountainous country cannot compete with farms in warmer lands, and it is more economical to build industry and import food.

In 1946 half the Norwegians lived on farms, yet by 1980 it is expected that 80% will live in urban areas. For the past four years twenty farms a day have gone out of production, for the young people switch to the higher wages of industry and older people die off.

40% of the population live within sixty miles of Oslo (this in a country 1,100 miles long). Of this wild, mountainous country, 5% is used for agriculture, and 13% for grazing. Farming accounts for only 7% of the net national product, and 11% of exports. In Europe, only Switzerland imports more per capita.

Farms are heavily subsidised, yet continue to die off. Farmers make the plea that much of the North Sea oil money should be used to keep the farms going and that a country growing less and less of its own food requirements is vulnerable in a possible world food shortage. It is sad to see the farms closing, for much of Norway's strong culture of hand crafts stems from the farms, where there was so much knitting and wood carving in pre-snowplough days.

Norway's greatest assets before North Sea oil were her merchant fleet, (one of the biggest in the world) and abundant water to make cheap electricity. So cheap is electricity that she can import ore, refine it, export, and make a profit, although her timber wealth is not great compared with Finland or Sweden, and her wood pulp factories eat up much of the available timber.

The people look fit and well. The old saying that it is hard to tell the difference between a labourer and a professor on his way from work is to some extent true. They are an hygienic people (maybe overdone?) and dress colourfully and well, with a wonderful sense of the right garment for temperature and season. Sport is a religion to them, yet aside from skiing, they have not won many world championships—nothing like Australia per capita.

Some might point out that they are a gentle, straightforward people, lacking in complexity. Yet even here there is a paradox, for this small country has produced three of the world's greatest artists, Munch in painting, Grieg in music and Ibsen in drama.

Many of the qualities Shaw sought in humanity are in the Norwegian people (kindness, realism and the ability to live as a community), but I think he would have become tired of the passiveness, the lack of interesting talk and the naive nationalism.

Norwegians are very given to self-praise, and this often takes the form of pointing out how much more prosperous they are than the rest of Europe.

There are two major reasons why they can so easily delude themselves. First, a language spoken by only four million people carries none of the world's major cultural or intellectual currents directly to the people, and leaves the interpretation of the outer world in the hands of translators of varied abilities. The second reason is that Norway was not urbanised, and many of her people lived locked in snow-covered valleys for up to half of each year, until well into this century.

The above factors developed both the good and bad sides of the Norwegian character. I, a talkative Irishman, speak Norwegian as well as the average native, yet I still find Norwegians a mystery. I look forward to the day when I can resolve in my writing this love-hate relationship with Norway which began in 1961.

[Irish-born Nicholas Emmett is a journalist and teacher of English. As a part-time occupation he drives trucks for a service firm all over Norway, in which country he has now lived for ten years.]

MORAL RIGHTS AND ABORTION

by Hugh V. McLachlan

SHOULD women have abortions; should they be allowed to have abortions? Under what circumstances should women have or be allowed to have abortions? I do not want specifically to answer these questions: I aim, rather, to discuss three habits of speech and of thought which might be impediments to or answering these moral questions correctly. The habits in question are firstly, the tendency to talk of *rights* and *duties* in this context and to ask, for example, whether or not a woman has a *right* to an abortion; secondly, the tendency to think of a foetus as part of or an extension of a woman's body; and thirdly, the tendency mistakenly to think that only people who are actually alive can have moral rights.

People who want to argue that women should be allowed to have abortions often claim that women have a *right* to an abortion. Similarly, people who want to say that women should not have and should not be allowed to have abortions deny that women have such a right and some might even feel like suggesting that a foetus has a *right* not to be aborted. What might it mean to talk of 'rights' in this context? There are (at least) two senses in which we talk of 'rights'. We talk of rights of *action* and rights of *recipience*.[1] A right of recipience corresponds to someone's obligation while a right of action is an absence of obligation. I have a right of action to scratch my nose if I am under no obligation not to scratch my nose. If I have such a right of action then it does not impose obligations upon anyone else nor does it correspond to anyone else's obligations. If I have a right of action to scratch my nose then it does not follow from my having this right that other people are obliged not to stop me scratching my nose (although they would generally be so obliged on other grounds). On the other hand, my rights of recipience correspond to other people's duties. To say that I have a right of recipience to five pounds is to say that someone else is obliged to give me five pounds. To say that I have a right of recipience to have my nose scratched would be to say that someone has a duty to ensure that my nose is scratched. If it were not the case that someone has a duty to give me five pounds or to see to it that my nose is scratched then it could not be the case that I have a right of recipience to have my nose scratched or to receive five pounds although I might still have a right of action to receive five pounds or have my nose scratched; I might still be under no obligation *not* to receive five pounds or to have my nose scratched.

To what type of right might people be referring when they assert or deny that women have a right to an abortion? To say that women have a right of action to an abortion would be to say that they are under no obligation *not* to have an abortion. Perhaps anti-abortionists mean that women are, for some reason, obliged not to have an abortion when they deny that women have a right to an abortion. Of course, such a right of

action to an abortion would not correspond to nor impose duties upon anyone else. It would not follow from women's having such a right to an abortion that people are obliged to give any particular women an abortion; it would not even follow that people are necessarily obliged not to prevent women from having abortions. For example, if I am in a large football crowd, I might have a right of action to move or to try to move to my right or to my left. Yet, depending on how densely packed the crowd is, people standing near to me might be under no obligation at all to try to aid my attempted movement; they may even be quite entitled to try to prevent it and, in the interest of crowd safety, an adjacent policeman may have a *duty* to try to force me to stay still. Yet, people in favour of abortions surely mean something different from this when they claim that women have a right to an abortion. Do they not mean that they have a right to *receive* an abortion? Perhaps they mean that women already have such a moral right which, in their view, should be enshrined in a legal right. If this is the claim that is being made then, for two reasons, it is a slightly curious one. Firstly, it is far from clear to whom the corresponding duties apply. Who has a duty to give women abortions? Obviously *I* do not have a duty to give anyone an abortion, since apart from anything else, I would not know how to set about the task. Does the obligation apply to doctors? This would still be slightly curious. Obviously, no single doctor could give abortions to all those women who wanted them. Are *all* doctors obliged to give abortions to a quota of women who want them? And, are they so obliged whether or not they want to give abortions, whether they want to shut up shop and retire, whether they would rather have another day off work than pocket their abortion fees or whether they are even vehemently morally opposed to abortions and imagine that mankind might be better helped were they to sweat their energy in some other field? Or, is it the government or the state which is obliged to ensure that facilities are made available to those who want abortions? Secondly, it is far from clear upon what grounds women are considered to have a right of recipience to an abortion; it is far from clear upon what grounds people are considered to have a duty to give women abortions. The fact that some women *want* to have abortions is barely a relevant ground and it is hardly a sufficient ground of such an obligation. I may very much want to go out with or make love to the blonde girl who lives near-by but my longing of itself would not oblige the girl to allow me to take her out or to make love to her.

One of the dangers of talking about a 'right' or the lack of a 'right' to an abortion is the ambiguity of the term. People claiming that women have a 'right' to an abortion and those denying it may simply be talking at cross purposes: they may be using the term 'right' in different ways or, perhaps more likely, they may be using the word as a laudatory sound with no meaning or no clear or settled meaning being attached to it. And there are other dangers in talking about rights and duties.

When we talk about 'right', we cannot help thinking about *complete, inalienable* and *exclusive* rights. Talk of 'rights' and 'duties' makes moral decisions sound far more clear cut than they usually are. For example, if

we say that a woman has a right of recipience to an abortion, we tend to think that she must have a *complete* or *unconditional* right to an abortion and, hence that she is being unjustly treated if her request for an abortion is turned down. If we think that a woman has a right to an abortion, we tend to think that she ought to have one if she is ever pregnant and wants one. Similarly, if we say that a foetus has a right not to be aborted we tend to imagine that abortion is necessarily a moral evil. Yet, it is probably quite rare for us ever to have complete or unconditional rights of recipience. Most of our rights of recipience are conditional, partial rights. For example, it would be implausable to claim that we have an unconditional, complete right to work in the sense that the state or the government is completely obliged in all circumstances to provide us with suitable employment. Nevertheless, it would seem quite reasonable to suggest that we have a conditional and partial right to work. We might reasonably claim that *one* of the obligations of a government is to provide work for the adult population although it might be the case that this obligation is in conflict with other obligations which, in some circumstances, might be more morally compulsive.

Hence, although we might have a partial right to work, it does not follow that justice always demands that we are given employment.[2] And similarly, to say that a woman has a right of recipience to an abortion might not mean that she is necessarily being unjustly treated whenever she is denied an abortion; her right may merely be a partial one. Perhaps a foetus has a partial right not to be aborted. Does a woman have a right to an abortion or does a foetus have a right not to be aborted? When we try to consider the morality of abortion in these terms then we may be misleading ourselves. Perhaps it is the case that women do not have a (complete) right to an abortion while it is also the case that foetus do not have a (complete) right not to be aborted. Both women and foetus may have partial rights corresponding to partial duties. The morally relevant questions may be: 'Upon what grounds are these partial rights established?'; 'In particular circumstances, which of the conflicting partial rights are morally the strongest?' Perhaps we should cease to talk about 'rights' and 'duties' in relation to abortion and talk instead about competing and conflicting moral arguments, interests, and claims. If we do want to continue to talk about 'rights' and 'duties' we should always try to consider whether we are referring to complete or partial rights and remember that our rights are not necessarily 'inalienable'. Our partial rights are often quite justly 'violated'.

A foetus lies within and/or is even part of a woman's body. Why should this be misleading since it is obviously certainly true? It is misleading because it tends to suggest misleading and false analogies between a foetus and other things which pertain to the female body. We would generally say that we have a particularly strong right to dispose of our own bodily parts as we see fit; we have almost complete authority over our own bodies. What should happen to my kidneys, my foot, or my urine? Generally speaking, I alone would be considered to be peculiarly competent to answer such questions. Generally, it is entirely up to me what happens to my own body providing I do not create a nuisance by my use or abuse of it. After all,

my kidneys and my feet are *mine* in a far more intimate way than my house or even my wife are mine. If we unduly focus our attention upon the fact that a foetus is in an obvious sense part of a woman's body, we may automatically assume that the woman in question has the same authority over this part of her body as she has over any other part of her body. We might even automatically assume that a woman is solely competent to regulate the fate of her own foetus.

It is misleading to consider a foetus in this way since although it is in many respects very much like other parts of a woman's body, in other morally relevant respects it is quite different. Perhaps a woman does not have the same right to dispose of her own foetus as she has to dispose of other parts of her body. In many respects, a foetus is more like a man asleep in a bed, a Jonah in a whale, a baby in an incubator or a child in a deep coma in a hospital than it is like a nut in a squirrel's nest or an organ in a woman's body. A foetus is in some respects more like a person than a part of a human body. It is of course not a person, or, rather, it is not yet the body of a person but, as we might say, it is heading in that direction, which is something other parts of a human body do not do. A foetus is potentially the body of a person and this is sufficient grounds for a foetus to deserve a certain moral consideration which would not be due to, say, a table, a stone or even a kidney or a lung. If a woman decided, for whatever reasons, to have a kidney or a wisdom tooth removed, then the state might want to intervene to prevent such things happening in the interests of the women concerned whose judgement may perhaps have been impaired. Yet, it would not make sense to try to prevent such operations on the grounds that the woman's tooth or kidney were being unjustly treated.

Nevertheless, it does make sense, although it may often or always be false to say that the state might intervene to prevent or to promote an abortion in order to ensure that a foetus is justly treated. It makes sense to attribute rights and accord moral consideration to a foetus where it would be senseless to do so in the case of other physical objects including human bodies and parts of human bodies. Furthermore, the co-progenitor of a foetus has a legitimate interest in its fate. A foetus is, in a sense, always a woman's foetus but, in an equally obvious sense, it is also always a man's foetus. A man's wife's foetus can be *his*, or partly his, in a sense in which no other part of her body can be his.

Perhaps some people might want to say that a potential mother should always have a larger say in the fate of a foetus than the potential father on the grounds that the potential mother has actually to carry a foetus around with her and has to undergo the burdens of being in labour from which all potential fathers are spared. But, it is not completely clear that this is what we should say. Apart from anything else, do some women not find pregnancy and labour not unduly burdensome while some 'expectant' fathers become physical and nervous wrecks? A foetus does not need to inhabit your own body in order to cause you anxiety and pain. A potential father has a legal as well as a moral obligation to support not only his spouse, if he has one, but also his offspring. Does this fact alone not

entitle a potential father to have at least some say in the debate as to whether or not 'his' foetus should be aborted? Should a woman have her wisdom teeth removed? Generally, we would say that women wanting their wisdom teeth removed should be allowed to have them removed; we can allow women, and men, complete authority to decide for themselves whether they want to discard or retain their wisdom teeth. Should a woman have an abortion; should she be allowed to have an abortion? These question can hardly be answered quite so simply since the interests and rights of a foetus and, generally, also those of a potential father as well as the interests and rights of a potential mother need to be considered.

Some people might object to the claim that a foetus can have moral rights. This leads to the third misguided habit of thought which I want to consider; it is the tendency to assume that only people (and perhaps even animals) *who are actually alive* can have moral rights or partial rights. Even people who are not in favour of abortion often seem to think in this way and hence there is much discussion about when a foetus is actually some sort of living creature capable, perhaps, of an existence independent of its mother and there is much discussion as to whether abortions should only be allowed within twenty weeks, or nineteen weeks or, perhaps, twenty two weeks after conception. Some people even seem to want to draw a dividing line between the time when a foetus is just a foetus, only partially formed and when abortions should be freely available and the time when a foetus is almost a baby, almost completely formed at which time they think different moral principles are applicable.

It would certainly sound very strange to say that people who are not presently alive presently have moral *duties* since there seems to be no possible way that they could fulfil them. Nevertheless, those not presently alive can quite sensibly be accredited moral *rights*. We can have duties towards them. For example, I think that we can quite sensibly speak of our having duties towards people who happen to be dead, Winston Churchill is dead. Nevertheless, we still have duties and partial duties towards him. For example, we have a duty not to slander him. Obviously, his living relatives and friends would be hurt by such slander and for this reason we are obliged not to do it. Yet, even if he had no living friends, relatives or admirers, I think it would still be perfectly sensible to say that we have a duty towards him not to slander him. Churchill, although dead, has a right not to be slandered. Similarly, we have duties towards those who are yet unborn and even to those who never will be born. This, indeed, is a principle upon which many of our political decisions seem to be based. For example, consider the arguments of the conservationists. Perhaps, the resources of the world might be exhausted in, say, one hundred years. Why on earth should we who are presently alive be in the slightest morally concerned over this possibility since we will then be dead? Nevertheless it does seem appropriate that we should be morally concerned over the plight of future generations precisely because it does seem quite proper to say that we have certain moral duties towards the future or potential generations. It is not only those who are actually alive to whom moral consideration is due.

It is perhaps not quite correct to say that a foetus has moral rights. After all, a foetus is merely a partially formed human body. We do not say that human *bodies* have moral rights; it is, rather, *people* who have moral rights. Rather than say that a foetus has moral rights, we should probably say that the person whose body a foetus will, or might develop into has moral rights and partial rights. And the person concerned need not be alive or even be born to possess such rights. Since a person need not be alive or be able to survive as a creature independently of his mother in order to be reserving of moral consideration, much of the discussions as to whether abortions should be prohibited after a specific time after conception are quite beside the point. Of course, we may still want to claim that the more developed a foetus is, the more moral consideration is due to it and the less partial are the rights of the person whose body the foetus may become.

Should women have abortions?; under what circumstances should they be allowed to have abortions? I have not answered these questions, nor have I tried to. Instead, I have tried to go some way towards suggesting a framework within which such questions can be rationally discussed and accurately answered. It is platitudinous to say that abortion is a very complex moral issue but sometimes it is as well to remind ourselves of platitudes since they serve as antidotes to naive claims such as 'Women obviously have a right to abortions' or 'A foetus obviously has a right not to be aborted'. In considering the morality of abortion, we would be wise not to confuse the question 'Should women have or be allowed to have abortions?' with the question 'Do women have a *right* to an abortion or does a foetus have a *right* not to be aborted?'

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[Hugh V. McLachlan is Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Glasgow.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THE NOVELISTS AND THE NONCONFORMISTS

Everywhere Spoken Against: Dissent in the Victorian Novel. Valentine Cunningham. Clarendon Press. Oxford. £7.50.

Mr. Cunningham's study is a useful addition to the corpus of criticism of the Victorian novel. His strength lies in a thorough grasp of Victorian novels and of the background of the more famous novelists. Of special interest are his investigations into the background of William Hale White (alias Mark Rutherford), Victorian Nonconformity's most famous writer.

The author's task is to study the inter-play between the major novelists of the last century and the body of English Dissent which so often played a part in their writings. Thus the first four chapters are devoted to a study, admittedly of uneven quality, of English Dissent in its religious, social, geographical and political aspects. The author then turns to more specific discussions of various famous novelists and their relations to Dissent. These are the Brontës, Mrs. Gaskell, Dickens, Mrs. Oliphant and 'Mark Rutherford.'

The author has attempted, of course, a difficult task, namely, that of covering two fields (history and literary criticism) with equal devotion. The result, which in such cases is almost inevitable, is strength in one case and weakness in the other. The weakness here lies in his grasp of the complexities of Nonconformist life in the last century; his understanding is uneven, and his dependence on secondary sources, great. He sometimes gives the impression of thinking that Nonconformity as it existed in 1851 remained the same throughout the period. His tendency is to generalise without sufficient evidence or, in some cases, without any evidence. He states that 'there was a tendency among the more educated Dissenters to drift into a form of Unitarianism . . . ', that 'Nonconformity was radical *per se*', and, most surprisingly, that 'Nonconformists supported socialist movements . . . '. All of these assertions are misleading, to say the least.

Like many other writers on Dissent, the author readily accepts the traditional identification of Nonconformity as the chief English protagonist in the struggle for human freedom, dignity and so forth. The enemy is, naturally, the Church of England, the fortress of privilege, snobbery and oppression. Thus we are told of Dissent's struggle for education whereas, in fact, it was the intransigence and short-sightedness of Nonconformist leaders which prevented time and time again a settlement of the educational problem. To claim that the Church in 1902 'sought advantage by law over Dissent' is too careless an assertion to let pass. The Church and the Roman Catholic community sought to keep what was theirs so as to ensure that the Faith would continue to be taught in England. Nonconformity, between 1906 and 1914, showed how a denomination could use legislation to 'seek advantage' and they almost succeeded.

A point which could have been made was the extent to which Nonconformist writers adopted an attitude towards the Church of England no less cavalier than that adopted by Anglican writers. Joseph Parker, the famous Congregationalist pastor, in his novel *Paterson's Parish* (not included by Mr. Cunningham), grossly caricatured Anglican priests as did Silas K. Hocking (whom the author did include in passing). In the later part of the century there was a shift in attitudes. Fr. James Adderley wrote novels in the 1890s which contained the

stock caricatures of Dissenters but he also tried to point out their spiritual qualities. To him, as to others, Matthew Arnold's view had not lost its grip. Dissenters were 'bad' not because of their religious views but because they embodied more than any other group English middle-class, Philistine attitudes. What is surprising is that no discussion is given of Arnold Bennett's novels, for whilst accepting some of the traditional views of Dissent (e.g. provincial and philistine) he also accepted in a matter of fact way that a dissenting background was, or could be, normal and unimportant. Thus in *The Old Wives' Tale*, the two sisters' Methodism is as irrelevant as if they had been Anglican. Dissent is now part of English life.

Many interesting points emerge from the book. The whole question of caricatures in Victorian novels is a fascinating one. Dissenters are but one group in many. There is, also, for example, the narrow-minded and intolerant young high-church curate (e.g. in Trollope, George Eliot or Samuel Butler). There is, also, the money-grabbing Jew (e.g. in Trollope or Thackeray) or the loud-mouthed American (e.g. Dickens or, again, Trollope) or the conniving, Jesuitical Roman Catholic (e.g. Disraeli, Charlotte Brontë or, again, Trollope). The widespread profusion of caricatures indicates the essential weakness of so many Victorian novels: their badness. They were so often badly constructed, filled with stock plots and unrealistic characters. Dissent was but one amongst many. Novels were poured out, after all, by the line and the more one wrote the more one earned, especially with the circulating library's one-time insistence on three-deckers and the demands of meeting a weekly issue. Still, the great novels appeal to readers today and Mr. Cunningham's study will enhance our understanding of them.

J. E. B. MUNSON

MARITIME SUPREMACY

Command of the Sea. Clark G. Reynolds. Hale. £6.50.

From primitive man and his simple marine craft to the sophisticated technology of this twentieth century, the author plods his ineluctable path through this remarkably instructive book, ever mindful of his purpose—to examine the preconditions and prerequisites of maritime supremacy and to indicate its importance in the past, today, and in the foreseeable future, for 'Command of the sea will continue to be a constant of historical strategy up to the moment that a thermonuclear World War III breaks out—if it does.'

Geography is the principal factor that determines any nation's ability to utilise the sea commercially and to protect its integrity, both political and economic, from external attack. Insularity is of supreme importance, for a maritime nation without land frontiers to defend can reduce the size of its army for home defence to a minimum whilst simultaneously projecting its commercial and naval strength overseas. Oceanic states such as ancient Athens, modern Great Britain, and the contemporary United States are such classic examples, all being situated in such favourable positions relative to rival land powers as to have enabled them to emerge as dominant maritime nations. According to Professor Reynolds, great powers reach the height of their political prestige by becoming imperial nations, and by real imperial powers he means those great nations in history which have based their policies and strategies chiefly on maritime activities: commercial trade, overseas possessions, and naval forces. The other great powers, which are non-maritime by nature, he labels continental, relying largely upon the produce and manufactures of the national homeland.

If a continental power is in need of a naval presence, in addition to its own small navy, for no nation has yet been able to afford the expense of sustaining both a large army and a large navy, its most viable solution is alliance with a maritime power, but this can be risky, as indeed it was in the case of Prussia's alliance with Britain during the Seven Years' War.

In order to illustrate the principles of naval strategy the author embarks on a comprehensive survey of what might be termed global history, examining in some detail the early thalassocracies which include *inter alia* the Minoans, the Athenians, and the Vikings; thence to the Oceanic Age with the supremacy of Spain from 1415 to 1600, the Dutch Seaborne Empire of the 17th century, the clash between England and France, and the *Pax Britannica* from 1815 to 1914 during which the Royal Navy remained in undisputed command of the sea, for its capital ships received such respect that no nation dared challenge them. This was followed by the era of total wars and finally to the present era which may strategically and aptly be termed the *Pax Americana* inasmuch as the United States by its formidable military strength at sea and in the air has balanced the continental powers of Russia and China and policed the oceans of the world. One of the striking features of the thalassocratic nations, and especially of ancient Athens and modern Britain, is that their long process of growth culminated in a golden age of enlightened government, high culture, and artistic achievement. Ultimately, due to a concatenation of contingent events there had to come a recession in grandeur and power, and all that remained would be memories of past glories, as those of us who are reaching the sere and yellow leaf know too well from the fate of the British Empire.

Professor Reynolds points out in his bibliographical notes that the sources of most of his information for this broad overview have been provided by secondary works but that he has done much primary and oral research as part of his specialised work in twentieth century naval history; this latter fact is clearly evidenced in his observations on the *Pax Americana* and in his final chapter on a hypothetical World War III, where he shows a profound knowledge of nuclear warfare and the latest nuclear weapons. *Command of the Sea* is a scholarly, informative, and eminently readable book that can be recommended not merely to students of history but to all who genuinely seek to understand this modern age in which they live.

S. F. WOOLLEY

A BUCKETFUL OF HARDY

Hardy: Novelist and Poet. Desmond Hawkins. David and Charles. £4.95.

Listing his sources in the foreword to this excellent book—some parts of which have appeared in *Contemporary Review*—Desmond Hawkins reminds us that 'there is . . . one other well into which we all lower our buckets,' the *Life* by Florence Hardy which is generally recognised to be mostly written by Hardy himself 'and is to be regarded as an autobiography couched in the third person.'

Mr. Hawkins's own bucket is admirably full. To the question sometimes asked, whether Hardy was a great novelist who also wrote poetry, or alternatively a great poet who also wrote novels, he returns the simple, satisfying answer that Hardy was 'novelist *and* poet,' novelist indeed first of all as a method of earning a living that could not have been earned by poetry alone, but in his best work such as *The Return of the Native* and *The Mayor of Casterbridge* achieving in prose that Shakespearean quality he was always seeking and which he attained in poetry in only a comparatively few poems of his considerable output.

Mr. Hawkins does not divide the life from the work, but takes us steadily through Hardy's career, rightly wary of seeing autobiography in every fictional episode but relating the work to the life where it is tolerably certain that a connection exists. It is perhaps in the lesser Hardy in prose—novels like *A Pair of Blue Eyes*—but the greater Hardy in poetry—poems like those addressed to his first wife immediately after her death—that the connection between the life and the work appears most clear. There seems little of Hardy personally in *The Return of the Native* or *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, but the setting and the background are Hardy's, Egdon Heath and the countryside around Dorchester, which he knew as intimately as Dickens knew London or Scott Edinburgh. Whether *Jude the Obscure* reflects symbolically some personal struggle in Hardy's life is uncertain. *Tess* can more plainly be related to the Hardy family, for the Hardys, too, had 'come down in the world."

In the present overwhelming, academic state of 'Hardy studies,' about which mere lovers of Hardy will inevitably be in two minds—perhaps the last of the novelist's 'Little Ironies'—a straightforward book like Mr. Hawkins's is doubly welcome. The author is well known both as a west-country naturalist and as a dramatist for radio of some of Hardy's best novels. Both interests are well to the fore in this book. Mr. Hawkins knows his Wessex almost as well as Hardy himself: he is one of the natives who will always return to Hardy as Cumbrians return to Wordsworth. But Hardy is, of course, also a writer of national and international importance, as Mr. Hawkins's valuable appendix on 'Dramatisations' well brings out. It is not always remembered that *Tess* was adapted for the operatic stage in 1906, having its premiere at San Carlo, Naples, with Rina Giachetti in the title role. The performance was disturbed by an eruption of Mount Vesuvius which obliged the authorities to close the theatre. A typical Hardy catastrophe, which if put into a novel would have brought protests from Hardy readers.

R. C. CHURCHILL

MUSICAL GUIDELINES

Yehudi Menuhin Music Guides. Macdonald and Jane's. Paperback, £2.25; hardback £4.50.

It is highly appropriate that Yehudi Menuhin, who has done so much for this country's music both by playing and, more recently, particularly by teaching, should celebrate his 60th birthday by inaugurating a new series of musical guidebooks. These *Yehudi Menuhin Music Guides* will eventually comprise a series of about twelve books, each one on a different instrument within the 'orchestral family,' and Menuhin himself is the series' general editor. The intention is to produce 'working handbooks aimed at music students of all ages, amateur musicians, music teachers and all readers actively committed to music.'

It is equally appropriate that the first two volumes in the series should be by Menuhin himself on the violin, with a short but most valuable section by William Primrose on the viola, and by Menuhin's brother-in-law, Louis Kentner, on the piano. Of the two books, Menuhin's is markedly more of a practical guide, reviewing technique, practising, performance and repertoire, with a section on care and repair of the instrument, as well as one which demonstrates by tape transcription Menuhin's teaching technique at his School. There is also a well researched section on the instrument's history by Denis Stevens, an analysis of Bach's Sonatas and Partitas for Violin, a Glossary and a Discography.

Kentner's book on the other hand is rather more idiosyncratic. Stimulating certainly, but far more a work of personal opinion and reminiscence urbanely phrased and authoritatively stated. Some might query his decision, having dealt with the instrument itself and the technique of playing it, to devote the entire second half of the book to a study of just three composers whom he regards as the great ones for the pianoforte: Beethoven, Chopin and Liszt. A rather wider survey, even if confined to the author's own playing experience, might have been more helpful and relevant to the student's needs.

Nevertheless, these are both agreeable and useful books, possibly more a pleasure to read than of actual practical assistance to the executant musician. Further pleasures in store from the series include Jack Brymer on the clarinet, Sidonie Goossens on the harp and Barry Tuckwell on the horn.

DAVID FINGLETON

MOTHER AND DAUGHTER

Daughters and Mothers; Mothers and Daughters. Signe Hammer. Hutchinson. £4.25.

At this time, when all traditional concepts of femininity are being challenged so fiercely, an American commentator, Signe Hammer, has chosen to discuss the female role through an exploration of the way in which the relationship between mother and daughter profoundly affects the interaction between that daughter and her daughter. She has concentrated less on the future of the total nuclear family in the modern world where 'God is dead' than on the chain-links between generations of mothers. As these links change, painfully, the idea is that daughters achieve more 'self-hood,' grow less dependent and ambivalent about their place in society.

However, the anxiety which she uncovers in her interviews with more than seventy-five women show only too clearly how far we are from any paradise of sexual disinhibitedness—'Amy had asked me questions about sex since she was very small and I had answered them. *She seemed very relaxed about it* (reviewer's italics). When she was nine, she found my birth control pills. . . . And she said, with some fear, I thought, "Do you and Daddy want another baby?" I said, "No." She asked why I took them, and I said so we could make love without having a baby. She burst into tears; I was completely taken aback.'

Or we may well consider the extraordinary presumption of what is the norm in the following statement of a sixteen-year-old: 'A lot of kids don't have sex for fear of getting pregnant. Tht pill and the IUD are dangerous, and the diaphragm is a pain in the ——. I don't feel any pressure to have sex; I think maybe five years ago kids felt a lot of pressure, but now nobody seems to care too much anymore.' What a remarkable *volte-face,* but what an anxious, defensive attitude this young girl really displays.

Intellectually, it seems, liberated women, at least in America, are equally insecurely poised in those areas which are graphically described as the joys of achievement and mastery. One would, perhaps, dispute the conclusion that 'Only rarely do girls grow up with the expectation that their education is

preparing them for the future pursuit of some goal of their own.' Many able girls, it seems, begin to 'fail' artificially at college when pitted against men—and this is caused by the messages received from the mothers of those girls. Mothers who pass a 'double message' to their daughter—to achieve and yet to be dependent and passive—destroy their daughters' ability to attain a strong view of 'self' and bind them in a 'semisymbiotic' relationship in which neither ever entirely sees herself or the other as a separate person.

Although, as can be seen, loosely psycho-analytical in framework, this most interesting study contains many practical clinical insights, such as: 'If a mother's relationship to her own sexuality is negative, vague, or ambivalent, she is less likely to be able to support her daughter's development of a sexual identity.' Nor are social conventions ignored—'Until recently, it was simply not accepted for mothers to acknowledge their own sexuality, much less communicate fully with their daughters about it.' This is the kind of frank and disturbing work which would have benefitted earlier, questioning groups, such as Virginia Woolf's circle.

MOLLY TIBBS

SHORTER REVIEWS

Court Satires of the Restoration (Ohio State University Press. $14.00). Professor John Harold Wilson's latest work on the English Restoration is this fascinating collection of Court lampoons during the years 1663-1690, with particular emphasis on the period 1679-1688 when this vogue was at its height. Most of them come from manuscript collections. 'Court satires were rarely printed.' As Professor Wilson points out and his selection demonstrates, 'the favourite devices of the satiric poets were scurrilous invective, obvious irony, and occasionally burlesque—all written in the coarsest possible terms.' They are usually anonymous and 'attribution in manuscript or print must always be suspect.' On the other hand, Professor Wilson identifies some of the satirists. The court satires are concerned with courtiers, writers and theatrical personalities and the sordid scandals in which they were said to be involved, relating especially and inevitably to sex. 'The Court poets seem to have been remarkably well informed,' although identification of their victims and their affairs are difficult. Professor Wilson has, however, done a great deal of detective work among the thirty-three satires here published. The basic justification for the book is that these lampoons 'tell us a great deal about the lives and manners of Restoration high society.'

A Cornishman Abroad (Jonathan Cape. £5.95). This is the third volume of Dr. A. L. Rowse's autobiography. *A Cornishman at Oxford* described his education at Oxford. At the age of 21, he was elected a Fellow of All Souls'; and this new volume is concerned with his early years as a young don and his travels abroad, particularly in Germany, Austria and France, during the late twenties. It is full of detail about his activities, but most particularly of the development of his own impassioned attitude to life, self-examination and intellectual interests. He came to be out of tune mentally with his own working class family in Cornwall, but clearly devoted to Oxford university life and his own projected career as a writer, poet and historian. He has something to say of many of the Oxford dons of this period, and he also met outside the university many literary and political figures who were or became disting-

uished names. He was attracted to left-wing politics, but realised perhaps that this was not his field. He writes of many of his friends and acquaintances, including most particularly Alan van Trott who exercised a great influence upon his outlook. The great detail is due to his meticulous diary and his remarkable memory. Dr. Rowse apologises for the detail, commenting 'it is precisely the detail that is revealing and what the historian most values.' The volume gives the impression of a brilliant but basically lonely young man with tremendous energy in his various enterprises and ambitions.

Masters of the Illustrated Book (Paddington Press, Two Continents Publishing Group). Three additions have been made to this excellent series of republishing famous illustrations of established works, together with the text. In each new book, Michael Marqusee provides a useful and penetrating Introduction to the life and work of the illustrator, and with particular reference to the illustrations themselves. **The Book of Job, Illustrated by William Blake** (£2.50) contains all twenty-two of the engravings, published in 1825. Mr. Marqusee contends that 'this series is not only Blake's most sustained and unified work but arguably the greatest achievement in line engraving since the sixteenth century.' **Dante Inferno, Illustrated by Gustave Doré** (£3.50) is a reproduction of the first English edition, including Cary's translation with Doré's 75 designs which first appeared in 1861. Mr. Marqusee comments, inter alia, that 'the figure of Dante was for him only a device for stringing together the interesting people and the horrible visions.' He argues that the very theatricality of Doré's compositions 'is really their great strength.' The third volume is **William Shakespeare's Hamlet with Sixteen Lithographs by Eugene Delacroix** (£2.95). These lithographs were executed in the years 1834-45. This edition brings together for the first time in English all these illustrations with the complete text of Hamlet. The reproductions in all volumes are of high quality: the covers are soft back.

Karl Marx: Man and Fighter (Penguin Books. U.K. £1.50; U.S.A. $4.95). This classic study of Marx as socialist and politician by Boris Nicolaievsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen was first published in Germany in 1933. The rise of Hitler to power in that year prevented further publication there. In 1936, however, Methuen published an English translation. In 1970, after the authors' deaths, a French edition was published by Gallimard, with notes and bibliographical material incorporated. The object is to indicate the authors' sources and to indicate new material. This new Pelican edition includes the Notes, Appendices and Bibliography.

The First Cuckoo (Times Books. George Allen & Unwin. £4.50.) This delightful 'selection of the most witty, amusing and memorable letters to *The Times* 1900-1975' has been chosen and introduced by Kenneth Gregory. They are a few hundred out of 300,000 letters published during these years and cover almost any theme capable of a light touch or providing some rare information. 'Any bias in choice is disclaimed, eccentricity admitted. . . . The sole criterion for inclusion has been a letter's readability regardless of the opinions expressed.' The anthology opens with readers' views as to when the nineteenth century ended and concludes with the future and how to get a letter in *The Times*. To be an expert is not by itself an opening, as one reader discovered; but eccentricity is a help as Sylvis Margolis bore witness. Bernard Levin has contributed a witty Foreword to a perfect bedside book.

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